Jordan Two-Year Scenario Analysis
(2016-2018)
Deteriorating Resilience & Increasing Vulnerabilities

January 2016
UNHCR 2015 Country Operations profile: Jordanian refugee camps

KEY POINTS

1. Protracted conflicts in Syria and Iraq will keep refugee populations in Jordan at stable or increasing levels, despite pull factors driving refugees to Syria, Turkey and Europe.

2. Adequate funding will continue to challenge humanitarian response in Jordan. Cuts will exacerbate vulnerabilities for refugees in host communities in WASH, shelter, health and food security sectors.

3. Government-implemented economic reform will have a negative effect on the coping capacity of Jordanians, due to austerity policy and persistently high unemployment.

4. High numbers of Jordanians fighting with the Islamic State and other Salafist-jihadist groups will remain a security concern in the coming years, both within Jordan and at the country’s borders.

This analysis will examine the Jordan context and put forth unique scenarios based on current trends and dynamics to assess how the situation could evolve between 2016 and 2018, with particular focus on humanitarian access, challenges and opportunities.
INTRODUCTION

The evolving, multi-fronted conflicts in Syria and Iraq present the greatest challenges to Jordan's security and stability. While the country has experienced several huge waves of migration in its short history, the most recent influx of Syrian refugees escaping war has exacerbated extant structural weaknesses and caused the government to consider new strategies to cope with the burgeoning refugee community, now officially reaching almost 700,000—almost one-tenth of Jordan's population. This has impeded Jordan's economic recovery from the financial crisis and the Arab Spring, and has increased needs in governorates with the highest proportion of refugees—especially those in Ma'araq, Irbid and Amman.

Impact of the Syrian Crisis

Now entering its fifth year, the Syrian war has killed more than 310,000 people, displaced almost eight million Syrians within its borders, and made four million Syrians refugees abroad. Neighboring Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey have taken in the majority of refugees, but an increasing number of Syrians are choosing to travel to Europe and apply for asylum, embarking on dangerous, exploitative journeys to secure a better quality of life. Shifts in the conflict continue to have an immediate and direct impact on refugee caseloads from Syria. Flows between the two countries—and especially back to Syria—are significant, despite Jordan's control of border entry. Syria's multi-fronted war involves numerous players, including: the Syrian government supported by Iranian and Russian financial and military support including ground troops (and Iranian proxy ground troops, Hezbollah); various Sunni rebel factions supported predominantly by US, Turkish, Saudi and Qatari funding; the Syrian Kurdish PYD supported by US financial and military support, and ISIS, supported by oil production and oil infrastructure, kidnapping and extortion, tariffs on goods, and small amounts of funding from predominantly Gulf backers. Currently the regime, ISIS, rebel forces and the Kurds hold land, but any frontline shift or aerial bombardment will lead to increased displacement, and will impact numbers reaching Jordan's borders. The increased intervention of Russia on the side of the Syrian government was viewed to be a game-changer in the conflict, and is slowly assisting the Syrian government to achieve small victories for the regime against rebel forces. Russia began its intervention by predominantly targeting FSA-held areas, yet since the IS-claimed bombing of a Russian plane in Egypt's restive Sinai Peninsula, the regime ally has focused increasingly on IS targets. Such a show of strength against IS could cause the US and Turkey to increase airstrikes against ISIS and perhaps even deploy troops so as not to lose their strategic influence in the country. Russia is also taking the lead in international talks. After a failed effort to arm a small group of secular combatants willing to fight only against ISIS, the US has chosen to increase its funding and provision of weapons to “moderate” rebel forces.

What has proven to be successful on the ground is local ceasefires between rebel forces and the Syrian regime in certain areas. In the first week of December, rebel forces belonging to numerous battalions including the jihadi Al-Nusra and more liberal forces began to evacuate the last rebel-held area in Homs with their families after a negotiated truce with the regime, following a three-year siege. Many were moving onward to rebel-held areas further north, especially to Idlib. Syrian factions of a variety of political stripes were in Saudi Arabia in December to organize a united front for talks with President Assad. In Syria, along its southern

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1 UNHCR estimates the population to currently number 672,930.
border with Jordan regime and rebel forces fight for Dara’a and Quneitra provinces, with reports that the Syrian regime is preparing for a stronger offensive in the south².

The intensification of air campaigns carried out by the international coalition against Islamic State and Russia backing the Syrian regime has also been felt at Jordan’s borders. Greater displacement through air bombardments has caused a spike in the number of Syrian refugees gathering at two points along the remote, desert area of the Jordanian border: Hadalat and Rukban—near the intersection of Jordanian, Iraqi and Syria borders³. What was a month ago a population fluctuating between 2,000 and 4,000 people has swelled to 16,000 in mid-January—likely caused by the recent targeting of IS-held areas of eastern Homs, Palmyra and Raqqa and rebel-held areas of Dara’a and Sweida provinces by Russian airstrikes. Despite unusually vocal opposition from UNHCR and HRW to Jordan’s border policies, the Jordan government has so far resisted opening its borders for more than the 50-100 people allowed in daily, citing security concerns⁴. Since mid-2013, the Hashemite kingdom has restricted the flow of Syrian refugees into the country, and the encampment along the border is not new. Its growing size, however, is an ominous warning of how an escalation in fighting could increasingly exacerbate the Syria’s refugee situation⁵. In a briefing, Jordan’s UNHCR spokesperson discussed the deteriorating weather conditions faced by these refugees⁶, and incidents of respiratory tract infections, gastroenteritis, skin diseases, acute malnutrition among children and diarrhea⁷.

