



# INTEGRATION OF THE EUROPEAN CAPABILITY PROCESS IN MEMBER STATES' ADMINISTRATION

## The Estonian case

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Tony Lawrence has worked at ICDS since 2006 on a variety of defence policy issues, including the future of NATO's Baltic Air Policing mission, European defence policy, air defence of the three Baltic states, and the maritime aspects of deterrence and defence in the Baltic region. Between 2005 and 2013, Tony was also an Assistant Professor at the Baltic Defence College, responsible for the design and delivery of around 50% of the annual Higher Command Studies Course.

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## ABSTRACT

This paper explores the degree to which, and how, Estonia has used the Capability Development Plan (CDP), the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD), Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), and the European Defence Fund (EDF) in its national defence planning and acquisition policies and practices. Consistent with its view of the respective roles of NATO and the EU in defence, Estonia largely disregards the outputs of the CDP and CARD in its defence planning, focusing instead on national and NATO-derived requirements. Estonia is, however, a strong advocate for the role that EU support and funding can play in building Europe's defence capabilities. It is a willing participant in PESCO and strongly encourages its defence industry to participate in EDF projects, where Estonian entities have achieved relatively high levels of success in fields such as cyber, robotics, sensors, and surveillance technologies.

**Keywords:** Estonia | EU capability development mechanism | Defence cooperation | Defence industry

## INTRODUCTION

Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has had far-reaching impacts on European security. It has shaped a common understanding among European states of the threat Russia poses and the need to respond to it on many fronts, including defence. This understanding was reflected in new strategy documents published shortly after the invasion: NATO's revised Strategic Concept and the EU's Strategic Compass (North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO], 2022; European Union, European External Action Service [EU, EEAS], 2022). NATO's subsequent transformation saw it enlarge to Sweden and Finland and renew its commitment to defence and deterrence, requiring considerable increases in defence spending by the allies. The EU has perhaps transformed to an even greater extent. Through its substantial military assistance to Ukraine via the European Peace Facility and its training mission, EUMAM Ukraine, for example, it has significantly increased its role as a security policy actor.

The war also drove the EU to step up efforts in military capability building, with new initiatives such as the European Defence Industry Reinforcement through Common Procurement Act (EDIRPA) and the Regulation on Supporting Ammunition Production (ASAP). By encouraging collaboration in armaments acquisition among the Member States, these initiatives aimed to bolster European defence capabilities, increase Europe's military assistance to Ukraine, and strengthen the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB).

They built upon an earlier generation of EU initiatives with broadly similar aims, notably those launched or operationalised following the publication of the 2016 EU Global Strategy, which set out a much higher level of ambition for EU defence (EU, EEAS, 2016). These included the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD), Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), and the European Defence Fund (EDF). Together with the Capability Development Plan (CDP) and the Overarching Strategic Research Agenda (OSRA), they continue to be the main components of the EU's capability development process.

Over the past decade, these instruments have been welcomed and exploited to varying degrees by the Member States. Experience in and lessons from their operation may help ensure the success of more recent EU armaments initiatives, including the European Defence Industry Programme, adopted at the end of 2025, and other measures that may flow from the European Defence Industry Strategy. The aim of this paper is to investigate the degree to which, and how, one Member State, Estonia, has used of the four main instruments of the EU's capability development process in its national defence planning and acquisition policies and practices.

## CONTEXT: ESTONIA AND EU DEFENCE

Since the re-establishment of its independence in 1991, Estonia's security policy has been dominated by concerns about Russia. These concerns were sometimes underplayed in front of the allies and partners who accused Estonia and those who thought similarly of 'paranoia' (see, for example, Diehl, 2014). But the dramatic degradation of the European security environment since 2022 has allowed Estonia to state clearly that Russia is its "greatest security threat" and that this threat is both "existential" and "long-term" (Government of Estonia, 2023, p. 6). i.e., that Russia presents, and will continue to present, a military threat to Estonia's territorial integrity. Estonia's policy response to this threat, largely unchanged since the early 1990s, has been twofold: strengthening its own defence posture, and seeking integration with Euro-Atlantic security structures. Joining NATO, which Estonia achieved in 2004, was always seen as the primary means to guarantee national security, while joining the EU, also achieved in the same year, was seen mainly in economic and political terms (Haab, 1995).

