EU DEFENCE:
The White Book Implementation Process

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ABSTRACT

The question of a defence White Book at European level has been under discussion for some time. Many voices, particularly in the European Parliament, are pushing for such an initiative, while others consider that it is not only unnecessary, but could even dangerously divide Europeans.

Concretely, the question cannot be tackled separately from that of defence planning and processes which underpin the development of military capabilities, as White Books are often the starting point for these.

Within the European Union, however, there is not just one, but three types defence planning: the national planning of each of the Member States; planning within the framework of NATO (the NATO Defence Planning Process) and, finally, the European Union’s planning, which has developed in stages since the Helsinki summit of 1999 and comprises many elements. Its best-known component - but by no means not the only one - is the capability development plan established by the European Defence Agency.

How do all these different planning systems coexist? What are their strengths and weaknesses? Answering these preliminary questions is essential in mapping the path to a White Book. This is what this study sets out to do.
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TERMS OF REFERENCE AND METHODOLOGY

The present study was carried out within a research framework agreement with the Foundation for Strategic Research (FRS), as per the following schedule. The engagement letter was delivered on 18 July 2018. The draft report should be submitted on 9 November and the final draft no later than 30 November 2018.

The terms of reference for the study were as follows:

‘In the study, “On the way towards a European Defence Union - A White Book as a first step”², the Authors propose a process for developing an EU level Defence White Book, depict the roles and responsibilities of the institutional actors, and suggest to set the time horizon 2025 to frame the strategic analysis and the level of ambition.

‘In its resolutions ³, ⁴, ⁵ the European Parliament has called for the elaboration of an EU white book, which should take the form of an inter-institutional agreement of a binding nature and should – inter alia – describe the measures and programmes, which would be implemented during subsequent MFF. The EP has furthermore called for a process based on an annual inter-institutional agreement that establishes the scope and funding of the individual Union actions under the MFF.

‘Against this background, the study will:

(1) describe the annual and the multiannual defence planning and review processes in EU and NATO, and describe their respective timeframes and actual outputs,

(2) identify ways and means by which the EU could facilitate measures and programmes that are identified through the processes referred to under (1), and

(3) recommend an approach to the annual and multiannual implementation of the measures and programmes identified in a white book, taking into account the specificities of the defence policy at EU level.’

This study has been carried out using documents from open sources and building on previous work done by the author on the subject. The author has also conducted several interviews with individuals involved in the defence planning processes and has had access to various classified European Union and NATO documents concerning these processes.

The author takes full responsibility for the opinions expressed in this document.

The title of this report was selected by the European Parliament.

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² Study carried out by Mr. Javier Solana at the request of the European Parliament’s Directorate General for external studies and submitted on 18 April 2016
³ European Defence Union (P8_TA(2016)0435)
⁵ Annual report on the implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy (P8_TA(2017)0492)
OVERVIEW

The first part of this study presents the two defence planning processes which coexist in Europe: the Nato Defence Planning Process (NDPP), and the European process, which has no official name, but to which we will refer, symmetrically and for the purposes of this study, as European Union Defence Planning Process (EUDPP).

The NDPP has existed since 1971. It is an established process to which the nations have long been accustomed, and which serves primarily to ensure that the Alliance has the forces it needs to complete its missions, the main one of which remains the collective defence of its members. It is a cyclical process, over four years, structured top-down and dominated by concerns of a military nature. It ends with the allocation of capability targets to each of the members of the Alliance. It is carried out by a staff of more than three hundred and fifty people.

The European process is more recent. It came into being at the Helsinki Summit of 1999 and was put in place in three successive major steps, starting in 2003. It has been placed under the responsibility of several institutions: the European Union Military Committee (EUMC) supported by the European Union Military Staff (EUMS), the European Defence Agency (EDA), the Council, the European Council, the European External Action Service (EEAS) and, now, the European Commission. Its main vocation has been to supply autonomous capability of action – both military and civil – to which the EU aspires in the framework of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) in order to manage crises on its own doorstep, when the Americans did not wish to intervene. However, this process has evolved considerably. Its remit is now broader as it aims to satisfy the EU’s level of ambition, which has extended to ‘the protection of Europe and its citizens’ and is less focused on needs in terms of military capability than on potential industrial cooperation projects. It ends with a bottom-up procedure in which each Member State fulfils capabilities as it sees fit. It suffers from a manifest shortage of staff, as there are just thirty people manning it.

The second part of this study sets out the strengths and weaknesses of each process. It must be noted that neither of the two processes produces the capabilities needed to satisfy the stated levels of ambition. The gap between the ambitions and capabilities is no doubt wider for the EU than it is for the Alliance. However, the latter gives its members a security guarantee thanks to the American forces, while the Union is incapable of executing the most demanding CSDP missions on its own.

Capability processes have other benefits. The NDPP can be considered as the Alliance backbone, as it underpins the implementation of any Alliance decision, at one step of the chain or another. This is why it is often described as the glue that keeps the allies together, the crucible of Western military identity or the matrix of European forces interoperability, among themselves and with American forces. The NDPP also answers the key question asked by all members of any Alliance:
‘who does what?’ The EUDPP has the merit of existing. It constitutes a capability cooperation platform for the Member States of the EU and thus answers the question: ‘how?’. The two processes also have their weaknesses. The NDPP is the conduct of an American military mindset and leaves little room for critical military thinking. It is, moreover, frequently accused, rightly or wrongly, of favouring the American defence industry. As for the EUDPP, it has unfortunately helped to develop very little by way of capability in fifteen years. This is because it is stricken by serious structural failings, such as the insincerity of the statements made by certain Member States and peppered with flawed logic that hobble it. Against these observations, however, we must set the fact that many initiatives have recently been taken by the Europeans, such as the ‘Coordinated Annual Review on Defence’ (CARD), the establishment of a ‘Permanent Structured Cooperation’ (PESCO) and the ‘European Defence Fund’ (EDF) which will bear fruit - or not – in the next ten years.

Finally, the third part of this study presents the possible developments of defence planning in Europe, excluding the scenario of a single process. Certainly, an end to the NDPP would only come about as a result of the disappearance of the Alliance, which is an unlikely prospect, despite Donald Trump and his caprices. An end of the EUDPP would signify that any ambition of a European strategic autonomy had been abandoned. This would imply giving up the CSDP and therefore amending the treaties or, at the very least, leaving them partially ineffective. Finally, the idea of merging the two processes, is excluded for reasons of simple logic: whatever the respective defence objectives of the EU and the Alliance, one cannot build the same defence tool factoring in the presence of American, British, Canadian and Turkish forces, and factoring them out.

Having cast aside these misleading options, the study then sets out a number of possible improvements to the European planning process. In the short term, it posits as essential the drafting of a political guidance that reflects in concrete military terms the defence policy objectives expressed by the European Council. It also proposes to make the European process cyclical and to synchronise its cycle with that of the NDPP. Such a change is common sense and is actually expected to be very soon the subject of proposals by the EUMC/EUMS. A proposal is also made to assign to the European structures the volume of staff they need to carry out planning, as well as to clarify the European political-military chain of command so that everybody knows who does what. In this regard, it would be desirable to institute a command for European operations and a command for planning. Finally, it would be helpful to give the European process a name and describe it in a single document. In the medium term, the study proposes that a White Book be drawn up, which could be done by 2022 to synchronise the European cycle with that of the NDPP, which will start again in 2023. Regardless of the name that is given to it – strategic concept, level of ambition, or defence strategy, such a White book would effectively be the star wheel kicking off the planning process. Furthermore, in the
absence of capability targets, which would not be accepted by the Member States, the EUDPP would feed into a **single capability roadmap**, rather than six different roadmaps as is currently the case (Progress Catalogue – Capability Development Plan – Overarching Strategic Research Agenda (OSRA) – CARD – selection of projects under the PESCO – EDF’s work programme). Finally, **the role of the EDA needs to be revised** to make it a proper research agency – entrusting it, *inter alia*, with European disruptive research - or indeed a proper acquisitions agency, merging it with the OCCAR to benefit from synergies and economies of scale, in the interests of the European taxpayer.

These medium-term changes, which are the most important ones, can be considered only if the EU is able to **deal with the three elephants in the room**. The first is the need for the EU to clarify its **relationship with NATO**. What should the objective of European defence be? It is for the Europeans, and them alone, to decide. Should they still be aiming for an autonomous crisis management capability, as in 1998? This no longer seems to be of very great interest to the Member States, with the exception of France. Should they then definitely conclude that European defence should be redesigned as a collective defence system in complementary to the Atlantic Alliance and within it, in other words, an authentic pillar of the Alliance, once and for all? Why not? The second elephant is the need to **move from industrial cooperation to the integration of defence systems**. Integration is what will make huge savings possible and produce operational efficiency. Refusing integration will lead to fragmentation and inefficiencies. PESCO and EDF will not change this fact. However, to move from the one to the other, it would be necessary to **rethink EU governance in defence matters**, our third elephant. From this point of view, the most promising solution is unquestionably that of a **European Security Council**, the possibility of which was mooted at the most recent Franco-German European Council held in Meseberg in June 2018.
1 INTRODUCTION

There is a long way from desire to will,
from will to resolution,
from the resolution to the choice of means,
from choice of means to implementation.
Cardinal de Retz - Mémoires

What is meant by the term ‘Defence White Book’ varies significantly from one country to the next\(^6\), but always refers to the most delicate part of a defence planning process, that of moving from political objectives expressed in general terms to specific and quantifiable military objectives. This is why the consideration of a European Defence White Book must start with the question: what is defence planning?

Defence planning can be defined as a process aiming to build the future defence apparatus, in other words, the military capabilities – forces and equipment – that a state or alliance deems necessary to satisfy its ambitions or confront the threats facing it. It is important to differentiate between defence planning and operational planning, which consists of planning the use of military capabilities in the eventuality of the crisis, conflict or external operation. The two concepts are of course partly connected, but in the former case, the aim is to produce capabilities and in the second, it is to use them.

Even when carried out within a single state, defence planning is a difficult art, as the process rarely goes as planned. Budget overruns are frequent, and armaments programmes seldom remain within schedule. Defence planning within an alliance is even more complicated, as it involves a number of sovereign actors. Even so, it invariably aims to respond to a series of sequential questions summarised hereafter, notwithstanding their precise wording varies in time and among organisations:

**How is the world changing? And what are the military implications of this?**

At this very early stage, the aim is to form a coherent and properly justified vision of long-term developments in a series of areas (demographic, economic, geographical, technological, political, etc.) and, more importantly, to deduce their military consequences.

**What is the role we wish to play in the world and what are our defence objectives?**

The aim here is to sketch out a global strategy in the field of external relations, also including the diplomatic dimensions as well as economic and environmental considerations, and at least

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the broad outlines of the security and defence dimension. If defence strategies are set out separately from the overall strategy, they will typically consist of a more or less precise atlas of threats and/or define the defence objectives in capability terms, such as for instance being capable of ‘managing crises external to Europe’.

**What do we want to be able to do militarily?**

This is the most delicate part of the process. It is about a military translation of the political objectives of the previous phase into concrete and measurable terms, in other words, the ‘level of military ambition’. And it is generally this question that launches the mechanical part of the defence planning process, in the military sense of the term.

**What military capabilities should we have as a consequence of this?**

The aim here is to determine which military capabilities, in quantitative but also in qualitative terms, are necessary to fulfil the strategic objectives. Military capability should be understood as encompassing not only forces and equipment, but everything that renders them operational. This includes the doctrine, force employment concepts, support, training, stocks and munitions, etc. All of these factors taken together are referred to in American military vocabulary by the acronym DOTMLPF: Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities, Interoperability.

**How can these capabilities be acquired and how long will it take?**

This is the stage at which concrete action follows from decisions, either in the form of detailed timetables of acquisitions supported by a payment schedule for national planning, or, in an alliance, by defining the collective objectives and/or individually allocating to each nation the capability objectives that will come together to meet the overall objective.

**Who will be responsible for plan execution?**

For national planning, this part is theoretically the subject of close supervision, both by internal control bodies and the national parliaments. In an alliance, on the other hand, implementation is generally left up to the goodwill of the nations that have committed to the process. This goodwill can be increased by various means (peer pressure, financial incentives, etc.).

**Have we made progress towards our objectives and to what extent?**

The aim here is to clarify whether there has been any progress towards the capability objectives and to what extent. This is a very important part, as the inventory of troops and lessons learned obviously feed into the next planning cycle.

NATO sets out its capability objectives in the NDPP on the basis of the orientations of its strategic concept, of the various conclusions of the summits aiming to move this forward and, in particular, of a **political guidance** that is defined once every four years.

The EU defined a complete and coherent defence planning process at the turn of the millennium: The **Capability Development Mechanism** (CDM), which is expressly referred to in
the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and which it entrusted exclusively to the military structures. However, it added on the top of the CDM a Capability Development Plan (CDP) drafted by the EDA that now occupies most of the communication space in this area. To this, various initiatives such as the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD), the implementation of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), the Preparatory Action on Defence Research (PADR) and the European Defence Industrial Development Programme (EDIDP) - the last two initiatives to be merged into a European Defence Fund (EDF), as of 2021 - have recently been added. Taken together, these elements amount to an empirical trial and error aggregate rather than a capability process. The cornerstone, in the form of a Defence White Book, or ‘political guidance’ at the very least, has yet to be laid. In its absence the efficacy of the approach will remain questionable.

We shall now attempt to describe the two processes, prior to analysing their respective strengths and weaknesses and then considering possible evolutions and improvements to be made to EUDPP. The latter will focus on whether there is a need or not for a White Book and, in case a White Book is agreed, what should be the conditions for its implementation.

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Protocol n° 10 on Permanent Structured Cooperation established by article 42 of the TEU states that: “To achieve the objectives laid down in Article 1, Member States participating in permanent structured cooperation shall undertake to: (…) (d) work together to ensure that they take the necessary measures to make good, including through multinational approaches, and without prejudice to undertakings in this regard within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, the shortfalls perceived in the framework of the ‘Capability Development Mechanism’.”
Defence planning

- What are the global trends?
- What are the military consequences?
- What is our role in the world?
- What are our defence objectives?
- What do we want to be able to do militarily?
- What do we need to do so?
- How to acquire those capabilities?
- How do we ensure capability development?
- Have we made progress towards our objectives?

“The EU in a changing global environment” 2015-06 SEAF
Long Term Capability Assessment – 2018 EDA
TEU Title V 2007
EU Global Strategy 2016-06
EUGS Implementation plan
Council conclusions 2016-11
Headline Goals 2003 revised 2017
Requirement Catalogue 2017
Force Catalogue 2017
Progress Catalogue 2017
CARD 2018
Capability Development plan 2018
EDA/OCCAR/EDF/National defence planning
Coordinated Annual Review on Defence 2020
2 NATO AND EU DEFENCE PLANNING

2.1 NATO DEFENCE PLANNING

2.1.1 Main features

The NDPP is an old and established process. There have been no fewer than eight different versions of the DPP since 1971:

1971 Procedures for the NATO Defence Planning Review DPC/D(71)10
1980 NATO Defence Long Term Planning DPC/D(80)6
1982 Long Term Defence Programme - review of LTDP procedures DPC/D(82)24
1984 Force Planning Procedure DPC/D(84)24 DPCD/D(84)24
1993 Defence Planning Procedures DPC-D(93)7
1997 Defence Planning Procedures C-M(97)35
2009 Outline Model for a NATO Defence Planning Process PO(2009)/0042

As evidenced by the list above, the NDPP is a process in constant evolution, with each version aiming to put right the shortcomings of the previous ones. However, it is worth noting that the process set in place following the Strasbourg-Kehl summit in 2009 marks a key improvement on its predecessors, particularly with the decision to use qualitative indicators in addition to quantitative ones. The current version results from a directive of 24 October 2016 [PO(2016)0655] entitled 'The NATO Defence Planning Process', which marks a new development from the 2009 version.

Secondly, the NDPP was devised against the backdrop of the Cold War and its purpose was to ensure that the Alliance had enough forces – as opposed to capability\(^8\) - to carry out its missions. Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty signed in 1945 provides that:

'In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.'

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\(^8\) The concept of ‘forces’ referred to the old organic divisions of an army (e.g. battalions, corps, etc.) whereas the concept of ‘capability’ focuses more on the desired military effects (e.g. suppressing enemy anti-aircraft defences).
This is what explains the **importance of the military** in the process and the fact that, originally, the NDPP had no scientific or industrial dimension, as each nation was free to choose, and responsible for choosing, its own military equipment. This freedom remains intact, but today NATO nations enjoy the support and assistance of the organisation (Defence Investment Division) and its agencies, in particular the NATO Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA) and the NATO Science & Technology Organization (STO).

Because of this second characteristic, it is a **results-oriented process**. The NDPP works from the objective to be achieved and follows a ‘top-down’ approach by which each nation is assigned the quantitative and quantitative objectives that it is supposed to achieve within a given period of time. This is a vital characteristic which constitutes the basis of the process as set out in the reference documents: ‘the aim of the NDPP is to provide a framework within which national and Alliance defence planning activities can be harmonised to enable Allies to meet agreed targets in the most effective way.’ (PO(2016)0655 referred to above § 4.).

The third and final characteristic of the NDPP is that it is a **structured, transparent and cyclical process**. Reams of literature describe it with precision, including on the Alliance website⁹. Each stage is detailed, and the roles are defined specifically so that each party knows what it must do, without impinging on the competences of any other. Finally, each step in the planning is accompanied by the drafting of a traceable document or output, with the exception of the fourth step, which lasts over the entire cycle.

Each cycle of the NDPP lasts for four years and is based on a **ten-year planning time horizon**. Each cycle therefore takes forward the planning time horizon by four years, as illustrated below. Through this process, Alliance members undertake to develop the capabilities required in the short and medium terms within a horizon of no more than 19 years.

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⁹ See [www.nato.int](http://www.nato.int) : Nato Defence Planning Process
2.1.2 The steps, structures involved and resulting documents

Preliminary activities – Defining the defence objectives

The definition of the defence objectives is informed by the forward studies of the Allied Command Transformation (ACT) in the form of the ‘Strategic Foresight Analysis’ (SFA) and the ‘Frameworks for Future Alliance Operations’ (FFAO), which seek to pinpoint the military implications of anticipated trends.

The SFA and FFAO are developed in the light of the principal responsibilities of the Alliance as defined in the North Atlantic Treaty of 1948 and redefined in the ‘strategic concept’, the most recent of which was adopted at the summit of Lisbon in 2010.

The 2010 concept assigns the Alliance three ‘essential core tasks’, which are:

1) collective defence (article 5);
2) crisis management;
3) cooperative security, which includes such things as partnerships with certain countries, arms control and non-proliferation.

Every NATO summit draws the conclusions of the changes in the strategic environment that have occurred over the previous period, as was the case with the summits of Chicago in 2012, Wales in 2014, Warsaw in 2016 and Brussels in 2018.

Before a full cycle is launched, NATO staff responsible for planning within the Defence Policy and Planning division (DPP) and ACT staff carry out consultations with the Allies to discuss their long-term planning, which is generally known as the ‘direction of travel’ and the principal factors which influence this planning. The objectives of the NDPP are defined on the basis of a
‘threat/risk informed, capability-based approach’\(^{10}\). Not until these preliminary activities have been carried out can the NDPP cycle, which is made up of five stages, begin.

**Step 1. – Establish political guidance**

The **political guidance** includes and details the orientations taken from the higher-level strategic documents and translates these general orientations into sufficiently specific military terms to steer the defence planning activities. It is a classified document that defines the number, scope and nature of the operations which the Alliance must be in a position to carry out in order to fulfil its objectives. All of these operations together constitute the ‘level of (military) ambition’ of the Alliance. The directive also defines, from a qualitative point of view, the capabilities required to carry out the operations foreseen and set the priorities and deadlines to be applied in the various planning areas, including nuclear deterrence if necessary.

The political guidance is drawn up under the aegis of the Defence Policy and Planning Division of the NATO International Secretariat (IS/DPP) under the responsibility of the national representatives meeting within the ‘Defence Policy and Planning Committee’ (DPPC) of NATO, ‘reinforced’ by the military experts (DPPC[R]).

The political guidance is then **adopted by the defence ministers within the North Atlantic Council** (NAC) and, if necessary, by the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG).

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\(^{10}\) For the distinction between a threat-oriented approach and a capability-oriented approach, see the most complete paper by Alexander Mattelaer, *Rediscovering Geography in NATO Defence Planning* – Defence Studies September 2018 Vol 18 n°3
The Military Committee, which works closely with ACT on the forward studies, drafts two military opinions, one before and one after the political guidance. Upstream, the initial guidance describes what the military representatives consider necessary to meet the defence objectives. This document is fed into by the intelligence and joint assessment of threats, as well as by the lessons learned from earlier planning cycles. Downstream, the political guidance is complemented by a document entitled supplementary guidance, which goes into details on the military requirements deemed necessary.

**Step 2.-Determine requirements**

This stage is conducted by two strategic commands, ‘Allied Command Operations’ (ACO) and ACT on the basis of the supplementary guidance. The two commands, under the leadership of ACT, are responsible for identifying all of the capabilities needed to satisfy the level of ambition laid down in the political guidance, both quantitatively and qualitatively, which includes the level of capability preparation. Known as the Capability Requirement Review, this step is transparent for the Nations, but it is not subject to their approval as long as there is no risk of the process being pre-empted by considerations of a political nature other than those set out in the political guidance.

This step gives rise to the drafting of two documents: The Minimum Capability Requirement (MCR) and the comparison report. The latter lists gaps in capability, capability to be maintained and surplus capabilities in the pool of forces.

