European Security: The War in Ukraine and the “Day After”

What options are available to prepare Ukraine and Europe for potential negotiations and the security environment that may follow? The prospect of imminent negotiations over a ceasefire in Ukraine—at the very least halting active combat—should prompt Western allies to intensify their military support in the coming weeks, ensuring Kyiv a stronger position in discussions. This is especially critical, as negotiations unfavourable to Ukraine would also undermine European security. In the future, Europeans will bear a significant responsibility for defending the continent and deterring Russia. This will require reliance on a strengthened and autonomous defence industry, as well as overcoming several key challenges, foremost among them the issues of defence funding and political unity.

Towards an Acceleration of Military Support for Ukraine?

The election of Donald Trump as President of the United States appears to have significantly accelerated the timeline for negotiations to halt the fighting in Ukraine, at a time when the evolution of the war has taken a turn against Kyiv. Russian forces have made rapid advances in recent months, with the front line shifting by several kilometres per day in some areas. If negotiations were to occur under these conditions, Moscow would be in a position to push its maximalist demands—namely, the full annexation of the five partially occupied Ukrainian oblasts—jeopardising Ukraine’s integrity and stability, as well as the long-term security of the entire continent.

Europeans would also find themselves in a weak position, potentially sidelined in negotiations for which they would later bear the costs without having had a chance to defend their interests. Some actors are beginning to mobilise: Emmanuel Macron hosted Donald Trump and Volodymyr Zelensky in Paris in early December before travelling to Warsaw, where Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk stated that preparations were underway for potential negotiations “this winter.” Poland will have a particular responsibility on the European political stage during the first half of 2025 as it assumes the rotating presidency of the EU Council. However, Europeans remain largely disunited, lacking a clear strategy for negotiations or the credibility to secure their place at the table.

Only a few weeks remain to reverse these dual trends of Russian advances and European fragility before the new American president can act on his promise to “end the war within 24 hours,” a move that would likely come at the expense of Ukraine and Europe. To complicate Vladimir Putin’s strategic calculus and bolster European credibility, intensifying military support for Ukraine—which currently represents, on average, less than 0.1% of the GDP of the states involved—emerges as the primary solution.

Nordic and Baltic countries regularly announce new aid packages and accelerate deliveries. Denmark has already transferred all its artillery capabilities to the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) and is financing armoured vehicle deliveries jointly with Sweden, which is ramping up production. Norway focuses on air defence, while the three Baltic states each allocate approximately 0.25% of their GDP to supporting Ukraine. Denmark’s financial investment is also expected to expedite the delivery of Caesar self-propelled guns from France’s KNDS, bringing the timeline forward to 2025 instead of 2026.

Ukraine also needs to strengthen its air force. The first F-16s arrived in Ukraine this summer through a coalition led by Copenhagen and The Hague—more than 60 have been pledged, potentially making a difference on the battlefield. Ukraine could also receive three to six French Mirage jets in early 2025, following statements made by President Macron last spring. Despite transferring advanced artillery and missile systems (though no single type of equipment can turn the tide alone), France’s military support is still perceived as falling short of what could be expected from the EU’s leading military power, with ambitions of leadership within the Union. Former French Defence Minister Sébastien Lecornu notably admitted during a parliamentary hearing in October that the €3 billion military aid target for 2024, set under the bilateral Franco-Ukrainian security agreement, would not be met.

To regain an advantage on the ground, the UAF must also be capable of striking military targets within Russian territory. Joe Biden’s decision to authorise Kyiv’s use of ATACMS systems and lift restrictions on the use of SCALP and Storm Shadow missiles provided by France and the UK marks progress in this direction. However, the impact remains limited: these systems have restricted ranges (300 kilometres for ATACMS and 500 kilometres for SCALP/Storm Shadow) and are available only in limited quantities, particularly the SCALP/Storm Shadow missiles.

Military support efforts could therefore be sustained and intensified, particularly by providing Ukraine with additional cruise missiles and artillery munitions, as far as European production capacities allow. Kyiv will especially need new short- and medium-range air defence systems (at least 19, according to Ukraine’s Foreign Minister) to protect its energy infrastructure this winter.

Finally, increased support could also involve accelerating the training of Ukrainian soldiers. Ukraine’s request for instructors to be deployed on its soil was deemed “legitimate” by Emmanuel Macron, who proposed forming a coalition with several partners outside the EU framework, given the lack of consensus within the Union on this issue. Although this initiative did not materialise, it could be revived to address the urgency of the situation and reaffirm European resolve.

The Terms of a Potential Negotiation: Freezing the Conflict in Exchange for Security Guarantees for Ukraine?

