

**What tools and methods are used in the Unites States and in Canada
in order to proceed with the strategic analysis
of domestic security intelligence ?
Comparison between those two countries'intelligence agencies
(organisation, missions, nears, efficiency)**

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Synthesis

Does a national security intelligence as we know it in Europe still exists in the USA ? As we are going to see it through those pages, between december 2004 and july 2005, its outstanding characteristics, the most famous ones on the Old continent, have become marginal within the american intelligence apparatus which has recently been reformed by the White House and the *ad hoc* committees of the Congress. Even though, a bit up north, the traditional specificities of its perimeter and handling remain within a Canadian administration which is disposed to follow its powerful neighbour and ally's evolutions more cautiously.

What do those changes in the United States mean ? If, for one moment, we favour a constructivist approach, we will see that, despite appearances, the jobs, methods and tools of intelligence gathering have not changed tough its *raison d'être* has been at the heart of a redefining work at least as strategic for the actors at stake as the results obtained by intelligence activities.

Hurricane Katrina, sweeping away on October 29, 2005 the relevance of an exclusive and central domestic security of utmost importance, reminded us that “the objective reality of the dominance of a terrorist, nuclear, bacteriological or chemical threat” does not exist in absolute terms. What the crowning achievement of this threat rather reflects is the converging of individual interests between prescribers (those in charge in the different administrations, researchers, journalists and political leaders) who, faced with the coverage by the media of terrorist acts, have produced a wide range of propositions and commentaries, just as if they wanted to demonstrate that, in a competitive environment, their ability to satisfy – even though this could go as far as miming it – the fever displayed by the uninitiated as they express their desire to understand the reasons and consequences of those very terrorist acts. Being conditioned by their relations with the parliamentaries and the press, the key people in charge with intelligence in the US have been the ones most exposed to these constraints of castes. And the set of their behaviours has surely reshaped the speeches on how to deal with the said threat and on the subsequent security programmes.

In the field we are studying, the geographical specificity conveyed by the “domestic security intelligence” formulation – which is supposedly complementary to “foreign security intelligence” – has lost its legitimacy throughout the reforms that have been decided as a result to those reflections. Indeed, we gradually moved from a geographical perception of the threat to an utilitarian one: while we once had an opposition between domestic and foreign (internal and external) activities, we now have an opposition between defensive and offensive activities. Consequently, security intelligence does not have spatial limits any more. It serves defensive policies (*Homeland Defense Policy* and *Homeland Security Policy*) which try to anticipate the threats in order to neutralise them before they become a reality (pre-emptive acts).

This re-interpretation work, which is vital to the actors, has been all the more successful that it echoed similar processes at work in other fields of investigation, regarding societal and economic issues (see the criticism of globalisation which makes the borders disappear and blurs the distinction that was made between a centre and an outskirts, between phenomena which have strictly internal consequences and those which have external ones). It has finally perfectly adapted itself to the american federal administration which, by nature, is focused on

how to deal with police and defense means (in 2006, 65% of the federal budget will be devoted to security).

As a consequence, during this second semester of 2005, the organisations dedicated to intelligence reveal a paradoxical panorama at the institutional level, in Washington, especially since many organic changes have occurred in the last few months. Those changes seem to be the final stage of the reforms plan intended by the executive power in the aftermaths of the attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon. Because, on the one hand, since 9/11, the methods and tools to gather, analyse and use this intelligence – as we still distinguish it – have not drastically evolved. But, on the other hand, the means allocated to intelligence gathering missions have skyrocketed while the legal limits of this activity have constantly been pushed further.