Salafi-jihadist ideology and the Islamic State remain a key threat to the kingdom’s stability. King Abdallah II has taken a clear stance against the IS since 2013, joining the international coalition to fight the organization’s territorial advancement in Syria and Iraq. As a member of the Security Council, Jordan voted to adopt resolution 2199 to cut Islamic State funding in December 2015⁸. The kingdom has been a launching base for airstrikes conducted by the UK, US and France, and

³ UNHCR stated in a briefing on 8 December 2015 that 11,000 of the displaced were at the Rukban border crossing, and 1,000 were at Hadalat. “It includes elderly people, others who are sick or wounded, children, women, and others who are vulnerable and need help.”
⁴ Telegraph, “Thousands of Syrian refugees stranded along Jordan border, say UN,” 8 December 2015.
⁵ Ibid.
⁶ UNHCR, “12,000 people stranded at Syria-Jordan border in deteriorating conditions,” 8 December 2015.
even to train moderate anti-Assad rebels. Jordan has also participated alongside coalition partners in coordinated bombardments. This has put Jordan in IS crosshairs. The Islamic State has directed threats against the kingdom since at least 2014, threatening to overthrow the monarchy and invade Jordan. IS then executed a Jordanian air force lieutenant, publicizing a brutal video that was responsible for turning Jordanians against the Islamist group. Yet the greatest threat of IS to Jordan is the radicalization of Jordanian citizens and the return of those who have fought for IS and similar groups in Iraq and Syria—estimated to be nearly 2,000—behind Tunisia and Saudi Arabia, and yet the highest number of fighters per 100,000. Jordan has also provided key support to southern secular anti-Assad rebel forces like the Southern Front Alliance of the Free Syrian Army as a bulwark against the expansion of Islamist extremism. While Jordan has occasionally called to carve out a humanitarian buffer zone within Syria to protect its own border, so far the kingdom has operated diplomatically and pragmatically, coordinating between Russian military support and the FSA to prevent greater instability along the Syrian-Jordanian border and the potential displacement of hundreds of thousands more people. So far, Russian airstrikes have struck further north and have not targeted the Southern Front. Nevertheless, Islamic State territory remains uncomfortably close to the border, with jihadis using the area as a crossing point into Iraq.

Economy

The consequences of war, a massive refugee influx and the global financial crisis have had serious repercussions on the Jordan's upper-middle income economy in the last five years, and recovery is slow. A largely urban population, the Human Development Index ranks Jordan in the medium category, with sustained progress that has led to high human development and a shift from 0.545 in 1980 to 0.745 in 2014, or 77 out of 187 countries. Nevertheless, Jordan still suffers from a high rate of unemployment—nearly 14 this year, a rate that climbs much higher for young people and women—approximately 34 percent for youth between the ages of 15 and 24. Female participation in the labor market is 23 percent, compared to 74 percent for men.

Though the government has undertaken numerous measures to restructure its finances and reduce spending, public debt still represents more than 80 percent of the country's GDP. Since 2012, the Hashemite kingdom has embarked upon significant structural reform by liberalizing the economy, improving the business climate for public and private partnerships, and reforming the health and education sectors. The government's subsidy regime has been pulled back, fuel subsidies have been removed and electricity and water subsidies are gradually being removed as well; tax reform and social protection have been implemented. Yet the ongoing effect of the wars in Syria and Iraq and the subsequent refugee crisis, compounded by the endemic and neglected issues of high unemployment, inflation and low foreign direct investment, has severely dampened the economy's recovery. Despite these challenges, the central bank has managed to oversee lowering governmental fiscal deficits, a smaller trade deficit and strong private consumption.

The country is highly influenced by regional economic trends. Having few natural resources of its own, a lack of agricultural lands or water resources, Jordan's economy is inextricably tied to those of its neighbors in Iraq, Palestine, Syria, Israel, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait: to remittances,

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10 FT, “Jordan to set up buffer zone in southern Syria”, 29 June 2015.
12 World Bank, “Unemployment, youth total (% of total labor force ages 15-24) (modeled ILO estimate)”.
tourism, the service sector and direct foreign aid. High volatility in the region, and wars in Iraq and Syria especially have not only led to a migratory influx, it has also disrupted commercial trade and with two of the economy’s biggest trading partners, reducing GDP growth rates. Despite these risks, the stability of Jordan remains in the interest of the country’s Arab neighbors and international powers, and has increased Jordanian popular support of the government. The government has strengthened military relations with its allies by participating in joint exercises to maintain the country’s territorial integrity and relies on a significant amount of foreign assistance. Jordan is also embarking in stronger trade relations with Israel, through the Dead-Red sea desalination plant that will provide water to both countries, by building a bridge to connect Oslo-Accord era Qualified Industrial Zones (QIZs) between the two countries, in addition to a recent Israeli announcement that work permits will be given to Jordanians to work in the Israeli beach resort of Eilat. Such projects suggest Jordan’s concerted efforts to become more energy-independent, to prevent shocks that could follow an increase in oil prices. Regarding local dynamics, Jordan is attempting to decrease grievances and any further damage to the country’s economy by managing refugee communities within camps as much as possible, separating refugees from local labor markets and making them visible to international donors.