Estonia maintained this perception following its accession to both NATO and the EU, remaining sceptical of any developments within the EU that might duplicate or undermine NATO and strongly favouring transatlanticism over notions of European autonomy (Veebel & Ploom, 2022). These sentiments were strengthened by Russia's first invasion of Ukraine in 2014 but, at the same time, Estonia began to warm to the possibilities the EU might offer in supporting military capability development. Indeed, it included security and defence as one of four priorities for its Presidency of the Council of the EU in the second half of 2017, and CARD, PESCO and the EDF were all launched under its stewardship during this period.

The perspective that NATO, due to its transatlantic membership, military expertise and experience, should be solely responsible for Europe's defence while the EU should assist with military capability development and funding has gained ground since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine (Clapp, 2025, p. 1). Following the invasion, Estonia embarked on a substantial and urgent process of capability building. It plans to spend in excess of 5% of GDP on defence in the coming years (Government of Estonia, 2025a) and has identified priorities that include intelligence gathering systems, air defence, long-range strike, larger armed forces and expanded ammunition stocks. It has also urged other allies and Member States to follow suit. In support of this agenda, it insists that EU defence initiatives must support NATO's capability targets (Government of Estonia, 2025b). Furthermore, it advocates EU and Member State funding for the European defence industry, joint borrowing for defence, EU budget support for defence projects of common interest, and easier access for SMEs to EU defence development programmes. It also supports the inclusion of third states in EU defence

initiatives as a means of promoting more options for acquisition programmes and, for similar reasons, objects to ideas of European preference in defence procurement.

In short, primarily driven by perceptions of the military threat posed by Russia and of the pressing need for both itself and Europe-at-large to be able to respond to this threat with corresponding means, Estonia has become one of the leading advocates of an ambitious EU defence policy for building defence capability. This policy priority guides its own participation in EU defence initiatives. It has, for example, applied for substantial funding under the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) equipment procurement initiative—2.3 billion euros, almost 6.5 times its expenditure on defence equipment in 2025 (European Union, European Council & Council of the European Union (EU, EC & CEU), 2026; NATO, 2025, p. 7, 14). At the same time, remaining sceptical of a role for the EU in operational matters, it has so far declined to take part in the EU's Rapid Deployment Capacity (interview 1). Similarly, it is an enthusiastic participant in those earlier EU initiatives that support capability and defence industry development—PESCO and the EDF—but much less supportive of those that do not, and may overlap with NATO tasks—the CDP and the CARD.

## **THE CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT PLAN AND THE COORDINATED ANNUAL REVIEW ON DEFENCE**

The CDP and CARD share the broadly similar objectives of increasing coherence between Member States' defence planning activities and encouraging greater cooperation in capability development (European Union, European Defence Agency (EU, EDA), 2026a; EU, EDA, 2026b.).

Estonia provides the input data required by the European Defence Agency (EDA) to implement these processes, but regards the Agency's outputs as informative, rather than prescriptive. This is factually the case—neither the CDP nor the CARD are intended to be in any way binding—but also reflects the strong conviction among Estonian officials that NATO, the sole organisation for Europe's collective defence, should also be solely responsible for any collective defence planning. Estonia's capability development is thus driven first and foremost by its own national defence development plan, which in turn includes requirements flowing from the capability targets allocated during the NATO Defence Planning Process. In practice, however, there is a great deal of commonality between NATO and EU priorities, in particular since the EU's ambitions for defence capability development have extended to include the full spectrum of capabilities required for high-intensity warfare (EU, EEAS, 2022, p.43).

Estonia recognises the possible value of the CDP and CARD in identifying potential partners for collaborative procurements, but there are many other arrangements through which Member States' plans and wishes are elaborated, including bilateral and minilateral fora (for example, Nordic-Baltic) at all levels (interview 2). More broadly, Estonia does not initiate procurement projects on the basis that a collaborative opportunity exists. First, a requirement must be identified through the national defence development plan. Only then will opportunities for collaboration be considered if either cheaper or more rapid deliveries can be secured by this route. Finally, the possible additional benefits of using EU instruments will be weighed. Estonia's participation in the SAFE initiative, for example, entailed no adjustments to existing procurement plans.

