Interviews / Africa/s
20 April 2026
Africa tested by the war in the Middle East
The conflict in the Middle East has destabilised geopolitical, economic and energy balances on a global scale, and the African continent, far from being spared, has not escaped the repercussions of this war. The Israeli-American strikes and the Iranian response have highlighted the diversity of diplomatic positioning across the region, at a time when many states maintain relations with both Washington and Tehran. At the same time, this conflict reveals the vulnerability of African economies to the region. How have these economies been affected by the conflict? Could the current instability in the Middle East offer a strategic opportunity to African states exporting oil and gas, enabling them to strengthen their influence within the energy sector? An analysis by Francis Laloupo, Associate Research Fellow at IRIS.
How are African states positioning themselves in relation to the conflict in the Middle East?
From the outset of the conflict, the African Union (AU), by calling for an immediate ceasefire, sought to reaffirm its attachment to international law. Considering that an escalation in the Middle East would risk worsening global instability, the Chairperson of the AU Commission, Mahamoud Ali Youssouf, relayed the concerns of many African countries by warning of the consequences of this war, particularly for energy markets, food security and economic resilience. Once again, in light of current developments, the AU sought to reaffirm its commitment to respect for international law and the virtues of multilateralism. At both national and regional level, several leaders very quickly highlighted the foreseeable economic impacts of this conflict on the continent. While the AU insists that the conflict in the Middle East “poses a serious risk” to Africa, emphasis is regularly placed on the political significance of the event. In this regard, and beyond the broad principles set out by the AU, national positions are far more diverse. While some countries, such as Senegal and South Africa, unequivocally condemned the Israeli-American offensive while expressing concern over violations of international law, others, such as Morocco and Chad, mainly deplored the attacks targeting Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, a number of states opted for a balanced position, condemning both a war deemed illegitimate and launched by the United States and Israel, while also denouncing Iran’s targeting of the Gulf states. One may also note the discretion shown by the leaders of the military regimes in the Sahel, confronted with a thorny diplomatic equation. As allies of Russia and resolute supporters of Moscow in its illegal war against Ukraine, it is difficult for them to join those denouncing violations of international law in the Middle East. Added to this diplomatic embarrassment is the delicate dual management of their security and economic partnership with Tehran, alongside the recent reactivation of their cooperation with the United States.
Has the conflict in the Middle East changed the way African states view Trump’s United States?
The conflict will inevitably affect relations between the United States and a number of African countries, even though African leaders are showing clear caution towards the Trump administration. While most of them hope that this war will not fundamentally disrupt existing cooperation frameworks with the United States, it is fair to say that it does little to strengthen trust in the American leader. Within ruling circles in Senegal, South Africa and Nigeria, attention is drawn to Donald Trump’s unpredictability, and his tendency to favour the law of force over the primacy of law and international norms. On a continent still marked by the memory of colonialism, principles such as the right of peoples to self-determination and territorial sovereignty constitute cardinal values that are widely shared. The conflict in Iran casts particular light on the hostile stance adopted by Donald Trump towards South Africa since his return to the White House, as well as on his reckless interference in Nigeria’s security policy. The reshaping of cooperation with Africa sought by Donald Trump will certainly be affected by the conflict in Iran. Given their various vulnerabilities, African countries are approaching a new phase in their relations with the United States in different ways, balancing pragmatism, mistrust and caution.
How is the war in Iran affecting African economies and the transportation of energy resources?
The initial warnings issued by states have been confirmed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), which, in an emergency report, warned of a trade shock likely to affect both the cost of living and state budgets. The various reactions reflect one reality: that of the partnerships developed over recent years between African countries and those of the Near and Middle East. It should be noted that the Middle East accounts for 15.8% of the continent’s imports and 10.9% of its exports. The ongoing conflict is dealing a severe blow to the activities, transactions and opportunities that have developed over the past twenty years through private and individual enterprises between Africa and the Gulf countries. From the very first week of the conflict that began on 28 February 2026, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) warned of the consequences for global oil and gas flows. Among the feared consequences was a potential surge in energy prices in West Africa, a region already affected by inflation and slowing growth. The AU also highlighted threats to food security. Since the economies of most countries depend on oil imports, the difficulties affecting the transportation of these products are already having repercussions on national economies, particularly in Southern Africa. Elsewhere, increases in food prices can be observed, as well as rising fertiliser prices, since production depends on imports of liquefied gas. In an unprecedented move on 7 April, a state of energy emergency was declared in Madagascar. The Malagasy government introduced this measure in response to widespread shortages in a country that is economically fragile and particularly exposed to the oil shock caused by the conflict in the Middle East. UNDP experts estimate that if the conflict lasts more than six months, Africa could experience, on average across the continent, a loss of 0.2 percentage points in GDP growth in 2026.
To what extent could the conflict in the Middle East benefit the energy sector of certain African states, which could be perceived as poles of stability compared with countries affected by the war?
In principle, and through a substitution effect, some African oil- and gas-exporting countries could benefit from the instability in the Middle East. This notably concerns major exporters such as Nigeria, Africa’s leading oil producer, and Algeria, the continent’s leading gas producer and fourth-largest oil producer. To a lesser extent, Angola, Congo, Chad, Libya, South Sudan and Gabon could also benefit from emerging opportunities, given soaring crude oil prices. However, this possibility must be qualified, as these countries do not all possess the same production capacities. Algeria, which is energy self-sufficient, has substantial export capacity, while Nigeria, a major exporter, is now home to Africa’s largest refinery. Aside from these two examples, the other producing countries face multiple structural fragilities: dependence on imports of refined fuel, shortages, rising prices, electricity supply deficits and reliance on subsidies. This is without mentioning the natural decline in oil and gas reserves in certain countries, which leaves them facing almost the same budgetary difficulties as non-oil-producing states. All these factors lead us to qualify the ability of African oil producers to fully benefit from soaring prices and from their potential status as alternative suppliers. In other words, the tree of opportunity fails to conceal the forest of structural vulnerabilities.