“Europeanising” NATO: A Utopia or an Obvious Necessity for Europeans?

The relationship between the United States and NATO is often misconceived by Europeans, who readily make the mistake of equating the United States’ defence organisation with NATO. Europeans in general, and the French in particular, do not grasp the reality of this relationship properly for several reasons.

On the one hand, they have forgotten the exact context and circumstances of the organisation’s birth, and the ambiguities that ensued. On the other, whether consciously or not, they remain very self‑centred and have still not acknowledged the geopolitical shift from Europe to the Asia‑Pacific. Finally, they are insufficiently aware of the evolution of American society, the weakening of its historic ties with the European continent, and they lack sufficient understanding of the United States’ global defence organisation.

By shedding new light on all these points, we will see how Europeans must rethink their own relationship with NATO, imagine a new positioning within it, in order to reduce their dependence on external contingencies and protect their interests more effectively.

History

In the aftermath of the Second World War, war‑ruined Western European countries, having reduced their defence apparatus, requested that the Americans remain militarily engaged on the European continent in order to ensure their protection against the threat posed by the Soviet Union.

The British then proposed in 1948 the necessity of a “treaty of alliance and mutual assistance”, which would establish on both sides of the North Atlantic a defence alliance and a regional grouping within the framework of the United Nations Charter. This proposal materialised the following year with the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington on 4 April 1949.

The decision‑making body of this new transatlantic alliance is the North Atlantic Council (NAC), established by the Treaty. Composed of the heads of state and government of the 12 founding allied countries[1], the Council subsequently decided on the creation of permanent institutions, formalised by the signing of the Paris Protocol on 28 August 1952 concerning the status of international military quarters created under the North Atlantic Treaty. Together, these institutions now constitute the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).

From 1951 and for 15 years, at France’s request, the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE[2]), then, the following year, NATO’s headquarters, were installed in the Paris region until France’s withdrawal from the integrated military command in 1966, by decision of General de Gaulle.

Constructive ambiguities

However, from the outset, it appears there was a misunderstanding regarding burden‑sharing, since a marked disparity in military capability contribution emerged between Americans and Europeans. After the Second World War, the United States considered its most important contribution to NATO to be economic support through the Marshall Plan, to help European countries begin their post‑war recovery. On their side, Europeans gradually perceived that this military imbalance was a fair compensation for having relinquished any ambition of leadership and accepted a situation of relative dependence in terms of security.

Yet in 1956, the Suez Crisis had a significant impact on relations between allies. Indeed, following the nationalisation of the Suez Canal by Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt, France and the United Kingdom launched a joint military operation to retake control. The military success of this operation was immediately tempered by the stance of the era’s two nuclear powers, who supported the decolonisation process in progress. Faced with the barely veiled threats from the Soviet Union and the deafening silence of the United States, the UK and France drew diametrically opposed conclusions.

In order never again to be surprised by the United States, Britain decided to draw as close to it as possible, in hopes of influencing its decisions upstream and keeping it engaged in Europe.

In contrast, General de Gaulle, doubting the US security guarantee, decided that this would be the last time France was threatened by a nuclear power, whichever it might be. This led, ten years later, to France’s withdrawal from NATO’s integrated military command and to the demand that allied troops leave French territory, in order to freely develop France’s own nuclear deterrent. The immense effort that France then undertook to establish its nuclear deterrent permeated its entire economy, reinforcing its energy independence through civil nuclear power and developing a world‑class defence industrial and technological base. On that occasion, France also expressed its desire for autonomy vis‑à‑vis its American ally and began promoting the principle of a European defence, while remaining a loyal but demanding ally within the Atlantic Alliance.

Until France’s return to the integrated military command structure in 2009, this position fostered, for its allies, a certain ambiguity regarding its stance on NATO.

Evolution of the geopolitical centre of gravity

During the Cold War, the USSR was the strategic competitor of the United States and the battlefield was the European continent. This is no longer the case today. With a GDP equivalent to that of Spain, Russia cannot compare to the United States. It remains, however, a nuclear power whose arsenal cannot be ignored, and it uses its disruptive capacity to intimidate rivals and challenge the current international order. In its new imperialist design, it has once again become a threat to its neighbours, for an empire has no border, only fronts.

