Political Developments in Asia in 2024: The Exhaustion of Democratic Systems and Values?

Overall, turbulence has been prevalent in Asia throughout 2024: growing tensions in the China-U.S. relationship, contrasting elections in a quarter of the countries in the region, including two of the world’s largest democracies, India and Indonesia—along with the United States, whose influence on the continent is significant—controlled transition to the fourth generation of leadership in Singapore, political unrest, and major crises in Japan and South Korea.

The prevailing perception, somewhat paradoxically, is that of an erosion of established democratic systems in which citizens no longer identify, as seen in Japan and South Korea, while the active involvement of populations in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh has led to a return to greater political transparency and, seemingly, a renewal of the ruling elites. Southeast Asia, for its part, continues to offer a varied landscape of regimes dominated by single parties with little real interaction with their populations. Taiwan, India, and Indonesia stand out. While corruption, socio-economic inequalities, and ethnic-religious tensions weigh to varying degrees on political life in these three countries, this does not prevent the opposition from participating in debates and engaging in the public space.

Furthermore, as revealed by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the interconnection of crises and the mirror effect of conflicts between Europe and Asia have continued to resonate from one region to the other. The NATO summit held in Washington in July 2024 saw allies express growing concerns about the strengthening of the partnership between Moscow and Beijing. In November 2024, the deployment of North Korean troops to fight on European soil alongside Russian aggressor forces further strengthens this interconnection. It increasingly ties the security of the continent to that of Asia, in the face of a China-Russia-North Korea front whose configuration evokes memories of the Korean War and the Cold War.

Southeast Asia: between autocracies and authoritarian democracies

In 2024, the presidency of ASEAN was held by Laos, a single-party communist state, supported by its large neighbor and main partner, Vietnam, with the theme of connectivity and resilience. Relatively small (7 million inhabitants) and landlocked, Laos had to wait until 2023 and the construction of a rail link with China to connect with the Chinese province of Yunnan and establish a connection with Thailand. In 2025, the presidency of ASEAN will be held by Malaysia, focusing on inclusivity and sustainability. However, the association continues to have little influence in the face of the civil war ravaging Myanmar since the military coup in February 2021.

In Singapore, after twenty years at the helm of the city-state, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, whose father, Lee Kuan Yew, is considered the founding father of the nation, has implemented a power transition process for the benefit of his deputy, Lawrence Wong. Wong is set to formally replace him on May 15, 2025. This staged process aims to preserve the city-state’s reputation for stability. An authoritarian democracy with a complex structure, Singapore is keen to maintain its status as a key financial and commercial hub in Southeast Asia. Since its independence in 1965, a single party, the People’s Action Party (PAP), has dominated the country’s political life, controlling opposition with strict oversight, over a population of six million.

In Indonesia, Prabowo Subianto, the defense minister of outgoing President Joko Widodo, was elected in May 2024 in the first round with 58.6% of the vote, notably due to Widodo’s support and the “co-optation” of his son as vice president. The fourth most populous country in the world (280 million people), Indonesia is the top nickel producer and the third-largest coal producer. It is also the world’s largest Muslim-majority country, with 82% of the population adhering to Islam. The new president, a former military officer accused of massive human rights violations, particularly in Timor, has his foreign policy closely watched. He says he wants to follow the country’s traditional non-alignment policy. Reflecting this policy, he visited China and the United States in November 2024 on his way to the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit, while also getting closer to the BRICS, which Indonesia joined in January 2025. In a dispute with China over the northern Natuna Sea zone, where Chinese fishermen and coast guards have made regular incursions since 2019, Jakarta recently signed a military cooperation agreement with India, under which the archipelago could receive supersonic Brahmos cruise missiles. To date, India has only sold these to the Philippines, which has clearly stated its intention to use them against China.

The Socialist Republic of Vietnam has seen numerous political upheavals in 2024, which the pragmatism of its authoritarian governance has allowed it to overcome. Many Communist Party officials have been victims of an opaque anti-corruption campaign led by the regime’s strongman, Party Secretary General Nguyen Phu Trong. After a year in power, President Vo Van Phuong had to resign in March 2024. The appointment of Minister of Public Security Pham Minh Chinh as president in May 2024, however, did not end the large purge sweeping the country.

In Thailand, the political situation has become more repressive. The Constitutional Court, generally opposed to democratic reforms, banned the progressive Move Forward Party in August 2024. This party had won the most seats in the 2023 legislative elections but failed to form a majority. The party, which sought to reform the lese-majesty law, was accused of threatening the monarchy.

Cambodia confirms its drift towards a semi-hereditary autocracy. Former Prime Minister Hun Sen, who ruled the country for over 40 years, retired in 2023, not without appointing his eldest son, Hun Manet, to power. In 2024, Hun Sen himself was elected to the honorary position of President of the Cambodian Senate, which should allow him to retain some influence over Cambodian politics.

A South Asia between populism and desires for change

The February 2024 Pakistani legislative elections did not alter the country’s general direction nor reduce the long-standing dominance of the military, despite widespread popular support for Imran Khan, the former Prime Minister, who has been imprisoned since August 2023 for defying the all-powerful military institution. His party, the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), the main opposition force and largest group in Parliament, regularly organizes demonstrations of strength to demand his release. The country is also subject to continuous deadly attacks by Pakistani Taliban, many of which target Chinese interests and personnel involved in construction projects.

In Bangladesh, years of increasing authoritarianism, corruption, and economic underperformance have led to the downfall of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s regime and her party, the Awami League. Since her hasty departure and exile to India in August 2024, a new government led by 2006 Nobel Peace Prize laureate Mohammad Yunus is attempting to restore a democratic system. Legislative elections are expected to be held in 2025. The country faces multiple security challenges, including its significant vulnerability to climate change. Sharing a border with Myanmar, it is confronted with numerous smuggling operations (human trafficking, weapons, drugs) and the management of Rohingya refugees, over a million of whom have been accommodated.

