FCAS: Breaking the deadlock

The failure of the Future Combat Air System (FCAS) programme is a collective failure on the part of the states that promoted it, as well as the industrial companies that were supposed to implement it. It is essential to understand the reasons for this failure before outlining possible ways and means of breaking the deadlock.

States pursue industrial policy, not defence policy

The first reason is that European states place the concerns of their industrial companies ahead of those of their armed forces. Yet the armed forces’ primary interest is to have the best possible aircraft, with complete freedom of action, not an aircraft that sells well on export markets. The Rafale produced by Dassault and the Eurofighter produced by BAE, Airbus and Leonardo emerged from programmes launched in the early 1980s and entered service in the early 2000s. They are so-called “fourth-generation” aircraft (they are not stealth aircraft), while a “sixth generation” (collaborative combat involving combat drones) is already beginning to emerge. Our technological lag will therefore increase.

By failing to provide their armed forces with the best weapons, states neglect their “first duty – defence”, to use General de Gaulle’s words. All French politicians who claim to follow the Gaullist tradition should remember this. The interests of our industrial companies are not always the same as those of our states.

The Germans and the French are deceiving themselves

The second reason for the failure is that political decision-makers, industrial companies and the armed forces lie to one another and to themselves.

German decision-makers misled the French by accepting ab initio operational requirements such as the carriage of a nuclear missile or the ability to land on an aircraft carrier, only to pretend to discover them ten years later in order to reject them more easily. They are also deceiving themselves if they believe that they can independently develop a sixth-generation combat aircraft within a reasonable timeframe and at a controlled cost, as Tom Enders, the former head of Airbus, rightly reminded them. Even if German industry succeeds, it is highly likely that it will only be able to sell the aircraft on its domestic market. Moreover, German decision-makers are familiar with promises of cooperation that have never come to fruition, such as the maritime patrol aircraft, the modernisation of the Tiger helicopter and the Eurodrone, or that have resulted in clear failures, such as the Trigat LR missile.

On the French side, although Dassault claims to be capable of building a sixth-generation combat aircraft “on its own”, it is unrealistic to believe that France can finance it. The Rafale programme cost more than €50 billion at 2026 prices, for a total of 178 aircraft. The Eurofighter programme cost more than €90 billion for nearly 500 aircraft. The US F-22 Raptor is estimated to have cost €62 billion for 195 aircraft. Under these conditions, a strictly national programme would cost at the very least close to €100 billion for around one hundred operational aircraft by the end of the 2040s. One billion euros per aircraft: we need to face reality! Given its budgetary situation, France will not be able to finance a new aircraft carrier, modernise its nuclear deterrent, increase both the quantity and quality of its equipment and munitions and, in addition, develop a new air combat system on its own, when the French Air and Space Force has still not reached its initial capability target of 286 Rafales! To claim otherwise is self-deception.

Political and military decision-makers continue to prepare for the previous war

The third and most important reason for the failure is that the armed forces of both countries have not drawn the lessons from the wars in Ukraine and Iran, nor have they adjusted their operational requirements accordingly.

The FCAS specifications date from 2017, or even 2014 if we go back to the Franco-British FCAS project, which also failed. Yet these wars have demonstrated how difficult it is for fourth-generation combat aircraft to penetrate integrated air defence systems, on both the Ukrainian and Russian sides. Conversely, they have highlighted the importance of industrial warfare.

Mass, cost, production speed and adaptability are now the essential parameters of warfare. Does it still make sense to possess a limited number of extremely expensive combat aircraft when inexpensive drones can strike deep inside enemy territory with warheads much heavier than those carried by our best missiles?

FCAS is dead, long live FCAS!

Those responsible for national defence continued to think “inside the box”, seeking to recreate what already exists: a multirole aircraft capable of carrying out every air superiority and ground attack mission, carrying a nuclear missile and, as an added bonus, landing on an aircraft carrier… We are recreating the same thing, only better, more expensive and in smaller numbers… Under these conditions, why change? In any event, the conclusion has just been reached: there will be no change. For France, the Rafale will be the only option on the horizon.

