Singapore: a forerunner in addressing Islamist terrorism with a counter-ideology

“If ever there is an attack in Singapore, it will severely damage not just our physical infrastructure, but also the harmonious ethnic relations that underpin our existence as a nation”[1]Prior to 2001, Singaporean authorities had had little interest in addressing the terrorism issue. declared Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong in 2006. The likelihood of a terrorist attack in Singapore in the aftermath of 9/11 became a central feature of its national security.

 

Despite economic success and harsh legislation, the threat of Islamist terrorism had developed in Singapore under the leadership of home-grown Ibrahim Maidin, leader of Jemaah Islamiyah’s Mantiqi 1. And yet Singapore was not meant to be a favourable place for harbouring terrorists within its population. Ibrahim Maidin managed to develop his home-grown network thanks to its international connections to Afghan jihad veterans and regional terror group Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). In the very wake of 9/11, attacks on Singapore’s Changi international airport and a US Marine naval base were foiled thanks to a first wave of arrests of JI members under the Internal Security Act (ISA) enforced in 1960. Following failures to strike Singapore, JI later opted to target the holiday island of Bali, Indonesia, killing 202 including 88 Australians in October 2002.

 

Wedged between its Malaysian and Indonesian neighbours, Singapore is located at the very centre of Southeast Asia’s terrorist threat. It was the first Southeast Asian state to recognise the presence of JI operatives on its own soil and took a proactive role in the fight against radical Islam. Because military means alone are not efficient enough to curb radicalisation, Singapore has developed a multi-pronged approach designed to “de-radicalise” and rehabilitate detainees sentenced for terrorism. Prisons indeed are breeding grounds for the spread of radicalism. Sentenced for petty thefts in the 1990s, Richard Reid and Khaled Kelkal embraced radical Islam under detention. The former tried to bomb an airplane from Paris to Miami in December 2001, whereas the latter became a GIA terrorist responsible for the wave of bombings in France in 1995. As these examples show, radicalisation in prisons needs to be addressed by public authorities in order to reduce its harmful impact on the society. The Singapore method of counter-radicalisation has consisted in emphasising the vital significance of ideology. The authorities’ ultimate goal is to prevent inter-community relationships from worsening.

 

 

14.9% of five-million Singaporean citizens are of Muslim faith[2], which accounts for the second largest religious community after Buddhists. As a whole, Singapore is made up by a pluri-religious and multiethnic mosaic gathering large Buddhist, Christian and Muslim communities as well as Taoist and Hindu minorities[3]. By noticing this rich religious diversity, ensuring peaceful inter-community relationships has become apparent to maintain social cohesion within the nation. This tiny city-state was compelled to act proactively to prevent the danger of radicalism from harming social harmony between religious communities. Singapore feared that several terror attacks such as 9/11 and the 2002 Bali bombings could arouse suspicion between the Muslim community and non-Muslim communities. Given Singapore’s multi-religious society, its vital national security interest was to address the issue of radicalism as quickly as possible on two accounts. Firstly, jihadist radicalisation has challenged Singapore’s social resilience over the years. Secondly, deradicalisation success has depended on the possibility for a former radical detainee to return to the mainstream society. That is why then-Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong established “Inter-Racial Confidence Circles” mixing Malay Muslims, Indians and Chinese citizens just a month after the discovery of Singapore’s JI cell. IRCC’s main goal was to build a “safety net”[4] between communities if ever an attack was to occur.

 

Singapore’s counter-ideological strategy lays mainly in the Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG), a gathering of twenty Islamic scholars whose work was to initiate dialogue with terrorist detainees on a voluntary basis. In order for release to be contemplated, such a program has to be implemented successfully. In the framework of the Community Engagement Program (CEP) introduced in 2006, community leaders have greatly contributed to make deradicalisation a Singaporean success. Indeed, government efforts alone would not satisfy the need for counter-ideology. That is why prompting community leaders to head the fight against radicalism turned out to be a highly valuable asset. Islamic scholars were the most involved since they were able to reach the community directly through the mosque or madrasas.

 

 

Such measures were promoted as a way to address radicalisation efficiently. Ongoing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have not reduced the threat of terrorism, nor have they deterred others from embracing radical Islam. On the contrary, the general conduct of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) has angered Muslims worldwide. Consequently, supporting dialogue between scholars and detainees was designed to short-circuit the process of radicalisation. Psychological assistance and teachings on Islam were proposed. Scholars aimed at teaching prisoners a true and peaceful interpretation of Islam, which was actually an interpretation endorsed by the Singaporean government. Fighting radicalisation was made possible thanks to the use of counter-ideological responses. US journalist Maria Ressa declared that the most effective way to address radicalism was to “fight ideology with ideology”[5]. As a result, the unpaid RRG members have become JI detainees’ counsellors and have endeavoured to counter JI’s distorted vision of Islam. Singapore authorities as well as community leaders have done their utmost to encourage former individuals engaged in extremism to adopt a non-violent Islam compatible with the mainstream society.

 

A wide array of community-based initiatives greatly helped the Religious Rehabilitation Group to carry out its duties with success. By the Singapore Peace Initiative[6] and the P4peace forum[7], the internet has been a great tool in the hands of Singapore leaders to target the youth. Beyond the relevance of essential ideological dialogue, the originality of the Singapore approach has been to offer assistance to the whole family instead of focusing solely on the detainee. The RRG also offered counselling sessions to their wives and children to prevent second-generation terrorists. Furthermore, because the prisoner is commonly thought to be the breadwinner, detention may affect the family’s income. As a result of such knowledge, Singaporean policymakers further fortified their deradicalisation strategy by setting up aftercare programs with financial and psychological aid, as well as educational assistance for the prisoner’s children.

 

 

About two thirds of terrorist detainees have already been released[8]. Figures show that since the outset of rehabilitation and deradicalisation programs in Singapore, none of the detainees who underwent these programs has ever resumed any terrorist activity[9]. With some more material assistance, clerics have successfully managed to put these former radicals back on the right track. The use of former radicals, who once were involved in extremism, is greatly helpful to assist the government in shaping its counter-ideological response.

 

The growing efficiency and usefulness of Singapore’s counter-radicalisation method have raised the interest of a large number of international observers and states. Despite its non-universalised aspect, the threat of Islamist terrorism has globalised. Several states dealing with Islamist extremism have been prompted to carry out similar counter-ideological programs. Mainly based on psychological assistance and religious counselling, Singapore’s method has been praised by US Marine Major-General Douglas Stone. Former commander of Task Force 134 in charge of Iraqi prisons from April 2007 to June 2008, he advocated such a program to be implemented in order to reduce the likelihood of extremism in detention centres[10]. In addition, in the wake of the 2003 Riyadh bombings, Saudi Arabia and Yemen promoted similar methods to challenge the “underlying beliefs that support and encourage violence”[11]. These initiatives symbolise the rising importance of soft power measures in addressing the radicalisation issue. The launching of such soft power methods in these countries has resulted in former terrorist detainees being less likely to resume extremism. However, some hardliners may reject any deradicalisation initiative if their degree of radicalism has risen too high. Eventually, one cannot but notice that the reluctance of hardliners may establish the limits of such programs.