In late November, Volodymyr Zelensky expressed his willingness to make provisional territorial concessions in exchange for a ceasefire and NATO membership. The Ukrainian president would thereby temporarily abandon the goal of restoring his country’s territorial integrity within its 1991 borders. Such potential concessions as part of a conflict freeze must be considered with the gravity they demand. While they may enable a cessation of hostilities—a prospect currently desired by a majority of Ukrainians and inherently desirable—they would also carry significant legal, moral, humanitarian, and security consequences. They would, at least temporarily, mark a retreat of international law in the face of territorial acquisition by force.

In this context, freezing the conflict contrasts with signing a peace treaty with Moscow, which would formalize Russian territorial gains and represent a genuine defeat. Beyond principles and justice, the fate of the inhabitants of these territories is of great concern. Since 2014, the occupied Donbas and annexed Crimea have endured forced Russification aimed at erasing Ukrainian identity, as well as the loss of collective and individual freedoms inherent to the Russian regime. The large-scale invasion of 2022 has been accompanied by terrible atrocities and potential war crimes committed by the Russian army: executions of civilians and prisoners of war, torture, and sexual violence have been documented by several international organizations and NGOs. For all these reasons, any cession, even temporary, of Ukrainian territories to Russia would leave deep scars on collective memory and weaken the security of the entire region.

For a ceasefire agreement to be viable, it must be acceptable to both parties without leaving one side feeling overly “defeated.” Some experts suggest that provisions for defining this de facto border could draw inspiration from the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) of 1975. Signed during the Cold War by European states—including West and East Germany—the Act states that “their frontiers can be changed, in accordance with international law, by peaceful means and by agreement.” Such wording could enable a ceasefire while allowing Ukraine to refrain from formally accepting Moscow’s claimed border modifications, thus freezing the conflict without legitimizing Russia’s gains. These provisions should be complemented by international monitoring of the front line, possibly through a peacekeeping mission, to prevent renewed hostilities.

Ukrainian concessions cannot be contemplated without firm and credible security guarantees from Western allies to prevent a renewed aggression once Russia rebuilds its military capacity. Beyond purely security considerations, these guarantees are essential to ensure the country’s relative stability, the return of Ukrainians currently displaced abroad, and the economic recovery necessary for reconstruction.

Europeans will inevitably have a leading role in any arrangement designed to secure Ukraine—and their own security. The “West Germany model”—NATO integration of Ukrainian territories under Kyiv’s control—seems excluded for now due to a lack of agreement among allies on an issue that constitutes a “red line” for Moscow. The vocal opposition of Hungary and Slovakia appears less significant than the reluctance of the United States and Germany, which also enables other similarly hesitant European countries to remain silent on the matter.

Other security guarantee options are being considered by various experts to deter Russia from resuming its war. The most credible option—though not necessarily the most feasible—is the deployment of Western soldiers to Ukraine as part of an ad hoc coalition, potentially comprising tens of thousands of troops. Focused primarily on ground forces, this coalition could also include aerial surveillance missions, inspired by NATO’s Baltic Air Policing initiative. Europeans would contribute the bulk of troops and equipment, taking tangible responsibility through a significant effort in terms of personnel mobilized. While American involvement might be a dealbreaker for Moscow, it would still be desirable, even if limited to a symbolic role, to avoid a decoupling of Europe and the United States. Washington’s involvement is also necessary to address capacity gaps, particularly in strategic transport and ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance).

Which European countries could participate in such a coalition? The involvement of France and the United Kingdom, the continent’s leading military powers, seems essential. Nordic and Baltic states, already demonstrating their determination to support Ukraine, could also contribute contingents, along with the Netherlands. Poland’s participation, as a rising European military power, is also desirable, although far from guaranteed. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk recently indicated during Emmanuel Macron’s visit to Poland that Warsaw does not currently plan to send a European peacekeeping force to Ukraine, especially outside the NATO framework. Germany has also expressed reservations.

Other complementary measures could include the permanent deployment of air defense systems in Ukraine and within the European Union. European projects in this area, such as the missile shield proposed by Poland and Greece, should be prioritized in Europe’s capacity development and extended to Ukrainian-controlled territories.

The training of Ukrainian soldiers should also continue, particularly under the European Union Military Assistance Mission (EUMAM). Currently conducted in Poland and other European training locations, EUMAM’s activities could expand to Ukraine itself after a ceasefire, if member states reach a consensus. Several European countries have already established specialized training programs for the use and maintenance of equipment. France, for instance, has focused on artillery and trains Ukrainian soldiers on Caesar cannons. These training efforts will remain vital beyond the war to help modernize Ukraine’s military and align it with Euro-Atlantic standards, potentially resuming within Ukraine after a conflict freeze.