Today, the true strategic competitor of the United States is China, in all domains. China has declared its aim to become the leading global power by 2049, the centenary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China. Unlike Westerners, who remain impatient, China’s strategy is long‑term and rests upon Sun Tzu’s principle in The Art of War: “appear weak to surprise your adversary”. The Obama administration acknowledged this new strategic reality of the world’s strategic gravity shifting eastwards by enacting its “pivot to Asia”.

To understand the United States’ new posture towards Europe, one must abandon European references and view the world from the American perspective. The United States is a true global power, a continental‑sized country bordered by friendly neighbours, protected by two oceans, with interests and allies across the globe.

Europeans often fall victim to what might be called the “Mercator bias”. Indeed, for practical reasons, the world map most commonly used in the West is the Mercator projection, with Greenwich meridian at 0º of longitude centred on the map to push the date‑line to the edges. This familiar representation for us Europeans maintains the illusion that we remain at the centre of the world—and are therefore central to the concerns of other countries, including our American allies. But nothing could be more false.

The United States’ defence organisation

To better understand the American standpoint on defence, security and foreign policy, let us analyse its national military power factor[4]. The organisation of the US defence apparatus gives the United States the unique capacity to project its military power to any point on the globe. Comprising nearly three million active military personnel, reservists and civilians, and possessing the world’s largest defence budget at USD 886 billion[5], the US Department of Defense comprises six services: the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, Air Force and Space Force. As in most modern Western militaries, these services are responsible for force generation—i.e. recruitment, equipment and training for land, sea, air and space environments. Under the authority of the President and the Secretary of Defense, responsibility for their operational employment lies with a senior military officer. In France, this is the Chief of the Defence Staff (CEMA). In the United States, the highest military authority is the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). He serves as the military adviser to the President but holds no direct operational command. Operational employment responsibility is shared between 11 strategic commands known as Combatant Commands (COCOMs), of which 6 are regional[6] and 5 are functional[7]. It is as though the United States has 11 equivalents to the French CEMA to command and conduct operations worldwide. Each COCOM is responsible at the strategic level for joint military operations within its geographic or functional area. It employs the military forces of the various services assigned to it through a complex force generation process, with national-level decisions made by the Pentagon.

NATO today

NATO is a politico‑military organisation composed of civilian bodies and military commands. At the political level, the decision‑making body is the North Atlantic Council. Heads of state and government meet in person at summits; otherwise, they are represented permanently by their ambassador or by their minister at thematic meetings (defence, foreign affairs). The Council is chaired by the NATO Secretary General (Jens Stoltenberg for the past 10 years), appointed by consensus among the nations. He is supported by an international secretariat to prepare and implement its decisions. At the military level, the alliance’s military chiefs committee, whose executive arm is the International Military Staff, oversees the command structure. This is composed of two strategic commands: ACO (Allied Command Operations) for conduct of operations in Europe and ACT (Allied Command Transformation) for preparing future operations.

Since France’s return to NATO’s integrated military command in 2009, the second strategic commander post—formerly held by an American admiral (SACLANT – Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic)—was assigned to a European, a French general, who became SACT (Supreme Allied Commander Transformation). This strategic commander in charge of the Alliance’s transformation is based in Norfolk, Virginia, USA. By contrast, SACEUR (Supreme Allied Commander Europe), a US general based in Mons, Belgium, is responsible for NATO’s current operations, while SACT is responsible for future‑oriented preparedness. His command deals with strategic analysis, foresight, capability development, industry relations, innovation, interoperability, training and doctrine.

NATO has no forces of its own, except for a few AWACS detection and control aircraft, and large surveillance drones. Its real added value lies in offering its members and partners a permanent command structure (headquarters, command and communication systems). This allows immediate responsiveness and interoperability of allied military forces to conduct Alliance operations as soon as the political level decides. Military capabilities (personnel, equipment) are provided by the nations. The Alliance’s military force is the sum of member states’ armed forces operating together.

The United States is preponderant in the Alliance, but it must be compared appropriately. American military power is designed to engage in two world wars simultaneously—in the Indo‑Pacific and European theatres—whereas European armed forces are primarily dedicated to defending European territory.