**HUMANITARIAN NEEDS**

Jordan’s humanitarian needs have returned to the international agenda as growing numbers of Syrians in host countries seek asylum in Europe, or even return to Syria due to growing push factors in the kingdom. Citing cuts to assistance, lack of access to the labor market, lack of continuing and higher education opportunities, the right to a better quality of life and cheaper travel costs, the number of refugees from Jordan going to Europe has increased four-fold since 2014, according to WFP. The Jordanian government has also made it more difficult to enter the country. Those restrictions slashed the number of registered arrivals from nearly 310,000 in 2013 to some 82,000 last year, according to the UNHCR. This year, slightly more than 27,000 have arrived, it said. It is unlikely that the number of refugees travelling to Europe would decrease, without significant opportunities for employment in Jordan and other host countries, or successful peace negotiations leading to a stable ceasefire in Syria. Yet the high likelihood of Iraq and Syria remaining severe humanitarian crises in

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15 Iraq is Jordan’s main trading partner and receives 20% of Jordan’s exports, totaling over USD1.2bn annually. Billion dollar trade between Syria and Jordan has also been disrupted due to border closures. 
16 The IMF lowered its 2015 GDP growth rate to 2.9%, and estimates 2016 to reach 3.7%. The organization has estimated that Jordan needs a growth rate of 6% to absorb new labor into the workforce. 
17 Reuters, “Israel hints at air force cooperation with Jordan, Egypt,” 3 November 2015.
18 The US estimates it has provided around USD 1.5bn to the Jordanian government every year since 2009. Congressional Research Service (2014): “Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations.”
20 In Mid-October this was estimated to be about 100 a day leaving Jordan from Zaatari. BBC News, “Desperate Syrian refugees return to war zone,” 12 August, twice as much as in July. i _times of Israel_, “Syrian refugees increasingly return to war-torn homeland,” 6 October 2015.
21 _The Jordan Times_, “WFP to reinstate food aid to 229,000 Syrian refugees,” 19 October 2015.
2016 and 2017 means that conflicts will continue to displace people to Jordan and elsewhere, even with restrictive border controls for refugees. This will put greater pressures on Jordan’s already overburdened infrastructure and services, which will likely be compounded by funding shortages for refugees in the country. And for the reasons listed above and to reunite with their families, greater numbers are also returning to Syria. Those being left behind will increasingly represent the most vulnerable and least mobile. With the volatility of humanitarian aid for the Syrian response, refugees in Jordan have experienced distressing cuts to the aid they receive that have led many to consider other options, depending on their access to financial resources and mobility. With approximately 85 percent of refugees living in host communities, and camp conditions unattractive to all but the most vulnerable refugees, decreases in funding have been felt acutely by Syrians in the country, particularly in the governorates of Mafraq, Irbid and Amman. In August 2015, WFP cut food assistance to 229,000 refugees and halved support for many others. This coincided with a spike in rates of voluntary repatriation, when approximately 4,000 Syrian refugees returned to Syria in one month, seeing no alternative to the dire living conditions in Jordan. Two months later, funding was restored to the small and already-reduced amount of JD10 per person, per month. The WFP stated that with current funding levels, assistance can only be assured until January 2016. The precariousness of funding has a direct impact on food insecurity in Jordan, which correlates closely to poverty and female-headed households in the country. WFP itself said that it struggles “to run the operation based on predictable sources of funding”.

A report published by UNHCR in June 2015 found that 86 percent of Syrian refugees living in host communities (almost 84 percent of Syrian refugees in Jordan) are living below the poverty line defined at under JD68 per capita per month, a startling increase from January, when UNHCR assessments showed two-thirds of refugees across Jordan are living below the national poverty line. Half of the families visited for the survey had no access to fuel, one-quarter had little access to electricity and one-fifth had no access to a functioning toilet. Yet the high cost of life in Jordan, increasing medical costs, decreasing amount of humanitarian capacity, and inability to work has left refugees highly vulnerable to shock, and pushed many households to adopt negative coping mechanisms, move into camps or even back to Syria. Rates of child labor in Jordan reflect the drastic coping strategies that families have adopted. A survey conducted by UNICEF and Save the Children released in July 2015 found that close to half of all refugee households rely partly or entirely on income generated by a child. Syrian refugee children in Jordan are now the joint or sole family breadwinners in their households, often working in hazardous and unhealthy environments. A majority work six or seven days a week; one third for

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25 Ibid.


27 The Jordan Times, “WFP to reinstate food aid to 229,000 Syrian refugees,” 19 October 2015.


29 Jordan Vista: “Funding shortage leaves Syrian refugees, host nations without vital support,” 26 June 2015.


31 In July the UN cut food assistance to 1.3m Syrians. More than 200,000 refugees had their food rations cut for the remainder of the summer. New York Times, “As Doors Close, Syrian Refugees Despair,” 4 November 2015.

32 UN Women Inter-Agency Assessment (2013): “Gender-Based Violence and Child Protection Among Syrian Refugees in Jordan, With a focus on early marriage”.

33 Ibid.
more than eight hours a day\textsuperscript{34}. Understandably, the rates for those dropping out of school are much higher\textsuperscript{35}.

Currently the Regional Response Plan 2016-2017 (3RP)\textsuperscript{36} and the government-led Jordan Response Plan 2015 (JRP)\textsuperscript{37} have experienced significant underfunding, impacting their ability to assist in refugee and resilience responses, and reducing or delaying programming. In the face of continuing instability in Syria and Iraq this has drastically increased the vulnerability of refugees to food insecurity, education, livelihoods, healthcare, shelter and WASH in the country. With the persistence of these crises, refugees have exhausted their savings and resources and are resorting to negative coping mechanisms. The proportion of food insecure Syrian households has risen from 47 percent in 2014 to 86 percent in 2015. Funding meets the needs of only 40 percent of those living in host communities, and does not reach approximately 312,000 people. Half of Syrian refugees in Jordan are shelter vulnerable, and waste water and water services for three million refugees and host community members are in jeopardy. Similarly, the lack of livelihood opportunities has forced one in five families to withdraw their children from schools\textsuperscript{38}.

Jordanian government oversight of international NGOs working in the country through the Ministry of Planning and International Coordination sets certain qualifications that question humanitarian organizations’ fair access to beneficiaries, by diverting a significant portion of resources to host communities, dismissing livelihoods programming and enacting restrictive border controls that are putting thousands at risk. The 2015 Jordan Response Plan calls for USD2.99 billion to: “address the entire spectrum of refugee resilience and budget support needs”. The budget is divided into three categories: budget support (USD1.14 billion directly used to support the budget of the Jordanian government\textsuperscript{39}), refugee response and resilience response. Resilience response is apportioned nearly 60 million dollars more than refugee response.

