Benin: What Does the 7 December Coup Attempt Reveal?

With the attempted overthrow of President Patrice Talon on 7 December, Benin has revisited its old military demons. Despite a succession of coups in the aftermath of its independence on 1 August 1960, the former Dahomey had experienced no interference or attempted interference by the military in the political sphere since the coup led by Mathieu Kérékou on 26 October 1972, followed in early 1990 by a resounding “National Conference of the Vital Forces of the Nation”, which ushered the country into a long period of pluralistic and legalistic stability. Often held up as an example, this sequence of “democratic governance” has just been swept away by a handful of officers.

Although loyalist forces quickly regained control with the support of external actors (France, Nigeria, Côte d’Ivoire, among others), the event must, of course, be taken very seriously, despite motivations that remain unclear. The appearance on national television of Lieutenant-Colonel Pascal Tigri, head of the Special Forces attached to the Marina Palace, seat of the presidency, to announce the removal of the head of state, cannot be reduced to mere corporate frustration on the eve of the Christmas holidays. It is rooted in extremely degraded national and sub-regional contexts, which have only made possible a derailment of the kind to which Africa is accustomed in the run-up to, or in the aftermath of, a decisive election [1].

A polarised political scene

For several months now, the political landscape has indeed fractured as the presidential election scheduled for 12 April 2026 approaches. Despite the outgoing president’s decision not to stand again, everything appears to have been put in place to ensure that his designated successor, the Minister of Economy and Finance, Romuald Wadagni, enjoys a solo run without any serious challenger or major obstacle. Two recent developments illustrate this absolutist temptation. First, on 22 October, the Electoral Commission rejected the candidacy of lawyer Renaud Agbodjo, candidate of the Democrats party (LD), the main opposition force founded by Thomas Boni Yayi, Patrice Talon’s predecessor and sworn enemy, who was in power from 2006 to 2016. This decision triggered a gradual radicalisation of the political landscape. Far from being a coincidence, Chabi Yayi, the son of the former president and an LD member, was arrested on the morning of 14 December before being released pending a summons following post-coup investigations. As the country’s chief financial officer since 2016, Romuald Wadagni is therefore expected mainly to face the moderate and relatively low-profile opponent Paul Hounkpè of the Forces Cauris for an Emerging Benin (FCBE).

The adoption, on 15 November, of a controversial constitutional reform carried by the presidential majority has only exacerbated the crisis. By authorising the extension of the presidential term from five to seven years while creating a second chamber—a kind of Council of Elders composed of appointed members—this reform would, according to the opposition, allow Patrice Talon to retain control over power, and thus over the country. On one side, an omniscient presidential camp; on the other, an opposition deliberately weakened and prevented from putting forward its key figures for the 2026 election.

Authoritarian drift

This climate is further burdened by a witch-hunt that has targeted numerous figures regardless of political affiliation, but with clearly stated electoral ambitions. This modus operandi appears to be the hallmark of the Talon regime. In September 2024, the presidential ambitions of businessman Olivier Boko, right-hand man of the head of state and number two of the regime, were dashed by his arrest for “attempting to undermine state security”, on the orders of the powerful Court for the Repression of Economic Offences and Terrorism (CRIET). In May 2023, the influential Minister of Foreign Affairs, Aurélien Agbénonci—another figure from Patrice Talon’s inner circle—was abruptly dismissed from the government. Shortly before the presidential election of 11 April 2021, excessive exposure led to the arrest and sentencing to 20 years’ imprisonment of former minister and Democrats candidate Reckya Madougou for “conspiracy against state authority”. The same fate befell constitutional law specialist Joël Aïvo. By creating the impression that only the presidential camp dictates the tempo, these “judicial” cases have gradually reinforced, among a segment of public opinion, the sense of a genuine authoritarian drift in the regime.

Sub-regional threats

To these internal tensions must be added a critical security situation, driven by the activism of jihadist groups—Jama’at Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM), affiliated with Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara—in the northern regions [2], but now also in the centre of the country, with the emergence of the Nigerian group Mahmuda, responsible for repeated incursions into the Borgou department (central-east). Despite rising military expenditure and initiatives presented as innovative, such as Operation Mirador—which seeks to contain jihadist advances through the involvement of local populations—the Beninese Armed Forces (FAB) are struggling to stem these violent groups, whose objective is to reach the coastline [3]. This push towards the littoral has been described as a “deliberate strategy” by ACLED in a recent report [4].