## THE EUROPEAN DEFENCE FUND

Estonia's increasing defence budget and the proven performance of Estonian technologies in Ukraine have recently led the MoD to place more emphasis on the potential of the Estonian defence industry to satisfy domestic needs. Russia's war has also highlighted the importance of supplementing imports with local production to ensure security of supply and local innovation to allow the rapid generation of responses to battlefield developments. This has led to a broad understanding that the defence industry should be considered an integral part of the structures and arrangements that constitute Estonia's defence capability (interview 3).

This marks something of a shift, as Estonia has traditionally placed a great deal of stress on defence industry exports. Even the most recent version of the defence industry policy states its goal as "maintain[ing] and develop[ing] an internationally competitive, export-oriented, and highly developed defence industry in Estonia, which also serves Estonia's national defence goals" (Ministry of Defence (Estonia) (MoD), 2025, p. 4, author translation). This document also establishes targets for the defence sector: by 2030 it should achieve 1.4 billion euros per year in exports and a total sales revenue of 2 billion euros.

In accordance with this policy, the MoD has consistently encouraged Estonian defence companies to participate in EU capability development programmes, which provide both financial support and access to other European defence markets. Estonia was thus an active participant in the two EDF precursor initiatives: the Preparatory Action on Defence Research (2017-2019) and European Defence Industrial Development Programme (EDIDP, 2019-2020). Entities including Cybernetica (technologies for secure digital societies), Talgen Cybersecurity (formerly GT Cyber Technologies, cyber resilience), Defsecintel solutions (autonomous

situational awareness), Milrem (robotics), Marduk technologies (electro-optical systems for counter-drone operations), CAFA Tech (robotics), Rantelon (radio-frequency electronics), and VR Lab (Criffin R&D, virtual reality) benefited both financially and through the connections they built with other European partners (Palavenis, 2024). Four projects involving five Estonian entities received more than 10 million euros from the 2019 EDIDP call, while seven projects involving seven Estonian entities received 6 million euros from the 2020 call, as well as attracting 500,000 euros in Estonian government funding (Estonian Defence and Aerospace Industry Association (EDAIA), 2020; EDAIA, 2021).

The MoD regards the EDF as a very effective instrument for capability development, particularly for medium- to long-term projects and has supported the defence industry's participation, practically and financially, since it was introduced in 2022 (interview 1). It aims to have at least one Estonian entity each year coordinate an EDF project and to support the participation of Estonian entities in at least 2-4 EDF projects that overlap with national goals (MoD, 2026). It thus hosts frequent information days for Estonian entities wishing to apply to the Fund and makes efforts in Brussels to ensure that EDF priorities are in tune with the defence sector's strengths (cyber, robotics and autonomous systems, sensors, communications and surveillance technologies, electronics, personal equipment, vehicle repair and maintenance (MoD, 2025, p. 6)).

The MoD also provides co-funding for some EDF projects involving Estonian entities that accord with Estonia's defence industry strengths or meet the capability needs of the Estonian Defence Forces, which is held in reserve and released if a bid for EDF funding proves successful. The sums involved have steadily increased. A total of 400,000 euros was allocated to Estonian entities participating in projects selected from the 2022 EDF call, and 600,000 from the 2023 call (ERR News, 2023; MoD, 2024). For the period 2025-27, the MoD expects to allocate at least 2 million euros per year in co-funding for EDF projects (MoD, 2025, p. 11).

These efforts have likely contributed to the Estonian defence industry's relative success in EDF participation. From responses to calls issued in 2021, 2022, 2023, and 2024, the Commission has selected a total of 224 projects to be allocated EDF funding (European Union, European Commission (EU, EC), 2022; EU, EC, 2023; EU, EC, 2024; EU, EC, 2025). Estonian entities have participated or are participating in 53 of these, including seven as coordinator (see Table A.1., Annex A). In total, some 28 entities are, or have been, involved, many in multiple projects. CAFA Tech, for example has participated in 14 EDF projects, Cybernetica in nine, Marduk technologies in six, and Talgen Cybersecurity and Milrem each in four. The MoD estimates that

each euro it has invested in co-financing EDF projects has returned an average of approximately 6 euros to the Estonian defence industry (MoD, 2025, p. 11).