Uniquely in Europe, the SACEUR position is held by an American general who also commands (and primarily) US forces permanently stationed in or operating in Europe (COM EUCOM). EUCOM headquarters is in Stuttgart, Germany. This general holds both responsibilities concurrently under two different authorities. At the national US level, as COM EUCOM, he answers to the Secretary of Defense and the President. However, within NATO, as SACEUR, he is under the authority of the North Atlantic Council (NAC), consisting of the 32 heads of state and government or their representatives.

Alliance or coalition?

Given the United States’ global defence system, it is evident that the US does not need NATO to wage war and defend its interests worldwide. Indeed, since the Kosovo War—during which it was particularly struck by the slowness and weight of the NAC’s political validation of air target selection (notably due to the French veto reflecting divergent assessments of certain targets)—it has definitively stated that its preferred mode of engagement is the coalition (“Coalition of the Willing”). The slogan “whoever loves me, follow me” is far simpler to wield than securing consensus at the NAC. However, though different, both models offer advantages and disadvantages, and are thus complementary. The coalition is more reactive but less stable, whereas the alliance is slower to decide, but stronger—since decisions are made through consensus and can be sustained long-term.

Europeans need an alliance, because no European country alone has the capability to defend itself or conduct large-scale military operations to resolve an international crisis. The Americans do not need a military alliance in the same way—it is why they prefer a coalition, which, for them, primarily serves to broaden the political legitimacy of military interventions without sacrificing flexibility and agility. Moreover, in case a coalition partner withdraws, the United States generally fills any capability gap (personnel or equipment) with its own military force—something beyond the reach of any European country, even France.

The American general SACEUR is adored and respected in Europe. His legitimacy is indisputable because he brings his country’s military power. Yet what Europeans do not perceive is that this general is first and foremost commander of US forces in Europe (COM EUCOM). He spends most of his time at his US headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany, or on bilateral visits to countries in his area of responsibility. He is present in his NATO headquarters, SHAPE in Mons, Belgium, on average only one day per week. It is important to be aware of this reality.

The truth is, in the event of conflict in Europe, only a small portion of US forces would fall under NATO command and thus the SACEUR. We would likely see two simultaneous operations—as has been the case in recent theatres such as Afghanistan, Libya and Iraq: a NATO operation and a US‑led operation free of alliance constraints (caveats, vetoes, etc.). What NATO would refuse to do or take too long to decide, a US‑led coalition could execute immediately thanks to different rules of engagement and a faster decision process. It is illusory to believe that all US forces would fall under the exclusive political control of the NAC. In fact, in the minds of US military personnel in operational theatres, NATO or coalition is simply a grouping of other partners—possibly under US command—but intellectually they do not include themselves within it, because their national defence organisation is far more significant.

Article 5 of the Washington Treaty—erected into a totem by Europeans—does not guarantee automatic US engagement. In case of an attack on a member, there will be a vote at the NAC and unanimity is required to invoke this article. Unlike its European equivalent, Article 42‑7[8], it places no obligation on allies regarding the means they must provide. The only time it was invoked was on the proposal of NATO Secretary General Lord George Robertson—not at the request of the United States—following the 11 September 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center. Allies unanimously adopted Article 5, offering their support to the United States, attacked by Al‑Qaida on its own soil.

Americans do not know NATO and do not need it. The reality is that the majority of US military personnel have not served in Europe, but in Asia. They have often participated in operations in Central Asia (Afghanistan, Pakistan) or the Middle East (Iraq, Syria). Many were stationed in Gulf countries, where rotations are more frequent, or in Southeast Asia (Japan, South Korea). Politically in Washington, those handling NATO and European questions number only a few dozen at the Pentagon, State Department and White House (NSC). This has perhaps shifted somewhat with the war in Ukraine, but without fundamentally altering the balance.

The United States and NATO

In Europe, and indeed across the world, most countries associate NATO with the United States because of its political pre‑eminence and enormous relative military weight within the organisation. But this is an erroneous perception of the US–NATO relationship. European countries see NATO as an encompassing organisation larger than they are, whereas the United States views NATO as a smaller regional organisation than its own defence apparatus.

