From the Paris Agreement to COP30 in Belém: “Imperfect but Essential” Climate Conferences

Ten years ago, on 12 December 2015, the Paris Agreement was adopted at COP21, marking a major milestone in 25 years of climate diplomacy. Today, COP30 is bringing together in Belém, Brazil, from 10 to 21 November 2025, the various actors of climate governance in a tense geopolitical context, marked by the rise of anti-environmental populism and the erosion of multilateralism. At this point of stocktaking, the aim is less to oppose successes and failures than to assess the capacity of the international system to mobilise in the face of the climate emergency.

A discussion with Mathilde Jourde, researcher at IRIS, head of the Climate, Environment and Security Programme.

What is the retrospective since the adoption of the Paris Agreement?

Since 1992, the Conferences of the Parties (COPs) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) have been the annual meeting of the Convention’s member states to review progress and determine the measures to be implemented for the years ahead.

Often described in binary terms as “successes” or “failures”, the COPs are frequently subject to a reductive reading that obscures their real progress. Yet several notable advances can be highlighted over the past ten years. COP26 stood out for its call for the gradual reduction of electricity generation from coal. COP27, in Sharm el-Sheikh, was a historic milestone as it endorsed, for the first time, the creation of a “loss and damage” fund to support the most vulnerable countries. COP28, held in Dubai, concluded with a call for a gradual transition away from fossil fuels. Finally, COP29 led to an agreement on a new quantified goal (NCQG) for climate finance for developing countries, to support their efforts to tackle climate change.

At the same time, these international negotiations have translated into progress at national level. In terms of public policy, more than 100 countries have announced carbon neutrality targets since COP21, often accompanied by national climate strategies – such as the European Green Deal. Through a spillover effect, these national policies have also delivered concrete results, such as the spectacular fall in the cost of low-carbon technologies, which has dropped by 60 to 90% since 2010.

Highlighting this progress does not mean ignoring its limits – whether in terms of overly communicative approaches, lack of ambition or insufficient implementation. It does, however, serve as a reminder that these processes remain genuinely useful. A study by World Weather Attribution showed that, before the Paris Agreement was signed, “global greenhouse gas emissions were following a trend that would have led to an increase in the planet’s average temperature of at least 4°C by 2100 compared to the pre-industrial era. Now, global warming is on a +2.6°C trajectory.”

Far from being sufficient, this study nonetheless illustrates the progress made and shows that the defeatism and disillusionment often associated with international climate negotiations should be qualified. All the more so since the fight against climate disruption is not a binary matter: every tenth of a degree counts. Every fraction of warming avoided helps to mitigate, at least a little, the potentially devastating impacts.

Ten years on, what lessons can be drawn from COP29 and what is at stake at COP30?

One of the fundamental differences between COP29 and COP30 lies in the international context. COP29, held last year in Baku, was already taking place against a complicated geopolitical backdrop. The consequences for climate diplomacy were tangible – relations between France and Azerbaijan were badly strained and Emmanuel Macron did not attend; Donald Trump had just been re-elected with the aim of once again withdrawing the United States from the Paris Agreement; and several major leaders – Ursula von der Leyen, Olaf Scholz, Joe Biden – were absent. Yet this COP was crucial to reaffirm the importance of climate issues despite international tensions, and could have demonstrated their unifying potential. Many topics were to be addressed, but the NCQG issue monopolised a significant share of the discussions, to the detriment of mitigation, adaptation or gender issues, for instance. The agreement on the NCQG was strongly criticised by developing countries, which had indicated the need to mobilise 1,300 billion dollars by 2035, whereas the amount adopted was 300 billion. Some progress was also made on Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, which defines the mechanisms of the carbon market, but the way it was adopted – without genuine debate – drew criticism.

The COP currently being held in Belém is set to be highly symbolic. Brazil wants to make this COP, convened in the heart of the Amazon, the COP for forest preservation, while also highlighting the role of indigenous peoples. COP30 will also be highly political: marking ten years of the Paris Agreement, it must reaffirm the credibility of climate multilateralism at a moment of great geopolitical uncertainty. Central issues will include the new Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) – that is, states’ climate action plans – which each country must update in light of the 2023 Global Stocktake. Discussions must also continue on the implementation of Article 6, in particular on finalising the rules for its operationalisation. Deforestation will also be a core topic – Brazil will showcase the Tropical Forest Forever Facility (TFFF), a fund dedicated to the conservation of tropical forests. Lastly, climate finance will remain a sensitive point, as the United States has suspended its contributions and several European countries are cutting their development aid budgets.

This COP also faces numerous challenges. Logistical, first of all: the lack of infrastructure and soaring accommodation prices in Belém risk excluding certain delegations and NGOs. The challenges are also political, linked to the growing wave of anti-environmental populism and the unravelling of environmental policies in some states. This trend runs across all continents, including those historically at the forefront on climate. In the United States, attacks on climate science and environmental policies are targeting scientific production (mass lay-offs at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and the Environmental Protection Agency), climate strategies (the end of the Green New Deal and the Inflation Reduction Act) and financing (the Trump administration has ended the US contribution to the UNFCCC, i.e. 20% of the total budget). The same trend can be seen in Europe, with the gradual dismantling of certain regulations under the guise of administrative simplification. The “omnibus law” proposed by the European Commission in February 2025 aims, in particular, to “simplify” the Green Deal by easing, for example, the CSRD (reporting obligations) or the CSDDD/CS3D (corporate due diligence) frameworks. This ecological backlash is not, however, inevitable: on 22 October, the European Parliament rejected this draft law, preventing its direct adoption and opening up a new debate in plenary.

Finally, the challenge is geopolitical, as international rivalries are slowing down and fragmenting climate governance. Armed conflicts – whose number, according to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), rose from 30 in 1990 to 120 in 2024 – have direct impacts on ecosystems (pollution, destruction of soils and water infrastructure), but also indirect ones, by diverting financial resources towards the defence industry and the war economy, to the detriment of environmental policies, as some seek to pit investment in the energy transition against spending on defence. The correlation between higher defence budgets and greenhouse gas emissions illustrates this paradox: the more militarisation increases, the further the climate trajectory drifts away. In the long term, countries at war also display a lower environmental performance index than those in a state of “peace”.

Why is it essential to continue climate negotiations and efforts despite the challenges encountered?

COPs are indeed imperfect and sometimes lack effectiveness, but they remain absolutely essential. First, they are the only moment when global attention focuses on climate issues. Moreover, even if some states struggle to meet their climate commitments, other actors continue to stay the course and use COPs to introduce new measures – municipalities, non-governmental organisations, the private sector and civil society as a whole are actively pursuing their actions. These actors are sometimes more responsive than political bodies themselves and are adept at using alternative instruments to push states to be more ambitious. Since the Paris Agreement, the legal lever has in particular made it possible to hold certain actors to account – France, for instance, was taken to court in 2021 and then ordered to remedy the consequences of its climate inaction.

States, moreover, have every interest in continuing to engage in these forums. Beyond the obvious benefits for the planet’s habitability and for public health, international climate negotiations are also arenas of inter-state competition. Tackling climate change is a strategic tool, both to strengthen states’ positions on the international stage – for example by consolidating their credibility with other states or showcasing their climate strategies – and to increase their national resilience in the face of climate risks. China, for example, enshrined the concept of “ecological civilisation” in its Constitution in 2018, which under Xi Jinping has become a pillar of the national narrative. The Gulf monarchies are also using climate as a lever of diplomacy and diversification, having fully understood the benefits this approach can bring.