## PERMANENT STRUCTURED COOPERATION

Estonia considers PESCO projects to be a useful tool for intergovernmental coordination on defence capability issues (interview 1). Since the launch of the initiative, it has participated in 10 projects that, as with EDF participation, largely reflect Estonian defence industry strengths such as cyber and autonomous systems (see Table A.2., Annex A). These projects span four of the seven project areas recognised by the PESCO secretariat. In four of them, Estonia has acted as coordinator.

Estonia sees particular advantage when PESCO and EDF projects can be linked, including when actions developed in the context of a PESCO project can be leveraged to secure a funding bonus from the EDF. While the EU does not publish details of the projects that benefit in this way—there is no legal linkage between the two instruments—the synergy between the PESCO projects coordinated by Estonia and the EDF projects involving Estonian entities is apparent. The Milrem-led integrated Modular Unmanned Ground System 2 (iMUGS 2) EDF project, for example, which aims, to develop a robotic vehicle for use by land forces, will certainly have benefitted from the harmonisation of requirements in the Estonian-led iMUGS PESCO project. Similarly, there will be strong connections between the Estonian-led Medium size Semi-Autonomous Surface Vehicle PESCO project, and the Euroguard semi-autonomous vessel being developed under the EDF by a consortium led by the Estonian company Baltic Workboats.

Estonian officials, however, also note that the success of individual PESCO projects depends heavily on the quality of leadership (interview 1). Given Estonia's enthusiasm for the EU's support to military capability building, it is likely to be an active user of any such tools. However, this will be for practical reasons—Estonia will be a user of tools that deliver advantages such as cost savings or earlier deliveries, but not a committed supporter of an expanding EU of defence.

## CONCLUSIONS

Estonia regards NATO as the sole forum through which collective defence should be planned and executed but has also become a strong advocate for the use of EU instruments and funding to assist in building the military capability that collective defence and other defence tasks require. This understanding, which has broad consensus across the defence establishment, drives its own use of the tools that constitute the EU's capability development process: its defence planning is based on its own national defence development plan which is, in turn, informed by the capability targets that flow from the NATO defence planning process. The CDP and CARD may thus sometimes be useful in identifying opportunities for defence collaboration but are not considered as inputs to defence planning.

By contrast, and to the extent that resources allow, Estonia is a willing participant in PESCO projects and strongly encourages the Estonian defence industry to participate in the EDF. It also welcomes the synergies that can be found between these two initiatives. Through practical and financial support, Estonia has found some success here. It has achieved relatively high levels of participation by Estonian entities in EDF projects that play to the strengths of the defence industry, and relatively high levels of coordination of PESCO projects.

Overall, it might be concluded that Estonia does not view the EU's capability development process as any kind of coherent whole, but rather as a discrete set of instruments to be used on a case-by-case basis when they can deliver advantages.

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## INTERVIEWS

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2. Defence official (acquisition), 7 January 2026.
3. Defence industry representative, 18 December 2025.