What is the situation today? The strategic interests and values we largely shared during the Cold War are no longer so convergent. Since the Bush junior administration, US political leaders regularly remind Europeans that security “free‑riders” are increasingly unacceptable to the American taxpayer. Indeed, the composition of the American population has changed over 75 years. During the Cold War, US political leaders often had close ties to the European continent—by ancestry or because they had themselves fought for its liberation. The identified enemy of Americans and Western Europeans was the same: the Soviet Union, and the potential battlefield was Europe. Today, with the growing presence of African American, Latino and Asian American minorities in the United States, and the collective memory of the Cold War fading, this transatlantic bond has weakened—despite European reluctance to accept it. Joe Biden is the last representative of that bygone era. Barack Obama is a man of the Pacific (raised between Hawaii and Indonesia), and Europeans felt a certain distance from him—which corresponded with awareness of China’s rising threat and led him to declare a “pivot to Asia”.

In his bombastic declarations, Donald Trump simply echoes this new American reality, by making official the shift from a strategic transatlantic relationship to a more transactional one. American citizens no longer understand why they should pay to protect Westerners (Europeans, as well as Asian democracies) who are richer, more numerous than they are, yet unwilling to agree among themselves to defend themselves.

Although he later walked back the statement, Trump’s suggestion of a possible US withdrawal from NATO—which sowed doubt about transatlantic solidarity and the validity of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty—should not have surprised us for the reasons noted above. On the one hand, it was consistent with his remarks during his first NAC appearance in Brussels in 2017, following his election. On the other, his approach reflects his negotiation strategy (cf. his book The Art of the Deal), in a purely transactional perspective. Shared values come after national economic interests, contrary to Article 2 of the Washington Treaty. Moreover, the European market is the primary destination for US arms exports. According to SIPRI, 55% of European countries’ arms imports during 2019‑23 came from the United States. Trump’s exhortation (sometimes in the form of blackmail) for Europeans to increase military spending was to the benefit of the American defence industry. Indeed, his abandonment of allies—particularly in Syria in 2018—prompted Defence Secretary James Mattis to resign, reminding Trump that “America first does not mean America alone”[10].

Americans will elect their president to defend American interests, not those of their allies. Even if Joe Biden remains in office, that would not change the situation—because the US Congress has shown deep divisions over European support, as seen in the blocking of support to Ukraine. The potential election of Donald Trump poses a risk to the Atlantic Alliance, but should also be seen as an opportunity for Europeans to reclaim their security and assume more responsibilities.

Europe of defence or defence of Europe?

Strengthening NATO’s European pillar is the most common way to envisage a better burden‑sharing and increased European contribution to their defence—but without challenging America’s comfortable leadership within the Alliance and its military command. It is true that it is natural and easier for allies to accept leadership from the most powerful among them (ten times more defence spending and military capability potentially deployed to the European theatre than the largest European contributors), especially when that leader is physically distant across an ocean. Another reality shared by all members of an alliance or coalition is that “who commands, pays”. This is the principle of the framework nation, which must provide more human, material and financial resources than its partners.

Would a US withdrawal condemn NATO? It must not be so. NATO is the Europeans’ life insurance for collective defence. They must therefore change their approach to this vital organisation and no longer see it as an American organisation in which they participate, but as a European organisation in which Americans participate. Europeans should regard NATO as Americans do: a regional organisation dedicated to protecting the European continent and the North Atlantic, which ensures interoperability between allied military forces and facilitates their coordination in action. Americans, meanwhile, have another organisation to rapidly project and employ their military power onto the European continent: the US EUCOM command.

It is thus entirely conceivable and legitimate to envisage a European SACEUR, as Marshall Foch once was, the first Supreme Allied Commander during the First World War. This European general should preferably come from a militarily credible and nuclear‑armed nation. He should not be selected purely on political grounds disconnected from the required military experience and strategic competence to lead allied forces successfully in combat.

He could be assisted by a US general to facilitate coordination between NATO and US command structures acting in coalition. This model is, for example, adopted by the United States in their interallied air operations centres (CAOC – Combined Air Operations Centre), whose direction is entrusted to general officers from their closest allies, the Five Eyes[11]. A European SACEUR would have no national appointment and could dedicate himself entirely to his charge for NATO, i.e. the defence of Europe, just as SACT does today.