\textsuperscript{34} ILO (2014): “Report of the rapid assessment on Child Labour in the Urban Informal Sector in three governorates of Jordan (Amman, Mafraq and Irbid)”.

\textsuperscript{35} Save the Children International (July 2015): “Small Hands, Heavy Burden.”

\textsuperscript{36} 3RP (2014): “Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan 2015-2016 In Response to the Syria Crisis: Regional Strategic Overview.”


\textsuperscript{38} The Jordan Times: “Funding shortage leaves Syrian refugees, host nations without vital support—report”, 26 June 2015.

response, at USD956.6 in comparison to USD889m\(^{40}\), to support the government budget, scale up government capacities, strengthen social services, restore and reinforce municipal services and infrastructure. Certainly, UNHCR needs assessments conducted in May 2015 showed severe vulnerabilities across WASH, education, shelter, food security and health sectors especially in the Amman, Ma’afraq and Irbid urban centers and to a lesser extent spanning across the country\(^{41}\). Yet the degree to which NGOs can address refugee needs in host communities remains to be seen, especially when key issues relating to resiliency like refugee access to livelihoods and income-generating programs; and high rates of unemployment in host communities—especially for women and youth—continue to be neglected or ignored.

While the Interior Minister stated that Jordan has received “only 38 percent of aid required for refugee response\(^{42}\)”, it is likely that international funding will increase in the coming months to prevent a greater exodus towards Europe. Yet this aid is only a temporary solution for a protracted issue. Longer-term resolutions are needed to improve conditions for refugees in Jordan to avoid hazardous repatriation, the use of erosive coping strategies and to prevent unsafe and inhumane informal camps of people at Jordan’s borders denied refuge.

**SCENARIOS 2016-2018**

Each scenario aims to provide a differing 24-month outlook (2016-2018) into the context of the Hashemite kingdom of Jordan, weaving together hypotheses concerning key drivers in the country to create a cohesive possible outcome. Alternatives to the political, economic and social reality exist beyond the following outlooks, but are framed by key themes, particularly the Syrian war, economic trends, refugees and local grievances.

**Most likely scenario - Status quo: A better humanitarian response, but long-term challenges remain**

Jordan manages to maintain internal stability despite the continuation of wars in neighbouring Iraq and Syria. International terror attacks in Russia, France and elsewhere have hardened the resolve of western nations to coordinate an offensive against the Islamic State in the Middle East, focusing specifically on the terrorist group’s territories in Syria, and then in Iraq. Airstrikes increase significantly, with Jordan remaining a crucial launching base for coordinated air assaults. On the ground, in the fight against ISIS in Syria and Iraq, Kurds and other rebel groups direct their energies against the Islamic State with Western support while consolidating control over their territories. In Iraq, Shi’ite factions within the government under the support of the Quds force clamour for greater power, and escalate conflict against southern tribes, further

\(^{40}\) The budget is broken down into the following components: Budget support: 1144.8m; resilience response 956.6m; refugee response 889.0m. [Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation](http://www.mpic.gov.jo) “Jordan Response Plan for the Syria Crisis: 2015 Appeal.”

\(^{41}\) UNHCR needs assessments in May 2015 showed high levels of vulnerabilities for access to education, attendance, and education vulnerability in Amman governorate, especially in areas bordering Zarqa and Balqa. Areas with the highest needs were Amman Qasabah, Ma’afraq, Irbid, Ar-ramtha, Quasmeh, Russella and Zarqa in Zarqa governorate, and Salta and Fuhais in Balqa, in addition to Madaba city in the Madaba governorate. [UNHCR Vulnerability Assessment Framework (May 2015): “Central Region Syrian Refugee Vulnerability: Education Vulnerability in Amman, Balqa, Madaba and Zarqa; Ma’afraq; Ajloun, Irbid and Jarash. Severe vulnerabilities also identified for shelter in Zarqa, Rusella, Amman, Marqa, Al Janiah, Ain Albash, Salt, Fuhais, Quasmeh, Wadi Essier and Madaba.](http://www.unhcr.org) [UNHCR Vulnerability Assessment Framework (May 2015): “Central Region Syrian Refugee Vulnerability: Shelter Vulnerability in Amman, Balqa, Madaba and Zarqa; Ma’afraq; Ajloun, Irbid and Jarash. Wash needs were pervasive in similar locations to shelter and education vulnerabilities.](http://www.unhcr.org) [UNHCR Vulnerability Assessment Framework (May 2015): “Central Region Syrian Refugee Vulnerability: Wash Vulnerability in Amman, Balqa, Madaba and Zarqa; Ma’afraq; Ajloun, Irbid and Jarash.](http://www.unhcr.org)

\(^{42}\) [The Jordan Times](http://www.jordanantiquities.com), “Jordan received only 30% of aid required for refugee response,” 26 October 2015.
igniting sectarian tensions that threaten to fuel support for Sunni jihadist organizations beyond IS. Factionalism and sectarianism continue to aggravate tensions in both countries, regardless of a unified attempt to fight ISIS. Russian air support for the Syrian regime continues to use barrel bombs in southern and northern offensives against rebel groups. This causes an increase in the refugee influx to neighbouring countries, including Jordan.

The kingdom continues its attempts to stabilize refugee numbers by a combination of tough border controls and a lack of access to livelihoods and employment. Nevertheless, the European Union directs more international aid to the country to stave off the possibility of greater migration flows to Europe, a significant proportion of which goes directly to the Jordanian government and to host communities. This increase in funding and increased advocacy from EU member state donors contributes to a general improvement for the lives of refugees in Jordan—though strict border controls continue to operate to keep numbers stable, and pull factors guiding people to seek asylum in Europe remain. One of the key advocacy points for humanitarian actors is greater opportunities for refugees to work.