## ANNEX: ESTONIA'S PARTICIPATION IN THE EDF AND PESCO

### THE EDF

**Table 1: Participation of Estonian entities in EDF selected projects.**

Category	Project	Estonian Entity/Entities *: project coordinator	EU Funding (project) (m euros)
2021 calls: 60 projects selected with total EU support of almost 1.2 billion euros			
Cyber	EU-GUARDIAN - European framework and proofs-of-concept for the intelligent aUtomAtion of cybeR Defence Incident mAnagement	CYBERNETICA AS	13.5
Digital Transformation	EDOCC - European Defence Operational Collaborative Cloud	GUARDTIME OÜ DEFSECINTEL SOLUTIONS OÜ	40.0
Digital Transformation	FaRADAI - Frugal and Robust AI for Defence Advanced Intelligence	DEFSECINTEL SOLUTIONS OÜ	18.5
Energy and Environment	INDY - Energy Independent and Efficient Deployable Military Camps	CAFA TECH OÜ	14.2
Energy and Environment	NOMAD - NOvel energy storage technologies usable at MilitAry Deployments in forward operating bases	SKELETON TECHNOLOGIES OÜ	19.7
Information Superiority	5G COMPAD - 5G Communications for Peacekeeping And Defence	CAFA TECH OÜ	27.0
Medical Response and CBRN	TeChBioT - Surveillance and Reconnaissance Techniques for Chemical and Biological Threats	TALTECH	4.3
Medical Response and CBRN	MoSaiC - Real-time Monitoring and Sampling of CB menaces for improved dynamic mapping of threats, vulnerabilities and response capacities	CAFA TECH OÜ	4.4
Naval	dTHOR - Digital Ship Structural Health Monitoring	CAFA TECH OÜ	14.5
Protection and Mobility	SDMMS - Secure Digital Military Mobility System	CYBERNETICA AS *	9.1
Protection and Mobility	ACHILE - Augmented Capability for High End Soldiers	TALGEN CYBERSECURITY OÜ	40.0
Sensors	ARTURO - Advanced Radar Technology in eUROpe	MARDUK TECHNOLOGIES OÜ	20.0
2022 calls: 41 projects selected with total EU support of almost 832 million euros			
Air Combat	REACT II - Responsive Electronic Attack for Cooperation Tasks II	CAFA TECH OÜ RANTELON OÜ	40.0
Cyber	EUCINF - EUropean Cyber and INformation warfare toolbox	CYBERNETICA AS	33.0
Cyber	FACT - Federated Advanced Cyber physical Test range	CR14	27.0
Cyber	NEWSROOM - Adapting Cyber Awareness for Evolving Computing Environments	CYBEXER TECHNOLOGIES CR14	10.0
Digital Transformation	DeterMine - Detect and Recognize Mines and IEDs hidden in the environment	MILREM AS	5.0
Digital Transformation	STORE - Shared daTabase for Optronics image Recognition and Evaluation	CYBERNETICA AS FALCONERS OÜ MARDUK TECHNOLOGIES OÜ	23.3
Disruptive Technologies	THEMA - TecHnology for ElectroMagnetic Artillery	MARDUK TECHNOLOGIES OÜ	15.0
Ground Combat	LATACC - LAnd TActical Collaborative Combat	MILREM AS	48.7

Information Superiority	EC2 - European Command and Control System	CAFA TECH OÜ TALGEN CYBERSECURITY OÜ	30.0
Medical Response and CBRN	iMEDCAP - Development of intelligent military capabilities for monitoring, medical care and evacuation for contagious, injured and contaminated personnel	MAWI SOLUTIONS OÜ MILREM AS	25.0
Naval	E-NACSOS - EU NAval Collaborative Surveillance Operational Standard	CAFA TECH OÜ	65.0
Naval	EUROGUARD - EUROpean Goal based mUlti mission Autonomous naval Reference platform Development	BALTIC WORKBOATS AS * MARDUK TECHNOLOGIES OÜ	65.0
Sensors	TIRESYAS - Technology Innovation for Radar European SYstem ApplicationS	MARDUK TECHNOLOGIES OÜ	15.0
Simulation and Training	FEDERATES - FEDerated Ecosystem of euROpean simulation Assets for Training and decision Support	VR LAB	29.6
Space	SPIDER - Space based Persistent ISR for Defence and Europe Reinforcement	FALCONERS LTD SPACEWAVE OÜ TALTECH	39.4
Underwater Warfare	SWAT-SHOAL - SWArm and Teaming operation of manned & unmanned underwater vehicle SHOAL	CAFA TECH OÜ	25.0
<b>2023 calls: 61 projects selected with total EU support of almost 1.2 billion euros</b>			
Air and Missile Defence	E-CUAS - European Counter Unmanned Aerial Systems	MARDUK TECHNOLOGIES OÜ	43.0
Cyber	ECYSAP EYE - European Cyber Situational Awareness Platform – Enhanced Cyberspace Operations	CYBERNETICA AS	20.0
Cyber	AIDA - Artificial Intelligence Deployable Agent	CR14 * SORAINEN OÜ	26.0
Disruptive Technologies	SWARM-C3 - Command, Control, and Communications for Multi-X Swarms	WAYREN	4.0
Energy and Environment	CALIPSO - Innovative propulsion solutions for land and naval defence applications	CAFA TECH OÜ	25.0
Ground combat	MARTE - Main ARmoured Tank of Europe	CAFA TECH OÜ RANTELON OÜ WAYREN	20.0
Sensors	EISNET - European Interactive Sensor-Based Dynamic Defence Network	CAFA TECH OÜ	26.3
SMEs	BadB - GNSS-free navigation and geolocation of objects based on satellite imagery maps and other sensor data	KRATTWORKS OÜ * KAPPAZETA OÜ	5.8
SMEs	HSM4COM – European cybersecurity HSM/TPM device for securing micro/nano satellite and UAV communications	DEFSECINTEL SOLUTIONS OÜ SKUDO OÜ	3.1
<b>2024 calls: 62 projects selected with total EU support of almost 1.0 billion euros</b>			
Air Combat	GARUDA – reconfigurable Autonomous collaborative Unmanned Aircraft	CYBERNETICA AS	9.6
Air Combat	HYROGLIVE - Hypersonic Radar and Optical signature collecting GLide Vehicle	TALTECH	78.0
Cyber	CITADEL Range – Cyber Infrastructure for Training in Advanced Defence Exercises and Learning	CR14 * CYBEXER TECHNOLOGIES TALGEN CYBERSECURITY OÜ	48.0
Disruptive Technologies	ORQUESTRA - Orchestrating the Operational Deployment of Quantum Resistant Services for Next-Generation Secure Defence Systems and Communications	CYBERNETICA AS	9.3