Requirements are defined by a military analysis of the permanent tasks, the objectives of the summits, the political guidance, but also changes that have occurred since the previous cycle, such as the hybrid threat as it emerged in the Ukrainian crisis. Additionally, the process is permanently fed into by lessons learned from previous cycles and developments in concepts, doctrines, tactics, techniques and procedures.

The MCR establishes a hierarchy between the capabilities within a global framework of operational functions divided into six capability groups: preparation; projection; support; C3 (communication, control, command); protection; information. The needs are analysed and identified for the short, medium and long terms.

The work of the defence planners is supported by the NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCIA), which provides in particular technical support through analytical tools such as the planning software JDARTS (Joint Defence Planning Analytical Requirements Toolset), that makes it possible to deduce pre-determined force employment scenarios and the volume of forces necessary. The results thus obtained are then checked against the experience of senior officers within ACT and ACO, who meet as a panel to deliver their military judgement.

**Step 3. Apportionment of requirements and setting of targets**
At this level, the NDPP aims directly to influence the national planning efforts. The strategic commands, under the leadership of ACT and with the support of the NATO International Secretariat, develop a package of capability targets for each Alliance member to maintain or develop, plus the associated priorities and deadlines. The targets are expressed in terms of capabilities (aptitudes of a qualitative nature and quantitative tables of forces), rather than in financial terms.

The apportionment process applies the political principles of a ‘fair burden sharing’ and of a ‘reasonable challenge’. The former implies a fair sharing of the risks, roles and responsibilities within the Alliance. For instance, each ally is required to provide combat capability, with the exception of Iceland, which has no armed forces. In addition to this principle, the ‘relative wealth’ of each country is also taken into account, through its average GDP over the last five years as a percentage of the total GDP of the Alliance countries. The principle of ‘reasonable challenge’ posits that the level of ambition set for each ally, should take into consideration its economic and financial capacities. The political guidance may also include additional apportionment principles, as is currently the case, for instance, with the so-called 50 % rule: no ally should provide a contribution that represents more than half of a capability, other than in exceptional cases or when this capability cannot be dispensed with.

Following a series of bilateral consultations between the International Secretariat, ACT and Alliance members on their individual capability target packages, these packages are re-examined through multilateral consultations and approved on the basis of the so-called ‘consensus minus one’ rule, i.e. no ally can veto what would otherwise be a unanimous decision on its own package of capability targets. Once agreed upon, the capability targets packages are submitted to the NAC before being put to the defence ministers for approval. The approval means that the ministers agree to include their package in their respective national defence planning processes. A summary report on the capability targets is drawn up for the defence ministers. It includes an evaluation by the Military Committee of the potential risks and consequences for the achievement of the Alliance level of ambition if any of the capability objectives should be dropped.

The capability objectives can be achieved through three main channels:

- **national** – each nation is given its own objectives. This is the preferred route, which quantitatively consists of around 80 % of the packages of objectives;

- **multinational**, in the event that ad hoc groups are set up, such as the logistical support group of the four Višegrad countries (Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary) or the multi-role tanker transport (MRTT) fleet launched in 2016 and comprising five countries (Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Germany and Belgium). In these
cases, it is up to each group to decide how it will divide up the collective capability target, but each nation remains responsible for its own contribution;

- **by NATO itself through common funding.** It is under this category that most of the C3 capability requirements are financed, such as the Air Command and Control System (ACCS) launched in 1999, and it is in many ways the cement that binds all members, even though national objectives can be added; Common funding may cover not only the acquisition of common capabilities but also their operating costs, such as for the air reconnaissance aircraft fleet known as AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System). In some cases, this may apply to a sub-group of the allies, such as in the Alliance Ground Surveillance programme (AGS), in which five countries jointly acquired HALE Global Hawks drones, which will be operated and supported by the Alliance. It is important to note that these programmes do not necessarily come under the NDPP, although the NDPP takes their existence into account and specifies the skills they require for interoperability purposes.

**Step 4. Facilitate implementation**

This step, which is a continuous activity, is the least well-known of the NDPP. Official documents state that it ‘assists national measures, facilitates multinational initiatives and directs NATO efforts to fulfil agreed targets and priorities in a coherent and timely manner’. Implementation facilitation is not sequential but continues for the entire length of the process. It is carried out by the Defence Investment Division of the International Secretariat (IS/DI).

The initiatives taken under this step aim to measure and encourage the Allies’ efforts in the fourteen areas of planning set out in the political guidance. Essentially, the intent is to focus on addressing the most significant capability shortfalls, best known as the ‘defence planning priorities’. Twenty-one priorities were identified at the Warsaw summit of 2016. Today, there are just eighteen. In this context, the Deputy Secretary General, Director of IS/DI, chairs the conference of the Representatives of the National Armaments Directors, which meets twice a year and whose remit is to promote multinational corporation in the field of defence, identifying and exploiting collaboration options. IS/DI has named capability area managers and capability area facilitators for a few of the most critical capability gaps.

**Step 5. Review results**

The capability review or **Defence Planning Capability Survey** (DPCS) carried out every two years has two major objectives: firstly, to verify the degree of implementation of the targets and, secondly, to establish an inventory of the capabilities owned. The DPS also encompasses Alliance members’ defence policies and plans, with emphasis on the capability of the Alliance to meet its level of ambition and the objectives jointly agreed upon. It also facilitates lessons-learning for the next cycle.

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The DPCS starts by sending out a questionnaire on the degree to which targets have been achieved and national planning and defence policies implemented.

On that basis, the IS/DPP prepares an evaluation for each NATO member (NATO staff analysis). These evaluations are the subject of bilateral discussions with each nation, which focus mainly on the points requiring clarification. Through this process, a record of national inventories and defence plans is kept up to date in a database managed by the IS/DPP. The Reinforced Defence Policy and Planning Committee DPPC(R) then reviews and approves the evaluations in a multilateral framework governed by the rule of consensus minus one mentioned above.

In parallel, the two strategic commands prepare Suitability and Risk Assessments, which are submitted to the Military Committee. In particular, ACO aims to assess the risks represented by potential gaps in terms of forces and capabilities, while ACT focuses on the suitability of allies’ plans to allow NATO to achieve its level of ambition and on drawing up a hierarchical list of the capability gaps stemming from this analysis.

On the basis of those assessments, the DPPC(R) drafts a report summarising the NATO capabilities (Capability report), which highlights individual and collective progress made in terms of capability development, considering NATO’s level of ambition. This report, which is drawn up every two years, includes the approved overviews of the national assessments. It is submitted to the NAC for approval, and then to the NATO defence ministers for ratification, in principle in the month of June every even-numbered year.
The NDPP steps and timelines, next cycle

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Source: Stedelijk college
2.2 THE EUROPEAN UNION DEFENCE PLANNING

2.2.1 Main features

The European process is recent, and its elements have been put into place in successive stages:\n
1999 – 2004 a military phase, dominated by the creation of the ‘Capability Development Mechanism’ (CDM), under the authority of the EU Military Committee (EUMC) with the support of the European Union Military Staff (EUMS), which takes the form of the approval of the various catalogues of requirements, forces and progress;

2004 – 2016 a defence phase, marked by the creation of the European Defence Agency (EDA), whose main tool in this area is the ‘Capability Development Plan’ (CDP);

2016 – 2018 the current phase, marked by many new initiatives in favour of European defence, many of which affect the capability process: the definition of European defence objectives through the (political) ‘level of ambition’ set out in the global strategy implementation plan; the launch of a new planning cycle involving both the CDM and the CDP; the establishment of a Coordinated Annual Review on Defence, (CARD), a sort of capability review carried out by the EDA; a preparatory action on defence research (EDA and Commission) and of the EU Defence Industrial Development Programme (EDIDP) ahead of the launch, by the European Commission, of a European Defence Fund, in the field of defence research and development and, finally, the establishment, by twenty-five Member States, of the Permanent Structured Cooperation, which was supposed to be a capability process in its own right.

Up until now, this process has been limited in its scope: it has not aimed to acquire all types of military capabilities in cooperation, but only those necessary for the implementation of CSDP. However, this situation has evolved. Moreover, and unlike the NATO treaty, the European Treaty makes no provision, at least explicitly, for the acquisition of common capabilities. Indeed, article 42.1. TEU provides that:

‘The common security and defence policy shall be an integral part of the common foreign and security policy. It shall provide the Union with operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets. The Union may use them on missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. The performance of these tasks shall be undertaken using capabilities provided by the Member States.’

As the CSDP has a civilian dimension as well as a military one, provision is made in the Treaty for both military and civilian resources to be used for the performance of the same missions. This is set out in article 43 TEU, which provides that: ‘1. The tasks referred to in Article 42 (1), in the course of which the Union may use civilian and military means, shall

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12 See Annex 4: Brief history of the European Capability Process
13 Nicola Pirozzi: The Civilian CSDP A success story for the EU’s crisis management Cinderella? EU-ISS October 2018

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include joint operations (...).’ The consequence of this is that the military capability process is
supposed to coexist with a process aiming to build civilian capabilities. In fact, the ‘Civilian
Headline Goal 2008’\(^{14}\) adopted by the European Council of 17 December 2004\(^ {15}\) set in place a
capability process in six priority sectors: police; rule of law; civil administration; civil
protection; observation missions; support for the Special Representatives of the Union. It
provides for the launch of capability conferences and a process of monitoring the headline goal.

The European capability process is neither linear nor cyclical, in other words – as things
currently stand – it is called upon only when the European Council considers that it
should. This process is hard to understand, as no official document describes it in its
entirety (CDM, CDP and other initiatives) and it has no name. It is purely out of convenience
that we will refer to it, for the purposes of drafting this document, by the acronym EUDPP
(European Union Defence Planning Process) to reflect the name of the NATO process. As far as
we know, there is only one study describing it\(^ {16}\).

The process is not implemented by a single organisation, as with NATO, but is shared between
various institutions: the EUMC with the support of the EUMS; the Political and Security
Committee (PSC); the Council; the EDA, not to forget the Member States and, now, the
Commission. Only the European Parliament has no part to play in it. In reality, the EDA is at the
forefront and obscures the role of the military bodies. Many of those who were interviewed for
the purposes of this report were unaware that the CDM even existed, even though it is
enshrined in the Lisbon Treaty (article 2(d) of Protocol n°10) - the only capability-related
element – along with the PESCO – to be mentioned in the Treaty. As for the Commission’s role,
it is very recent, but everybody can grasp its importance.

Finally, the last notable characteristic of the EUDPP is that it is ‘top-down’ in its military
dimension (EUMC/EUMS) but concludes with a defence part managed by the EDA which is
‘bottom-up’. Unlike the NDPP, indeed, capability targets are not assigned to each Member State;
there are simply priority action areas to be satisfied collectively and for which each Member
State remains free to decide whether or not to invest\(^ {17}\).

The steps, the structures involved and resulting documents

**Preliminary activity - Defining the defence objectives**

The definition of European defence objectives is based on successive texts that overlap rather
than replace each other.

The first of these texts resides in the **conclusions of the Helsinki summit** of December 1999,
which define a capability ‘**headline goal**’:

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\(^ {14}\) CONS EU 15863/04

\(^ {15}\) European Council 16239/04 p. 6

\(^ {16}\) Daniel FIOPT  *EU defence capability development – Plans, priorities, projects*  EU-ISS 25 June 2018 – the general
overview scheme of this study is presented in Annex 5: the European capability process as mapped by the EU-ISS

\(^ {17}\) The term **bottom up** is expressly used in one of the first documents to refer to it: the European Capability Action Plan
(ECAP): *General Affairs Council, Brussels 19-20 November 2001 C/01/414 III § 9*. It is also used in the document 6805/03
dated 26 February 2003 describing the CDM § 37.
28. Building on the guidelines established at the Cologne European Council and on the basis of the Presidency’s reports, the European Council has agreed in particular the following:
- cooperating voluntarily in EU-led operations, Member States must be able, by 2003, to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least one year military forces of up to 50,000-60,000 persons \(^{18}\) capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks; \(^{19}\)

It is worth highlighting that the **definition of political defence objectives** – ‘the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO \(^{20}\)’ - and the translation of these objectives into concrete military terms – ‘deploy 50,000-60,000 persons for one year’, **together, and extremely succinctly, constitute the two core building blocks of a Defence White Book**. The headline goal plays the same role as the political guidance at NATO: it is the first star wheel of the planning process.

**The second founding text** is the **redefinition of the headline goal** by the Council of the EU on 4 May 2004 \(^{21}\) and its validation by the European Council of 17 and 18 June 2004 \(^{22}\). This document, which was initially classified and is better known as ‘**headline goal 2010**’, takes on board the ‘European Security strategy’ (known as the ‘Solana Strategy’) adopted by the European Council in December 2003 \(^{23}\). This document sets to the EU the defence objectives of being ‘able by 2010 to respond with rapid and decisive action applying a fully coherent approach to the whole spectrum of crisis management operations covered by the Treaty on the European Union’. It does not in itself describe the military forces needed to fulfil the headline goal and reserves the definition of this objective to the results of the planning process set out in a classified document entitled: ‘**Definition of the Capability Development Mechanism**’, which was adopted by the Council of the European Union on 28 February 2003 \(^{24}\). The main innovation in the headline goal 2010 is the creation of battlegroups. Thus ‘the ability for the EU to deploy force packages at high readiness as a response to a crisis either as a stand-alone force or as part of a larger operation enabling follow-on phases, is a key element of the 2010 Headline Goal’ \(^{25}\).

**The third significant text** is embedded in the **European Council conclusions of 11 and 12 December 2008** \(^{26}\) endorsing the updated Solana Strategy and in particular its ‘**operational ambition**’:

‘Europe should actually be capable, in the years ahead, in the framework of the level of ambition established, inter alia of deploying 60,000 men in 60 days for a **major operation, within the**

\(^{18}\) The number of 50,000 to 60,000 personnel is roughly the size of an Army corps.

\(^{19}\) Presidency Conclusions Helsinki European Council

\(^{20}\) Presidency Conclusions Cologne European Council Annexe III § 1 p. 33

\(^{21}\) CONS EU 6309/6/04 REV 6

\(^{22}\) Presidency Conclusions Brussels European Council 10679/2/04 REV 2

\(^{23}\) Conclusions of the Presidency 5831/04: ‘European Council adopted European security strategy and congratulated SG/HR Javier Solana on the work carried out. §84 p. 21

\(^{24}\) PSC 6805/03 of 26 February 2003 preparing the decision of the Council of 28 February. This document had not been made public.

\(^{25}\) CONS EU 6309/6/04 REV 6 § 4

\(^{26}\) CONS EU 17271/08 Annex 2
range of operations envisaged within the headline goal for 2010 and within the civilian headline goal for 2010, of planning and conducting simultaneously:

- **two major stabilisation and reconstruction operations**, with a suitable civilian component, supported by a maximum of 10,000 men for at least two years;\(^\circ\)
- **two rapid response operations** of limited duration using inter alia the EU's battlegroups;
- **an emergency operation for the evacuation** of European nationals (in less than 10 days), bearing in mind the primary role of each Member State as regards its nationals and making use of the consulate lead State concept;\(^\circ\)
- **a maritime or air surveillance/interdiction mission**;
- **a civilian-military humanitarian assistance operation** lasting up to 90 days;\(^\circ\)
- **around a dozen ESDP civilian missions** (inter alia police, rule of law, civil administration, civil protection, security sector reform and observation missions) of varying formats, inter alia in a rapid reaction situation, including a major mission (possibly up to 3000 experts), which could last several years.

‘For its operations and missions, the European Union uses, in an appropriate manner and in accordance with procedures, the resources and capabilities of Member States, the European Union and, if appropriate for its military operations, of NATO.’

**The fourth significant text** is made up of the aforementioned articles 42 and 43 TEU, which entered into force on 1 December 2009. It is worth recalling that article 43 TEU provides for the following actions:

- joint disarmament operations,
- humanitarian and rescue tasks,
- military advice and assistance tasks,
- conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks,
- tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation.

All these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories.’

Given that they belong at the top of the hierarchy of norms through the Treaty, these tasks must be taken seriously by defence and security planners.
Finally, the fifth and final founding text is the EU Global Strategy (EUGS), which was presented by HR/VP Federica Mogherini to the European Council on 28 June 2016. This text was not formally approved, but ‘welcomed’, with the ministers calling for the work to be taken forward. On the basis of this further work, the European Council of 14 November 2016, which adopted the EUGS implementation plan and set what it called a level of (political) ambition, which constitutes the defence objective ‘that the EU and its Member States set out to achieve (...) in the area of security and defence’, namely:

- Responding to external conflicts and crises;
- The capacity building of partners;
- Protecting the Union and its citizens.

The translation of these texts into military terms that allowed planning to begin.

Step 1. – Establishing military requirements to deliver EU defence goals – the Capability Development Mechanism (CDM)

Until the EDA was created in 2004, the CDM was the Union’s only capability process. It was described in a detailed document, approved by the Council of 2003, still in force, but not public. The CDM covers only military planning, to the exclusion of civilian planning, and this is why it is sometimes referred to as the ‘military capability development mechanism of the European Union’ (MCDM-EU) and placed under the exclusive responsibility of the experts of the Headline Goal Task Force Working Group (HTF/WG) of the EUMC with the support of the EUMS.

The CDM redux dates back to late 2016, by instruction of the European Council, following on from the EUGS. However, it was conducted in a partial and compressed version compared to the above description. Its third phase on addressing capability shortfalls, for instance, which had never really been implemented, is now being carried out at the EDA and the first two phases have been speeded up.

Between 2016 and 2018, the CDM has been conducted in four phases.

1) The ‘Military CSDP Level of Ambition’.

On the basis of the above-mentioned defence objectives, the EUMC made a proposal to PSC in late 2016 to retain five illustrative scenarios, it being understood that some of them could be carried out at the same time (concurrents):

- peace enforcement;
- stabilisation and support for the capacity building of partners;
- conflict prevention;

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27 CONS EU 11355/16
28 CONS EU 14149/16
29 For ease of reading, we have included the in extenso quotation of the Level of Ambition in Annex 5.
30 See Annex 4 – Brief history of the European defence planning process
28

• rescue and evacuation;
• support to humanitarian assistance.

The Council considered that these ‘illustrative scenarios’ (adopted by the Council in February 2017), together with the ‘strategic planning hypotheses’ (maximum distance for operations outside the EU, implementation time and duration) (adopted in July 2017) would constitute the ‘Military CSDP Level of Ambition’, which is indispensable to serve as a ‘political guidance’ and without which it would have been intellectually impossible to begin the actual planning.

2) The Requirement Catalogue

The WG/HTF/EUMC, supported by the EUMS, developed the new range of illustrative scenarios in detail. The new catalogue was adopted in November 2017. The EUMS experts, assisted by the Member States’ experts, used the NATO software tool (Capability Requirements Planning (CRP) tool) (JDARTS) thanks to EDA funding.

Various ‘military tasks’ responding to the objective of ‘protecting the Union and its citizens’ were included in some of the CSDP scenarios. This is the case in particular with EU border protection, tackling cyber and hybrid threats, etc.

In comparison with the Requirement Catalogue 2005 (RC05), two scenarios have been updated and three more revised substantially. However, it is hard to compare the two catalogues, as they are based on different strategic hypotheses, concerning distances and concurrencies in particular, and they use different capability codes. The RC17 calls more upon maritime capabilities, special forces and assistance for the partners, and less upon strategic deployment and enforcement operations.

The RC17 also differs from the RC05 in that it defines operational requirements not only in quantitative, but also in quality terms.

3) The Force Catalogue

Until recently, the most recent Force catalogue established by the EUMS dated from 2015. This catalogue lists forces available for CSDP missions, which is a significant difference from the NDPP, which takes all forces available into account – both for NATO missions (‘NATO deployable’) and elsewhere (‘other forces’). Besides, it expressly specifies that these ‘contributions’ are established on a ‘voluntary’, ‘non-binding’ basis, and only for the purposes of defence capability planning. This particular terminology means that the data may not be used automatically to generate forces, unlike the practice within NATO. Despite this provision, some countries that are members of both organisations may declare lower capabilities to the EU than to NATO, out of concerns that they will be forced to make them available in the event of CSDP missions. It is clear that this type of response distorts the inventory of forces and therefore the entire planning process.
The Force Catalogue 2017 (FC17) was submitted in February 2018. Unlike earlier editions, it does not list contributions from non-EU Member States. It is worth noting that for this most recent edition, the questionnaire sent out to the Member States is virtually the same as the one sent out by NATO and that the taxonomy of European capabilities (EU Capability Codes and Statements – EU CCS) is virtually identical to the NATO taxonomy.

4) The Progress Catalogue and the ‘Alpha’ and ‘Delta strands’ of the CDP.

The aim of the Progress Catalogue is to give policymakers a realistic assessment of the possibility of satisfying the level of ambition, considering capability shortfalls declared for the target year of 2020. Taking account of the capability development plans of the Member States, this catalogue proposes a phase-by-phase approach in each of the six capability areas\(^{31}\) to fill out the gaps in the short term (up to 2026) and in the medium term (up to 2032), by prioritising the ‘high impact capability goals’.

The progress catalogue (PC18) was produced in May 2018. It was approved by the PSC in June and is expected to be adopted by the Council in November 2018.

Ahead of the next step, the EUMC, supported by the EUMS, provides the EDA with two documents that will constitute two parts of the CDP: Strand A (or ‘strand Alpha’) – Excerpts from the Progress Catalogue (adopted in February 2018) and Strand D (or ‘strand Delta’) – Feedback from operations carried out in the framework of the CSDP (adopted in December 2017).

