Iran: the water bomb

Seen from afar – in any case from here, in Europe and in France – speaking about Iran often means focusing on the mullahs, centrifuges, missiles and militias. In doing so, one sometimes overlooks the massacres of civilians, particularly horrific in recent weeks, but unfortunately recurrent under this highly repressive authoritarian regime. The Islamic Republic has just celebrated its 47th anniversary, and we are commenting, in light of the military parades in Tehran and the nearby US armada, on the statements made by Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and President Donald Trump. The former will soon turn 87; the latter 80. Many analysts fear the worst, notably an unintended escalation that could mechanically lead to a war or to large-scale targeted strikes, far more perilous for the region than those already carried out on Iran by American bombers last year. Others highlight the economic game unfolding behind the scenes in the current negotiations between the two countries. The Islamic Republic of Iran says it is ready to discuss its nuclear programme, as demanded by the White House, provided that the commercial sanctions weighing on the country for years are lifted. The country seeks to reintegrate into the international arena due to its considerable need for economic development. The United States also knows that this market of nearly 100 million inhabitants is far from insignificant in prospect. Business is never forgotten in their diplomatic action – a golden rule reinforced by the transactionalism of the Trump administration.

However, the most dangerous bomb threatening Iran may be neither atomic nor ballistic. It is hydric. And it is already primed. For years, the country has been sliding towards a structural water shortage. More than 70% of its main aquifers are overexploited. Groundwater levels are collapsing and reservoirs are reaching critical thresholds. Renewable water resources have fallen by one third in two decades. Some regions are approaching the threshold of absolute scarcity. In several provinces, repeated droughts are no longer climatic accidents but harsh realities, generating tensions between users, particularly in agriculture. The year 2025 was probably the driest since the beginning of the century. Iran has long treated food self-sufficiency as an imperative, with the Ministry of Agriculture even bearing the title of the Ministry of Agricultural Jihad (“struggle”). International sanctions have reinforced this doctrine: produce at home so as not to depend on external sources.

Wheat, rice and sugar beet – crops that require large quantities of water – have been encouraged in arid territories. Water has been massively subsidised. Cheap energy has encouraged intensive pumping. Hundreds of thousands of wells have been dug, often without rigorous oversight. The result is unequivocal: extraction far exceeds natural regeneration capacity, soils subside and traditional irrigation systems such as qanats are deteriorating. In seeking to secure its food supply, Iran has weakened its vital resource. This contradiction lies at the heart of a specific strategic dilemma: how can food security, social stability and environmental sustainability be reconciled in a country subject to international commercial sanctions, urban demographic pressure and an increasingly unstable climate? Put differently, Iranians are trapped: by the regime’s ideology on the one hand and by the constraints of geography on the other.

This water insecurity is not merely an environmental issue. It is a matter of national stability. The water crisis is visible and tangible. In several provinces, demonstrations have broken out under the slogan “We are thirsty”. Farmers watch their orchards die and their livestock decline. Rural populations migrate towards cities that are already saturated, increasing unemployment and social tensions. Inter-provincial water transfers, intended to supply industrial centres or major cities such as Tehran, are perceived as territorial injustices. Even in the capital itself, water stress and access to drinking water have become critical issues in recent months, echoing the considerable rise in food prices – more than 70% in 2025. These elements must be borne in mind in order to understand why Iranians are also taking to the streets to express their anger.

Iran has learned to live under the threat of a military strike and has developed a strategy of deterrence. But in the face of the progressive degradation of its water resources, no deterrence is possible. The atomic bomb belongs to the realm of strategic calculation. The water bomb belongs to physical reality. Water shapes the trajectory of a country. In Iran’s case, it is the silent factor that is profoundly reshaping the country’s internal balance and its external posture. This water bomb does not explode in an instant. It spreads slowly, over years, weakening Iranian territories and eroding the minimal foundations of human security in a country where everything is already complicated, codified and constrained. The crisis extends beyond Iran’s borders, as water is a source of division and competition in a Middle East that suffers acutely from its scarcity.

A country confronted with a structural water shortage is a country whose room for manoeuvre at home is shrinking. A country whose rural areas are emptying out is a country whose social stability becomes more fragile. What will happen if shortages worsen? If internal migration accelerates? If agricultural production declines durably? If dependence on food imports increases in a context where Iran is not reintegrated into the international geo-economic arena? Whatever Donald Trump does, whatever happens in the coming weeks, for the regime of the mullahs as well as for the entire region, water scarcity will remain a major geopolitical constant. To ignore this issue is to remove oneself from the long term and from strategic thinking. Food and water security are an integral part of security as a whole. This applies to Iran, just as it does to the rest of the world. In Europe, we would be wrong to underestimate this equation.