Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) in Syria: the Final Step on the Road to Normalisation?

Since Bashar al-Assad’s flight during the night of 7 to 8 December 2024, Syria has entered a new phase in its history: the transitional government led by Ahmad al-Chaara is attempting to restore the unity of the State, rebuild institutions destroyed by fourteen years of civil war, and restore Syria’s regional and international legitimacy. Yet the country remains exhausted, fragmented and marked by deep uncertainty. In this context, the DDR process – disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration – constitutes one of the central levers for containing risks of fragmentation, reducing the circulation of weapons, and rebuilding a shared national framework. However, the challenges remain significant. What is the current security situation in Syria? How are the government and the population approaching this DDR process? An overview with Kassim Bouhou, Associate Research Fellow at IRIS.

Since the fall of the Bashar al-Assad regime and the establishment of the transitional government under the leadership of Ahmad al-Chaara, how would you assess the current security situation in Syria?

Syria remains a fragmented country, facing a very high risk of “Somalisation” in many regions of its territory.

First in the East, the Kurds of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have not joined the new Syrian political and military institutions. Despite the compromise signed on 10 March 2025 between the SDF and the al-Chaara transitional government, the situation remains extremely tense along the demarcation line, which stretches as far as certain districts of Aleppo. Despite a continual reduction in American personnel (there are currently 900 U.S. soldiers out of the initial 2,000), the SDF still feels supported by the presence of several American training camps under their control. The announcement, following the meeting between Ahmad al-Chaara and Donald Trump in Washington on 10 November 2025, of the opening of an American military base has sealed cooperation between U.S. forces in the Middle East under Central Command (Centcom) and the central government’s security organs. It is important to stress that the SDF played a decisive role in the war against Daesh. It is a mosaic of armed groups composed of members of Arab Bedouin tribes and Kurdish fighters from the People’s Protection Units (YPG). While the latter remain deeply mistrustful of the Syrian authorities, the Arab tribes of the SDF consider that the time has come to return to the fold of Damascus.

In the North, Turkey, a major ally of the new government, maintains a significant military presence aimed at both expanding its influence in the region and containing Kurdish ambitions. Turkey faces a dual power dynamic. On the one hand, it is engaged in negotiations with Abdullah Öcalan, in which the demilitarisation of the PKK is the cornerstone; on the other hand, it is conducting containment operations against the SDF and its territories through several military interventions. Ankara considers the presence of those it calls “terrorists” on its border a casus belli. Rather than launching a major military operation at this stage, Turkey favours strong support for Damascus’ normalisation process within the international community, with the objective of ending Kurdish autonomy in north-eastern Syria and reducing separatist risks.

In the South, Israeli forces are stationed in what Tel Aviv describes as a “security zone”, seized in December 2024. In addition to the Golan Heights, Israel occupies certain southern territories and conducts strikes on various military sites considered suspicious or hostile to its security. Israel pursues several objectives in Syria, including preventing the new authorities from challenging its military superiority in the region, driving out Hizbullah affiliates who had at one point found refuge in Syria to reorganise and prepare for the post-Nasrallah era, and exercising a form of “protectorate” over the Druze, who are considered a quasi-protected minority in the Golan Heights – 1,660 Druze out of 22,000 hold Israeli nationality. Deadly clashes have repeatedly occurred in the south of the country between Syrian security forces and certain Druze militias, fuelling persistent secessionist risks.

Syria continues to experience recurring episodes of violence between the new authorities and the ethnoreligious mosaic that spans the country. Several thousand Alawites, the community from which the Assad family originates, most of whom were civilians, are believed to have been massacred earlier this year along the coast. The threat of the so-called Islamic State (IS) has by no means been eradicated. The jihadist group occupies vast desert areas in central and eastern Syria, from where it launches raids and ambushes against Syrian security forces and civilians. It has strengthened its capabilities following the U.S. withdrawal from SDF-held areas and the collapse of the Assad regime, which abandoned numerous weapons stockpiles. IS operates in “gaps” between areas held respectively by the SDF and Syrian forces. The group’s “foreign brigade”, composed of French fighters, remains highly active and has rejected all calls to disarm and join regular forces.

The DDR (disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration) process is not limited to security matters alone; it also requires social and community reintegration. How is the government addressing reconciliation between former combatants, civilians and minorities? In your view, what are the essential conditions for lasting stabilisation in post-Assad Syria?

A symbolic moment can be chosen to demonstrate the new authorities’ commitment to security reform, of which DDR is one of the key components, as well as its wider impact. During the annual Concordia Summit in New York on 22 September 2025, Syrian President Ahmad al-Chaara met with former U.S. General David Petraeus. The event received widespread media coverage due to the complex history between the two men. As commander of U.S. forces in Iraq, Petraeus oversaw the arrest of al-Chaara in 2006 when he was leading the group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). This meeting was therefore perceived as a significant gesture of reconciliation and dialogue. Al-Chaara used the opportunity to reaffirm his position on the disarmament of militias in Syria, stating that all armed groups, including Kurdish factions, must surrender their weapons to the Syrian State.