After the Liptako-Gourma region shared by Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, a new space of jihadist confrontation is currently forming along the border between Benin, Niger and Nigeria [5]. “The repercussions of regional instability are observable in the neighbouring states of Benin and Togo, where the advance of JNIM operations constitutes a strategic expansion rather than a mere spillover,” ACLED notes. Did the would-be putschists of 7 December seek to take control of the country’s defence? It is too early to say. But there is no doubt that political tensions, as well as multifaceted external threats, constitute so many casus belli that convinced certain seditious elements to cross the Rubicon.

Logically, and because its own survival is at stake in the face of the epidemic of coups in West Africa, the reaction of ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) was all the more rapid. Faced with the risk of an uncontrollable “contagion” of putsches following that of 23 November in Guinea-Bissau, as well as those in Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Guinea, the sub-regional organisation was forced to consider military intervention, on pain of further eroding its credibility.

The risk of Benin tipping over was all the more evident given that the pro-Russian and anti-Western regime in Niger has also played its part by multiplying attacks and efforts to delegitimise Patrice Talon over recent months. The head of the junta, Abdourahamane Tiani, even accused his neighbour of hosting French bases aimed at overthrowing him [6]. Had it succeeded, the coup attempt of 7 December would not only have enabled Niamey to gain an ally with easier access to the Port of Cotonou, its natural hub, but would also have allowed the Alliance of Sahel States (AES)—whose three member countries have withdrawn from ECOWAS—to extend its sphere of influence by rallying a new country to its cause.

While collusion between the mutineers and Niger has not yet been definitively established, the issuance of an arrest warrant on 14 December against the pro-Russian “influencer” of Beninese origin, Stellio Gilles Robert Capo Chichi, alias Kemi Seba, nevertheless points to Niamey’s ambiguous role. Appointed “special” adviser to Abdourahamane Tiani in 2024, this spearhead of an anti-Talon vendetta was quick to hail the coup on his social media accounts. Moreover, according to Jeune Afrique, Niamey had been informed of the operation in advance and even provided assistance to the mutineers.

Abandon Rajoelina, save Talon

The jihadist threat, political crisis and manoeuvring scenarios orchestrated by juntas fuelled by anti-French resentment convinced Paris to become rapidly involved in this case and to mobilise its partners. Emmanuel Macron, who was hosting Nigerian President Bola Tinubu on an official visit to Paris in November 2024, urged the Nigerian leader to come to the aid of the Beninese authorities. For its part, France provided intelligence support and deployed special forces elements to secure the economic capital and track down fleeing mutineers.

This eagerness goes beyond Benin itself. After being expelled from the Sahel, Cotonou remains, for the Élysée, a solid anchor point in the region, especially as Togo has in turn just yielded to Moscow’s overtures by signing a historic military agreement in mid-November. This agreement notably allows Russian vessels to dock freely in the port of Lomé. Hence Emmanuel Macron’s determination to involve himself in this affair in order to better contain the spread of regimes close to the Kremlin—even at the cost of definitively blurring France’s policy in Africa and Paris’s doctrine on the continent.

This rapid mobilisation to save Benin’s imperfect democracy contrasts sharply with the offer of assistance extended by France to Mickaël Randrianirina, the new strongman of Madagascar following the overthrow of President Andry Rajoelina, in order to “support the transition” after the coup on the island.

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[1] Fiacre Vidjigniniou. « Bénin : le coup d’État qui dit tout haut ce que la région murmure », Conflit/Revue de Géopolitique. 13 décembre 2025.

[2] Kars de Bruijne. « Loi de l’attraction. Le Nord du Bénin et le risque de propagation de l’extrémisme violent. Clingendael ». Institut néerlandais de Relations Internationales. Juin 2021.

[3] Hadrien Degiorgi. « Bénin : une nouvelle attaque révèle l’extension du péril djihadiste ». Le Point Afrique. 30 avril 2025.

[4] Voir aussi Kars de Bruijne. « Le conflit s’intensifie et l’instabilité s’étend au-delà du Burkina Faso, du Mali et du Niger ». Acled. 12 décembre 2024.

[5] Héni Nsaibia. Nouvelles lignes de front : l’expansion djihadiste redessine les contours de la frontière entre le Bénin, le Niger et le Nigeria. Acled et Institut Clingeldaen. 27 mars 2025.

[6] Mathieu Millecamps et Mawunyo Hermann Boko. « Cinq questions pour comprendre pourquoi la crise s’enlise entre Talon et Tiani », Jeune Afrique, 17 juin 2025.