Lastly, the defense industry support for Ukraine, initiated by Nordic countries like Denmark, which has proposed a direct funding model, should be expanded. Industrial cooperation between Ukraine and Europe’s defense industrial and technological base (BITDE) should also be strengthened. This would solidify Europe’s credibility as a security actor.

The defense industry: a pillar of European security

The question of credibility is not only relevant to the EU’s partners, but also to its adversaries. The European Defense Technological and Industrial Base (BITDE) must indeed become a component of conventional deterrence, through its technological level and production capacities. “Production is deterrence”—the now famous words of U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Bill LaPlante, spoken in 2022 when European and American industries were facing the challenges of ramping up production—remain highly relevant in 2024 and 2025. Strengthening European production capabilities for armored vehicles, tanks, artillery, ammunition, air defense systems, and deep strike capabilities will be crucial for the credibility of the security guarantees given to Ukraine and to deter Russia from resuming or even expanding its aggressive war. In France, for example, this effort is already becoming evident in the artillery and ammunition sectors, as well as in missile production. KNDS France (which produces the Caesar gun) and MBDA (Europe’s leading missile manufacturer) have thus increased their production rates, opened new production lines, and purchased significant stocks of raw materials and components to shift from a just-in-time production model to building wartime production capacities.

Furthermore, as Europe risks increasing its dependencies on the United States in the context of the war in Ukraine, the awareness of the strategic importance of the BITDE should lead to its reinforcement. A 2013 European Commission communication already emphasized that “the BITDE is a key element of Europe’s ability to ensure the security of its citizens and protect its values and interests. […] For this, it needs a certain degree of strategic autonomy: to be a reliable and credible partner, Europe must be able to decide and act without relying on third-party capabilities. Security of supply, access to critical technologies, and operational sovereignty are therefore essential.” To achieve these goals, the reinforcement of European capabilities must focus on European-designed systems, rather than American-made equipment produced under license within Europe. This is not a matter of principle but of guaranteeing European sovereignty over the weapon systems in their possession and their immediate deployment capability in case of need, without requiring authorization from Washington. Moreover, production under license or the ability to assemble systems designed outside the EU would impose limits on any effort to ramp up production in case of necessity, since Europeans would not have control over supply chains.

Ukraine is directly concerned by the need to strengthen its defense industry, which should become a priority for European support, including after a potential ceasefire. The Ukrainian defense industry has a fundamental role to play in building long-term conventional deterrence potential. Therefore, Ukraine’s defense industry should not only receive financial support but also become a vector for cooperation with the European industry, potentially integrating into the EU. The twenty or so bilateral security agreements signed with Ukraine by European countries in 2024 indeed include the objective of strengthening cooperation in this field.

Industrial cooperations with Ukraine are already being initiated at various levels: industrial, state, and European. As early as 2023, several European companies announced their intention to develop their activities in Ukraine and strengthen ties with the local industry. This includes German company Rheinmetall, Swedish group Saab, Czech Czechoslovak Group (CSG), small Baltic companies specializing in robotics and drones, and others (for a full map, see Daniel Fiott’s ARES note on the subject). French companies are also part of this movement. Sébastien Lecornu visited Ukraine in September 2023 to mark the shift “from a logic of stock disposals to one of industrial partnerships.” KNDS France will thus cooperate with Ukrainian companies in the field of artillery with the production of 155mm shells and the opening of a maintenance site for Caesar guns in Ukraine. The European Commission is also involved, as support for Ukraine’s defense industry is one of the axes of the upcoming European Defense Industry Program (EDIP), to which Ukrainian companies will be eligible just like EU member states. The EU also opened a defense innovation office in Kyiv in 2024 to facilitate industrial cooperation.

All of these support and cooperation initiatives should allow Ukraine greater operational responsiveness—by focusing on the needs of the Ukrainian Armed Forces (FAU) and facilitating equipment maintenance near the front lines—and modernize its defense sector by aligning its industrial and capacity standards with NATO standards. Normatively, they would also allow for a gradual integration into the European defense market even before official EU membership. The defense industry reform launched in 2023 by the Ukrainian government to increase sector transparency and tackle corruption is also part of this direction. The continuation of these cooperations—currently still in their early stages—seems important to ultimately facilitate Ukraine’s entry into the EU and NATO.

Reciprocally, Europeans will also have lessons to learn from these exchanges with the Ukrainian industry in terms of methods for rapidly capturing and integrating innovation, whether civilian or military. The evolution of innovation processes is, in fact, one of the many challenges the European defense sector will have to adapt to in order to face its new strategic environment.

The challenges for European defense in an unstable strategic environment.