This process is also called ‘SAEP’ (Scrutiny, Assessment, Evaluation, Prioritisation). Its main output is the production of the list of prioritised capability shortfalls, the most important of which are judged ‘high-risk’ (or ‘critical’) for the achievement of the level of ambition. They are both quantitative and qualitative.

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\(^{31}\) The six capability areas are: force projection, engagement, support, C3, protection and information.
Step 2. – Determining priority cooperation areas – the Capability Development Plan (CDP)

Unlike the CDM, the CDP is not based on Council decisions, but on decisions of the Steering Board of the EDA. The initial decision to give the Agency a mandate to draw up a capability development plan for the ESDP was made on 14 December 2006\(^\text{32}\).

The objective assigned to such a plan was originally to:

- make the conclusions of the ‘long-term vision’\(^\text{33}\) more specific and therefore more useful;
- identify the priorities for capability development;
- highlight opportunities for pooling and cooperation, and thereby:
- frame the efforts of those carrying out the capability development process in its entirety;
- steer research and industry;
- provide collective progress benchmarks.

It was also stressed that the CDP did not aim to constitute a sort of supranational defence planning and, consequently, that the defence plans and investment choices were still the subject of sovereign decisions of Member States.

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\(^{32}\) See Annex 4 – Brief history of the European capability process

\(^{33}\) The ‘Initial long-term vision’ is a foresight analysis document drawn up by the EDA between November 2005 and October 2006 to inform the capability choices of the defence planners: *An initial long-term vision for European Defence Capability and Capacity needs*
From the beginning, a decision was made to identify **four work strands** which constitute the first output of the CDP:

A. Establish the basic elements of the **capability gaps** stemming from the CDM and prioritise them (EUMC in charge);

B. Develop the purpose of the **long-term vision** by testing the principal hypotheses carrying out a series of studies on the key capabilities (EDA in charge);

C. Create a **database** (‘CODABA’) on the defence plans and programmes of the Member States (EDA);

D. Learn **lessons** from past and current ESDP operations for future capabilities (EUMC).

The second output of the CDP is a **summary document** of these four areas of work aiming to inform the decision-makers of the Member States participating in the EDA of the priority capabilities to develop. Each gap/priority is expressed as a military task (derived from a Generic Military Task List, or GMTL) and is allocated points for each strand, from 0 to 3. The Member States have the possibility to amend the points barometer. They also set a limit on points to select the gaps to be analysed in greater detail in the process of defining **priorities and sub-priorities**

Finally, the third output of this process is a **list of proposals for specific actions** (projects) (EDA) required to perform these tasks within different time frames: short term (five years); medium term (5-15 years) and long term (20 years and beyond) and a **follow-up timetable** (EDA).
Over the course of its evolution, the CDP has become more sophisticated and complete, but essentially, its initial architecture was not called into question in the 2009-2011 update, or in the 2011-2014 one, used until 2016.

The decision to launch a revision of the CDP, made by the Steering Board of the EDA on 6 December 2016, in line with the global strategy implementation plan, was accompanied by a request to improve the planning process. In so doing, Member States echoed a recommendation of the EUGS to bolster the CDP.

Accordingly, improvements to the CDP were proposed to the EDA Steering Board of the Agency in 2017. They consisted of:

1) **including the 'level of ambition' derived from the global strategy**, which means providing access to the entire spectrum of capabilities including the ISR\(^{34}\) RPAS\(^{35}\) resources, satellite communications and permanent earth observation from space, as well as strategic enablers such as long-distance air transport and in-flight refuelling. This also means taking into account other capabilities designed to ‘protect Europe and its citizens’, such as cyber-warfare capabilities, the means to tackle terrorism or hybrid threats, border protection, etc.;

2) **improving coherence with long-term capability development prospects.** For the most part, the aim has been to establish a connection between the EDA’s work in R&T activities, consisting of developing research agendas (OSRA/SRAs\(^{36}\)) and the CDP;

3) **increasing the effectiveness of EU capability development priorities.** It is with a view to this that the following ideas have been put forward:

- carrying out a **Coordinated Annual Review of Defence** (CARD) to establish a transparent review framework to take stock of the implementation of priorities on a regular basis;

- drawing up ‘**Strategic Context Cases**’ (SCCs) aiming to pinpoint and clarify viable cooperation projects. These are effectively blueprints, aiming to develop a priority capacity by means of concrete actions. For each priority of the CDP, there would be an SCC. These new tools aim to put the capability requirement in its strategic context, by including elements stemming from research (Strategic Research Agendas - SRAs, and the Overarching Strategic Research Agenda - OSRA) and capabilities. The SCCs would aim factor in the primary technological challenges to be resolved in the short, medium and long terms. This could initiate a **convergence between capability requirements and technological or industrial solutions.** However, the scheme does not imply a firm commitment on the part of Member States to participate in the working programme stemming from an SCC.

- taking account of the strategic research agendas, in other words the technology push, in capability development that is usually capacity-driven. The aim is to imagine possible military uses of emerging technologies, particularly those stemming from the civilian field;

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\(^{34}\) Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance  
\(^{35}\) Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems  
\(^{36}\) OSRA – Overarching Strategic Research Agenda and Captech SRA’s – connecting R&T and Capability Development
applying the methodology to identify key strategic activities. The aim is to identify, in coordination with the defence industry, the technologies and skills necessary to ensure a certain degree of industrial strategic autonomy.

Taking on board these changes, the EDA Steering Board adopted a **new CDP on 28 June 2018**. These changes turn the CDP on its head. Their most important implication is without a doubt to detach the CDP's purpose from the CSDP and to direct it into a defence tool that will allow interventions across the entire range of capabilities, in particular what we might call **collective security** (protecting Europe and its citizens).

As regards documentation covering the **work strands**, the Agency has included the ‘strand Alpha’ (capability shortfalls and associated operational risks) and the ‘strand Delta’ (lessons learned from past and ongoing operations) from the EUMC/EUMS outputs. It has derived the ‘strand Charlie’ or medium-term strand from the CODABA database concerning the defence planning of the participating Member States between 2018 and 2030. Finally, it has developed the ‘strand Bravo’ or long-term strand on the basis of a study commissioned from Rand Europe, the major outlines of which have been made public37.

The new CDP establishes a list of **eleven capability priorities**, split into 38 sub-areas and in which there is a potential for cooperation38. These priorities concern requirements for expeditionary corps-type missions for crisis management (land, sea, air, but also logistical and medical support) but also for adapting the military capabilities required to carry out land defence permissions, such as air superiority or military mobility within the EU, internal security and cyber defence.

The CDP2018 features four major differences with the CDP2014:

- it has a **broader scope of application**, which is no longer limited to simply taking into consideration the requirements stemming from the CSDP, but takes account of, and even exceeds the level of ambition of 2016;
- the priorities are likely to be met **independently** of the development framework, whether this concerns the EDA, OCCAR, multi- or bi-nationally, or indeed within a purely national framework.
- each CDP priority must be backed up by a **strategic context cases (SCC)** which will be adopted in 2019;
- finally, the **coherence between the military part of the EUDPP (the CDM) and the NDPP has been reinforced** by the fact that the EDA has been invited to attend all bilateral meetings between Member States (except one) and NATO.

As this report was being written, the European capability process was reaching the end of this phase.

37 **Exploring Europe’s capability requirements for 2035 and beyond – insights from the 2018 update of the long-term strand of the Capability Development Plan**
38 **Capability Development Plan – Fact sheet** (public version)
Step 3. – Taking stock of progress in capability building – the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD)

Officially, the aim of the CARD is to ‘develop, on a voluntary basis, a more structured way to deliver identified capabilities based on greater transparency, political visibility and commitment from Member States’39.

Basically, the CARD methodology was adopted by the Council of 18 May 2017, with the aim of making better use of Member States’ responses to the questionnaire on the quantitative and qualitative inventory of forces of the EUMS (EUMCQ), the defence plans and cooperation possibilities of the EDA (CODABA), and completing these data with financial information concerning the commitments of the Member States over a period of five years (2015-2019).

The CARD is being developed in three phases of discussions between the EDA and the Member States. The first phase consists of bilateral dialogues on the dual basis of the initial financial data set out in the agency databases and Member States’ responses to the EUMCQ so as to refine the data and information available. The second phase embeds the result of these dialogues in a consolidated analysis which is submitted to the Steering Board in its capability format. The third phase consists of the drafting of a preparatory report, to be discussed and approved by the Steering Board in defence minister format, and then submitted to the Council. This cycle began in September 2017 and is expected to conclude with the presentation of the report to the Ministerial Steering Board of the EDA on 20 November 2018.

The CARD report is expected to present the principal conclusions of the review and associated recommendations. Although it will be drafted by the EDA, which holds the CARD secretariat, the EUMC and the EUMS will also make their contributions. This process will not be carried out not on an annual basis, as its name suggests, but once every two years, and therefore with the same regularity as the capability review of the fifth step of the NDPP.

Available information on the forthcoming CARD report indicates that its findings section will comprise of three series of observations:

- the first concerns the ‘European capability landscape’ and includes known indicators (level of defence spending in percentage of GDP terms, as a percentage of budgetary expenditure, R&D, R&T spending, etc.) which it sets in a dynamic perspective (recent past, present, next three years). It also lists the capability priorities of the Member States and, as an important innovation, seeks to measure the implementation of the previous CDP, as well as to measure the capacity of EU forces to respect their level of military ambition, in both military

39 Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) – European Defence Agency
and operational terms (making forces available) – the later on the basis of the observations fed in by the EUMC;

- the second concerns the analysis of spending in cooperation;
- the third concerns the analysis of cooperation opportunities in the various capability areas.

The recommendations section concerns both defence spending and cooperation opportunities.

Finally, a conclusions section attempts to take stock, from a methodological point of view, of the cycle.

In this way, the CARD for the first time provides as faithful an image as possible (notwithstanding any incomplete declarations by certain Member States) of European capability and operational cooperation, without referring to specific Member States and thereby avoiding the kind of ‘naming and shaming’ process that is characteristic of the NDPP.

Concurrencies – Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), Preparatory Action on Defence Research (PADR), European Defence Industrial Development Programme (EDIDP), European Defence Fund (EDF)

At the same time as the launch of the new planning cycle at the end of 2016 (CDM/CDP/CARD), two major initiatives concerning the capability process have taken place:

The first originated with the European Commission which, through its ‘defence action plan’ of 30 November 2016, sought to put in place a European Defence Fund made up of two complementary structures:

- a ‘research window’ to finance collaborative research projects in the field of defence at EU level;
- a ‘capability window’ to finance joint capability development in the field of defence agreed upon by the Member States. Funding comes in the form of subsidies from the EU budget on top of Member States’ financing for the development of capabilities endorsed in a Community programme of work.

This EDF follows on from the Preparatory Action on Defence Research (PADR), with a budget of EUR 90 million and running over the financial years 2017, 2018 and 2019, and from

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the European Defence Industrial Development Programme (EDIDP), with a budget of EUR 500 million and running over the financial years 2019 and 2020.

If the budgetary proposals of the Juncker Commission are adopted as they stand, (either before the next European elections of May 2019, or by the next Parliament to be voted in by these elections and by the European Council), the EDF will be endowed with a budget of EUR 13 billion for the next multiannual financial framework, including EUR 4.1 billion for the research window and EUR 8.9 billion for the capability window.

Considering that, for the latter window, the Commission’s budgetary commitment for the most advanced projects may not represent more than 20 % of the direct costs\(^\text{41}\) of the project, with the rest to be borne by the Member States, the EDF contribution has an investment multiplying factor of 5. In the most optimistic scenario, nearly EUR 50 billion may therefore be invested in the defence industry.

However, it is clear that, short of making the EDF into a beauty pageant, which would be a failure, the allocation of subsidies should follow an overall logic that cannot deviate from the priorities resulting from EU defence planning. This must be clearly spelt out.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>PADR</th>
<th>EDIDP</th>
<th>MS</th>
<th>Total (capability)</th>
<th>Total R&amp;D</th>
<th>Total EU</th>
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<td>2019-2020</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>500</td>
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<td>2500</td>
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<table>
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<th>EDF (capability)</th>
<th>MS</th>
<th>Total (capability)</th>
<th>Total R&amp;D</th>
<th>Total EDF</th>
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<td>2000</td>
<td>8000</td>
<td>10000</td>
<td>10800</td>
<td>2800</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Total sur la période: 4100 8900 36600 44500 48600 13000

\(^{41}\) Up to 30 % in some specific cases (if the project is included into PESCO) or in cooperation projects including SMEs or MIDCAPs.
The **second initiative** that is likely to affect the European capability process is the establishment by twenty-five Member States on 30 November 2017 of the **Permanent Structured Cooperation** provided for by article 46 TEU and by the additional Protocol no. 10 to the treaties. Without going into detail on a complex mechanism that has been the subject of a great many analyses and commentaries, PESCO can be described as the **process provided for by the TEU to develop the ‘autonomous capacity for action’ considered vital for CSDP missions**. As the authors of the Treaty anticipated that not all Member States would be willing or able to participate in such missions, they set out to ensure that a **vanguard** of states wishing to act could not be prevented from constituting the capability to do so by the other Member States. This restriction of the number of participants was a suitable way of accommodating the **intergovernmental** nature of the CSDP, which makes decision-making all the more difficult that the vision is inclusive, due to unanimity rule.\(^42\)

As implemented, PESCO looks more like a simple cooperation ‘framework’, fairly similar to the EDA, rather than a structured and therefore structuring capability process. Member States put into what they consider to be a ‘basket’ or an ‘umbrella’ a first wave of 17 projects, only one of which would be developed by almost all of them. That project aims to increase military mobility on EU territory. As such, it has only a tenuous link to the CSDP and responds more to NATO objectives. Two other projects are worth highlighting, however. One is a project of Spanish origin (**Strategic Command and Control (C2) System for CSDP Missions and Operations** or **C2-CSDP**), which could provide a future headquarters for the CSDP with the backbone that is currently absent from EU operations. The other is a German project (**Crisis Response Operations Core**, **CROC**), the description of which reflects the initial ambitions of the EU to have an ‘autonomous capacity for action’ for crisis management.

A second wave of projects is due to be proposed in the course of November 2018. It is to be hoped that it will include projects with a more decisive impact on the European capability landscape. For it to be so, it would be important for PESCO – like for the EDF – that project selection be based on coherent defence planning, rather than simply fitting in with the Member States’ hopes of plugging their own gaps.

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A link has been established between the PESCO and the EDF, as the projects included in the PESCO are likely to benefit from a bonus of 10% of additional funding compared to other projects. For the time being, however, connections between the various elements of the European capability process are not as clear as the graph on the following page, drawn up by the EDA, would suggest.

It is, moreover, interesting to note that on this graph, the CDM progress catalogue drawn up by the EUMC/EUMS has disappeared, which is particularly shocking as it is the only transparent and traceable document that lists the capability gaps of the EU.

Furthermore, what could be interpreted as a causal link between the CDP, the CARD and capability development is actually a link that depends entirely on the goodwill of the Member States.

It is also worth noting that the way in which the coherence will be assured between the bottom-up process of the PESCO and the top-down process of the EDF (as calls for projects are supposed to be carried out on the basis of the programme of work) has yet to be clarified.
ANALYSIS #6 – EUROPE, STRATEGY, SECURITY PROGRAMME / March 2019

Common Priority Setting

CDP (Capability Development Plan)
- Identifies EU capability development priorities
- Output-driven orientation
- Capability shortfalls
- Lessons learned
- National plans & programmes
- Long term capability trends

OSRA (Overarching Strategic Research Agenda)

Impact on European Capability landscape

CAPABILITIES
- Owned by Member States
  - Coherent set of usable, deployable, interoperable, sustainable capabilities and forces

Defence Review & Opportunities for cooperation

CARD (Coordinated Annual Review on Defence)
- Provides a full picture of capability landscape
- Monitors implementation of EU capability development and R&T priorities
- Assess state of defence cooperation in Europe
- Identifies cooperation opportunities

Common Planning & Project implementation

PESCO (Permanent Structured Cooperation)
- Common planning, harmonised requirements, coordinated use of capabilities, collaborative approach to capability gaps
- Identification, initiation, implementation of projects in capability & operational domains

OCCAR Multinational EDA

EDF (European Defence Fund)
- Research and Capability windows
  - Contribute to strengthening the competitiveness and innovative capacity of the EU’s defence industry
  - Foster Defence cooperation through supporting investment in joint defence research, development of defence equipment and technology

Source EDA

CDP / CARD / PESCO / EDF / Nations
Which articulation?
EUDPP steps and timelines

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Preliminary Activities</th>
<th>Global Strategy</th>
<th>Long term Technology trends (EDA)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU in a global changing environment (HR/VP)</td>
<td>CC Implementation Plan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Step 1**
Assess the Operational needs for CSDP/European Defence

**Step 2**
Determine Capability development priorities

**Step 3**
Review

**Concurrent activities**

|------|------|------|------|------|------|

**PERMANENT STRUCTURED COOPERATION**

PREPARATORY ACTION ON DEFENCE RESEARCH

EDIDP

CARD

CDP

SSCs

Strand Bravo

Strand Charlie

Strand Delta

Level of Ambition

Requirement Catalogue

Force Catalogue

Progress Catalogue
Comparison of the two processes

**NDPP**
- Long standing (50 years)
- Collective defence
- Output oriented (results)
- 1 organisation (NATO)
- Easy to understand
  - Well established and accepted
  - Covers the entire capability spectrum
  - Properly staffed (≈ 350 personnel)
  - Member States deeply involved

**EUDP**
- Recent (15 years)
- Now more oriented toward the entire spectrum
- Input oriented (contributions)
- 6 organisations (EEAS, EDA, EUMC, EUMS, Commission, Council)
- Complex to understand
  - Staff insufficient (≈ 30 personnel)
  - Lesser involvement from the Member States

**CSPD**
- The most important component is 2 years-old
- - bottom-up at the end of the process
- - not cyclical (up to now)
- - not very intrusive

Source: Frédéric Maurer
2.3 COHERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO PROCESSES

The need to ensure coherence between the European and NATO capability processes has been recognised from an early stage. The aforementioned document of 26 February 2003, which defines the Capability Development Mechanism, dedicates lengthy developments to the subject. With this in mind, a general principle of transparency between the two organisations was agreed, and an EU-NATO working group set up.

Unfortunately, these measures did not bear fruit until 2016, due partly to blockages of a political nature (Cypriot question), which greatly limited transparency between the two organisations and hobbled the EU-NATO working group in meetings of no great interest.

The differing positions taken by the EU Member States in 2003 to American intervention in Iraq have also left deep marks and definitively anchored the leaders of the United Kingdom and some of their allies in a position hostile to European defence, which is seen as likely by nature to weaken the transatlantic connection by its nature.

To this must be added the defeats of the Dutch and French referendums in 2005, which marked an end to the enthusiasm of the continental powers for European defence and a return to ‘mini-lateral’ solutions, as well as the financial crisis of 2008, which exacerbated a natural inclination to reduce defence budgets since the end of the Cold War.

Finally, one must take account of the structural reasons, which have historically made harmonisation between the two planning processes difficult. Certainly, the aim is not to create the same military tool. In one case, it is to ensure the collective defence of European territory, with the support of the American armed forces, up to and including nuclear deterrence, in the other, it is to manage crises, in the European neighbourhood, without the assistance of the American forces.

**NATO CSDP**

- Collective defence – including nuclear
- Crisis management by civilian and military means
  - On European soil
  - In the neighbourhood of Europe
  - With the Americans
  - Without the Americans

This situation has moved on. Firstly, since the end of the Cold War, at the London summit of 1990, NATO found itself a new raison d’être in crisis management. This development was enshrined in the strategic concept endorsed in November 2010 at the Lisbon summit, which
gave the Alliance three principal missions: collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security, thereby encroaching to a considerable extent on CSDP missions.

Then, the European perspective itself has changed much under different factors, which are clear for all to see: constant and repeated demands of the various American administrations for a fairer share of the burden; US ‘pivot’ towards Asia raising concern about American lack of interest in protecting Europe; the resurgence of a threat on the eastern flank, following the crisis in Georgia and the one in Ukraine (2014); finally, the Brexit vote in June 2016. This development has forced the European Union leaders and national leaders to respond.

Their first reaction was to extend their defence objectives. As has been said, European defence is no longer only about the Union being able to carry out its external crisis response operations alone, but also to ensure the ‘protection of Europe and its citizens’, which we might just as well liken to collective defence, or at least collective security.

In the second place, the Europeans started to take seriously the need to increase or, at the very least, stop cutting their defence spending and to bring the military structures of the EU and NATO closer together. This happened at the NATO summit of 2014, with commitments concerning defence investments, then at the Warsaw summit of June 2016, which initiated a ‘transatlantic strategic partnership’ between NATO and the EU. This partnership led to an initial result in December 2016, with a plan comprising of forty-two actions aimed at increasing cooperation between the two organisations. Six of these expressly concerned defence capabilities:

- ‘Pursue coherence of output between the NDPP and the EU Capability Development Plan through staff to staff contacts and invitation to EU staff to attend NDPP and PARP (Planning and Review Process of the Partnership for Peace) screening meetings upon invitations by the individual countries concerned.
- ‘Seek to ensure that capabilities developed multinationally by the Allies and Member States are available for both NATO and EU operations.
- ‘Pursue complementarity of multinational projects/programmes developed within NATO ‘Smart Defence’ and EU ‘Pooling & Sharing’, in areas of common interest, such as air-to-air refuelling, air transport, satellite communications, cyber defence and Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems, notably through continued and intensified staff-to-staff contacts.
- ‘Further contribute to the coherence of multinational efforts, by reflecting multinational projects developed in an EU context, as relevant, in the capability roadmaps supporting NATO defence planning priorities, and by taking into

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43 The Warsaw declaration on Transatlantic Security 8-9 July 2016
44 Statement on the implementation of the Joint Declaration signed by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission, and the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 6 December 2016
account multinational projects developed in a NATO context in deriving Priority Actions in the framework of the EU’s Capability Development Plan.

