Japan: What Prime Minister Takaichi’s Victory in the Legislative Elections Tells Us

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  • Marianne Péron-Doise

    Marianne Péron-Doise

    Senior Research Fellow, co-Head of the Asia-Pacific Programme, Director of the Indo-Pacific Geopolitical Observatory, IRIS

The Prime Minister now holds a strong mandate to tackle economic recovery and reinforce Japan’s defence. This success marks a spectacular reversal after two consecutive defeats in the 2024–2025 national elections, which had left the LDP unable to form a government. Mrs Takaichi’s resounding victory may be compared to that of Shinzo Abe, her mentor and political model, who was Japan’s longest-serving Prime Minister. After orchestrating the LDP’s return to power in December 2012 through a landslide electoral victory, Shinzo Abe remained in office for nearly eight years.

Sanae Takaichi’s election as party leader in October 2025 captured public attention, particularly among younger voters. The broad support enjoyed by this unconventional politician, associated with the LDP’s most radical wing, suggests that she has succeeded in demonstrating that she is a pragmatic and astute leader, capable of addressing difficult issues such as immigration and budget deficits while maintaining a firm stance towards China. While operating within a traditional and at times antiquated party structure, the Prime Minister’s political energy enables her to embody a possible future for the archipelago, injecting new momentum into a system long dominated by elderly male “heirs”.

Opposing Mrs Takaichi, the new Centrist Alliance for Reform — formed by the Constitutional Democratic Party and Komeito — failed to generate sufficient momentum and lost a significant number of seats.

The LDP benefited from a “coattail effect”, capitalising on the Prime Minister’s high approval ratings. Having adopted a more nationalist tone than her recent predecessors, she appears to have rallied conservative voters, some of whom had deserted the party in previous elections. Sanae Takaichi clearly prioritised constitutional issues, and her firm foreign and security policy positions were warmly received by the most radical segments of the electorate. This shift intensified competition with neo-populist parties challenging the LDP’s harder line, particularly on immigration — notably Sanseito and the Democratic Party for the People — both of which struggled to expand their seat counts.

A series of reforms is expected to help restore the severely tarnished image of Japan’s political class. The first concerns stricter regulation of political financing. The LDP has long been embroiled in money-related scandals, and tighter campaign finance rules have been introduced. In 2023, former Prime Minister Kishida Fumio investigated reports of undeclared “slush funds”, primarily derived from fundraising events, and numerous LDP members were found guilty and sanctioned.

Another political reform likely to have significant impact on smaller parties involves reducing the number of legislative seats. Under the coalition agreement with the LDP, the Japan Innovation Party advocated cutting the number of Diet seats and reducing the size of government. While aiming to tackle a Japanese bureaucracy widely perceived as cumbersome, the party seeks to lower public expenditure and enhance the efficiency of the state apparatus. The number of seats in the Lower House is expected to fall from 465 to 420, a reduction of around 10 per cent.

Sanae Takaichi now wields considerable legislative authority and political capital to implement her fiscal stimulus agenda. She has pledged to freeze for two years the 8 per cent consumption tax on food products to support low- and middle-income households suffering from wage stagnation amid high inflation. However, this reduction in food consumption tax is expected to result in a decline of 5 trillion yen in annual tax revenues and could hamper the anticipated economic recovery. Public debt exceeds 230 per cent of GDP, the highest level among advanced economies.

Moreover, one of the principal points of contention between the governing forces and the opposition remains the highly debated and instrumentalised issue of the presence of foreigners in Japan — often conflated with concerns about “overtourism”. The government has already strengthened rules relating to permanent residency and land ownership. The Japan Innovation Party has called for the number of foreigners to be “limited”. Yet official figures indicate that foreigners account for 2.7 per cent of a total population of approximately 125 million, a comparatively low proportion. The most represented nationalities are Chinese, Vietnamese, South Korean and Filipino.

On the diplomatic front, the way Prime Minister Takaichi manages Japan’s relations with its American ally and with China will prove crucial. It is clear that she intends to reaffirm the primacy of the Japan–United States Security Alliance. On 19 March 2025, she is expected to travel to the United States to meet Donald Trump, with the aim of strengthening bilateral ties. A few days before the Japanese elections, the American President had declared on Truth Social that Sanae Takaichi enjoyed his “total and absolute support”. However, he is also due to meet Chinese leader Xi Jinping during an official visit to China in April 2025, seeking to define relations with Beijing that he described as “respectful”.

Mrs Takaichi thus finds herself in a context in which the United States and China appear to be drawing closer — in contrast to Japan and China — placing Tokyo in an uncertain position. In November 2025, the Prime Minister triggered tensions with Beijing by suggesting that Japan might intervene in the event of future Chinese aggression against Taiwan — a statement consistent with comments made by her predecessors, who recognised that Japan could not remain on the sidelines in the event of a crisis in the Strait. Beijing, seizing the opportunity to test the resolve of the new Prime Minister, reacted sharply by imposing restrictions on rare earth shipments to Japan and warning its nationals against travelling there.

Although Japanese public opinion remains divided on whether to assist Taiwan in the event of conflict with China, Mrs Takaichi’s firmness in response to Chinese hostility — along with her decision to raise defence spending to 2 per cent of GDP by March 2026, two years ahead of schedule — now enjoys broad support. In December 2025, the Japanese government approved a 9.4 per cent increase in defence spending to reach this target, prioritising domestic production and advanced capabilities (cyber defence, space, long-range strike). More broadly, in response to rising threats from China, North Korea and Russia, the government also plans to swiftly revise Japan’s core security and defence strategies.