Giorgia Meloni: Three Years in Power, Between European Pragmatism and National Ambiguities

5 Reading time

  • Fabien Gibault

    Fabien Gibault

    Enseignant à l’Université de Bologne

Three years after coming to power, Giorgia Meloni has managed to defy expectations. Her 2022 election campaign was marked by post-fascist symbolism and an anti-European, populist discourse in complete rupture with the institutions of the European Union (EU) – enough to raise fears of instability across the continent. Ms Meloni had declared she would go to see “the usurers of Brussels” to set things straight and overturn the balance of power. Today, she leads one of the most stable governments in contemporary Italy. This longevity, rare in a country accustomed to chronic instability, can partly be explained by a much more cautious foreign policy than expected, aligned with European and transatlantic standards.

From the outset of her mandate, Giorgia Meloni abandoned the implementation of her sovereigntist agenda. On major international issues – Ukraine, the European Union, transatlantic relations – she has followed in the footsteps of Mario Draghi. The Minister of the Economy, Giancarlo Giorgetti, who already held the post under Draghi, has pursued a rigorous fiscal policy (not without difficulty), facilitating access to funds from the European Recovery Plan (PNRR), of which Italy is the main beneficiary. This plan represents a loan of nearly €200 billion – a windfall to boost public investment – impossible for the Prime Minister to turn down once she realised the EU’s importance.

Ms Meloni has thus maintained cordial relations with Ursula von der Leyen and positioned herself as a reliable interlocutor within the EU. This proximity has earned her a degree of indulgence from Brussels, which seems reluctant to criticise Italy’s shortcomings, notably in terms of compliance with EU norms: the country remains under sanctions for failing to respect certain laws, but these have gone no further than a few fines.

On the Ukrainian front, Italy has maintained its support for Kyiv, including under the Trump administration. This position has allowed Giorgia Meloni to play the role of mediator between Europe and the United States, although it is not always an easy balance to maintain: an ally of Joe Biden in the Ukrainian conflict, a friend of Elon Musk in her effort to obtain the installation of a research centre in Bologna, and now an interlocutor of Donald Trump. These shifts confirm a particular interest in the United States, though one that rests on a precarious balance – a balance not entirely of her own making, given the volatility of the American president’s positions.

Giorgia Meloni has succeeded in transforming her image, at least internationally: from a radical figure (as expected in 2022), she has become a pragmatic leader, capable of dialogue with European institutions and partners, while retaining an identity-based rhetoric for domestic consumption.

On the national front, Giorgia Meloni’s record is more mixed. Certainly, the macroeconomic indicators have improved: unemployment has fallen from 7.8% to 6%, and the public deficit is expected to drop below 3%. Italy now borrows at lower rates than France, and renewed political stability has reassured the markets. A victory that might suggest the worst is behind Italy and that the coming years will be more favourable to investment and economic growth.

But behind these figures lie structural weaknesses. Growth remains sluggish – 0.5% in 2025, largely thanks to the recovery plan (without it, the rate would be zero or negative). Wages have stagnated: Italy is the only EU country whose salaries have fallen over the past twenty years. Purchasing power is suffering and has yet to return to pre-pandemic levels. Today, young Italians depend on “family welfare”: 20% of young households are regularly supported by their parents, even when they have a job. For others, emigration is often the solution (156,000 departures in 2024).

Migration policy illustrates the government’s ambiguities. In 2024, Fratelli d’Italia proudly announced the opening of two migrant reception centres in Albania. The government thus demonstrated to its electorate that it was doing everything possible to keep new arrivals away from the peninsula. These centres, with a capacity of 3,000 places, in fact hosted only 132 migrants in a year, for a construction cost of €65 million and annual operating costs of €200 million. A predictable result, given the incompatibility of such a scheme with Italian and maritime law, but one that creates the illusion of decisive action against migration flows.

While Giorgia Meloni projects symbolic firmness – port closures, externalisation of migrant processing in Albania – she has in practice authorised the granting of 500,000 work visas to non-European nationals. An authoritarian posture on the surface, but economic pragmatism in substance: Italy lacks labour, both for northern businesses and southern agriculture. Ms Meloni thus plays a double game – sovereigntist in rhetoric, pragmatic in practice – which undermines the opposition, unsure how to criticise her.

The opposition struggles to exist in the face of this strategy. The Democratic Party and the Five Star Movement are divided, and their main criticism concerns Giorgia Meloni’s stance on Gaza. On this issue, the Prime Minister has shifted her position: after unwavering support for Israel, she denounced the humanitarian situation in Gaza as “unjustifiable” and expressed readiness to recognise the State of Palestine under certain conditions – further weakening the left’s argument.

Within her own camp, Giorgia Meloni faces no serious competition. Matteo Salvini is weakened and tries to survive politically by moving further to the right, championing the grandiose (and somewhat utopian) project of a bridge over the Strait of Messina. Antonio Tajani plays more the role of ally than rival. The leader of Forza Italia is trying to assert himself in a party where Berlusconi’s shadow (that of his son this time, Pier Silvio) still looms. Little opposition and few viable leaders: this absence of credible alternatives strengthens the Prime Minister’s position, whose popularity remains stable at around 30%.

Giorgia Meloni seems to have found a winning formula: a foreign policy aligned with Europe, a strict fiscal approach building on previous trajectories, and effective communication with her electorate – at least for now. She maintains appearances through symbolic gestures while pursuing a moderate line, making it difficult to criticise her. Such criticism is, moreover, hard to express publicly, as the Prime Minister’s press appearances are rare or carefully orchestrated by accommodating journalists who never put her in difficulty.

An effective strategy, but one that carries risks. By moving away from her sovereigntist promises, she risks losing part of her electoral base. Social tensions – low wages, job insecurity, rising taxation – could become breaking points. And if the opposition were to reorganise itself, particularly around the Palestinian question or institutional reforms, the current stability could be called into question.

For the time being, Giorgia Meloni’s path to remaining in power seems clear. But that path, paved with compromises and renunciations, may take her further away from the ideology that brought her to the top. Her party’s logo, the tricolour flame (a fascist symbol), is often criticised. Removing it would symbolise her entry into the moderate right – a move that would dispel any suspicion of sympathy for Italy’s totalitarian past but would represent a complete break with her party’s roots and risk alienating part of her electorate. For now, Ms Meloni has not commented on the issue, carefully avoiding declaring herself antifascist. But the time will come when posturing will no longer suffice, and she will have to take a clear stance on the direction she wishes to set for Italy.