In the spring 2024 legislative elections in India, Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) retained its parliamentary majority but will have to rely on its coalition allies. The party has intimidated many media outlets, limited freedom of association, and stigmatized Muslims, stoking pre-election tensions in vain, confirming the populist direction of the regime. In power since 2014, Narendra Modi remains in office and continues to be a highly sought-after leader among the powers promoting the Indo-Pacific concept, including his QUAD partners (the United States, Japan, and Australia).

In Sri Lanka, after the severe financial crisis of 2022 and the departure of the Rajapaksa family, the September 2024 elections led to the presidential and parliamentary victory of the People’s National Party, a party with a strong left-wing orientation. Its leader, Anura Kumara Dissanayke, intends to fundamentally reshape the country’s economy by eliminating certain collusions between big businesses and political circles. He enjoys the support of the IMF and the international community, including the United States, Europe, and Japan, who are concerned about the island shifting entirely into China’s orbit.

North Asia: Discontent and Crisis within the Conservative Democracies of Japan and South Korea

Against all expectations, Taiwan’s presidential elections in January 2024 were held peacefully despite intense Chinese pressure. Voter turnout was high (over 70% of eligible voters), and despite the harsh campaign waged by the major parties, the election day passed without incident. The outgoing Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) won a new presidential term with William Lai. However, he does not hold a majority in parliament. Moreover, geopolitical tensions remain high across the Taiwan Strait. The inauguration speech of the new president in May 2024, in which he pledged to resist the “annexation” of the island, prompted a strong reaction from Beijing. More threatening than ever, China continued its military exercises over and around Taiwan to remind voters that relations with the mainland could be less tense if they supported candidates who unequivocally reject independence.

Mongolia elected a new parliament in June 2024, following a process largely respectful of democratic norms, giving a narrow majority to the Mongolian People’s Party (MPP). Marked by its situation of being landlocked between its two large nuclear neighbors, Russia and China, Ulaanbaatar has successfully managed its transition from a single-party system to a multi-party democratic system.

In Japan, during the early elections triggered by new Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba, the powerful Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which has governed the country for most of the past seventy years, lost its majority in parliament. This electoral setback is attributed to a poor image caused by repeated corruption scandals and the existence of “black funds” financing the party. These financial scandals had already led to the unpopularity of the previous Prime Minister. Shigeru Ishiba may face political instability in the future, which could even threaten the U.S.-Japan alliance.

The opposition, although fragmented around the Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP), remains very hostile to the military strengthening program initiated in December 2022, as China becomes more aggressive towards Tokyo and Sino-Russian military maneuvers multiply near the archipelago. Thus, the planned doubling of the military budget to 2% of GDP may be called into question. Moreover, with Donald Trump’s arrival, there are concerns about further demands for defense budgets and the purchase of American equipment. Sociologically, the decline of the LDP suggests a certain resilience in the Japanese population and the possibility that, next time, a strengthened opposition could win the majority, thus disrupting decades of Japanese political norms. The next test for Shigeru Ishiba’s domestic politics will be the elections for the House of Councillors in the summer of 2025.

South Korea, considered one of the most stable regimes in Asia, is facing great difficulties after the declaration of martial law and the call for the army on December 3, 2024, by President Yoon Suk-yeol. Arrested on January 15, 2024, and facing impeachment proceedings, he is now accused of rebellion. This attempted coup seemed unthinkable for a mature democracy and has recalled the country’s military dictatorship years from 1961 to 1988. The parliamentary guerrilla between an authoritarian-style president and a majority opposition in the National Assembly does not fully explain the temptation of presidential force. At the very least, it reveals the polarization of the country’s political life between the conservative and progressive blocs. This is an unexpected challenge for the young South Korean republic, which could lead to months of uncertainty and encourage North Korea to adopt more threatening postures. The Constitutional Court must decide by mid-June 2025 whether it confirms the impeachment of Yoon Suk-yeol or reinstates him. In the first case, an early presidential election will have to be held within 60 days. It should be remembered that President Park Geun-hye was impeached in 2017 for corruption and abuse of power. Furthermore, the ability of South Korean public opinion to hold the streets, in one direction or another, makes it an important player in the ongoing events.

The fluctuating future of President Yoon casts a shadow over the active rapprochement policy with the United States and Japan that began after the trilateral summit in Washington in August 2023. Moreover, the arrival of the Democratic Party in power following a presidential election could lead to a distancing from the United States and a more open line toward China and North Korea.

Perspectives  

At the beginning of 2025, the dominant themes in the coming months will likely be linked to the changes initiated by the new Republican administration, both in its relations with China and with the allies and partners of the United States, while the resilience of economic growth across the Indo-Pacific region is expected to remain stable. Asia remains dynamic, and its role as a driver of global economic growth remains strong. What happens in Asia – for example, in critical areas such as artificial intelligence, semiconductors, energy policies, and payment innovations – increasingly impacts global trends.

However, the Trump factor and his mercantile neo-populism are likely to test his most politically fragile traditional allies (South Korea, Japan) or partners fearing to be caught up in the intensified trade and technological competition with China (Southeast Asia). Only India and Taiwan appear to be in a favorable position. India remains a key asset for countering China. As for Taiwan, the island serves as a protective watchtower along the American Pacific route and the major military installations of Washington in the region (Guam and Hawaii). Moreover, Taiwan’s mastery of the semiconductor industry and TMSC’s technological superiority in this field make it a strategically valuable ally in two ways.