- ‘Continue closer cooperation between NATO and EU/EDA experts in the field of Military Aviation with a view to ensuring complementary efforts in the interest of defence and security in Europe especially as regards the development of a Military Aviation Strategy, the augmentation of Military Airworthiness arrangements, Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems and Traffic Integration, Aviation security including cyber, as well as civil initiatives, such as SES/SESAR (Single European Sky/Single European Sky Atm Research).

- ‘Enhance interoperability through increased interaction on standardisation. With the aim to avoid duplication in the development of standards, identify projects where standardisation-related activities could be harmonised.’

This EU/NATO collaboration was boosted through the adoption of thirty-two new measures in December 2017 45, three of which again concern capability development:

- ‘Establish cooperation and consultation at staff level, through regular meetings, in military mobility in all domains (land, maritime, air) to ensure a coherent approach and synergies between the EU and NATO aiming to effectively address existing barriers, including legal, infrastructure and procedural, in order to facilitate and expedite movement and border crossing for military personnel and material, in full respect of sovereign national decisions.

- ‘Hold an informal workshop to be co-organised in the first half of 2018 in order to develop a shared understanding on ways that counter-terrorism may benefit from defence capability development.

- ‘Ensure coherence of output between the Coordinated Annual Review of Defence (CARD) and respective NATO processes (such as the NATO Defence Planning Process), where requirements overlap, while recognising the different nature of the two organisations and their respective responsibilities, through staff-to-staff contacts and upon invitations by the individual Member States concerned to NATO staff to attend CARD bilateral meetings, as appropriate.’

According to the individuals who were interviewed as part of preparations for this report, cooperation between NATO and the EU has never been as good as it is now. In the most recent CDM cycle, coordination covered the following points:

1) when drawing up the requirements catalogue, the NATO taxonomy (Capabilities Codes and Statements) was fully used by the EUMS, thereby creating a sort of

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45 Common set of new proposals on the implementation of the Joint Declaration signed by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission and the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization NATO press release and CONS EU 14802/17
single taxonomy in capability planning between NATO, the Allies, the EUMC/EUMS and the Member States;

2) the latest EU questionnaire sent out took account of the timeframe of the NATO questionnaire (the DPCS) and the responses were dealt with using a software tool that is compatible with the one used by NATO;

3) finally, as previously stated, EUMS staff have been regularly invited to attend bilateral and multilateral first-stage (capability review) meetings of the NDPP.

Work is currently underway within the EUMS to better coordinate the NDPP with the European process. This will obviously require the latter to be made cyclical. In particular, there are reportedly plans to synchronise the operational requirement determination phase with the capability review phase.

This excellent cooperation at technical level contrasts with the political difficulties experienced by the ‘transatlantic link’ since the election of President Donald Trump.

It is important to stress, however, that bureaucratic difficulties have always limited the cooperation between the two organisations. For instance, NATO does not share its ‘unclassified’ documents with the EU; it does not allow its military experts to present NATO capability subjects to the EUMS; nor does it authorise access to its military training programme to all EEAS personnel. At the political level, the PSC may hold informal meetings with the NAC on capability matters, but the same may not always happen at the military level between the two military committees.
3 STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE EXISTING PROCESSES

3.1 MEETING THE LEVELS OF AMBITION

3.1.1 The NATO level of ambition

In 2015, the overall level of ambition of the Atlantic Alliance was to be able to carry out either a large-scale joint operation (‘Major Joint Operation’ or MJO+), which corresponds to a conventional war with an enemy state; or, two major joint operations (MJO) simultaneously, each of which corresponds, for instance, to a ground component that is capable of planning and executing the full range of ground operations up to army corps level, concurrently with six smaller-scale joint operations (‘Small Joint Operation’), including four predominantly at ground-level (division level).

It should come as no surprise that this level of ambition is no closer to being now than it was during the 2010-2014 cycle. In a 2015 study, General Maurice de Langlois calculated that the 2011 level of ambition was 66 % met, 50 % of which through the contribution of the United States, 12 % by the European nations and 3 % by Turkey and Canada, which amounts to saying that the United States alone represents 75 % of the capability objective of the Alliance, European nations 18 % and Turkey and Canada put together 5 %.

In the baldest terms, the Atlantic Alliance is only able to offer its security guarantees to its members because the Americans are part of it and are prepared to stake their own credibility to defend it. This is just as true for collective defence as for crisis management. Without the Americans, the Europeans would struggle to face major conventional aggression from Russia, without ultimately having to have recourse to using nuclear weapons.

3.1.2 The European Union level of ambition

The European level of ambition has not essentially changed since the global objective of Helsinki was set. The EU strives to be capable of carrying out: a peace-making mission, based on the separation of the belligerent parties, which corresponds to a NATO MJO, a stabilisation operation, a conflict-prevention operation, an evacuation operation and, finally, a humanitarian support operation. Here again, the observation made by General de Langlois in 2015 is unchanged: the EU is still incapable of fulfilling the level of ambition it has set itself as a target.

Even if one were to consider solely the defence dimension of the European process, one has to acknowledge, unfortunately, that in its nearly fifteen years of existence, the EDA's

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46 Alexander Mattelaer Preparing NATO for the next defence-planning cycle. RUSI Journal June/July 2014 Vol 159 NO pp 30-35
47 General Maurice de Langlois OTAN et PSDC : vers un rapprochement des processus capacitaires (available in French only). Strategic research note no. 20– June 2015 Institut de recherche stratégique de l’école militaire (IRSEM).
CDP has produced no military capability, with the exception of a few scant results in the field of mine warfare and tanker aircraft.

All of the military capability that has resulted from multilateral European cooperation, such as the A400M transport aircraft, multi-mission frigates, the Tiger attack helicopter and the Aster future missile family, were produced in the framework of the Organisme Conjoint de Coopération pour l’Armement (OCCAR) established in 1998 and up and running since 2001, or indeed in the framework of NATO, such as the Eurofighter fighter plane or the NH-90 utility helicopter, or again under the aegis of the Letter of Intent Framework Agreement (LoI-FA), such as the Air-Air Meteor missile, which has been an enormous success.

Admittedly, the EDA has succeeded in establishing itself as a vital player in the European defence landscape. It has also helped to push forward defence cooperation (see box below). However, cooperating is not equivalent to developing capabilities and, from this point of view, the Agency has barely fulfilled the mission assigned to it in the Treaty in the domains of ‘defence capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments’ (art 42.3 second recital TEU).

The problem is not of the Agency’s making and still less that of its staff. It lies in the fact that the Member States do not want the EDA to compete with their own armament services and are concerned that they will have to satisfy two or even three ‘laundry lists’, one for themselves, a second for NATO, and a third for the EU. They are therefore entirely satisfied with the current situation and do not wish it to change.

**The principal results of the EDA since its creation**

1. **Cooperative R&T projects whereby the EDA is responsible for tendering, contracting and monitoring the execution of the contracts** (in total, a portfolio of more than EUR 1 billion in investment since the EDA was created). This also covers the Agency’s implementation of the Parliament’s pilot projects and then the Preparatory Action on Defence Research by delegation of the Commission. The related contracts and subsidy agreements have been carried out in full respect of the deadlines and budgets stipulated.

2. **Preparation phases for armaments programmes**:
   a. **ESSOR**: development of a European radio-software solution – Initiated within the EDA, then transferred for development to OCCAR
   b. **MMCM**: maritime mine counter-measures - Initiated within the EDA then transferred for development to OCCAR
c. **FUAS**: future unmanned aerial systems (tactical drones for use on land (fixed-wing) and sea (rotary wing) – Production of a harmonised requirement between seven Member States (Common Staff Requirement) and options for European development (Business Case) – Useful work, which the industry uses when referring to the requirement for tactical drones. Unfortunately, the Member States finally decided to go through national acquisition procedures.

d. **FTH**: future transport helicopter – Work shared with NATO (which has undertaken to harmonise the requirement (NATO Staff Requirement), whilst the EDA was in charge of the business case – this project, launched by Germany and France and focusing on a requirement for a heavy helicopter, has unfortunately not been followed up thus far.

e. **MUSIS**: Earth observation – Certain aspects of this project launched within OCCAR have been discussed by the EDA.

f. **MMF**: air-to-air refuelers – Initiated within the EDA then transferred for development to the NATO Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA) and OCCAR.

3. **Deployable IED analysis laboratory.** A project included in the budget of the EDA to build a demonstrator (MNTEL) deployed in Afghanistan in 2014 under French leadership. The Netherlands then launched a subsequent project named Joint Deployable Exploitation and Analysis Laboratory (JDEAL) with two operational laboratories that could be used both for training on European soil and for deployed operations. The EDA was responsible for development and production in this project of a low level of complexity.

4. **Joint training activities** - For instance those that have led to European training centres, in particular tactical air transport exercises that gave rise to the European Tactical Airlift Centre located in Spain; the Helicopter Training Programme, during which many joint exercises and training sessions have been organised since 2012 and which is in the process of giving birth to a European training centre in Portugal; the MALE drone operator training demonstrator that is currently being deployed in nine countries and that will allow simulated joint mission sessions to be carried out in real-time with teams located in their respective countries.

5. More generally, the EDA plays the precious role of a **European armaments forum**, where hundreds of officers, planners, engineers, decision-makers and industry players from the 27 Member States meet every day to discuss a wide range of subjects concerning defence capabilities. It therefore contributes to increasing mutual trust among Europeans.
If the main purpose of a defence planning process is to produce the capability needed to respond to the level of ambition laid down, it must be noted that the NATO process and the European process have failed, one no less than the other. However, defence planning processes have other benefits, which in themselves justify their existence.

3.2 THE OTHER PURPOSES OF DEFENCE PLANNING

3.2.1 The NATO process

From our point of view, the NATO process has three major advantages.

Firstly, it structures the Atlantic Alliance. This is its principal benefit and this is why the expression ‘cement’ or ‘glue’ is often used to refer to it. It has this virtue because it is an old and therefore ‘established’ process. It is structuring, because it is structured. Admittedly, it is ‘complicated’, ‘cumbersome’, sometimes even ‘bureaucratic’ and all attempts to streamline it have failed. However, it is its very heaviness that forces the nations to work together on the same construction assumptions, to share the same operational concepts, to use the same standards and, finally, to increase the interoperability of their forces. It does its job of bringing together the national defence planning systems very well. In so doing, the NDPP can be considered the backbone of the Alliance, around which the muscles and other organs are coherently arranged.

Secondly, the NDPP reassures the Allies and deters potential enemies. For the twenty or so members of the Alliance that have no human resources or major strategic culture, it is the only way that they can have a quality and coherent defence planning system. Thanks to the allocation of capability targets, it answers the question that lies at the heart of the existence of all alliances: ‘who does what?’. And it is the idea of dividing the burden of the military mission between everybody’s shoulders that is the crux of the Alliance’s identity. Additionally, one of the benefits of the NDPP is to show potential enemies that the Alliance is prepared for any eventuality, makes the necessary adaptations and never drops its guard.

Finally, it reconciles the sovereignty of the nations with an effective mode of governance. Legally, each nation is free to decide whether or not to fulfil the capability objectives assigned to it. This offers the great merit of saving face: around the table of the North Atlantic Council, all nations are equal and all may veto a decision that does not suit them. And this does not fail to occur, due to the clash between Turkey and Greece on Cyprus, but in most cases, decisions are made by consensus, or by assigning capability targets on the basis of ‘consensus minus one’, in other words on the basis of need, against the view of the nation to which the decision applies. Of course, it is clear that what the American hegemon says carries a bit more weight than what the other nations say. This hegemony, which is due as much to the weakness of the Europeans
as to the strength of the Americans, has at least the virtue of giving the Alliance the capacity to make decisions.

On the other hand, we consider that the NATO process has **three major weaknesses**. Firstly, it makes it difficult to exercise critical strategic thinking. Since the end of the Second World War, the Americans have exerted unrivalled domination over military thinking, which has its roots in the colossal investment efforts they have ceaselessly made in the military arena. It must be acknowledged that the Europeans have invented no critical technology since the radar, the computer and ballistic missiles, in other words since 1945. All the technology being developed by the Europeans and all new armaments concepts, such as fighter drones, are mostly directly inspired by American advances. The art of war is written in American English. However, this inability of the Europeans to carry out a critical analysis of the strategic thinking of their ally can lead them down the same blind alleys as the Americans, or lead them to develop expensive arms systems that they do not really need. This, we consider, is the case with ballistic anti-missile defence, which is ineffective against nearby Russia, which has at its disposal highly manoeuvrable missiles, and pointless against Iran, which is not a threat to Europe. It could also send them in directions that are later abandoned by the Americans. This was the case, for instance, with the defence innovation initiative better known as the third offset initiative, which was a priority of the Obama administration but was put on the back burner by the Trump administration.

Secondly, for a long time the NATO process had a very short programming cycle: six years. This limitation prevented it from going beyond the time horizon of acquisitions, which is around a decade or even two. This meant that it could have no influence on the equipment cycles of states with an industrial base and condemned the others to buying off-the-shelf. However, this criticism has been tackled, with the creation in 2013 of long-term strategic analyses, which have extended the field of vision of the NDPP.

Finally, the NDPP stands accused, rightly or wrongly, of favouring the American defence industry. Reality is doubtless far more complicated. It can certainly not be denied that the establishment of certain standards favours the industry on the other side of the Atlantic. If, for instance, operational requirements establish that the standard for long-distance artillery is 300 km, and only the American industry produces this equipment, a bias in the choice of equipment is introduced. But at the end of the day, there is nothing preventing the European allies from opposing this, or from allocating themselves the resources for a technological upgrade. The same applies to the particularly effective exploitation of capability targets by the American industry. There is nothing stopping the European industry from doing the same. The fact is that the acquisition of military material follows logic that is political rather than economic. It is hardly surprising, or even illegitimate, for the United States to make Europe pay the price for
its protection in a transactional logic type of relationship. The real question is whether it is possible to be both military allies and ‘commercial foes’.

### 3.2.1 The European Union process

**The principal virtue of the European process is that it exists, despite the NATO process.**

Its recent return to full strength bears witness to the fact that the European dream of an ‘operational capability for action’ is still alive and well. In other words, the Europeans want once again to have an appropriate level of strategic autonomy to allow them not so much to conduct high-intensity warfare on their own, but at least to limit the effects of crises that take place in their neighbourhood. They would have to suffer consequences of those crises, and the Americans do not wish to get involved.

**As for the effectiveness of the new measures, the jury is still out.** The CARD, the PESCO and the EDF will not produce their effects for another ten years or so. In the immediate future, one must also take account of the fact that the **human resources** allocated by the EU to defence planning, i.e. around a dozen people at the EUMS, and as much at the EDA, or some thirty people in total, are out of proportion with the human resources allocated to the same duties by NATO (around three hundred and fifty people). Despite this enormous disparity, the process is served by staff who are able to produce high-quality outputs.

Finally, the European process **has the advantage of answering the question: ‘how?’.** Indeed, it gives states that are members of both the European Union and of NATO a range of options to enter into industrial cooperation projects, allowing them to build or acquire the capabilities they are supposed to have to fulfil the objectives assigned by NATO. This capacity to provide solutions is particularly attractive since, with the creation of the EDF, the European authorities now have a powerful incentive at their disposal, whereas NATO only has coercive instruments - naming and shaming. Finally, the **European process is both military and civilian,** and therefore theoretically gives the EU the means to build a **global capacity** to respond to external crises.

To set against these advantages, the European process has several major weaknesses.

**First, it is not cyclical – at least for the time being – and is not laid down in any document.** Its complexity harms its ability to be understood by the very people who are supposed to be implementing it, not only in Brussels, but also, and in particular, in the national capitals.

Secondly, **it is incomplete.** It lacks any clear dovetailing between the defence objectives set out political level and their translation into military terms, in other words, a **political guidance.**

Thirdly, it seems to us to be afflicted by **logical flaws.** The fact that the expression of the capability requirements is placed into sequence, one after the other, by the EUMC/EUMS
and that EDA does the same with the expression of the cooperation priorities, ends up giving final say to the industrial logic, at the expense of the operational logic. Furthermore, including the Member States’ capability requirements in the process (the strand Charlie) introduces a significant bias in their favour, at the expense of the Union’s capability needs.

The table below shows the difference between the capability gaps highlighted by the CDM and the priorities of the CDP. As we can see, the gaps of the EU are not the sum total of the gaps of the Member States.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main capability gaps highlighted by the progress catalogue of the EUMS – May 2018</th>
<th>Priorities of the Capability Development Plan of the EDA – June 2018</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Strategic transport</td>
<td>1. Enabling capabilities for cyber responsive operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Logistic support for deployment</td>
<td>Cyber cooperation and synergies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Stabilisation capabilities</td>
<td>Cyber R&amp;T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Mountain Light Infantry</td>
<td>Systems engineering framework for cyber operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Special Operations Forces Air</td>
<td>Cyber education and training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Military Engineering</td>
<td>Specific cyber defence challenges (air, space, mrt, ld)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Deployable Storage for Petrol, Oil and Lubricants</td>
<td>2. Ground combat capabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Medical Support</td>
<td>Upgrade, modernise &amp; develop Land platforms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Airborne Early Warning and Air Surveillance</td>
<td>Enhance protection of forces (C-IEE CBRN ind. eqip)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Deployable CIS systems</td>
<td>3. Underwater control contributing to resilience at sea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. EU CSDP Permanent strategic, Military-strategic and tactical Command and Control</td>
<td>Mine warfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Air defence</td>
<td>Anti-submarine warfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. C-IED Force Protection</td>
<td>Harbour protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. CBRN Force protection</td>
<td>4. Integration of military air capabilities in a changing aviation sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Cyber Defence</td>
<td>Military access to airspace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 17. Common Exercises and standardised Training | Protection of mission critical information  
Coordination with civilian aviation authorities  
Adaptation of military air/space C2 capability  
5. Spaced-based information and communication services  
Earth operation  
Positioning, navigation and timing  
Space situational awareness  
Satellite communication  
6. Enhanced logistic and medical supporting capabilities  
Military mobility  
Enhanced logistics  
Medical support  
7. Air superiorities  
Air combat capability  
Air ISR platforms  
Anti-access area denial (A2/AD) capability  
Air to Air refuelling  
Ballistic Missile defence (BMD)  
8. Information superiority  
Radio Spectrum management  
Tactical CIS  
Information management  
Intelligence, Surveillance an Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities  
9. Naval manoeuvrability  
Maritime situational awareness  
Surface superiority  
Power projection |
<p>| 18. Strategic communication |
| 19. Stabilisation and Capacity building |
| 20. Communication and Information Systems |
| 21. Space Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>10. Air mobility</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strategic air transport</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tactical air transport including air medical evacuation</td>
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</table>

<table>
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<tr>
<th>11. Cross domain capabilities contributing to achieve EU’s level of ambition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Innovative technologies for enhanced future military capabilities</td>
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<tr>
<td>Autonomous EU capacity to test and to qualify EU developed capabilities</td>
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<tr>
<td>Enabling capabilities to operate autonomously within EU’s LoA</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Finally, and possibly most importantly, the European process is fragmented between several competing players: the EDA, the EUMC/EUMS, the EEAS, the HR/VP, the Council and now the European Commission.
4 CHANGE SCENARIOS

4.1 A SINGLE PLANNING PROCESS?

4.1.1 Abandoning one of the two processes

Could the abandonment of the NATO process be a possibility?

Suggesting the abandonment of the NDPP is tantamount to questioning the existence of the Alliance. The question would have seemed totally incongruous before President Donald Trump came to power. But his allusion, at the Brussels summit of July 2018, to imply that the United States could withdraw from the Alliance, raises doubts as to the value of the implicit hypothesis underlying all European national defence plans, namely that: ‘the Americans will always come to our aid, no matter what’.

Despite the political declarations of the American President, there are strong reasons to believe that this hypothesis remains valid for the main reason that the Alliance is based on a solid and lasting congruence of interests.

The Alliance is clearly in the interests of the Europeans, to whom it offers a security guarantee that is all the stronger that the United States is prepared to stake its own credibility as a provider of security. This guarantee is all the more valuable for the states that feel threatened, which is particularly the case of Poland, the Baltic states and the Nordic states, but is also for the others, as the Alliance allows them either to spend less – as is the case with the so-called ‘free riders’ – or to carry out military missions or tasks that they would be incapable of carrying out on their own, as is the case for France in the Sahel and for the United Kingdom whose membership in the ‘Five Eyes community’ gives it access to a vast array of intelligence resources that it does not have.

Conversely, the Alliance serves American interests. It is clearly a question of trade, as the United States export more arms to Europe than the other way around and its economy finds considerable outlets there. More than the volume of the American trade surplus, it is the structure of this trade that is worth noting. The asymmetry of protection in favour of the American market has allowed many American firms to buy up their European competitors and become leaders on the European market, such as General Dynamics in the field of land-based arms, thereby removing potential competitors. Far beyond the question of armaments, the

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48 See the documented article by Renaud Bellais Le commerce transatlantique des armements, à armes égales DSI (Défense & Sécurité Internationale) Hors-Série no. 61 August-September 2018 pp 92 to 98 (available in French only).
European Union is the largest solvent market in the world. It is therefore important to nurture it.