Yet this creates a problem for defence innovation, which is likely to stagnate, and even more so for the airborne component of France’s nuclear deterrent. Today, a raid by the Strategic Air Forces still has a very good chance of penetrating Russian defences. But what about tomorrow? To be certain of doing so, a missile will be required that can travel much further and much faster than the current ASMPA-NG missile. To achieve this, it will necessarily need to be longer and heavier. The architecture of France’s future weapons aircraft should therefore have been determined according to the missile, rather than the architecture of the missile being determined according to the aircraft carrying it. It would therefore have been preferable to consider building several aircraft: a bomber (the Europeans do not have any) and a fighter. This would have provided work for everyone. Alas…

Germany, France and Spain were right to seek to develop a joint air combat system programme, because the major problem facing European defence is not the excessive number of defence companies, which is an advantage, but the excessive fragmentation of demand resulting from the inability of states to reach agreement. However, they were wrong to establish cooperation on the basis of industrial work-sharing, the deadly principle of “juste retour”, and even more wrong not to revise their operational requirements. So what should be done?

It will be difficult to preserve the programme’s achievements …

The most important immediate priority would be to protect the children of the divorce: saving the “system” even if the “aircraft” cannot be saved, namely the cloud, the variable-cycle engine, combat drones and weapons systems, including the onboard mission system. For France, the end of FCAS affects not only Dassault, but also Safran, Thales and MBDA, as well as all their subcontractors. Unfortunately, the German government’s decision to award a €500 million contract, without a tendering process, to Helsing for the architecture of a combat cloud does not bode well for the future. As for cooperation on the future engine, which appears to be progressing as well as possible, it will still need to result in an aircraft… Nevertheless, three possible ways forward appear to be available. 

… but much easier to develop long-range drones …

The first would be to focus short-term efforts on very long-range drones and air and missile defence. In this area, innovative start-ups should be favoured over major prime contractors. Some of these companies already exist in France, and cooperation with other European companies, particularly Ukrainian ones, should be encouraged. This could lead to families of less expensive drones, such as the “Valkyrie XQ-58A” produced by the US company Kratos, which cost less than €2 million per unit, unlike the NEUROn drone, which is more expensive than a Rafale. This would require circumventing the bureaucratic certification procedures for which France is renowned.

… to cooperate around Saab …

The second option would be to encourage cooperation with Europe’s third aircraft manufacturer, SAAB, on a future combat aircraft that could be equipped with the Franco-German SAFRAN-MTU engine, Thales radars and avionics, and MBDA effectors. In a sense, this would involve Europeanising the Gripen, which is a good fighter aircraft, but whose essential components (engine, radar) are American. One lesson that must be drawn from recent technological developments is that the future of combat aviation depends more on the mission system and its ability to communicate than on the characteristics of the platform carrying that system.

… and to rethink the airborne, or even land-based, component of France’s nuclear deterrent

Finally, there must be the courage to rethink the Strategic Air Forces by starting with the missile and its warhead, which are the true instruments of “sovereignty”, rather than the platform, which could be interchangeable and might even be a transport aircraft such as an A330 MRTT or an A400M.

Furthermore, consideration of a ground-to-ground ballistic missile similar to the Oreshnik should continue. Solutions already exist, such as the V-MAX hypersonic glider programme developed by ArianeGroup and Onera, the Sylex programme, or a ground-to-ground theatre ballistic missile, as envisaged in the Military Programming Act. Ukraine and Iran have demonstrated that there is no 100% protection against a saturation attack involving ballistic missiles, which are hypersonic by nature and, in most cases, impossible to intercept. We would do better to give this serious consideration.

The failure of FCAS must lead European political and military leaders to think “outside the box” and to keep the interests of their own industrial companies at an appropriate distance. European states were “sovereign” before Airbus and Dassault. They will remain so after them.