For European allies, claiming the supreme operational function within NATO’s integrated military command in Europe must go hand in hand with a substantial financial and capability effort, commensurate with their ambitions. This coherent approach would legitimise European allies’ effort to better share the burden of defending the European continent with their transatlantic partners. Such a repositioning within NATO would align with the tacitly accepted “3D” rule (no Decoupling, no Duplication, no Discrimination)[12] from the inception of the European Security and Defence Policy in the late 1990s.

For Americans, European Defence—or defence of Europe—whether within NATO or the European Union, will become a reality when European nations’ combined defence budget meets their security and defence stakes. It is important to note that, regardless of the organisation used for military intervention, nations have only one set of armed forces which they employ under one framework or another. Raising defence budgets sufficiently is not beyond European nations—because the EU alone is more populous and almost as wealthy as the United States. It is simply a matter of choice, priority and political will to ensure one’s own defence. Under such conditions, Europeans would truly demonstrate their will to share both the burden and responsibilities.

Ultimately, Europeans must change strategy, stop being naïve and believe that the United States will always agree to defend them for no more than the purchase of military hardware and a vague convergence of Western values. The reality is that a country helps an ally all the more easily if that ally is strong and powerful and can return the favour.

Whether within NATO or other European institutions, Europeans must take responsibility and organise to defend their interests—with the United States when interests converge, but also independently when priorities diverge.

France has a major role to play in this European dynamic. However, it must accept that what is natural and obvious for itself (strategic autonomy, defence effort, etc.) is not so for its European neighbours and allies. Rather than seeking to convince them of the validity of its viewpoint, it should listen more and reassure them of its desire to progress with them towards a credible European defence, which does not exclude Americans. Indeed, France—one of the few European countries to possess a complete Defence Industrial and Technological Base (BITD)—is often suspected of primary anti‑Americanism and perceived in its attempts to promote European strategic autonomy as favouring its national industrial interests over the American competitor.

In conclusion, Europeans should not be afraid. The uncertainty of the US election outcome is an opportunity to organise ourselves better to defend our interests and assume greater responsibility in a more balanced transatlantic relationship. It is time to break out of this excessive and deadly dependence, which leaves the American voter determining our future and security.

Let us view NATO as Americans do—as a European regional organisation that could perfectly well be militarily led by Europeans, in coordination with US military command in Europe. Openly considering such a possibility would create a positive dynamic to strengthen synergies between NATO and the EU, and help reduce Turkey’s systematic blocking capacity, which prevents the necessary rapprochement between the two organisations for a more credible European defence.

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[1] Belgium, Canada, Denmark, United States, France, Italy, Iceland, Luxembourg, Norway, Netherlands, Portugal, United Kingdom

[2] SHAPE: Supreme Headquarters of Allied Powers in Europe.

[3] The Hundred-Year Marathon by Michael Pillsbury, published in 2015 by Saint Martin’s Griffin, US.

[4] Western military doctrine generally recognises four main sources of power: economic, diplomatic, military, and informational.

[5] Record defence budget passed by the US Congress in December 2024.

[6] US Commands for North America (NORTHCOM), South America (SOUTHCOM), Central Asia and the Middle East (CENTCOM), Europe (EUCOM), Africa (AFRICOM), Indo-Pacific (INDOPACOM)

[7] Strategic nuclear (STRATCOM), logistics (TRANSCOM), cyber defence (CYBERCOM), space (SPACECOM), special forces (SOCOM)

[8] The mutual defence clause (Article 42, paragraph 7 of the Treaty on European Union) provides that, in the event of an armed attack against a Member State on its territory, the other Member States shall owe it aid and assistance by all means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.

[9] Speech to the NAC by US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates in 2011, criticising allied “free riders” failing to shoulder their fair share within NATO due to insufficient defence budgets.

[10] America First does not mean America Alone.

[11] Five Eyes (FVEY): an intelligence-sharing alliance between five English-speaking countries (United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand)

[12] In response to the 1998 Franco-British Saint-Malo agreements establishing a European Security and Defence Policy, US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright expressed the “3Ds” as conditions acceptable to the US and NATO: no decoupling between the US and European security, no duplication of existing NATO structures or initiatives, and no discrimination against NATO members who are not part of the EU.