The fundamental reason for the Americans to want to preserve the Alliance no matter what, is that like all alliances since the Delian League, it is a multiplier of power. Whatever the military power of the United States - and it is not negligible - their political power is magnified by their leadership position in several alliances, not only in Europe, but also in Asia and the Middle East. This is one of the keys to their power and it is unlikely that they will want to forsake it. One can imagine that if the Atlantic Alliance did not benefit the United States, President Trump would not hesitate to withdraw from it, as he has done with other multilateral agreements signed by his predecessor. The fact that he is staying in is indeed proof that the Alliance serves American interests. Moreover, the Americans do not make any secret of the importance of alliances in consolidating their leadership position.

Indeed, the Atlantic Alliance is a marriage of interests and it is in the reciprocity of these interests that it finds its permanence. Actually, the United States has increased its presence in Europe. The European Deterrence Initiative cost USD 4.8 billion in 2018 and will cost USD 6.5 billion in 2019. Its remit is ‘enhancing US deterrence activities in Eastern Europe to assure North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) allies and partners and deter aggressive actors’. All of this shows clearly that there is a difference between what Donald Trump says and what the United States does. If the United States decided to leave the Alliance, how many million dollars would that reduce their defence spending by? One per cent. In other words, almost nothing, given their military budget of USD 640 billion per year.

**Is the disintegration of the EU process a possibility to be feared?**

If, therefore, there are no grounds to anticipate the disappearance of the Atlantic planning process, should we conversely consider sacrificing the European process on the altar of ‘non-duplication’?

This, once again, is an entirely theoretical hypothesis, as the CSDP is enshrined in the TEU it would require treaty change to abandon it, and treaty changes are not on the agenda.

If, however, the European process is so unproductive, is it worth keeping it alive? This is a question that one may well ask, given the disproportion between the efforts of the EU States between the two organisations. The states of the Alliance did not, for instance, begrudge providing an extra 1 200 personnel (many of whom will, admittedly, come from the United States) to serve the new structures that arose at the summit of Brussels in July 2018, but the...

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50 Defense budget overview, United States department of defense, fiscal year 2019 budget request chapter 4-1
Member States of the EU struggle to supply an extra 35 staff members to serve the new European Military Planning and Command Capability planning structure.

In reality, the question of keeping the European defence planning process boils down to asking whether the EU really wants to have an ‘appropriate level of ambition and strategic autonomy’ or not. Judging from the Global Strategy of 2016, there is no doubt that it does. More recently, strategic autonomy has been made a project selection criterion in the EDF regulation. The notion also has a strong advocate in the person of the President of the French Republic51, whilst the German Chancellor calls for the Europeans to ‘take their own destiny in hand’.

Still, one is forced to admit that outside of France, the concept of ‘strategic autonomy’ is a frightening one, even in Germany, with most European nations, particularly Poland and the Baltic states, interpreting it as a dangerous chimera that is likely to push the United States away from the security of Europe forever52. It even looks as though this concept is increasingly irritating to the Americans, consider – quite rightly – that the defence of Europe would not exist without them.

Historically, however, European strategic autonomy is nothing other than the CSDP itself, in other words the idea of having an ‘autonomous capacity for action’ based on credible military and civilian resources, to manage crises in the immediate neighbourhood of the EU when the Americans do not wish to get involved53. It is certainly not about waging war on the Russians. Claiming the opposite would be like somebody accusing his dog of having rabies in order to get rid of it. If one thinks long and hard about it, however, the opposite of strategic autonomy is, quite simply, strategic dependence. Admitting this would be unacceptable to a small handful of European countries.

It would, moreover, run counter to the Treaty on European Union, the 11th recital of the preamble to which provides that the Member States are:

‘Resolved to implement a common foreign and security policy including the progressive framing of a common defence policy, which might lead to a common defence in accordance with the provisions of Article 42, thereby reinforcing the European identity and its independence in order to promote peace, security and progress in Europe and in the world.’

Merging the two processes?

The NATO process absorbing the European process

Since the NATO Lisbon concept of 2010 and the EU Global Strategy Implementation Plan in 2016, the defence objectives of the two processes have moved considerably closer together. In particular, with NATO intervening outside the territory of the Alliance and, reciprocally,

51 French strategic review of defence and national security (available in French only) 2017 p. 7
52 The Economist 4 October 2018 The Baltics fear European ‘strategic Autonomy’ – the dangers they face are real and immediate, Charlemagne; in Europe’s McCainland
53 Frédéric Mauro Strategic Autonomy under the spotlight – the new holy Grail of the European defence GRIP Report February 2018
European defence/CSDP intervening on the territory of the EU (Military Mobility cyber/hybrid threats, counter-terrorism), the territorial criterion has lost some of its relevance.

Nonetheless, in terms of capability planning, two substantial differences subsist:

- firstly, the foci of the two organisations’ respective missions continue to be fundamentally different: collective defence, up to and including the use of nuclear weaponry for NATO, crisis management for the CSDP;

- secondly, it is not possible to design and build the same military tool taking on board the Americans, the Turks and, tomorrow, the British, or not. This difficulty is exacerbated by the fact that the military weight of the United States in the Alliance is overwhelming.

**Harmonizing the two processes**

Although it is not desirable for the two processes to merge and the capability objectives become the same, one might at least hope to harmonise them. Up to now, and for the reasons that have just been explained, this has not been possible.

However, the broadening of the spectrum of the CDP brought about by the EDA in 2018 has changed the landscape. It is interesting to note that some of the priorities of the CDP in 2014,
which were clearly directed in favour of CSDP, such as ‘the protection of forces in theatre’, ‘enabling expeditionary operations’ and ‘securing sea lines of communication’ disappeared from the 2018 CDP, in favour of priorities that are part of the natural spectrum of collective defence, such as ‘underwater control’, ‘air superiority’, ‘space-based information and communication services’ and ‘naval manoeuvrability’.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priorities of the Capability Development Plan of the EDA – June 2018</th>
<th>Priorities of the NDPP – (MSA) June 2018</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Enabling capabilities for cyber responsive operations</td>
<td>1. Training and Exercises (particularly for large scale high intensity operations)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Ground combat capabilities</td>
<td>2. Deployable Networks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Underwater control contributing to resilience at sea</td>
<td>3. Airborne Electronic Attack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Integration of military air capabilities in a changing aviation sector</td>
<td>4. Joint Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (JISR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Spaced-based information and communication services</td>
<td>5. Cyber defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Enhanced logistic and medical supporting capabilities</td>
<td>6. Medical support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Air superiorities</td>
<td>7. Joint Precision Strike (including Precision Guided Munitions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Information superiority</td>
<td>8. Anti-submarine warfare (ASW)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Air mobility</td>
<td>10. Usability of Land Maneuver formations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Cross domain capabilities contributing to achieve EU’s level of ambition</td>
<td>11. Land engagement</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12. Ground Based Air Defence (including C-RAM)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>13. Land ISTAR</td>
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<td>14. CBRN protection</td>
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<td>15. Readiness</td>
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<td></td>
<td>16. Maritime engagement</td>
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<td></td>
<td>17. Naval Mine Counter Measures</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
It is possible today to trace comparative diagrammes for all the major military functions (projection, engagement, support, communication-command-control (C3), protection and information) in either planning schedule. Only the number of forces required differs between the two plans. Under these circumstances, scope for coordination between the two processes has appeared that did not previously exist.

**4.2 AXES OF PROGRESS OF THE EUROPEAN PROCESS**

**4.2.1 Short term**

*Writing a genuine political guidance*

Following the adoption of a (political) 'level of ambition' in the conclusions of the European Council of 14 November 2016, the ‘CSDP level of military ambition’ was adopted fairly rapidly at the end of 2016, no doubt so that the actual planning process could be launched. This is why the level of military ambition, which takes the role of a political guidance, is still attached to the overall objective of Helsinki from 2010, although it no longer offers a satisfactory military translation of the level of EU political ambition, which now goes beyond it. However, neither the progress catalogue of the EUMS/EUMC nor the EDA’s CDP really responds to the third defence objectives of the EU: ‘protecting the Union and its citizens’.

Furthermore, the CDP, as adopted in June 2018, has a broad spectrum, which is disconnected from the EU political level and takes account of the NATO level of ambition through certain priorities that have nothing to do with the CSDP, such as anti-ballistic missile defence. One might even consider that it is directed towards European ‘common defence’. A clarification
Concerning the capability objectives pursued by the EU is therefore needed.

**Making the European process cyclical and synchronising it with the NDPP**

If the NDPP and the EUDPP are to move closer together, the first item on the to-do list would be to make the European process cyclical, bringing its duration into line with and synchronising its cycle with that of the NDPP (which has a four-year cycle). The EUMC and the EUMS are actually already working towards that goal. Suggestions for improvement are to be submitted to the political authorities (PSC, Council) over the next few months in order to establish a new European Union Military Capability Planning Process.
Simplified overview of the two defence planning processes
However, the working hypotheses currently being discussed concern only the upper part of the European process, in other words the military part, excluding the defence part, which falls under the responsibility of the EDA.

To synchronise the two processes, it would seem logical to start them at the same time. However, the drafting of the new NATO political guidance has already begun, and the final document is scheduled to be adopted in February 2019. The drafting of a new political directive on the European side does not appear to be in the pipeline, which means that the next opportunity to synchronise the military objectives would be the first half of 2023. To meet this rendezvous, the process of writing the new European political guidance needs to be launched at the latest in 2021.

Even in the absence of a political directive, it would be useful to conduct a technical synchronisation of the forthcoming stages, on the basis of the current ‘level of military ambition’. This should not be difficult as part of the NATO capability review, to be initiated in 2019. The EU could continue to use the NATO questionnaire for the 22 Member States that belong to both organisations and send out the same questionnaire to the others, even if a European addendum to the NATO questionnaire should also be considered. Further, the drafting of the ‘minimum capability requirements’ could be carried out in the same timeframe and using the same tools.

Finally, as it will not be possible to assign capability targets in the framework of the EU, a new EDA CDP should be considered, alongside the assignment of capability targets within the NATO framework.

Providing European planning structures with human and material resources

It is clearly not possible to ask a staff of thirty people within the European Union (a dozen at the EUMC/EUMS and the same again for the EDA) to do the work that is done by three hundred and fifty people at NATO. If the European Union is really serious about defence planning, it needs to award itself the resources to do it. The current situation is not viable.

Unfortunately, it is highly likely that a request for extra personnel would be rejected by Member States, who will argue that they have just made considerable efforts to beef up the new NATO command structure. The argument of non-duplication will once again be brandished vehemently, which is a contradiction because the mechanisms supporting European defence must also allow Member States to meet their obligations vis-à-vis NATO. Would it be too much to ask for 100 officers out of one and a half million European military staff? If it is not possible to transfer personnel from the Member States, it may, under certain conditions, be possible to use personnel from an existing multinational staff (e.g. the Euro corps, or the Multinational Joint Headquarters in Ulm?) or, alternatively, to recruit independent personnel such as former soldiers or even civilians, as is the case at NATO (DPP) and the EDA (DPC).
The issue must be framed in slightly different terms concerning the long-term strategic vision. This is currently conducted by ACT in Norfolk for NATO, and by the EDA, which has outsourced this role to a private company (Rand Europe). One might, however, ask whether the NATO projections (SFA and FFAO) could not be used by both.

**Clarifying the European chain of military command**

One of NATO's great assets is that it has a clear political-military chain of command, with, at the very top, the North Atlantic Council, which is the political decision-making body, and the two military commands under its authority, which are in charge of operations (SACEUR) and defence planning (SACT) respectively.

However, nothing of this kind exists within the EU, where one might struggle to find out who does what. This struggle has been sustained by the constant opposition of the British to establishing a European headquarters to conduct CSDP operations. The British vote in favour of Brexit has already allowed an (operational) planning and conduct cell, which is an embryonic headquarters, to be put in place. The most logical hypothesis would be for this cell to develop fairly quickly into proper headquarters and for its 'Director' to be given the title of Commander. It is indeed clear that the PSC and the EUMC cannot manage the EU's military operations on a day-to-day basis. Only ideological considerations have so far hindered the decision to give Europe its own command structure.

The question applies symmetrically to defence planning, most of which is currently on the shoulders of the Director General of the EUMS. Yet this task is sufficiently important to justify a dedicated structure with a command at its helm. In this perspective, it would seem preferable to put the civilian and military planning processes under the same command and move away from the current situation, where the distribution of responsibilities between the EUMS and the civilian section(s) of the EEAS as regards planning across the whole spectrum of civilian and military capabilities (Crisis Management and Planning Directorate - CMPD2 - CPCC) is confusing.

**Naming and documenting the process in a single text**

Finally, it would be helpful if the European authorities would draw up an instruction setting out the entire planning process. This is simple common sense: how can a process be properly executed if it is not described anywhere and it is known only to a handful of players, who are posted elsewhere at regular intervals? How can the memory of the process be retained if it is not written down?

This lack of transparency and continuity in the European process is detrimental to its ability to fit in with either the NATO process or the national processes. In view of this, it should not come as a surprise that national planners prefer to avoid a European process they consider opaque
and complicated in favour of the NATO process, which is clearly described right down to the most minute details.

4.2.2 Medium-term

The White Book’s thorny issue

In June 2016, after HR/VP Federica Mogherini presented the Global Strategy and this strategy was given a warm welcome (but not formally adopted) by the Council, many people, starting with the European Parliament, asked for a Defence White Book to be drafted, or at the very least a ‘defence sub-strategy’ to be included in the Global Strategy.

The reasons why this White Book has never seen the light of day are simply down to the fact that it was seen as politically impossible at the time, given the deep divisions between the Member States over the evaluation of risks and threats and, in particular, over whether or not Russia constituted a threat. As the response was considered impossible, the question of whether the White Book was desirable was therefore not asked.

Even so, in her proposed implementation put before the Council on 14 November 2016, the HR/VP proposed a level of ambition in defence matters, which was adopted by the Council in its conclusions at the same day.

This (political) ‘level of ambition’ was not expressed in terms of ‘threats’, but in ‘capability’ terms (e.g.: ‘being capable of carrying out crisis management operations’), just exactly as it is done within the Atlantic Alliance. This is one way of not having to officially designate one’s ‘enemies’.

Against this backdrop, was a White Book out of reach? The question boils down to what one means by White Book. If one means a ‘French-style’ White Book, which does not content itself with sketching out a vast panorama of the strategic situation, but goes on to list the threats and describe ‘operational contracts’, in other words the military effects which the forces are supposed to meet, then yes, a White Book would be out of the frame and would take far too long to draft. The answer would be no different for a ‘British-style’ White Book, along the lines of the National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review of 2015, which goes into detail on the forces’ mission. It is worth noting, however, that the latter document is both a ‘global strategy’ (National Security Strategy and a ‘defence strategy’ (Strategic Defence and Security Review), whereas in the previous British planning cycle (2010), these gave rise to two separate documents. On the other hand, if the definition of a White Book is a document or a set of documents making it possible to initiate an authentic defence planning so as to allow for

54 See Annex 2 – Reports and resolutions of the European Parliament on the White Book
55 CONS EU 14392/16
capability building, there is no doubt that the Union has never been as close to this as it was in 2016.

Certainly, by defining the EU’s defence objectives, the authors of the Global Strategy did the hardest part of the work. Without it being necessary to draft a document formally entitled ‘White Book’, it would have sufficed for the Member States to translate the defence ambitions into military objectives more robustly. To do so, there was no need for them to write the military objectives themselves. It would have been enough for the European Council to proceed in the same way as at the Atlantic Alliance, by calling upon the EUMC to propose what it deemed necessary to fulfil the military objectives, to approve or amend them, and then to leave it up to the EUMC to flesh out these objectives. The entire process could be classified, as is the case in NATO.

In light of this, it is easier to understand the statement of the Executive Director of the EDA, Mr Jorge Domecq, that ‘the EU does not need a White Book’. Technically, this statement is true. The evidence is that the EUMC, supported by the EUMS, has been able to conduct a full capacity planning cycle on the basis of the headline goal 2010, the Treaty and the level of ambition of 2016. Nonetheless, the current situation is politically questionable, as the Heads of State or Government should not be offloading their responsibility for setting out ambitions in terms of defence to levels subordinate to them.
The next European authorities to be voted in by the elections of May 2019 would therefore be well inspired to reword the EU’s defence objectives more explicitly and in terms that can be translated into military objectives. It is in particular the case with the objective of ‘protecting the Union and its citizens’, which however praiseworthy is insufficient for military planners who have to answer: ‘With what?’.

In order for this definition of the military objectives to tie in with the NATO process, the EU political directive would have to be adopted in the first half of 2023, which would give the European Council and the new HR/VP three years to relaunch a global strategy/level of ambition process, to be adopted in 2022 at the latest. Depending on the results of the forthcoming European Parliament elections, this desirable scenario should be possible. In the meantime, a solution should be found to increase the focus of EDF on the Union capabilities needs?

If future European authorities continue to travel down the road of greater European strategic autonomy, then it would appear important for the European Parliament to become increasingly involved in the process, particularly by means of scrutinising the appointments of the members of the next European Commission and the nomination of the next HR/VP. The Parliament could also study the drafting process of the future White Book: who would bear the responsibility for writing it, the HR/VP, the Commissioner in charge of Defence, a High Representative of the Council for defence matters? What would the timescale be and what form would it take: should priority be given to a capability-based approach or one based on theatres of operations? How could the strategic reflection of the EUDPP be included in the NDPP rather than being subsumed by it? If the European Union is to be ready for 2023, it will have to start its active preparations now.

**Establishing a single capability roadmap for the EU**

As we have just seen in the previous developments the European planning process has seen the list of capability priorities growing longer. There is first of all the progress catalogue of the EUMS, which lists the capability shortfalls that are likely to have a negative impact on the EU’s ability to achieve its level of military ambition, then the EDA’s CDP, which we have shown to have only a tenuous connection to the former. To this must be added the EDA’s overarching strategic research strategy (OSRA), but also the projects proposed in the framework of PESCO, which should logically respond to the capability priorities set out either by the Progress Catalogue, or by the CDP, but are actually grounded in the national priorities of the Member States promoting them. Finally, one has to add the work programme to be drawn up by the Commission with the assistance of the Member States for the allocation of the subsidies under the EDF. This adds up to a grand total of five capability lists to be developed.

The very least what can be said about this situation is that it is not satisfactory.
For this reason, that a good deal of hope has been invested in the new process of the ‘Strategic Context Cases’ (SCCs), but the first set of results from these new tools will not be announced until 2019 and can therefore cannot be used to serve the EDF until 2021. It is by aligning these SCCs with the results of the OSRA research strategy and the Key Strategic Technologies process also implemented within the EDA that it might (finally) be possible to develop viable roadmaps and move away from a stovepiped logic.

It would have been easier, as per the national processes, to organise a dialogue between the teams in charge of expressing the operational requirements and those capable of providing technological solutions to phase in a convergence between requirements and solutions, including by involving industrial sectors capable of providing estimates in terms of technical feasibility, costs and lead times.

Allocating individual European capability targets?

At the end of the European capability process, the question that naturally arises is whether or not individual capability targets should be assigned, as is the case within the NATO framework. Allocating collective capability targets within the EU has been done since November 2007 and has produced no noteworthy results. Why then persist in this direction and not replace it with a straight top-down approach?
The fact is that assigning individual capability targets in NATO has not always produced noteworthy results and this is part of the reason for the American exasperation. Although they may be outvoted and forced to adopt a range of capability objectives that do not suit them, Member States cannot be compelled to fulfil these objectives. And sometimes, they do not hesitate to do just that.

The allocation of capability targets as part of the European process would in any event meet with a firm rejection from the Member States which cannot see themselves having to follow more than one set of capability recommendations.

There is no point advocating a solution that has no chance of being accepted by Member States. On the other hand, it is crucial that resources available through the EDF be used to contribute to the funding of a European capability roadmap rather than finance beauty pageants arranged on the basis of criteria that have nothing to do with plugging European capability shortfalls, but everything to do with flawed compromises and the industrial interests of Member States. This also includes projects presented in the context of PESCO.

**Rethinking the role of the EDA – armaments agency and breakaway innovation**

The creation of the EDA was based on the implicit assumption that EU Member States would agree to direct at least a tiny proportion of their own defence planning into working together on joint projects. This hypothesis proved to be unfounded and Member States have never been prepared to delegate any real armaments programmes to the EDA, particularly as it was born a few years too late, after many major projects had been entrusted to OCCAR over the years 1998-2003.

It would have been logical to merge OCCAR and the EDA. This was the intention of the authors of the treaty establishing the European Constitution 2003, but this perspective got lost. Yet it remains topical, as the missions of the two organisations are close and bringing them together would maximise mutual benefit. The mater is not just one of efficiency in public spending, but it would be a loss not to capitalise on the experience of OCCAR by delegating to it certain programmes under the EDF or PESCO. In this regard, merging the two bodies would have the merit of Europeanising OCCAR and professionalising the EDA for the conduct of armaments programmes.

Failing a merger with OCCAR, one might ask whether the EDA could not become a sort of European DARPA, bringing together the entire range of European organisations already in existence and to which initiatives such as JEDI (Joint European Disruptive Innovation) could be delegated in order to meet many technological challenges, such as the digital resolution, Industry 4.0, cyber, artificial intelligence, cloud combat, etc., all without creating a new structure.
Appointing an authority on investment decisions

If it were adopted, the convergence between capability requirements and technological solutions would require an arbitration authority to be put in place. At the moment, given the stovepipe functioning described, it is unlikely that disputes concerning investments would be escalated to the Steering Committee of the EDA. Even though this would be possible, it would not be desirable, as it would mean that industrial/cooperation considerations would always prevail over operational considerations. If the EU was in a position to put in place a capability development process leading to actual capability decisions, for instance: “Should we develop a programme or buy off-the-shelf?”, it would be useful to appoint an authority or body that was capable of making those decisions. This could theoretically be the HR/VP or, as would be far more logical, a Defence HR/VP. Unfortunately, such an institutional innovation is not on the agenda.