The Jordanian government slowly begins to reshape its labour policies, offering Syrian refugees opportunities to work in low-skilled labour fields typically filled by other foreign economic migrants, in the service and construction sectors. A greater number of permits are also given for Syrian refugees to work in some of the country’s Oslo-era Qualified Industrial Zones (QIZs) with high proportions of refugees in host communities in Mafraq, Irbid, Ajloun, Um Qais, Jarash and Zarqa. Displacing

Since 1998, the US has designated 13 Qualified Industrial Zones (QIZs) in Jordan as part of the Oslo Accords. QIZs benefit from quota and duty-free access to the US market, and employ nearly 47,000 people in mostly garment production. One quarter of employees are Jordanian. Though QIZs have been criticized for the lack of Jordanian involvement through employment, ownership or trade, they continue to contribute significantly to Jordan’s exports, which reached USD8.3bn in 2014.

The “Jordan Compact” was presented by MoPIC to a group of donors on January 11 in London essentially focusing on two main work streams: job creation and macroeconomic support through investment in economic zones, trade preferences, loans and grants. For Syrian job creation, MoPIC discussed work permits for Syrians who have valid MoI cards, a six-month suspension on the issuing of new work permits to third country nationals (except domestic workers) and offering those work permits to Syrian labor, enabling Syrians access to jobs in the newly supported economic zones and the right to work and trade for refugees in camps. These policies will likely be implemented in the coming months.

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predominantly Asian labourers, the government prospers from manufactured goods free from tariff and low labour costs, and the refugees participate in livelihood activities that do not increase tensions in Jordanian communities. Despite new work opportunities, many refugees continue to leave Jordan for a better quality of life and greater opportunity. With waves of displacement pushing at Jordan’s borders, numbers of refugees within the country remain relatively stable, yet demographics of the beneficiaries begin to change. Increasingly, younger Syrians seek asylum in Europe, leaving a predominance of women, children, the elderly and the most vulnerable refugees in Jordan.

Domestically, the kingdom utilizes the threat of terrorist attacks and instability on its borders to consolidate power. For refugees, border policies are stricter, even those already inside the country face greater security and obstructive visa processes. Even for Jordanians, space for civil society feels smothered, with self-censorship in the media and parliament. Economic pressures and the effects of the gradual lifting of electricity and water subsidies begin to take effect, decreasing household resilience as families expend their savings on basic needs. Yet the fear of external threats manages to forestall mass protest. Rates of poverty increase in both refugee and host communities, steadily increasing the number of vulnerable households and competition over access to services and infrastructure. Western and Jordanian Islamic State offensives in Syria and Iraq increase the risk of terrorist attacks in the kingdom, especially as citizens fighting for Salafist-jihadist groups begin to return. Lone wolf terrorist attacks targeting the security establishment and civilian areas occur, but are for the most part managed to prevent large-scale loss of life.

**Humanitarian Needs**

Even with a steadying population of refugees in the country, humanitarian needs will continue to increase without a greater focus on resilience in both refugee and host communities. Now five years into the Syrian war, Syrians in Jordan have exhausted their savings, increased their debts and are using negative coping mechanisms to survive in one of the Middle East’s most expensive countries. Tensions increase in host communities due to growing poverty and Syrian competition in the labour market. Children are the greatest victims, as many families depend on their children to be breadwinners, forcing greater numbers to drop out of school. With many children out of school for months or even years, reintegration is more difficult. Refugees and humanitarian organisations pressure the Jordanian government for better opportunities and greater recognition, but the government focuses on increasing donor support for economic development and the state budget. Even with the rolling out of greater permits to Syrians following concerted efforts by the international community, depressed wages continue to be a push factor for Syrians. Livelihood projects are a key focus of NGOs working in the country, but programming faces difficulties due to greater restrictions on the appropriation of funding between refugees and host communities, and state-led structural development. Greater work and income opportunities are needed. In host communities, deteriorating water infrastructure contributes to greater WASH needs, especially regarding access to sufficient, clean, affordable water and solid waste management in communities that have grown substantially. Most Syrian refugees are currently living under the poverty line (two-thirds according to UNHCR). Already extremely vulnerable to shocks, many will face inadequate shelter and resources to provide heating in winter months. Syrians congregating along Jordan’s north-western borders require shelter, services and protection. Their needs for adequate shelter will significantly increase in the coming months.
Worst case scenario - More refugees, more problems

Despite the concerted intervention of western powers against the Islamic State, the multifaceted interests of proxy powers involved in the war and the unwillingness to bring in ground troops leads to increasing displacement within Syria and beyond its borders, and the further factionalisation of local groups controlling land. Some areas remain relatively stable and local ceasefire agreements are conducted with the backing of international partners, leaving the opportunity for a safe return for a limited number of refugees, and a haven for internally displaced peoples open. Wars continue on two fronts: the Syrian regime with Iranian and Russian support pushing back rebel forces, and international powers fighting the Islamic State through airstrikes. Pushed back from some of its more distant holdings, the Islamic State retreats, but remains a continuing threat, with an increased focus on international terrorist attacks. Jordan risks getting involved militarily, with its borders compromised by shifting frontlines. This instability also increases the numbers of refugees attempting to enter the kingdom, and security risks associated with Islamic State-affiliated individuals and cells. Torn between the promise of foreign aid attached to refugee issues and the structural impact of such large numbers of Syrian refugees accessing Jordanian services, the government increases its efforts to place refugees in camps and separate them fully from Jordanian host communities, while enacting tougher and more punitive controls at the borders and for refugees already within the country.