Energy and Environment	SENTINEL - Sustainable Energy Capabilities for Enhanced Military Camps and Operations	POWERUP FUEL CELLS OÜ	39.9
Ground Combat	iMUGS2 - Integrated Modular Unmanned Ground System 2	MILREM AS * CYBERNETICA AS TALGEN CYBERSECURITY OÜ	50.0
Ground Combat	AURIGA - ArmoURed Infantry Ground Assault	DEFENSPHERE OÜ	25.0
Information Superiority	AI-WASP - Artificial Intelligence Warfare Adaptive Swarm Platform	CYBERNETICA AS	44.9
Information Superiority	5G COMPAD 2.0 - 5G Communications for Peacekeeping and Defence 2.0	CAFA TECH OÜ	25.0
Information Superiority	VANTAGE - Vertical Autonomous Next-generation Tactical Aerial European drone	DEFENSPHERE OÜ	10.1
Naval Combat	NEREUS - Naval systEm of systems and integrated sUrvivability of future EU platformS	CAFA TECH OÜ	45.0
Simulation and Training	READYMED EUROPE - Technology-Enhanced Military Medical Training for Increased Readiness and Survivability in the Battlefield	BLOODOUT OÜ	10.0
Sensors	SCEPTER – European Multifunction System Concept applied to Communications, Electronic Warfare and Radar	CAFA TECH OÜ	35.0
SMEs	SIGMA - Space Integrated system for GNSS Monitoring and Analysis	SKUDO OÜ	5.8
SMEs	SPADER - Space Debris Removal System Using Concentrated Solar Rays	VAAL AIRSHIPS OÜ *	3.7
Technological Challenges	ARGUS - Advanced Reconnaissance and Geospatial Unified Surveillance	KAPPAZETA OÜ	5.0

Source: The author based on data from EU, EC, 2022; EU, EC, 2023; EU, EC, 2024; and EU, EC, 2025.

**PESCO**

**Table 2: Estonian Participation in PESCO projects.**

Adopted	Area	Project *: as project coordinator
2018 (1 <sup>st</sup> wave)	Cyber, C4ISR	Cyber Rapid Response Teams and Mutual Assistance in Cyber Security (CRRT)
2018 (1 <sup>st</sup> wave)	Strategic Enablers & Force Multipliers	European Medical Command (EMC) (closed)
2018 (1 <sup>st</sup> wave)	Strategic Enablers & Force Multipliers	Military Mobility (MM)
2018 (2 <sup>nd</sup> wave)	Land, Formations, Systems	Integrated Unmanned Ground System (iUGS)* (closed)
2021	Cyber, C4ISR	Cyber Ranges Federations (CRF)*
2021	Land, Formations, Systems	EU Military Partnership (EU MilPart)
2021	Maritime	Medium size Semi-Autonomous Surface Vehicle (M-SASV) *
2023	Cyber, C4ISR	Arctic Command & Control Effector and Sensor System (ACCESS)
2023	Cyber, C4ISR	Robust Communication Infrastructure and Networks (ROCOMIN)
2023	Land, Formations, Systems	Integrated Unmanned Ground Systems 2 (iUGS2) *

Source: The author based on data from EU, EC & CEU, 2021; EU, EC & CEU, 2023; and EU, EDA, 2026c.

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