Mali, the Sahel: a “reclaimed sovereignty”?

In Mali, as in the whole of the central Sahel, the authorities that came to power through coups d’État claim to have reclaimed sovereignty, symbolised in the Malian case by the withdrawal of French forces in 2022 and staged through a national celebration held on 14 January. This rupture constitutes a major political turning point, without necessarily implying the effective exercise of consolidated sovereignty. Between persistent security instability, a constrained reconfiguration of external alliances, and the voluntary withdrawal from several regional and international frameworks, Malian sovereignty appears as a conflictual process, tightly limited by structural dependencies, as illustrated by the blockage of fuel supply routes in September 2025. Analysing this sequence allows us to examine the real room for manoeuvre available to Mali and its partners within the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), as well as the nature of the reconfigurations induced by the emergence of new non-Western actors.

What circumstances produced the systemic shift currently observed in Mali?

The unfolding story began with a first coup d’État on 18 August 2020, which brought an end to the regime of the elected president, Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta. The event was understood as the resolution of a long-standing conflict between the opposition and a highly contested government. While the junta that emerged from this coup had pledged to a transition period not exceeding one year – at the request, notably, of ECOWAS – a second coup occurred on 24 May 2021, aiming, according to its authors, to “correct” the orientations of the military executive. This “coup within the coup” marked a decisive turning point for the country by transforming what was supposed to be a transitional regime into a systemic rupture. The new head of state, Colonel Assimi Goïta – promoted to four-star general in 2024 – proclaimed the beginning of a “revolution” in the name of sovereignty, pan-Africanism, and the fight against Western imperialism. This option was inspired by a conjunction of factors: the quagmire in the fight against terrorist armed groups (GAT), rising resentment towards the French military presence, the revival of unresolved grievances from the colonial period, the discrediting of civilian political actors associated with an advanced crisis in the democratic process… Fuelled by these elements, the Malian junta’s project was further strengthened by the activation of Russia’s influence strategies in the region. 

How can we distinguish, in the Malian case, between the sovereignty claimed by the state, the sovereignty exercised in practice, and the sovereignty experienced by the population, in a context marked by persistent insecurity and the voluntary withdrawal from regional and international frameworks (ECOWAS, OIF)?

To demonstrate its sovereignist project, the Malian junta initiated a series of breaks with its traditional partners, broadly associated with what is labelled “the West”. These ruptures included France, European partner states, the United States, NGOs, MINUSMA (the United Nations peacekeeping mission in Mali), and ECOWAS, accused of being under French influence. These measures enabled the implementation of an exclusive form of cooperation – a kind of closed-door arrangement – with Russia, in the fields of security, mining, and information strategies. The sequence of ruptures – accompanied by “revolutionary” rhetoric and cyber-propaganda – above all enabled the junta to impose its agenda, alongside the juntas of Burkina Faso and Niger, with which it joined forces within the Alliance of Sahel States after withdrawing from ECOWAS in 2024. Five years after the seizure of state power by the National Committee for the Salvation of the People (CNSP, the Malian junta), the transitional executive has morphed into an unelected regime with no time limit. For the population, which associated “reclaimed sovereignty” with the end of insecurity, the wait continues. Cooperation with Russia, which had initially focused on protecting the junta through Wagner Group mercenaries, has not delivered the promised eradication of terrorist armed groups. The continued deterioration of the security situation has further reduced state control over entire swathes of territory. For many Malians, the conflictual rupture with ECOWAS, and its consequences for regional integration dynamics, remains an enigma – or an aberration. A rupture that is, however, relative: the three Sahelian states remain members of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), the monetary counterpart of ECOWAS for countries in the CFA franc zone.

In Mali, the collapse of the entrepreneurial fabric, the absence of a defined economic programme, and more broadly, the collateral effects of insecurity on daily life have created a climate of endemic precariousness. In this context, the military authorities have excluded democratic and fundamental freedoms from the sovereignist ideological corpus. While part of the population continues to believe that a “refounded Mali” is worth the sacrifices suggested by the authorities, others wonder whether the wrong version of sovereignty has been chosen. The persistent question is whether the sovereignist framework can indefinitely withstand the requirement to normalise state power through the restoration of constitutional order and the electoral verdict.

Has the break with former European, and particularly French, tutelage expanded the political and security room for manoeuvre of central Sahel states, or merely shifted constraints towards other forms of dependence, vulnerability, and negotiation?

The initial objective of these states was indeed to expand their room for manoeuvre in terms of decision-making and political autonomy. In practice, they have mechanically reduced their negotiating space. By designating part of the international community – including ECOWAS and the African Union – as hostile entities to their “revolution”, they have in effect curtailed their negotiating capacity on the regional and international scene. The confrontational rupture with ECOWAS has dramatically hindered the essential regional pooling of resources for the fight against terrorism. The closed-door relationship with Moscow’s political ally has also revealed its limits. Indeed, in December 2025, Russia invited the AES and ECOWAS to resume dialogue, in the name of realism, in order to develop joint solutions to combat terrorism. Already in August 2025, Russia’s Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN, Dmitry Tchoumakov, had expressed the urgency of global support for the central Sahel in order to combat terrorism more effectively. His remarks were echoed by Mali’s Permanent Representative to the UN, Issa Konfourou, who affirmed the AES’s full willingness to cooperate with regional countries and any partners wishing to do so. This shift in discourse comes at a moment when AES regimes are moving away from the principle of radical rupture and adopting a discourse of partnership diversification… in the name of sovereignty. This new phase of diversification no longer excludes possible negotiations with the United States or the European Union.

What kinds of resources, support, and constraints does the growing involvement of external non-Western actors (Russia, China and others) introduce into the political, security, and diplomatic configurations of the central Sahel?

Russia, which is not traditionally a development partner, is pursuing its security assistance through the Wagner mechanism, now rebranded as Africa Corps. More discreetly, China is preserving its long-standing advantages, having symbolically elevated Sino-Malian relations in 2024 to the level of a “strategic partnership”. In this competitive configuration, which extends beyond the central Sahel, Beijing is maintaining continuity in cooperation on defence, security, trade, and infrastructure. Turkey, on the basis of unprecedented protocols, provides security assistance through private companies. In return, it benefits from specific advantages in access to the mining sector in AES countries. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) are also establishing a presence in the central Sahel, through cooperation in defence and economic exchange. Less officially, the UAE hope to consolidate an influence-driven diplomacy at a time of sharp tensions between AES authorities and Algeria, which accuses Abu Dhabi of hostile behaviour towards it…

In reality, the freedom to choose partners is nothing new. Since the 1980s, all countries on the continent have pursued sovereign policies of diversifying external partners. The persistent challenge for all remains to strengthen, wherever possible, their decision-making power and their ability to navigate global interdependencies effectively. In the current context of the central Sahel, the question is the degree of compatibility between the agendas of partners solicited in an emergency and the region’s multisectoral challenges. Given the international agendas of some partners – Russia, in particular – there is a risk that these Sahelian states, already confronted with numerous vulnerabilities, might become adjustment variables for geopolitical dynamics that fall outside the scope of their specific interests and those of their populations.