Russia-Ukraine War: Is Peace Finally Possible?

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky began a European tour in Paris on Thursday, which will also take him to London, Rome, and Berlin. These bilateral talks come as Russian pressure is steadily increasing, albeit slowly, in eastern Ukraine, while the rhetoric among the country’s supporters is beginning to shift. In addition to the suspension of economic aid by Germany, the upcoming U.S. presidential election raises concerns in Kyiv about a potential victory for Donald Trump, which could signal a retreat of Western support. Can the Ukrainian army’s territorial gains in the Kursk region of Russia reverse the tide? Does this shift in the situation make negotiations with Russia more likely? What do the populations affected think? Insights from Jean de Gliniasty, research director at IRIS and former French ambassador to Russia.

Since the Ukrainian offensive in Kursk on August 6, 2024, and following a new episode of tensions in Crimea, how have the military positions of Ukraine and Russia evolved?

Russian pressure is increasing. The Russian army’s personnel has recently been raised to 2.4 million, including 1.5 million combatants by the end of the year. The Russian government did not need to carry out a second mobilization after the one in the fall of 2022; it simply increased the bonuses for contract soldiers and raised the maximum conscription age from 27 to 30. The Russian superiority in personnel, shells, tanks, aircraft, and missiles is being felt on the ground, despite the resumption and acceleration of Western aid to Ukraine.

However, the Russians have not yet succeeded in driving the Ukrainians out of the pocket they captured in the Kursk region in August, nor in taking the logistics hub of Pokrovsk. But the slow encroachment on villages around Pokrovsk continues despite the heroic defense by Ukrainians and heavy Russian losses. Vuhledar, one of the key points, was taken in early October, and the pressure is tightening. The pressure is general in the Luhansk and Donetsk regions, and Zaporizhzhia is regularly bombarded. Only the southwest sector (Kherson) has so far been relatively spared. Clearly, Russia’s priority is to conquer the entirety of the four regions formally annexed to Russia in September 2022, even though the Russian army did not fully control these territories (Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson, in addition to Crimea annexed in 2014) before any potential negotiations.

As the thousandth day of open war between Russia and Ukraine approaches, what is the stance of public opinion in both countries regarding the conflict?

There is certainly a sense of fatigue, and the difficulties in recruitment in Ukraine and, to a lesser extent, in Russia, are signs of this. However, the Russians remain receptive to the theme of Russia being besieged by the “collective West,” a narrative stirred by the Kremlin, and continue to support Putin at over 70% (according to the Levada Institute). On the Ukrainian side, there is a slight decline in the popularity of Volodymyr Zelensky (55% favorable opinion at the end of August 2024, despite a rebound during the Ukrainian offensive in Kursk in early August), and, more notably, supporters of negotiations have increased from 33% a year ago to 57%, according to the International Sociology Institute of Kiev.

The Russian government presents a united front after President Putin’s “triumphal” (but contested) election in March (88% of the vote) and the dismissal of the previous Defense Minister, Sergei Shoigu, in May, along with nearly all his teams.

On the Ukrainian side, much more transparent, a major reshuffle took place in September, with the resignations of Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba, and the Ministers of Justice, Environment, and Strategic Industries, as well as a few collaborators of President Zelensky. The president himself could not be “re-legitimized” by the ballot box due to the impossibility of holding presidential elections in a partially occupied country. The newcomers are seen as more open to negotiation. It is highly likely that there is a very tough debate within the Ukrainian leadership on how to conduct the war and the possibility of negotiations involving territorial compromises.

What about the West’s involvement in this conflict in light of recent statements by French President Emmanuel Macron and with the U.S. presidential election approaching? What could be the impact of the election results on the continuation of the war and the potential for negotiations?

The financial commitment from the West will weaken. While the European Union has recently decided to allocate an additional 35 billion euros, backed by the interest on frozen Russian assets, it seems that the implementation of this decision is still facing some legal and technical hurdles. Germany has announced it will halve its aid in 2025.

Financial aid to Ukraine is also being contested by U.S. Republicans, particularly vice-presidential candidate J.D. Vance. Joe Biden is trying to solidify this aid before the elections (an additional $8 billion in military aid was granted at the end of September), but he is exerting subtle pressure on Zelensky to resolve to negotiate. Biden has expressed his reluctance to Ukraine’s immediate NATO membership, buried the “Victory Plan” presented by the Ukrainian president at the UN General Assembly, and has refused to authorize Kyiv to strike deep into Russian territory.

The coordination meeting for Western aid, scheduled to take place at the summit on October 10 in Ramstein during Biden’s visit to Germany, and aimed at boosting aid to Ukraine, was postponed, as the U.S. president canceled his visit due to Hurricane Milton. France, which in May had declared it was not ruling out sending troops to the field and had cultivated some ambiguity about deep strikes, is becoming more discreet. President Macron has again raised the question of Russia’s place in post-war Europe.

Zelensky’s visit to Paris on Thursday, October 10, will likely result in a reaffirmation of French aid (delivery of Mirage jets), but also discussions about opening negotiations. Ideas are coming from all sides: Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorsky is considering a UN mandate on Crimea; his German counterpart, Annalena Baerbock, stated at the UN General Assembly that “we need peace” to avoid the destruction of Ukraine. According to the press, Ukrainian and Western experts are discussing various formulas (de facto control of occupied territories, recognized as Russian in exchange for Ukraine’s NATO membership). German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, weakened by the high support for peace advocates in the eastern Länder, has indicated that he is considering a phone call with Putin. The Financial Times mentions a “German scenario” with a division between the West and East, like the FRG and GDR. The Chinese-Brazilian plan, based on a prior ceasefire that would freeze the situation in favor of the Russians, is firmly rejected by Ukraine, with Zelensky calling it “destructive” at the UN podium.

Nonetheless, the “big maneuvers” towards opening negotiations have begun. But it remains to be seen whether Russia, which holds the military advantage and is counting on Western “fatigue,” will play along.