The quality of life in camps remains difficult. In spite of greater amounts of foreign funding, the continuation of the war in Syria into its six and seventh years with little opportunities for livelihood, residency or settling continues to draw more and more back to Syria and further afield to Turkey, and Europe. Claiming to have lifted the economic pressure asserted by Syrians on Jordanian communities, the kingdom continues the process of concerted economic reform, removing subsidies, forcing more and more refugees and households in host communities to adopt negative coping strategies. International humanitarian assistance for the Jordan response remains chronically underfunded, and food aid, shelter and access to WASH remain precarious. Unemployment remains high in poorer Transjordanian communities, and becomes a source of growing discontent. While permit regimes benefiting cheap, low-skilled Syrian labour open in limited fields, few job opportunities are provided for Jordanians, despite continuing high numbers of refugees in certain governorates. With the costs of water and electricity increasing, many Jordanian and Syrian families increasingly feel unable to meet basic needs, and Jordanians feel that very little international support improves the lives of ordinary Jordanians. Tensions in communities host communities increase. Temple Mount affair settles down, with Jordan's role as guardian of site is preserved. Nevertheless, the Jordanian kingdom uses security threats of increasing Islamic State-led activities in the country and the region to consolidate additional powers in parliament and impinge on citizen rights and freedoms for the sake of security. Random acts of terrorism conducted inside Jordan by lone wolves surge, targeting international sites and military and state apparatus.

Facing the repercussions of a huge influx of Syrian refugees, Europe increases funding in Jordan, but aid is not enough to decrease push factors, or to pressure the Jordanian government to allow for better quality of life. Jordan enacts policy to allow for greater opportunities of livelihood within camps and in QIZs. The exploitative labour regime encourages only the most vulnerable to leave Jordan. Meanwhile at the borders, the kingdom increases controls despite growing needs and displacement in Syria. The population gathered at Syria's borders still faces significant protection risks.
Humanitarian Needs

With an influx of greater numbers of refugees at Jordan's borders, chronic humanitarian aid funding shortages and a lack of willingness to deal with structural issues related to work opportunities and livelihoods, basic needs for refugees and vulnerable households in host communities increase. As families adopt more drastic coping mechanisms, issues like child protection grow in need, as child labour becomes endemic. The longer children are out of school, the more difficult it is to reintegrate them into Jordan’s education system, already overburdened with growing numbers of students. Increasing poverty also increases needs for direct food aid, cash assistance, shelter and access to clean and affordable water. Competition over these resources causes an increase in tensions in host communities, and it becomes more difficult for families to settle in certain areas. Growing gaps in assistance will continue to trigger migration flows to Europe and even back to Syria, as an increasing number of families living in host communities face dwindling household resources and a lack of viable opportunity. Those voluntarily choosing repatriation face severe security and protection challenges. Savings within households will deplete further due to a lack of livelihood opportunities. This increases the risk of children leaving school to support their families, a lack of access to healthcare services, eviction and an increase in food and water insecurity affected by cuts to food vouchers. Unable to meet basic needs, some households will also be forced to move into camps.

Best case scenario - With the prospect of peace in Syria, refugees begin to go home

Russian airstrikes and Iranian and Hezbollah military support succeed in wearing down rebel territories to small isolated pockets. Torn between continuing to fight against the enemy of Assad, or Islamic State, groups along the Turkish border, the Golan and the Euphrates River in the east begin to fracture with some choosing to lend their support to Assad in view of a possible peace process. The Islamic State slowly retreats from its territory, but increases the number of attacks carried out in the international arena. Under the Vienna talks framework, international powers and Syrian factions chosen by the Jordanian regime negotiate a roadmap to peace including a general ceasefire and transitional government headed by Assad until an election can be held. Southern Front FSA rebel troops are disproportionately represented among the fray due to their strong links with the Jordanian regime and moderate ideology. The Syrian Kurdish YPG is included in the settlement but maintains a low profile regarding statehood to fend off an escalation in Turkish aggression. The marginalisation of successful Islamist rebel groups like Islamic Front and Jabhat al-Nusra in the peace process leads to low levels of instability in regions they once held control over, and small conflicts continue to simmer along the fault lines of their control. It also fuels grievances that could lead to recruitment by Islamic State and Daesh-like groups in the future. Nevertheless, political transition begins and the security situation improves.

Trade begins again from the Naseeb border and triggers increasing investment in the Jordanian economy as a measure of trust. Syrian stability expands regional economic cooperation more broadly, as neighbouring countries work to reintege the Syrian economy into the broader economic field and stabilize the country against further risks. Jordan also continues its regime of border security to protect against external threats and expands security and economic coordination with Israel, embracing a more open partnership to coordinate over threats like the Islamic State and to prevent against the potential collapse of the PA. Though peace in Syria is far from absolute, Syrians begin to return in massive numbers, as the majority come from the neighbouring governorate of Dara’a. Other pressures increase for Syrians to go home. The Jordanian government introduces tougher permit and visa regimes for those in the country, household savings and international aid dwindle, and travel to Europe decreases due to the severe tightening of borders and decreasing of asylum benefits. Regarding humanitarian spaces
and the right to livelihood, advocacy work through international agencies and the economic need for inexpensive labour increases the space for Syrians to work in Jordan, with a greater number of permits distributed. Livelihood projects are also given greater access and operational capacity, easing tensions for Syrians still living in host communities and creating a greater degree of social cohesion. While refugee numbers do begin to slowly decrease, violence across the country during the transitional peace process prevents complete refugee repatriation.

International aid is directed towards Syria and development, and amounts decrease in Jordan, with growing developmental focus in the Jordan context for communities unlikely to return quickly. More funding goes towards helping the Jordanian government improve its own finances, infrastructure and employment opportunities for Jordanian citizens. A greater focus is paid to Jordanian communities, left increasingly vulnerable after years of war and a depressed economy. Considering the high cost of living and the increasingly high rate of unemployment, grievances among Jordanian communities pose a growing challenge to the regime.