Under these circumstances, the best solution would be to create a Defence Directorate General within the Commission, under the aegis of a Commissioner/Vice-President, as we proposed in 2016. This would logically be accompanied by converting the Subcommittee on Defence (SEDE) of the European Parliament into a committee in its own right, to promote dialogue between the political figures in charge of these questions.

EU Acquisition of its own capabilities

Finally, one of the most promising options to be explored seems to be for the EU to acquire its own capabilities.

It is known that the acquisition of such capabilities would not be possible in the framework of the CSDP, in which article 42.1 TEU clearly provides that the execution of this policy is based on the capabilities provided by the Member States.

However, it remains silent on how capacity should be provided for the ‘common defence’ set out in article 42.2. The EU has in fact acquired capabilities, admittedly dual-use which also have a military application, such as the geo-positioning satellite constellation Galileo.

The EU could therefore go down the same road and, for instance, acquire maritime surveillance drones concerning border surveillance, in both the South and the North. It could also look into the possibility of acquiring a fleet of multi-purpose transport aircraft, that could be extremely useful in humanitarian crises or evacuations of European nationals. Incidentally, this is what NATO does with the acquisition of ‘strategic enablers’ such as the AWACS early warning aircraft.

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56 Frédéric Mauro The Future of European Defence Research, aforementioned p. 60 §5.3.3.
4.3 THE ELEPHANTS IN THE ROOM

4.3.1 Relations with NATO

The complexity of the European capability process can be traced back to the fact that the EU has never chosen between the two paths of an autonomous capacity for crisis management – the CSDP – separate from but compatible with the Atlantic Alliance, and a ‘common defence’ that could develop within the Alliance as a ‘European pillar’.

The division of labour: the CSDP?

The history of the CSDP boils down to three words: ‘Never again Yugoslavia’. This was what the Saint-Malo agreement was all about, and it was on this agreement that the summits of Cologne and Helsinki, and the entire process which followed, were built. Originally, conceptually at least (see chapter 1.3 above), there was no ‘duplication’ between the CSDP and NATO, but instead a division of labour. The evidence for this is that the CSDP concept was initiated, shared and approved by the United Kingdom which, of all European countries, is the most committed to upholding the integrity of NATO.

Unfortunately, deep divides appeared in the European camp at the time of the Iraq war in 2003, which meant that the idea of an autonomous capacity for crisis management was put on ice. It was not until 2010 that it reemerged, in the bilateral framework of the Lancaster House agreements between the United Kingdom and France. Certainly, the ‘Combined Joint Expeditionary Force’ – established in the Treaty - is, as its name suggests, nothing but an ‘expeditionary force’ between the allies, designed to be used for ‘the most demanding’ CSDP missions.

Yet this expeditionary force has never been used. Why? Was it not ready for Mali or Libya? No doubt. Did the two governments disagree? Possibly. But the truth lies probably elsewhere. Without the support provided by the United States in terms of ISR, strategic transport, munitions and other critical capabilities, this expeditionary force could not be employed autonomously. In terms of ‘strategic autonomy’, this brings us back to square one.

Let us face the truth: not only are the Europeans incapable of conducting high-intensity crisis management operations on their own, but the vast majority of them, have no interest in doing so, either because they do not have the military resources to participate, or because they do not believe in the use of force to resolve crises, or again because they are focusing on their own security. Only France (and the United Kingdom, which is leaving the Union) still attaches importance to missions of this kind, but it is struggling to win over its European allies.

Under these conditions, is it worth digging one’s heels in? Should we stick to the dream of a CSDP operated by the Europeans and capable of the most demanding missions, or should it be
left to the P3 – the United States, the United Kingdom and France – to decide to act not, in the name of Europe, but in the name of the Atlantic Alliance, as in the case in the current situation?

**Inclusion within the Alliance: the European pillar?**

The return of the Russian threat, together with uncertainties over the future of the Alliance, has breathed new life into the idea of ‘common defence’, even though the concept made it into the TEU by the skin of its teeth, with the British hoping that it was simply wishful thinking that would never materialise57. The idea is not incompatible with NATO, but unlike the CSDP, its aim is to incorporate the European capabilities within the Alliance, with the same missions. It is the old idea of a ‘European pillar of the Alliance’, on which much ink has already been spilt.

The British have always opposed this idea, on the grounds of ‘non-duplication’ and the ‘single set of forces’. Their withdrawal from the Union will change nothing, as other European Member States are prepared to take up the campaign and have already started doing so. But it is an intellectual sleight of hand to argue that reinforcing European forces would weaken the Atlantic Alliance. Do we need to stay weak in order to be protected? This would run counter even to what the Americans say they want.

In reality, claiming that bolstering European defences would weaken the Atlantic Alliance is boundless hypocrisy. It is hypocritical of Europeans who do not wish to take charge of their own defence, and so delegate it to the Americans. It is hypocritical of the Americans, who are pushing to increase the defence budget as if Europe was going to be invaded tomorrow but have no interest in any discussion of European strategic autonomy. If the Americans are honest about wanting to share the burden, why do they not let the Europeans take on their own responsibilities58? And if the Europeans are being honest, why are they not doing it?

Some will say that the Europeans are not capable of doing so. They do not spend enough. This is true, if one compares European spending to American spending, particularly taking account of expenditure on equipment and research & development.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2016</th>
<th>US</th>
<th>EU 28</th>
<th>Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Research &amp; Development</td>
<td>61,1</td>
<td>8,8</td>
<td>1/7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investments (Equipments + R&amp;D)</td>
<td>151,3</td>
<td>42,5</td>
<td>1/4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Renaud Bellis DSI Hors Série n°61 août 2018

57 See the remarkable article by Peter Ricketts on this subject: *The EU and Defence: the legacy of Saint-Malo* RUSI Journal 28 July 2017

58 The most exhaustive article on this subject is the one by *Jolyon Howorth EU-NATO cooperation and Strategic Autonomy: Logical contradiction or Ariadne’s Thread?* Working paper KFG no. 90 August 2018
However, the Europeans are not planning to challenge the Americans for their role as military leader and still less to go to war against them. To judge whether the level of European defence spending is sufficient or not, it should be compared to those of their potential enemies, not that of their main ally. From this point of view, the Europeans have nothing to be ashamed of. Even without the United Kingdom, the defence spending of the 27 Member States of the European Union is nearly three times higher than Russia’s and not far behind China’s.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2018</th>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU 27</td>
<td>154 854</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU 28</td>
<td>196 915</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>59 122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>203 413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>United States</strong></td>
<td><strong>543 453</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SIPRI database

Can it be deduced from this that the European defence system is superior to the Russian defence system? This is unlikely. It is not so much from insufficient spending that European defences suffers but from insufficient efficiency in spending. It is precisely because European defence is fragmented by the decisions of 27 political and military chiefs of staff, duplicates the same research, the same programmes and the same capabilities and has no chain of command that it is, collectively, inefficient. Increasing the level of spending without first addressing the coherence between the different national defence systems would only increase the amount of wastage.

Promoting the emergence of integrated European defence structures, on the other hand, would not lead to ‘duplication’, as is often argued, but would reduce it. It is by creating an integrated whole that the Europeans could genuinely take their own destiny in hand. It is by planning progressively – in other words over around 15 years – military capabilities that are sufficiently versatile to ensure ground defence and least some of the CSDP missions. It is by making this integrated hub into a coherent entity taking account the NDDP targets as a whole (rather than individually, as is the case at the moment) that the Union could achieve an ‘appropriate level of ambition and strategic autonomy’ (our emphasis) without stripping the Atlantic Alliance of its purpose, nor weaken its role as a privileged collective defence tool. Within this integrated whole, the purpose of which would be to participate in territorial defence, the Europeans would also, once the time comes, have to discuss a shared nuclear guarantee.

In any event, the direction to be taken by the European capability process will be highly dependent on the choice made between the two scenarios, full CSDP and/or common defence.
4.3.2 The challenges of moving from cooperation to integration

The limits to cooperation

Up to now, all initiatives taken in the field of European defence have been based not on the idea of the integration of forces, a binding and irreversible process, but on the idea of cooperation, a less constraining and reversible process, which is the preferred option of the Member States for these reasons. All of the capability processes studied are affected by this tropism in favour of cooperation.

As regards the CDP, the EDA’s inclusion of the opportunities for cooperation between the Member States (“strand Charlie”) alters the expression of the operational requirements and transforms them into a list of capability areas, on which Member States would be well advised to cooperate. Member States are particularly committed to its inclusion, as it is the only element that is really of interest to them.

PESCO originally aimed to promote an “integration” of European forces. The proof of this is that protocol no. 10 to the TEU provided for “specialisation” measures of the forces or for “re-examination in the national decision-making processes”, which are certainly markers of integration. At present, however, PESCO is nothing but a simple cooperation framework. The “legally binding” commitments made by the participating states seem to do little to force anybody to do anything. For example, those made for the purposes of developing the European defence industrial and technological base have had virtually no results, and possibly even the opposite effect. Since November 2017, when PESCO came into being, participating Member States have spent more than USD 24 billion on foreign equipment, mainly from the United States. This total might actually be nearer USD 30 billion, since Belgium announced its decision to acquire American F 35 aircraft rather than any of the two others European options available, to update its fighter aircraft force. This is undoubtedly more than European equipment purchases over the same period.

Finally, a vital aim of the EDF is to decrease the risk of projects, in other words to alleviate the excess costs due to... cooperation. Doing so would be excellent, but the frame remains of cooperation, not integration. Besides, it is important not to confuse industrial cooperation with operational military capabilities. At the turn of the 2000s, the member countries of OCCAR carried out around ten projects together, worth more than fifty billion euros, which equates to more than is currently being considered in the framework of PESCO and the EDF. Can one say that this industrial cooperation has changed the face of European defence? Has it facilitated the implementation of the CSDP in any way?

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59 See Annex 7 – Purchases of foreign military equipment by the Member States of the EU which are parties to the PESCO.
60 See the list of these projects in Frédéric Mauro, The future of European Defence Research Study for the European Parliament – Directorate General for External Policies, March 2016, p. 89
Cooperation suffers from a triple limitation.

The first is that it does not offer an overview of the desired end state concerning the operational capability to be built. Only a properly conducted defence planning process could give such an overview. Adding together national priorities does not give a European priority.

The second limitation is that cooperation prefers to focus on developing new capabilities, because they carry the promise of new contracts and new research. However, plugging in capability shortfalls may sometimes simply mean acquiring capabilities that already exists, off the shelf. This is moreover particularly easy to do if the shelves are European. Let us take the example of air-to-air refuelling. This is a major European capability gap – estimated at 50 aircraft – for which a European solution exists in the form of the Airbus A330 MRTT. To plug this gap, all that is needed is to buy the aircraft. But European countries are doing so only with parsimony. This is either because they cannot afford it, or because they consider that it is unnecessary, as they can count on the American refuellers.

Finally, as it is shaped today, cooperation is limited to a handful of participating countries, even though it should include the largest numbers. This is particularly true of PESCO, which has an average of only seven participants per project, even though it is made up of 25 Member States, which should, in an ideal world, all get involved in all projects. Two projects are even being carried out by just two states. This is partly because, learning lessons from past experiences and, in particular, from the cooperation around the NH-90 helicopter (carried out in the framework of a NATO agency), of which there are as many versions as there were participating countries, European industrial circles have managed to convince their governments that successful cooperation needs to be carried out between a very small number of states, preferably just two. Once solidly up and running, the cooperation could be opened up to other countries. The United States, incidentally, develops its own programmes alone (or sometimes with a junior partner), taking account of their own capability requirements only. They then progressively open up more or less important parts of the programmes to subcontractors, depending on whether they need to offer industrial compensations. In Europe, where no single state has a national industrial base that is big enough to support the viability of programmes, it would make more sense to involve as many participants as possible from the beginning. This is particularly the case for command and control systems (C2), or programmes requiring sizeable investments and for which it is important to be guaranteed a set number of orders from the outset (A400M, for example).

To these limitations must be added the fact that cooperation often leaves unhappy memories for industrial partners, as it is not natural for industrial competitors, which fight tooth and nail over export markets and often despise each other, to cooperate just because they are told to do so. European industrial cooperation in defence matters is full of low blows, bitterness and
thoughts of revenge. The natural tendency in the defence industry is to avoid cooperating, to remain in a monopoly situation and, if possible, to wipe one’s competitors off the market.

Integration challenges

Only integrating defence assets can produce substantial budgetary savings and significant operational benefits. An integration model is provided by the Benasam agreements between the Netherlands and Belgium. These agreements have allowed these two countries, despite very low defence budgets (less than 1% of GDP), to maintain a fleet of frigate minesweepers. The reason is that the two countries plan together, financially commit together, build together, support together and operate together their capability, over which they nonetheless retain “sovereign” control. Such a cooperation model is also being pursued by Germany through the Framework Nation Concept, developed under the NATO umbrella.

However, most European states are not prepared to even contemplate integration as they fear losing their freedom for action, a freedom that is all the more valuable to them as their interests differ.

To clarify the landscape, it is useful to draw a picture of the States’ differing interests on the basis of their respective position towards the three components of strategic autonomy.

Firstly, as regards the operational component, i.e. the ability to carry out autonomous operations, some countries, such as France, attach capital importance to it, say, 8 on a scale of 1 to 10, whereas others, such as Germany, consider it less important and still others, such as Poland, dread the prospect, as they feel it would mean Europe would end up on its own, without the Americans.

Then, looking at industrial autonomy, this is important to all countries with an independent defence industry, which is the case of France and Germany. Other countries, whose defence industries are more interlinked with those of third countries, in particular the United States, have more mixed feelings. Finally, for all countries with an underdeveloped defence industry, the matter is of little relevance and they will buy from abroad, whether in Europe or outside. For these countries, depending on the United States is no different from depending on France or Germany.

Finally, the political component of autonomy, in other words the ability for the EU as an entity to make decisions in the field of defence and execute them varies from one country to the next. For Germany, for instance, European defence is synonymous with integration. This is certainly not the case for Poland. As for France, its leaders too often take refuge behind the deliberately ambiguous wording of ‘l’Europe de la défense’ to promote what is in fact no more than cooperation in operational and industrial domains, but probably not in the political domain.

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61 Frédéric Mauro *Permanent Structured Cooperation: national perspectives and state of play 2017* aforementioned p. 73
62 Frédéric Mauro *Strategic Autonomy: The New Grail of European Defence* Les rapports du GRIP 2018/1
63 Nicolas Gros-Verheyde *Ce qu’est l’Europe de la défense. Ce qu’elle n’est pas* blog B2pro 7 November 2018 (available in French only)
The table below is notional. It would have more value if it were filled by the European leaders or drawn up on the basis of defined criteria, rather than from intuition. Even so, it does highlight the differences of interests of the Member States and the important question of Europe's strategic autonomy. Each Member State sees only its own interests.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Member States Interest</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Italy</th>
<th>Spain</th>
<th>Belgium</th>
<th>Poland</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
<th>Portugal</th>
<th>Finland</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Operational autonomy</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial autonomy</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political autonomy of the Union</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The problem is that there is no reason for these interests to start to converge. They essentially depend on national factors and their orientation is contingent by nature, as it depends as much on the results of the elections in each country as it does on the personal alchemy that unites or divides their leaders. In the absence of an arbitration body, there is as much chance of seeing a convergence of European interests as there is of seeing all the planets of the solar system coming into alignment. This is why the policy of ‘small steps’ has very little chance of succeeding. Even in a hundred years.

The European political-military decision-making chain

One of the aspects the European military experts frequently put forward among the weaknesses of the European capability processes is the absence of a clear chain of command. Who is the military leader in charge of the capability process? Who decides on capabilities? What does the EU want? All of these questions have an answer if asked within a NATO framework, but not in an EU framework.

Raising the question of the military chain of command is tantamount to raising that of the political body that can make decisions in the defence domain and monitor their execution. If there was a European military leader, from whom would he or she take orders, and to whom would he or she report on their execution, if not to a political body? For such a body to be accepted, it must meet two conditions: legitimacy and efficiency in decision-making.

Legitimacy

Who, in Europe, has legitimacy to set out defence guidance? The most obvious answer, going by the treaties, is the European Council. As article 22 TEU tells us, the European Council ‘shall identify the strategic interests and objectives of the Union’. However, the same article also goes on to specify that ‘the European Council shall act unanimously on a recommendation from the Council’. This condition is sufficient to block any significant progress, considering how much
interests differ, as previously discussed. No country in the world would hand over its defence policy to a collegial body *acting unanimously* – not even the Swiss Confederation.

The HR/VP of the Commission has considerable powers in defence matters, in particular the power to put forward proposals to the Council to make decisions in the field of CSDP (article 42. 4). But her prerogative does not go beyond. Eight years after the Treaty entered into force experience shows that, whatever the degree of interest of the HR/VP in defence matters, Member States do not intend to give her much room for manoeuvre.

As for the President of the Commission, he has very few legal powers in the field of defence. Only barely does the aforementioned article 42. 4 give him the right – where appropriate – to make a joint proposal with the HR/VP in case the mobilisation of EU instruments in addition to national resources is deemed necessary. But even if he did have any legal entitlement, his legitimacy to make executive decisions in defence matters could be disputed, considering that the rules for his appointment remain vague, with regards in particular to the exact role of the political parties and the European Parliament.

**Efficiency**

The President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, has on a number of occasions expressed a desire to move from decision-making on the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CSFP) from unanimity to qualified majority.

In support of his proposal, he has argued that this would not call for Treaty change, but would simply require the application of the ‘bridging clause’ of subparagraphs 3 and 4 of article 31 TFEU, which provide that: ‘the European Council may unanimously adopt a decision stipulating that the Council shall act by a qualified majority’, with the exception of ‘decisions having military or defence implications’, meaning, given a strict interpretation, decisions involving the launch of CSDP missions involving the use of force (‘having military implications’) or reinforcing the military capabilities of the partners (‘having defence implications’).

This proposal was the subject of a Communication from the Commission to the Council on 12 September 2018 entitled ‘A stronger global actor: a more efficient decision-making for the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy’.

Taking a similar tone, the German Chancellor has many times mooted the idea of a European Security Council. This proposal, previously made by the Jacques Delors Institute, won the formal backing of the French President at the Franco-German summit of Meseberg on 19 June 2018, one of the recitals of which provides for the two States to undertake to:

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64 See in particular the *State of the Union speech* of 13 September 2017 speech by Jean-Claude Juncker at the 54th Security Conference, Munich on 17 February 2018 and *State of the Union speech* of 12 September 2018 (all available in French only).

65 COM(2018) 647 final 12.9.2018

'look into new ways of increasing the speed and effectiveness of the EU’s decision-making in our Common Foreign and Security Policy. We need a European debate on new formats, such as an EU Security Council and means of closer coordination, within the EU and in external fora. We should also explore possibilities of using majority vote in the field of the Common Foreign and Security Policy in the framework of a broader debate on majority vote regarding EU policies.'67

The German Foreign Minister, Heiko Maas, brought up the idea again at the Federal Academy Security Policy of Berlin68.

In the same vein, one may also mention the European Intervention Initiative, proposed by President Macron to certain European partners and which brings together some ten European states69.

Such is the landscape today. No one can anticipate the changes in European governance in defence matters that may yet come about. However, it seems increasingly clear that change is needed, within or without the framework of the treaties.

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67 Meseberg Declaration entitled 'Renewing Europe’s promises of security and prosperity'
68 Bundesakademie für Sicherheitspolitik (available in German only) 12 October 2018
69 Frédéric Mauro L’initiative européenne d’intervention : pourquoi il faut écouter la Chancelière Merkel IRIS (available in French only) 26 June 2018
CONCLUSION

Given the importance of technological superiority in modern conflicts, the cost of armaments and how long it takes to produce them, defence planning has become a vital activity in the preparedness of armed forces and the effectiveness of defence. Yet today, the European defence planning process is ineffective and complicated. It has produced virtually no capability since it came into existence and despite all initiatives taken since 2016, there is a risk that it will continue to produce nothing but paper.

Up to now, EU Member States have been fully satisfied with this situation, for the simple reason that they do not want an extra list of capability priorities added to the ones they already have. Indeed, the vast majority of them do not have the human or material resources needed to carry out planning exercises. For many, the only roadmap that matters has for a long time been the NATO one and they have no intent to change course. Others also obey only one roadmap, their own, and they have no plans to look at any other, other than as a subsidiary exercise. It would take a Copernican revolution, a reversal of prospects, to move away from the current situation. Every Member State would have to accept that European planning precedes its own national planning. Such a revolution is not on the horizon.

Nevertheless, changes are underway. With the European Defence Fund, the EU will probably be putting a fair amount of money on the table. If this money is not simply to be poured blindly into the pit of industry, but actually to produce the capabilities Europe needs to defend itself, then it must follow a truly effective defence planning process.

From this point of view, there is one certainty: there will be no effective European planning process without a document, or a set of documents, setting out what the European Union intends to do in defence matters – the level of political ambition – and what this actually means in military terms – the level of military ambition. This was nearly achieved in 2016.

The question is therefore not whether there should be a White Book in order to move towards a European Union of Defence. The question is when and how it should be drawn up. Concerning the “when”, the answer is clear: Europe needs to ready itself and have its act together for the forthcoming NATO capability cycle in 2023. As for the “how”, the Europeans do not necessarily need to agree on an analysis of threats. They would probably not be able to do so, unless they use the NATO atlas of threats. However, at the very least, they need to define their objectives in capability terms. The technical components will naturally flow from this and there is no doubt that solutions will be found if there is a genuine will to reach the desired end.