A shared assessment of the strategic environment and the threats it entails will be necessary both for defining the military and industrial capabilities to develop in Europe and for strengthening the political unity of the Union. While not neglecting the EU’s southern neighborhood and the rest of the world, member states will need to continue addressing the Russian threat, which will not diminish after a potential ceasefire in Ukraine, at least in the short term. On the contrary, with an increase in the percentage of its GDP devoted to defense to rebuild its military capabilities, as well as an advanced presence in Europe through the vassalization of Belarus and partial occupation of Ukraine, Russia will remain a major potential threat. Beyond the possibility of another major Russian military engagement, the Kremlin’s influence strategies and hybrid tactics will continue to destabilize the Caucasus and Europe. Information manipulation operations, interference in electoral processes, cyberattacks, and sabotage of infrastructure are already multiplying as part of a broad Russian offensive against the continent. Of the 500 suspicious incidents observed this year in Europe, about a hundred have already been attributed to Russia.

The countries bordering Russia and Belarus – the Nordic countries, the Baltics, and Poland – will continue to view Moscow as the primary source of threats to their security. And if the countries of “old Europe,” which will certainly also have to face crises elsewhere in the world, once again neglect the Russian threat after negotiating a potential ceasefire in Ukraine, they risk losing the trust of the Eastern capitals. These capitals would thus see their perception of the indispensability of the American security guarantee confirmed.

The European awareness of the need to assume responsibility for defense has been reflected in a significant increase in defense budgets since 2022, though with a strong geographic gradient and a more pronounced increase on the eastern flank. Today, the majority of EU member states allocate the equivalent of 2% of their GDP to their defense budget (1.9% on average in 2024 according to the European Defense Agency’s projection), whereas only six reached this target in 2021 (Baltic states, Croatia, Poland, Greece). The three Baltic states even exceed the 3% mark, and Poland exceeds 4% of GDP allocated to defense spending.

While it is unlikely that this trend will reverse in the short term given the deteriorating security environment, the simultaneous occurrence of an unfavorable economic situation will require budgetary choices. Public opinion across Europe differs on how to resolve this “butter vs. gun” dilemma, revealing a need for democratic debate at the national level on the issue. Moreover, the sustainability of this effort seems difficult to reconcile with the fiscal discipline imposed by the Stability and Growth Pact, under which EU member states commit to maintaining a deficit of less than 3% of GDP and public debt below or equal to 60% of GDP. Could the current imperative to revitalize the European defense sector serve as a basis for reforming the EU’s fiscal framework? This seems uncertain, as it has just been revised, but the Polish case, for instance, advocates for relaxing the debt correction trajectory rules to reconcile them with the need to increase defense budgets.

The European Commission has been working since 2022 to encourage member states to synchronize their efforts and is seeking solutions to increase funding at the European level. The new European Commissioner for Defense, Andrius Kubilius, aims to put €500 billion on the table for the next ten years, without waiting for the next multiannual financial framework in 2028 (the EU’s seven-year budget). Several possibilities are already being explored: expanded use of frozen Russian assets, revising the European Investment Bank’s lending policy to support defense investments, creating a defense fund financed by common debt, and using Cohesion Funds for military infrastructure projects. None of these options have unanimous support as of yet. The budget and financial volume allocated to defense will, however, be decisive in calibrating the level of ambition for the European approach.

It will also be essential to make these investments in a coherent manner across the EU, particularly through joint acquisitions. These are necessary to reach the critical mass of orders that allow states to achieve economies of scale and for industry to resize its production model, as well as to promote the harmonization of capacity standards and thus interoperability of European forces.

To face these challenges and continue on its path toward assuming responsibility for defense, the European Union will need unity and political will. In recent years, the European Commission has gradually asserted itself in the field of defense industry and now plays a key role in promoting cooperation between member states, as evidenced by the initiatives deployed since 2022 on ammunition production and joint acquisitions, as well as the publication of an industrial defense strategy and the proposal for a European Defense Industry Program. However, the European executive cannot do it all on its own. European leadership in defense will also need to be embodied by the member states.

Poland’s military buildup, its firmness towards Russia, and its role as head of the EU Council from January 2025 make it the new indispensable actor on the European scene. But the EU’s progress on defense must also be able to rely on the historical engines of European cooperation and integration: France – with its operational experience, nuclear deterrence, and longstanding stance in favor of European responsibility for defense – and Germany, with its economic power. If Paris and Berlin manage to overcome their respective internal political crises, the three countries of the Weimar Triangle could together have the potential to strengthen European defense and demonstrate the Union’s determination to support and integrate Ukraine. Reconciling the strategic analyses and political priorities, which are sometimes divergent, of these three countries would not constitute an insurmountable obstacle but, on the contrary, would guarantee balance and act as a driver of cooperation and integration.