**Humanitarian Needs**

The possibility for a peaceful transition in Syria sends hundreds of thousands of Syrians back to their country. Humanitarian funding shifts to focus on development projects within the war-torn country to stabilize the economy and prevent a further deterioration of the fragile peace. Jordan begins to focus too on its own internal issues, and increase the capacity and strength of communities that hosted high numbers of refugees, as needs have been displaced to a greater degree onto Jordanian host communities especially in the north and in rural areas, as camps begin to scale down their response. Tensions decrease between Jordanians and their refugee neighbours, and the Jordanian government offers increasing economic opportunities to integrate Syrians in the economy. Though the war is over, two or three hundred thousand refugees stay behind fearing for a potential destabilization and additional displacement. This community requires concerted advocacy efforts to remind the international community of their needs. Syrian refugees will continue to leave Jordan by the thousands due to fundamental obstacles to residency and livelihood. Those who stay will be among the most vulnerable of individuals, in addition to those that live close to Jordan’s borders. Refugees in camps and in host communities will remain extremely vulnerable to shocks and face the prospect of dwindling international aid, which will instigate the protracted worsening of short-term challenges, like food security, access to adequate shelter, access to education for children and access to health services. Vulnerable host communities will face increasing challenges and the deterioration of infrastructure, access to services and livelihood opportunities.

**UNCERTAINTIES**

In a longer five-year time frame, local drivers in Jordan itself will play a more dominant role; impacting security, economic and political considerations for the kingdom. Three drivers have been selected for consideration: Islamic radicalization, unemployment disproportionately affecting women and youth; and water scarcity. Each of these variables are currently present in the context, but their resultant effect on the context will develop and evolve to be more determinant in a further-spanning outlook, and should therefore be considered in longer-term strategic foresight.

**Islamic Radicalisation**

Considering Jordan’s proximity to Iraq, Syria and Saudi Arabia, the country has witnessed one major incident of terrorism in its history—the 2005 Amman hotel bombings masterminded by Jordanian Al Qaeda in Iraq founder Abu Musaab al Zarqawi. Since then, Jordan has prioritized intelligence gathering and maintained a high level of security coordination with western
governments. Nevertheless, in recent years the country has been pulled into greater regional dynamics due to the presence of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, taking a strong stance against IS from 2013. The execution of air force pilot Muath Kasasbeh in February 2015 arguably did more to turn Jordanians against the organization than any government statements ever could. Yet since the beginning of the crises in Iraq and Syria, an estimated 2,000 Jordanian citizens left the country to fight for IS and other Salafist-jihadist groups like Jabhat al-Nusra\(^44\), representing the highest number of extremist jihadists per capita than any other Arab or western country. Radicalisation not only increases the likelihood of violent disruptions within the kingdom, it also builds networks across the region to recruit and coordinate attacks. For King Abdallah, it also places the kingdom in the difficult position of maintaining its religious and cultural legitimacy while distancing itself from forms of extremism.

Following the rise of Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, many commentators have discussed how susceptible Muslims in the region are to the organization’s propaganda. Former Education Ministry official said that: “Islamic State ideology is there, in our textbooks. If Jordan were to be overrun by the militants, a large majority ‘will join IS because they learned in school that this is Islam’.” The dissonance between government policy and Islam taught in schools and mosques has already led to some reform, but some experts state that it is largely superficial\(^45\).

Recently, the son of prominent Jordanian parliamentarian Dalaeen carried out a suicide bombing for Islamic State (the second to die for an Islamist-terrorist group), and brought the spotlight back towards the number of Jordanians who have joined Islamic State and other Salafist-jihadist groups. The proximity to battlegrounds in Syria and Iraq and high levels of poverty and unemployment, and a lack of political expression have all been cited as compelling reasons for young men to join the group. Authorities estimate that between 1,500 and 2,000 Jordanians have joined Nusra and the Islamic State in recent years—ranking third after Saudi Arabia and Tunisia for the number of fighters joining, a feat considering the monarchy’s population. The government estimates that 500 Jordanians have been killed, and 500 have returned to Jordan\(^46\). Jordan is also a prominent member of the anti-IS international coalition.

\(^{44}\) International Centre For The Study Of Radicalisation And Political Violence (2015): “Foreign fighter total in Syria/Iraq now exceeds 20,000; surpasses Afghanistan conflict in the 1980s.” The number of fighters joining Islamic State from Jordan per million is the highest in the region, at 315/m. By contrast, Tunisia is an estimated 280/m. It is estimated that there are currently 1,500 Jordanian fighters in the battlefield; that 500 died and 500 have returned to Jordan.

\(^{45}\) Associated Press, “Jordan tries to stem IS-style extremism in schools, mosques,” 7 August 2015.

Jordan is attempting to fight incitement and extremism by banning certain Salafi preachers, controlling the building of new mosques, and licensing preachers based on the content of their sermons. In June 2014 the country amended anti-terrorism laws to arrest those attempting to join groups, or helped in recruiting or promoting extremist ideology. Some claim that these laws are only stoking extremism by restricting free speech, as they have been used to clamp down on criticism of Jordan and its allies, and control the use of social media. They have also had the effect of weakening the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood party, arresting the deputy head in February for insulting the UAE.

Unemployment disproportionately affecting Youth and Women

High unemployment rates among young people and women are a persistent problem for the Hashemite Kingdom, impacting the country's economic recovery, social integration and gender empowerment. High rates of unemployment affecting a youth bulge—or a preponderance of young people between the ages of 15 and 29—are considered a strong indicator of political instability, civil conflict and the resilience of a state.