If the European capability process is to produce capabilities, which is the name of the game, then three enormous elephants in the room will first need to be addressed.
Firstly, the EU need to clarify their relationship with NATO. Notwithstanding any irrational move (which is not impossible, but highly unlikely), NATO will not go anywhere. The Alliance serves European interests just as well as it serves American interests. The CSDP, on the other hand, which offers an instrument alongside and outside the Alliance, has failed in its objective of achieving autonomy of action. The main reason is that other than for the United Kingdom and France, this was not of interest to the other Member States. The time may therefore have come to reconsider and to build a capacity that corresponds to what the Europeans really want: a versatile European pillar of the Alliance. If European defence ever sees the light of day, it will be within the Alliance, Not outside it. Not against it.

Secondly, EU Member States must realise that industrial cooperation and even operational cooperation are not enough to create capabilities. Cooperation is a good thing, but it is only through integration that the European pillar will come about. Today, the Europeans are spending far more than the Russians and just a little bit less than the Chinese on defence, but they would be incapable of withstanding an attack from either of these two countries without the support of the United States. This is evidence that the problem does not lie in the level of spending, but in the efficiency of the spending. To increase this efficiency, it is not European industries that would need reorganising, but European defence assets that would need integrating. In other words, demand must be concentrated rather than supply, particularly if competition between industrial firms is to be preserved.

To move from cooperation to integration, however, the way the EU Member States make their decisions would need to change. Currently we are at a deadlock: European defence is impossible without the Member States which have the capabilities, money and experience, but, due to the unanimity rule, this European defence is also impossible with them. Each of them intends to remain “sovereign” and is concerned above all by its own interests. There is no European body capable of ensuring that the general interest, or even the highest common denominator, prevails. This is well-known, but no one is prepared to take action. Sovereignty, totem and taboo, is the gravedigger of national defence in EU countries and keeps Europe under an increasingly uncomfortable American protectorate.

Without treaty change and a move towards a more federal frame of mind, the most promising solution would appear to be that of the European Security Council referred to by Germany and France at the Meseberg summit on 19 June 2018. The proposal is not without connections with the French proposal for a European Intervention Initiative (E2I). In both cases, the aim is to have in place the tools to prepare for defence decisions, so that when the time comes, they can be made with the speed and efficiency required.

Moving forward will require boldness, as time is of the essence. Europe has spent too long watching the elephants breaking the crockery, thinking they were too big to be removed from the shop. Now, it has accustomed itself to their presence, in the middle of the broken dishes.
Europe has taken refuge in “pragmatism”, which is another way of saying that it has no compass, and invoked ‘step-by-stepism’, pretending to make progress while going nowhere. This path has led Europe to where it is today: the edge of a cliff. For giving up on the desirable because it was felt to be impossible, Europe is living with a possible that is not desirable. The art of politics is how to reconcile the two. This is what the Heads of State or Government should be doing. If their aim is for a European Defence Union that protects its members and its citizens, then they will need more than words. They must make sure that Europe has the appropriate military and civilian capabilities.

A Europe that protects, yes. But with what?
ANNEX 1:
LIST OF PEOPLE INTERVIEWED

The interviews were conducted in person or over the telephone.

GAA Denis Mercier  NATO Supreme Commander for Transformation (SACT)  12 July 2018
Mr. Guillaume de la Brosse  Member of the Brexit Task force on article 50 in charge of defence, security and foreign affairs matters – European Commission  1st August 2018

COL Jean-Louis Nurenberg  Defence Adviser  2 August 2018
Luxembourg’s Ministry of Defence

AL Philippe Coindreau  Vice Chief of Defence - FRANCE  22 August 2018
GCA Eric Bellot des Minières  Head of Planning directorate – general staff
GBR Bernard Toujouse  International affairs Division – Head of the Euratlantic branch

Mr. Paul Savereux  Director of defence Planning - NATO  23 August 2018

Dr. Dick Zandee  Senior Research Fellow to the Clingendael Institute of the Hague  27 August 2018

Mr. Bern Ulrich Von Wegerer  Armament attaché to the German Embassy Brussels  27 August 2018

Brig. Gen. Philippe Boisgontier (FR A)  Director of the Staff Element Europe  28 August 2018
COL (FR Armt) Jean-Paul Huberland  Head of Unit for capability needs Supreme Allied Command Transformation - MONS
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Col (FR Armt) Thomas Loudes</td>
<td>DGA – French military representation to NATO and EU</td>
<td>29 August 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Peter Round</td>
<td>Former Capability Director</td>
<td>European Defence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Camille Grand</td>
<td>NATO Deputy Secretary General</td>
<td>Defence Investment Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Kusti Salm</td>
<td>National Armaments Director</td>
<td>Director of Defence Investments Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAA Jean-Paul Palomeros</td>
<td>Former NATO Supreme Allied Commander for Transformation</td>
<td>3 September 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Alessandro Marrone</td>
<td>Head of Defence Programme</td>
<td>Senior Fellow, Security Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Daniel Fiott</td>
<td>Security and Defence Editor</td>
<td>EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms Zuzana Michalcová-Šutiaková</td>
<td>Advisor – Cabinet of the President</td>
<td>European Council Presidency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Alain Alexis</td>
<td>Head of unit – DG Grow</td>
<td>5 September 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr Nathalie Tocci</td>
<td>Director of Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI)</td>
<td>Special advisor to HR/VP Federica Mogherini</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Honorary professor at Tübingen University

ASD (meeting) Aerospace and Defence Industries 6 September 2018
Association of Europe

Mr. Peter Collins – Defence Committee chairman ASD Business planning Director – Selex Galileo
Mr. John Jansen - Chairman of the NATO Industrial Advisory Group Chairman of Netherland industries for Defence & Security
Mr. Thomas H. Weise - Director EU Rheinmetall
Mr. Andrea Nativi – Director EU Leonardo
Mr. Michael Langer – directeur EU Diehl
Mrs Isabelle Maelcamp d’Opstaele ASD Senior Defence Adviser
Mr. Alessandro Ricardo Ungaro ASD Defence Manager

COL Philippe Léopold European Defence Agency 7 September 2018
Head of the Cooperation Unit

Mrs Hélène Duchêne Ambassador 7 September 2018
French Permanent Representation to NATO

Mr. Pierre Delsaux Deputy Director General 12 September 2018
DG GROW – European Commission

Major General Serge Vassart Deputy Military Representative of Belgium 13 September 2018
To the EUMC – Aide de camp to the King
COL Geert Leeman Counsellor PMG/PSC of the Belgium Military Rep. to the EUMC
Capt Hans Huygens Defence Policy Division Chief – Belgium general staff

Lt GAL Esa Pulkkinen Director General of the EUMS 13 September 2018
Director of the MPCC (Military Planning and Conduct Capability)
Mr. Jean-Paul Perruche  Former Director General of the EUMS  13 September 2018
Author of many op-ed in favour of a European White book on Defence – Chairman of Eurodefence - France

Mrs Claudia Major  Senior Researcher  14 September 2018
Forschungsgruppe Sicherheitspolitik / International Security Division
SWP Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik
Deutsches Institut für Internationale Politik und Sicherheit/ German Institute for International and Security Affairs

VAE Eric Chaperon  Military Representative of France to the EU and NATO  17 September 2018
COL Franck Scher  Defence planning UE
COL Christophe Lhomme  Defence planning NATO

Mr. Jean-Youri Marti  Deputy director  19 September 2017
Capability, armament and research division
European Defence Agency

GAL Michail Kostarakos  Chairman of the EUMC  20 September 2017
COL Markus Kohlweg  Chairman of the WG/HTF of the EUMC

Mr. Nicolas Suran  Ambassador, Permanent Representant of France to the PSC  21 September 2017

Mr. Jean-Pierre Maulny  Deputy Director of the Institut de relations internationales et stratégiques (IRIS)  21 September 2017
Director of the study: ‘Analyse comparée des planifications capacitaires par pays de l’Union européenne et perspectives pour des orientations communes dans le cadre de la PESD
et impact sur les programmations nationales’ avec Sylvie Matelly et Fabio Liberti en septembre 2005.

RA Juha Vauhkonen  Military Representative of Finland to the EU and NATO 25 September 2018
Mr Arto Koski  National Armaments Director Representative
COL Hannu Teittinen  Deputy Military Representative
LtCol Harri Ahonen  Assistant Military Representative

Mr. Arnout Molenaar  European External Affairs Service Crisis Management and Planning Directorate 27 September 2018

Ms Sophie Lefeez  Associated researcher to IRIS Author of the L’illusion technologique dans la pensée militaire (The technological illusion in Military thinking) La pensée stratégique – Nuvis – November 2017

Mr. Martin Michelot  Deputy Director of Europeum Defence specialist for the Visegrad group 27 September 2018

VAE. Xavier Païtard  Former Head of the Military Staff French Minister of Defence (2005-2010) Former Military Representative of France to EU and NATO (2010-2012) Defence Counsellor to MBDA’s Chairman 1 October 2018

LtGen (ES A) Juan Montenegro  Military Representative of Spain to the EU and NATO 2 October 2018
MajGen (ES AF) Emilio J. Gracia  Deputy Military Representative of Spain
Navy Capt (ES N) Pedro Sánchez Arancón  Military Representation of Spain
LtCol (ES AF) Francisco Javier Rodriguez Ramos
Brigadier General Heinz Krieb  Director Concepts and Capabilities  16 October 2018
Directorate - EUMS

Ms Filomena Chirico  Member of cabinet of Mr. Jyrky Katainen  22 October 2018
European Commissioner for Jobs, Growth, Investments & Competitiveness – European Commission
ANNEX 2: 
REPORTS AND RESOLUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ON THE WHITE BOOK

31.10.2016
REPORT on the European Defence Union (2016/2052(INI))
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Rapporteur: Urmas Paet

The European Parliament,

M. whereas the EU-level White Book on security and defence should further strengthen the CSDP and enhance the EU’s ability to act as a security provider in accordance with the Lisbon Treaty, and could represent a useful reflection on a future and more effective CSDP; whereas CSDP missions and operations are mostly located in regions such as the Horn of Africa and the Sahel which are heavily affected by negative consequences of climate change, such as drought and land degradation;

N. whereas the Dutch Council Presidency promoted the idea of an EU White Book; whereas the Visegrád countries have welcomed the idea of a stronger European defence integration; and whereas Germany called for a European Security and Defence Union in White Paper of 2016 on ‘German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr’;

O. whereas gradual defence integration is our best option for doing more with less money, and the White Book could offer a unique opportunity to propose additional steps;

European Defence Union

1. Recalls that to ensure its long-term security, Europe needs political will and determination underpinned by a broad set of relevant policy instruments, including strong and modern military capabilities; encourages the European Council to lead the progressive framing of a common Union defence policy and to provide additional financial resources to ensure its implementation, with a view to its establishment under the next multiannual political and financial framework of the EU (MFF); recalls that the creation of the common Union defence policy is a development and implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy under the Lisbon Treaty, which is bound by international law and is actually indispensable to enable the EU to promote the rule of
law, peace and security globally; welcomes in this regard all ongoing activities of Member states aimed at further integrating our common defence efforts, also taking into account the very important contributions which the White Book on Security and Defence would make;

43. Calls on the VP/HR to launch an EU security and defence White Book which will be based on the EU’s global strategy as endorsed by the European Council; asks the Council to assign the task of drafting this document without delay; regrets the suggestion of the VP/HR to the EU defence ministers that there should be only an implementation plan on security and defence instead of a comprehensive White Book process; takes the view that such an implementation plan should be a precursor to a regular security and defence White Book process, which should provide a useful basis for quantifying possible Union contributions in security and defence policy for each legislative term in a specific and realistic manner;

44. Is convinced that the EU security and defence White Book should be the result of coherent intergovernmental and interparliamentary processes and contributions from the various EU institutions, which should be underpinned by international coordination with our partners and allies, including NATO, and by comprehensive interinstitutional support; calls on the VP/HR to revise its initial timetable in order to start a targeted consultation with Member States and parliaments;

45. Considers that, on the basis of the EU global strategy, the White Book should encompass the EU’s security and defence strategy, the capabilities deemed necessary for the deployment of that strategy, and the measures and programmes at both Member State and EU level for delivering those capabilities, which should be based on a collaborative European capabilities and armaments policy while taking into account that defence and security remain a national competency;

46. Takes the view that the White Book should take the form of an interinstitutional agreement of a binding nature which would set out all Union initiatives, investments, measures and programmes across the respective multiannual political and financial framework in the EU; is convinced that Member States, partners and allies should take that interinstitutional agreement into account in their own security and defence planning, with a view to ensuring mutual consistency and complementarity;

Launch initiatives

47. Considers that the following initiatives should be launched immediately:
The Committee on Constitutional Affairs calls on the Committee on Foreign Affairs, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following suggestions into its motion for a resolution:

5. Welcomes the Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy presented by the VP/HR, which constitutes a cohesive framework for priorities for action in the field of foreign policy and for defining future developments in security and defence policy; reiterates its support for the adoption of a White Book on defence to build upon the EU Global Strategy; underlines that the White Book should be based on an accurate joint appraisal of the existing military capabilities of the Member States, with a view to establishing genuine cooperation and cohesion between the Member States;
The European Parliament,

18. Stresses that strong commitment, ownership and support on the part of the Member States and national parliaments, in close cooperation with all relevant EU bodies, are needed in order to ensure the rapid and effective implementation of the EU GSP's political level of ambition, priorities and comprehensive approach in the form of an EU White Book on Security and Defence; welcomes the ongoing work of the VP/HR in the implementation process; underlines the fact that the appropriate resources need to be allocated for the implementation of the EUGS and for an effective and more robust CSDP;

19. Considers the development of a sectoral strategy a necessary follow-up to the EUGS – to be agreed and presented by the European Council – which should further specify the civil and military levels of ambition, tasks, requirements and capability priorities; reiterates its previous calls for the development of a European Defence White Book and urges the Council to prepare this document without delay; expresses its concern that the suggested implementation plan on security and defence remains far behind parliamentary and public expectations; reiterates the indivisibility of the security of all European Union Member States;

48. Supports the Commission’s defence-related initiatives such as the Defence Action Plan and the Defence Industrial Policy, which should start after the presentation of an EU White Book on Security and Defence; supports further involvement of the Commission in defence, through extensive and well-focused research, planning and implementation; welcomes the Preparatory Action for CSDP-related research and asks for adequate funding for the remainder of the current multiannual financial framework (MFF); supports the development of an EU Defence Research Programme under the next MFF (2021-2027);

22.11.2016


The European Parliament,
having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the opinions of the Committee on Budgets, the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection and the Committee on Constitutional Affairs (A8-0316/2016),

M. whereas the EU-level White Book on security and defence should further strengthen the CSDP and enhance the EU’s ability to act as a security provider in accordance with the Lisbon Treaty, and could represent a useful reflection on a future and more effective CSDP; whereas CSDP missions and operations are mostly located in regions such as the Horn of Africa and the Sahel which are heavily affected by negative consequences of climate change, such as drought and land degradation;

N. whereas the Dutch Council Presidency promoted the idea of an EU White Book; whereas the Visegrád countries have welcomed the idea of a stronger European defence integration; and whereas Germany called for a European Security and Defence Union in White Paper of 2016 on ‘German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr’;

O. whereas gradual defence integration is our best option for doing more with less money, and the White Book could offer a unique opportunity to propose additional steps;

**European Defence Union**

1. Recalls that to ensure its long-term security, Europe needs political will and determination underpinned by a broad set of relevant policy instruments, including strong and modern military capabilities; encourages the European Council to lead the progressive framing of a common Union defence policy and to provide additional financial resources to ensure its implementation, with a view to its establishment under the next multiannual political and financial framework of the EU (MFF); recalls that the creation of the common Union defence policy is a development and implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy under the Lisbon Treaty, which is bound by international law and is actually indispensable to enable the EU to promote the rule of law, peace and security globally; welcomes in this regard all ongoing activities of Member states aimed at further integrating our common defence efforts, also taking into account the very important contributions which the White Book on Security and Defence would make;

43. Calls on the VP/HR to launch an EU security and defence White Book which will be based on the EU’s global strategy as endorsed by the European Council; asks the Council to assign the task of drafting this document without delay; regrets the suggestion of the
VP/HR to the EU defence ministers that there should be only an implementation plan on security and defence instead of a comprehensive White Book process; takes the view that such an implementation plan should be a precursor to a regular security and defence White Book process, which should provide a useful basis for quantifying possible Union contributions in security and defence policy for each legislative term in a specific and realistic manner;

44. Is convinced that the EU security and defence White Book should be the result of coherent intergovernmental and interparliamentary processes and contributions from the various EU institutions, which should be underpinned by international coordination with our partners and allies, including NATO, and by comprehensive interinstitutional support; calls on the VP/HR to revise its initial timetable in order to start a targeted consultation with Member States and parliaments;

45. Considers that, on the basis of the EU global strategy, the White Book should encompass the EU’s security and defence strategy, the capabilities deemed necessary for the deployment of that strategy, and the measures and programmes at both Member State and EU level for delivering those capabilities, which should be based on a collaborative European capabilities and armaments policy while taking into account that defence and security remain a national competency;

46. Takes the view that the White Book should take the form of an interinstitutional agreement of a binding nature which would set out all Union initiatives, investments, measures and programmes across the respective multiannual political and financial framework in the EU; is convinced that Member States, partners and allies should take that interinstitutional agreement into account in their own security and defence planning, with a view to ensuring mutual consistency and complementarity;

Launch initiatives

47. Considers that the following initiatives should be launched immediately:

- development of the regular White Book process, for a first application in the framework of the planning of the next MFF;

The European Parliament,

having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Constitutional Affairs and the opinion of the Committee on Budgets (A8-0042/2017),

T. whereas the Union’s future annual and multiannual programming should include defence policy; whereas the Commission should initiate the work on appropriate interinstitutional agreements, including an EU Defence White Book, for a first implementation under the next multiannual financial and political framework of the EU;

Political recommendations

43. Supports the proposal for a Coordinated Annual Review on Defence, in the context of which Member States would coordinate their defence spending and capability plans, in an open process involving both the European Parliament and the national parliaments;

44. Calls on the Council and the VP/HR to elaborate an EU white book on security and defence that includes an appropriate definition of the threats and dangers to European security faced by the EU and its Member States, as a first step towards establishing the capacities that European defence requires, and a roadmap with clear phases and a calendar for progressive steps to be taken towards the establishment of a European Defence Union and a more effective common defence policy; believes that such a white book should be the result of contributions from the various EU institutions and be as comprehensive as possible, and should integrate the different measures foreseen by the Union;

47. Considers that the adoption of a EU White Book on Security and Defence should build on the Global Strategy’s Implementation Plan on Security and Defence, in order to drive the progressive framing of a common Union defence policy; stresses that this document should not only reflect the current military capabilities of Member States, but also
analyse the type of cooperation necessary and the means to achieve it, the kind of operations that the EU may conduct, and the required capabilities and funds, while also contributing to coordination and cooperation between NATO and the EU;

13.12.2017

European Parliament resolution of 13 December 2017 on the Annual report on the implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy (2017/2123(INI))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A8-0351/2017),

Institutional framework

18. Calls on the VP/HR and the Commission to act on Parliament’s calls for an EU Security and Defence White Book in the context of preparing the next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), as requested in Parliament’s resolutions of 22 November 2016, 23 November 2016 and 16 March 2017; considers that building the EDU, linking its strategic orientation with EU contributions to capability development and shaping the European institutional framework for defence, are elements that need to be underpinned by an interinstitutional agreement; stresses that with a comprehensive and trustworthy effort on the part of all stakeholders it is possible to increase the scope and efficiency of defence spending; calls for a powerful role in this process to be defined for neutral countries such as Austria and Sweden, without calling into question the neutrality of individual Member States;

19. Stresses that, in addition to a description of the strategic environment and the strategic ambitions, the EU Security and Defence White Book should identify, for the next MFF, the required and available capabilities, as well as any capability shortfalls, in the form of the EU Capability Development Plan (CDP), and should be complemented by a broad outline of the intended Member State and Union actions under the MFF and in the longer term;
38. Considers that the proposed DG Defence should have the responsibility to ensure open borders for the free movement of troops and equipment, as a necessary prerequisite for ensuring the degree of strategic autonomy, inter-operability, security of supply, standardisation and military certification arrangements required for: EU contributions to programmes under the CSDP and PESCO; EU-funded defence research; the EU's strategic autonomy; the competitiveness of Europe's defence industry, including SMEs and mid-cap companies forming the European defence supply chain; and the interinstitutional arrangements in the defence remit, including the EU Security and Defence White Book; stresses that the proposed DG Defence should contribute to better coordination of tasks among the various actors with a view to achieving greater policy coherence and consistency;

.................................

Coordinated strategic and annual defence reviews

43. Emphasises that CARD should be based on the EU Security and Defence White Book and the CDP, and should address the full spectrum of CSDP-related capabilities, in particular those of the Member States participating in PESCO; considers that CARD should deliver a set of concrete proposals to fill gaps and identify where Union action would be appropriate, to be taken into account in EU budget planning for the following year; underlines the need for the Commission and the EDA to work together in designing the annual work programmes under the capability and research windows of the proposed EDF; points out that the EDA should have a distinct role not only in designing the programme, but also in the management of projects financed from the capability window;
ANNEX 3:
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

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Committees

Working document on improving the functioning of the European Union building on the potential of the Lisbon Treaty, Committee on Constitutional Affairs [Mercedes Bresso, Elmar Brok]

Political groups

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Position paper: Security and defence – Foreign Affairs, Human rights, security and defence

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The development of a European defence technological and industrial base (EDTIB)

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On the way towards a European Defence Union - A White Book as a first step

Does the new EU Global Strategy deliver on security and defence?