This statement forms part of a broader set of measures taken by his government to centralise military power and ensure the country’s stability. The Syrian State makes no secret of the fact that groups refusing to comply with this directive will be excluded from the national dialogue process. Indeed, the DDR process is seen as a key step in bringing Syria out of international isolation, building a State committed to comprehensive reconstruction supported by the international community, particularly following the decision by U.S. President Donald Trump and the European Union to lift sanctions on Syria.

Although the process concerns all combatants, the greatest challenge lies in preventing the Alawite community — the minority to which the Assad family belongs and which formed the backbone of the former regime’s military and security apparatus — from being left without prospects. With the collapse of the regime, hundreds of thousands of soldiers, most of them Alawites, were demobilised with no alternative offered, in a deteriorated economic context with almost no employment opportunities. To succeed, the DDR process must be seen as one component of a wider project to transform the security, political, economic and social sectors.

Some former Alawite officers have formed militias that launched violent operations beginning in March 2025, provoking bloody reprisals and the deaths of many civilians. This cycle is fuelled by Iranian support — protector of a defeated Shiite proxy — and by former Assad regime officials who are organising to escape transitional justice.

In this context, DDR must help curb the proliferation of weapons and lower the risk of internal conflict, especially in areas affected by sectarian or tribal tensions. In Liberia and Colombia, combined with transitional justice mechanisms, these programmes supported former combatants in returning to civilian life, enabling social and professional rehabilitation and reintegration within State institutions.

In the Syrian case, addressing the issue of demobilised combatants — particularly among Alawites — within a unified national framework would help strengthen trust among different social components and ensure that no group is targeted for political or sectarian reasons. These programmes would also demonstrate the transitional government’s willingness to address humanitarian and security concerns, facilitating the return of international support and reconstruction funding.

The establishment of a Support Fund, modelled on those set up in Iraq, Sudan or Gaza, appears indispensable in this regard. This fund, placed under the direct supervision of the Syrian government, must enable the development of specific rehabilitation pathways for all armed groups regardless of their origins, and guarantee transparent and efficient resource management. Part of the funds could support balanced justice and the restoration of social cohesion. Arab States, particularly Saudi Arabia, present themselves as major financial backers of reconstruction. Their experience in Yemen and Iraq, as well as their involvement with transnational operators, would be decisive for the success of the process.

Syria faces challenges similar to those of Iraq. The coherence of DDR will depend less on disarmament than on the State’s ability to prioritise these actors without excluding them. A model of “negotiated” rather than centralised security will probably have to be pursued.

How is this process perceived by the Syrian population?

There is still little talk of a “social contract” in Syria, but the new authorities claim they aim to bring people together. The Syrian President reiterated this in September 2025 at the United Nations General Assembly, where he called for “reconstruction based on the foundations of a new State, through the creation of institutions and regulatory laws that guarantee the rights of all, without exception”.

The Syrian population is weary after more than a decade of war, affected by extreme poverty and the mass exodus of its skilled workers, which has devastated schools, hospitals and the economy at large. Local human rights organisations recall that if Syrians still show patience despite living conditions that have not improved since the fall of the Assad regime, it is because there remains a collective awareness of the country’s immense difficulties, along with a form of goodwill. The lifting of U.S. sanctions, particularly the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act, will be essential to restoring hope. This issue was central to discussions between Trump and al-Chaara on 10 November in Washington.

In a large-scale study published on 18 September 2025 by the Arab Center based in Washington, only 47% of surveyed Syrians stated that they trust the current government to dissolve armed groups. Most of the Syrian population does not trust either the capacity of the State or its new power instruments to guarantee security. Past traumas linked to communal violence and the loss of State legitimacy continue to fuel distrust. Druze, Shiite, Christian and Kurdish minorities believe that Sunnis benefit more than others from political and military power.

The fear of a security vacuum is particularly strong. In some communities, the sense of vulnerability is such that people wonder who would protect them if attacks occur. This fear is even stronger in areas where the State does not exercise effective control or where militias previously offered a form of communal protection. This is notably the case for the Druze community in Sweida, which has remained barricaded and heavily armed since the summer 2025 clashes with the army controlled by Damascus.

For many communities, disarmament without strong economic alternatives is equivalent to giving up a means of survival. The abandonment of weapons stockpiles by the former regime has opened a vast black market enabling enrichment and financing of jihadist or criminal activities. The NGO Small Arms Survey reports that tens of thousands of Syrian small arms and light weapons are believed to have already been stolen or trafficked. In certain Syrian regions, the price of an AK-type assault rifle has dropped to a quarter of its pre-collapse market value. In Lebanon, such weapons can be obtained for as little as 50 dollars. The proliferation of Syrian-origin small arms is set to become a regional and international security issue.