Though the proportion of the population under the age of 15 has been steadily decreasing since 1980, Jordan still boasts a young population with a youth bulge—one that has been inadequately incorporated into the economy. Over 70 percent of the population is under the age of 30. Currently, unemployment rates for those between the ages of 15 and 24 stand at 33.7 percent—a rate that has steadily increased over the last five years. For young women, rates are higher, reaching 41 percent, compared to 18.7 percent for men. An ILO study found that rates of male unemployment decrease with higher levels of educational attainment. For women, however, rates remain stubbornly above 40 percent, regardless of the level of education achieved. Pay equity between men and women also remains a disincentive for participating in the labor market. Wage parity remains a significant obstacle for gender empowerment and participation. The ILO estimates that men working in Jordan’s private sector earn on average 41 percent more than women, and 28 percent more in the public sector—likely contributing to such low levels of female

47 Al Jazeera, "Jordan's 'anti-terror' law cracks down on journalists." 27 August 2015.
50 UN Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (2015): “Jordan Demographics”.
51 Index Mundi (2015): “Jordan Demographic Profile.”
53 ILO (July 2014): “Youth in Jordan face difficult transition from school to decent work;” ILO (June 2014): “Labour market transitions of young women and men in Jordan.”
54 Jordan Times, Despite Progress Women still face Unemployment, lower wages, 15 June 2015.
participation and affecting women’s economic independence—considered to be by HRH Princess Basma as one of the key factors for the kingdom’s high rates of early marriage.

A lack of formal employment not only increases vulnerability for younger members of society, it also pushes Jordanians into the informal sector, where the likelihood of labor exploitation regarding wages, hours and working conditions is much higher and the work security is precarious. The ILO estimates that the share of young workers employed in the informal sector is currently 53.2 percent. While the Jordanian government has focused on this social and economic issue through the implementation of a national employment agenda that focus on apprenticeship training and the expansion of micro, small and medium-size enterprises, a lack of job opportunities for all spectrums of Jordanian society continues to impact growth rates. With a lack of educational, training and employment opportunities to incorporate this demographic into the economy, social and political instability increase. Jordan needs concerted economic developmental programming to make use of this well-educated and creative sector.

Water Scarcity

Considered one of the most water scarce country in the world, Jordan faces severe challenges in securing water for its quickly expanding population and refugee populations. The country’s major surface water sources are shared with Israel and Syria—the Jordan River and the Yarmouk River—and only a small portion of these resources is allocated to the kingdom. Jordan also extracts water from groundwater reserves, including the non-renewable Disi aquifer operated by the Disi Water Conveyance Project. This only increases resources by 12 percent. The largest water project is the recent announcement of tenders for the Red-Sea-Dead Sea canal, which will desalinate seawater for consumption in Israel and Jordan.

Through the careful management of these sources through diplomatic initiatives, and concerted management efforts, the Jordanian government has achieved high rates of access for its citizens. More than 97 percent of Jordanians access an improved water source and 93 percent to improved sanitation. Still, the gap between demand and supply continues to expand.

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55 UNSTATS (November 2014): “The gender-based differences in wages, the Jordanian case.”
57 ILO (July 2014): “Youth in Jordan face difficult transition from school to decent work.
Approximately 44 percent of the country’s water supply is lost to and leakage, improper registration and theft, and more than 50 percent of resources are used for agriculture\(^6\), which contributes only around 3 percent of the country’s GDP\(^6\). And costs are rising. Governmental debt has led to the slow lifting of water subsidies, but whether or not this will hamper demand enough to deal with chronic over-extraction and depletion of groundwater sources is unlikely. Increasing water scarcity will have an immediate impact on health and sanitation in the country, as the state and its citizens are forced to implement emergency coping strategies, like government-instituted emergency rationing, and the building of private wells, which will only exacerbate the use of non-renewable water sources.

International aid already contributes significantly to Jordan’s water crisis. Government ministries are buoyed by nearly 30 percent support to their budgets\(^6\), and humanitarian organizations have recognized the need in communities to create greater independence by installing rainwater catchments and greywater treatment systems\(^6\). The impact of individual coping strategies on the Jordanian government’s capacity to manage water could be catastrophic and could in the long-term affect the ability of state-run services like hospitals or schools meet sanitation standards.

![Desalinated Water as Percent of Demand](image)

**CONCLUSION**

Syria and Iraq will continue to be threats to Jordan’s stability, with borders remaining highly securitized, diminishing trade and entrance for refugees. For those already in the country, Syrian refugee households particularly in host communities will be unable to break out of the spiral of asset losses and poverty even if aid remains stable, increasing the necessity for cash assistance in host communities, and cash and food assistance in camps. High humanitarian needs and vulnerabilities are likely to prevail in vulnerable refugee and host communities, and will continue to create push factors for a significant proportion of Jordan’s refugee population to return to Syria or move onward to Europe due to the lack of aid and work opportunities in Jordan. High unemployment and the disruption of working conditions will cause the

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61 Ibid.
deterioration of the labor market and aggravate communal tensions, due to competition over unskilled labor opportunities. Changes to labor laws could allow refugees to access certain labor sectors, generating opportunities for some refugees but also accelerating the crowding-out effect for some Jordanians, creating de facto second-class labor rights where abuses and exploitation could be prevented. Funding cuts and conflicting government legislation—especially regarding labor laws—will be major challenges for NGOs operating in the country. Tighter control of the international community’s activities could lead to the necessity to balance responses, targeting a certain percentage of the Jordanian community and ultimately cause a serious breach in humanitarian principles, including impartiality, neutrality, non-discrimination. The state’s security apparatus will maintain control over violence and will deepen its grip over the country and its borders by negotiating with international powers and local actors involved in conflicts in Iraq and Syria. The security apparatus may begin to conduct operations against enemies of the state, which will increase political risk. Increasing water scarcity will make households more vulnerable, especially as the government faces IMF pressure to remove subsidies.
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