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EHRHARDT – What model for CFSP (EUISS)
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GNESOTTO & al. – European defence: a proposal for a White Paper

2010
LASHERAS, POHLMANN, KATSIOLIS, LIBERTI - European Union Security and Defence White Paper - A Proposal
BISCOP - From ESDP to CSDP: Time for some Strategy

2013
DE FRANCE, WHITNEY – Étude comparative des livres blancs des 27 États membres de l'Union européenne pour la définition d'un cadre européen
DE FRANCE, WHITNEY - Europe's strategic cacophony

2014
MATTELAER – Preparing NATO for the next-defence planning cycle

2015
COELMONT, BISCOP, ZANDEE, DRENT - European Strategy, European Defence, and the CSDP
BISCOP - Out of the blue: a white book
FIOTT - Milestone or Maelstrom? European Defence and the 2015 Council Summit
PERRUCHE - An appeal for a European white paper

2017
PERRUCHE - What defence for what Europe?

2018
MATTELAER – Rediscovering geography in NATO defence planning
HOWORTH - EU-NATO cooperation and Strategic Autonomy: Logical contradiction or Ariadne’s Thread?
ANNEX 4:
BRIEF HISTORY OF THE EUROPEAN CAPABILITY PROCESS

Historically, one can distinguish between three separate phases of the European capability process, which explain the presence of the various elements of the current process as well as their origin.

1. The military phase and the Capability Development Mechanism (CDM)

The European capability process started with the European Council of Helsinki of December 1999. The aim of the time is to provide the European Union with the military capabilities it needed to carry out external crisis management missions, as defined at the Petersberg Summit of June 1992 and hence to achieve the ‘autonomous capacity for action’ objective laid down in Saint-Malo between British and French in late 1998 and adopted by the 15 Member States that then made up the European Union at the Cologne Summit of 1999.

At the Helsinki Summit, the Member States set themselves the ‘headline goal’ of being able to deploy, within a period of six months, forces of between 50,000 and 60,000 for one year and support them. These forces had to be able to carry out the full range of Petersberg missions.

The Member States also agreed provisionally to set in place the Political and Security Committee or PSC (ambassadors), the Military Committee of the EU (comprising the national chiefs of staff) and the chefs d’état-major nationaux) and the Military Staff of the EU, as an entity of the Council Secretariat. Since then, these bodies have played a vital role in the European system and were made permanent by the European Council of Nice in December 2000.

As defined in Helsinki, the objective of capability process is as follows:

‘27. The European Council underlines its determination to develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises. This process will avoid unnecessary duplication and does not imply the creation of a European army.’

as for its content, it is defined as follows:

‘The ‘General Affairs’ Council, with the participation of the Defence Ministers, will elaborate the headline and capability goals. It will develop a method of consultation through which these goals can be met and maintained and through which national contributions reflecting Member States’ political will and commitment towards these goals can be defined by each

Member State, with a regular review of progress made. In addition, Member States would use
existing defence planning procedures, including, as appropriate, those available in NATO and
the Planning and Review Process (PARP) of the Partenariat for Peace (PP). These objectives
and those arising, but those countries concerned, from NATO’s Defence Capabilities Initiative
(DCI) will be mutually reinforcing.\textsuperscript{71}

From the beginning, the European capability process has aimed to build a military tool to serve
a European security and defence policy, then still being defined, and which presents three
fundamental characteristics:

- the focus is on crisis management interventions, rather than collective defence against
  external aggression;
- these interventions are supposed to take place outside the territory of the Union, for
  instance in the former Yugoslavia, and not on EU soil;
- they are supposed to take place when ‘NATO is not committed’ and ‘autonomously’, or
to put things into lay terms: \textbf{when the Americans do not wish to get involved}.

As we can see, the concept of ‘strategic autonomy’ is not a new idea, but a constant factor in the
DNA of European defence. Let us start by observing that these three founding characteristics
should have led the members of the EU to set in place the elements of an \textbf{Allied expeditionary
corps}, of the kind that would be set in place from 2010 between France and the United Kingdom
by means of the Lancaster House agreements. However, an expeditionary corps of this kind
presupposes having at its disposal intelligence, command and control and projection
capabilities different from the capabilities required for collective defence.

The idea of a \textbf{mechanism for evaluating military capabilities}, based on the five principles
below, was sketched out at the European Council of Nice in December 2000\textsuperscript{72}:

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textbf{a) preservation of the Union’s autonomy in decision-making}, in particular in the
definition, evaluation, monitoring and follow-up of capability goals;
  \item \textbf{b) recognition of the political and voluntary nature of the commitments made}, which
implies that the Member States are responsible for any adjustment of the commitments in the
light of the evaluation made;
  \item \textbf{c) transparency, simplicity and clarity}, in order among other things to enable
comparisons to be made between the commitments of various Member States;
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{71} Ibid: Annex 1 to l’Annex IV, p. 23
\textsuperscript{72} Conclusions of the Presidency of the European Council of Nice 7, 8 and 9 December 2000 Annex 1 to Annex VI.
d) a **continuous and regular evaluation** of progress made, on the basis of reports enabling ministers to take the appropriate decisions;

e) the **flexibility necessary** to adapt the commitments to newly identified needs.

The Council delegated the responsibility for evaluating and monitoring the evolution of the capability objectives to a *Headline Goal Task Force* under the aegis of the Military Committee.

At the first ‘Capability Improvement Conference’ held in Brussels on 19 November 2001, the Member States agreed on a *European Capabilities Action Plan* (ECAP), which was formally adopted by the General Affairs Council of 19 and 20 November 2001 and confirmed at the Laeken Summit of December 2001.

‘[This action plan] is based on national decisions (a ‘bottom-up’ approach\(^73\)). By rationalising Member States’ respective defence efforts and increasing the synergy between their national and multinational projects, it should make for an enhanced European military capability. The European Capability Action Plan is also designed to back up the political plan which gave rise to the headline goal and to create the necessary impetus for achieving the aims which the Union set in Helsinki.’\(^74\)

The ECAP basically consists of establishing ‘ECAP groups’ for every area in which a capability gap has been identified (drones, space, strategic air transport, strategic maritime transport, NBC, air-to-air refuelling, Istar, etc.) with a view to launching programmes under cooperation in order to respond to a unified military requirement. It adopts the idea voiced at the Nice summit of a capability process that was compatible with its NATO counterpart, by calling for the creation of a European military ‘**Capability Development Mechanism**’ (CDM).

At the same time, the Laeken summit of 2001 declared the European security and defence policy ‘operational’, in other words capable of fulfilling the objectives laid down in Helsinki: ‘the Union is now capable of conducting crisis management operations.’

**The CDM would not be finalised until February 2003.** It was the subject of a note approved by the PSC. This note, which has remained classified\(^75\), still to this day constitutes the basis for the functioning of the military dimension of the capability process. The document gives PSC the responsibility for the political lead in the development of military capabilities, with it responsible for taking into account the type of crises the Union intends to be capable of dealing with. It provides a revision, whenever necessary, of the final objectives and the production of three stage documents: the catalogue of (capability) requirements needed to meet the objectives; the catalogue of forces made available to the CSDP by the Member States and, finally, the progress catalogue, designed to measure the extent to which the capability gaps have been plugged, both quantitatively and qualitatively.

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\(^73\) In English in the French version

\(^74\) CONS EU 13802/01 (Press 414) 19-20 November 2001 § 9 p. 17

\(^75\) Forwarding Note 26 February 2003 (6805/03) from Secretariat General of the Council to the PSC defining the EU Capability Development Mechanism (CDM).
Finally, the CDM would be enshrined in the Lisbon treaty, as article 2 of protocol no. 10 on the Permanent Structured Cooperation established by article 42 TEU, which is still the law in force, provides that:

‘To achieve the objectives laid down in Article 1, Member States participating in permanent structured cooperation shall undertake to:

………………………………….

d) work together to ensure that they take the necessary measures to make good, including through multinational approaches, and without prejudice to undertakings in this regard within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, the shortfalls perceived in the framework of the ‘Capability Development Mechanism’;’

Originally, the CDM was destined to be conducted regularly and was based on four principles: the preservation of the European Union’s autonomy in decision-making; the recognition of the political and voluntary nature of the national commitments taken in this framework; the need to maintain coherence between the European and the national planning processes, including, for certain Member States, those derived from the NATO planning process or the Partnership for Peace; the aim of avoiding any unnecessary duplication or bureaucracy.

Three separate phases were provided for:

Phase A) consisted of defining the ‘military requirements making it possible to achieve the objectives of the EU and the commitments to be made by the Member States to this end’.

The first task was to regularly revise the defence objectives. To do this, the EUMC would make a proposal to PSC to determine the capability needed to fulfil these objectives. On the basis of these discussions, the defence and foreign affairs ministers were supposed to prepare the decisions of the European Council. This phase was the exact equivalent of the phase of drafting the ‘political guidance’ within the NDPP.

Then, the EUMC, with the assistance of the EUMS, was supposed to revise the capability requirements through the drafting of a ‘requirements catalogue’. It was anticipated that this catalogue would be drawn up, even in the absence of a revision of the defence objectives, and as often as needed for the objectives and requirements always to match up with each other. This catalogue would be approved by the PSC, and by the Council and, finally, the European Council.

The next aim was to identify the capabilities that the Member States (including national or multinational projects) declared that they could make available to the Union and to draw up a draft ‘Force catalogue’ to be submitted to the Member States under an iterative process. As

with the requirements catalogue, this catalogue would be put before the Council, and then for the approval of the European Council. Finally, the additional contributions of European countries that are members of NATO but not of the European Union (such as Norway and Turkey), or of two candidates for accession, were planned for inclusion, if applicable, in an **addendum to the force catalogue**.

**Phase B** was the phase of controlling and evaluating progress.

The evaluation of the capability gaps resulting from the difference between the capabilities needed and the capabilities available was to be the subject of a dual check, on both a quantitative and qualitative basis. The quantitative control of forces was supposed to be carried out in the short term for the provision of forces and, over a longer period, for equipment. A questionnaire was provided (EU Military Capability Questionnaire). The Member States undertook to notify the EUMS of any major changes that were likely to affect the force catalogue. The quantitative review of forces was supposed to be carried out on the basis of the evaluations used by NATO with its own tools. However, the evaluation was based on a self-evaluation by the Member State and experts of the HTF, with the addition of NATO experts if required (‘HTF plus’) in the event of multinational or multinationalisable units (e.g. headquarters). The aim is for this phase to feed into a ‘**progress catalogue**’. Additionally, the intention was to update this catalogue, entitled ‘Single Progress Report’, at the end of each rotating Presidency of the EU, in other words every six months. In 2012, this exercise became annual. Like the other catalogues, these catalogues required approval by the Council then by the European Council.

Finally, **phase C** was to consist of adopting the resources to plug the capability gaps, within both a short-term approach (increasing contributions for existing capabilities) and a long-term approach (projects to be developed), it being understood that the Member States would focus on specific projects in line with their own defence planning. The HTF, with the support of the EUMS, was supposed to identify the gaps and propose solutions. The capability development plan (ECAP) was intended to constitute an instrument additional to this phase.

It is worth noting once again that in its original version, the CDM set great store by coherence and the mutual reinforcement of its own process with the NATO process. It was with this in mind that a NATO/EU capability group was supposed to allow for in-depth exchanges between the two organisations. It was also anticipated that the standards would be the same and that the questionnaire used for the EU inventory of forces would be the same as the NATO questionnaire. There would also be transparency of information and harmonisation and coherence of objectives.

The CDM was conducted in its entirety for the first time in 2005 following the adoption, in 2004, of the ‘headline goal 2010’, whereafter it more or less fell into obscurity after the EDA was set in place in 2004. The requirements catalogue was drawn up only once, in 2005, before being
revised in 2007, which caused the whole process to malfunction. The force catalogues were drawn up every two years from 2004 onwards. The progress catalogue has been drafted three times: in 2007, 2011 and 2015.

In any event, the finalisation of the CDM marked the end of the first phase of setting in place the European capability process. The second phase would start with the Thessaloniki summit in Greece.

2. The defence and Capability Development Plan (CDP) phase

In Thessaloniki on 13 June 2003, the members of the European Convention laid down the existence of the CDM in black and white in the draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, which would be put before the inter-governmental conference and approved in June 2004, later to become the TEU. This reference to the CDM currently features in article 2 of protocol no. 10 on the Permanent Structured Cooperation (see above: the European capability process).

For their part, the representatives of the Member States, also meeting in Thessaloniki, did two important things at the European Council of 19 and 20 June 2003.

Firstly, they recognised that the operational capability of the EU was ‘limited and constrained by recognised shortfalls’, even though the ESDP had been declared operational in 2001. This recognition of the incomplete nature of the ‘autonomous capability’ would lead them to delay the ‘headline goal’ of Helsinki until a later date. This would be done at the Council of the European Union of May 2004, which defined a ‘headline goal 2010’77, which would be definitively approved by the European Council in Brussels on 17 and 18 June 200478.

Secondly, without waiting for the ratification of the TECE, which would give it a legal base, the European Council of Thessaloniki ‘tasks the appropriate bodies of the Council to undertake the necessary actions towards creating, in the course of 2004, an intergovernmental agency in the field of defence capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments. This agency, which shall be subject to the Council’s authority and open to participation by all Member States, will aim at developing defence capabilities in the field of crisis management, promoting and enhancing European armaments cooperation, strengthening the European defence industrial and technological base and creating a competitive European defence equipment market, as well as promoting, in liaison with the Community’s research activities where appropriate, research aimed at leadership in strategic technologies for future defence and security capabilities, thereby strengthening Europe’s industrial potential in this domain’.

The European Defence Agency (EDA) would be created by the joint action of the Council of 12 July 200479, approved by the Council of the European Union of 19 July 2004. Its mission is to ‘support the Council of Member States in their effort to improve the Union’s defence capabilities in the field of crisis management, and to sustain the European Security and

77 CONS EU 63/09/04 REV 6 - 4 May 2004 declassified
78 Presidency Conclusions 10679/2/04 REV 2 – 19 July 2004
79 Council Joint Action of 12 July 2004 on the establishment of the European Defence Agency 2004/551/CSFP
Defence Policy’, without encroaching upon the competences of the Member States in defence matters.

Article 5 of the common action more specifically assigns it four tasks:

a) the development of defence capabilities in the field of crisis management, ‘in association with the competent Council bodies (…) and using, inter alia, the Capability Development Mechanism (CDM)’ and ‘coordinating the implementation of the Capability Development Plan (CDP)’.

b) promoting the improvement of European cooperation in the field of armaments;

c) strengthening the European defence industrial and technological base and creating a European defence equipment market that is capable of competing internationally;

d) increasing the effectiveness of research

Very soon after it was set in place, the EDA was able to promote and, on 21 November 2005, secure the signature by the twenty-four participating states of a ‘code of conduct’ for the armament markets. This code of conduct, which was based on a voluntary and non-binding approach, aimed to allow all European Union contractors to compete on an equal basis, to have access to information and evaluation, if any individual Member State launches a call for tenders for its armed forces. This code of conduct would pave the way, in 2009, for the approval by the European institutions of the Directive on public contracts in the field of security and defence (Directive 2009-81).

In November 2007, the Steering Board approved four collective targets for capability investments: defence equipment should represent at least 20% of total defence spending; of this equipment expenditure, 35% should be carried out in cooperation; R&T expenditure should represent at least 2% of defence spending and 20% of this research expenditure should be carried out in cooperation.

In particular, however, the EDA very quickly made a proposal to work on the drafting of a ‘capability development plan’ (CDP), taking account of the medium-term dimension (‘headline goal 2010’) and a longer-term vision, in other words up to 2025 (document drafted between November 2005 and October 2006), but also an exchange of operational experience and the armaments programmes planned by the Member States participating in the Agency. On 14 December 2006, the Steering Board of the Agency decided to prepare this plan and to create a working group made up of all stakeholders: the ‘CDP team’. On 8 July 2008, the Steering Board of the Agency approved the initial version of the CDP as a basis for subsequent work, as well as identifying a first draft of 12 priority areas requiring effort on the part of the Member States.
This first CDP would be updated in 2009-2010 and adopted by the Steering Board in March 2011.

In the meantime, the Treaty of Lisbon, which was signed on 13 December 2007, would enter into force on 1 December 2009. There are three provisions of this Treaty that concern the EDA. Article 42-3 TEU assigns it four missions:

- identify operational requirements and promote measures to satisfy those requirements;
- implement any measure needed to strengthen the industrial and technological base of the defence sector;
- participate in defining a European capabilities and armaments programme;
- assist the Council in evaluating the improvement of military capabilities’.

Article 45 1. goes into greater detail on the full range of the Agency’s missions and, from the point of view of this report, its mission to ‘contribute to identifying the Member States’ military capability objectives and evaluating observance of the capability commitments given by the Member States’.

Finally, article 3 of protocol 10 concerning the Permanent Structured Cooperation confers upon it an important role in the implementation of the said cooperation, as it provides that: ‘The European Defence Agency shall contribute to the regular assessment of participating Member States’ contributions with regard to capabilities, in particular contributions made in accordance with the criteria to be established, inter alia, on the basis of article 2, and shall report thereon at least once a year. The assessment may serve as a basis for Council recommendations and decisions adopted in accordance with article 46 of the Treaty on European Union.’

There was, from that point onwards, a disconnect between the common action adopted in 2004 and the provisions of the Treaty of Lisbon which are, in many respects, more ambitious. It was hence necessary to bring the statuses resulting from the common action into line with the Treaty, which was done, not without difficulties due to the misgivings of the British, who opposed any increase in the role of the Agency, in 2011.80

The decision of 2011 gives the Agency a further two tasks:

- ‘support’ the implementation of permanent structured cooperation, by ‘facilitating major joint European capability development initiatives’ and ‘contributing to the regular assessment of participating Member States’ contributions’;

80 Decision 2011/411/CFSP of the Council of 12 July 2011
- ‘propose multinational projects to fulfil the objectives in terms of military capabilities, ensure coordination of the programmes implemented by the Member States and management of specific cooperation programmes’.

It should also be noted that the new decision replaces the reference made to the ECAP in article 5 with a reference to the ‘capability development plan’ (CDP), which thus becomes officially consecrated, and marks the definitive move away from the ECAP, which had fallen into disuse between 2006 and 2009.

Between 2009 and 2016, the EDA was at front and centre of several initiatives in the field of capability:

- in 2009, the approval of a European helicopter crew training programme;
- in 2010, the ‘Ghent Initiative’, which would lead, in 2012, to the adoption of a code of conduct for pooling and sharing, a sort of repository of best practice to which the Member States committed in matters of planning and investment decisions;
- in 2012, the signature of a first cooperation agreement (European Framework Cooperation) between the EDA and the European Commission, and then the signature of an administrative arrangement between the EDA and OCCAR, in order to facilitate the transfer of armaments programmes launched within an EDA framework over to OCCAR;
- in 2013, the Agency was invited by the European Council to play a supporting role for four essential capabilities identified, namely: remotely piloted aircraft systems or drones, air-to-air refuelling; government satellite telecommunications (GOVSATCOM) and, finally, cyberspace;
- in 2014, the Agency has a new capability development plan (CDP14), the revision of which had begun at the end of 2011, approved by its Steering Committee;
- in 2015, the launch of an initiative for the creation of a European defence financial mechanism ('buffer fund') aiming to facilitate the launch of armaments programmes in cooperation in the event of insufficient budgetary synchronisation between participating states.

Early in 2016, the EDA managed to establish itself as the principal ‘forum to discuss capability development in Europe’\(^{81}\). Its activity has been massive compared to its budget (EUR 30 million) and personnel (130 people). It has succeeded in making itself known and becoming a vital player in the European defence landscape.

Even so, the EDA has been unable to show any real added value in European capability development. More subtle observers have said that it is not a ‘rigid structure’ and that it plays a role of impetus, incentivisation and control that does not truly reflect the ambitions invested

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\(^{81}\) Alistair J.K. SHEPERD, ‘EU military capability development and the EDA – ideas, interests and institutions’ p. 73 in collective work 'The European Defence Agency – Arming Europe' edited by Nikolaos Karampekios and Iraklis Oikonomou – Routledge 2014
in it\textsuperscript{82}, or a role of ‘expertise in proposals’ \textsuperscript{83}, a ‘catalyst’ or even an incubator that is capable of triggering future technological cooperation a long way upstream, but leaving to OCCAR the role of ‘appropriate programme management instrument’. \textsuperscript{84} In a report to the Parliament of June 2015, Christian Mölling observed damningly that: ‘the EDA’s role has been cut back from an innovator to a facilitator (…). The twenty-seven EDA Member States are in the driver’s seat, but can hardly agree on the direction of the journey’. \textsuperscript{85} On the eve of Brexit, the deputy director of IRIS, a French think tank that is in favour of European integration in defence matters, Jean-Pierre Maulny, wondered whether the failure of the European Defence Agency was irreversible\textsuperscript{86}. But in the current phase, which has been characterised by an increase in number of initiatives in favour of defence, it has to be acknowledged that the Agency has found its second wind.

3. The current phase and a multiplication of initiatives: PESCO, CARD and EDF

The combination of the Ukrainian crisis in 2004, the British vote in favour of Brexit in June 2016 and the election of Donald Trump in the United States undoubtedly sparked a multiplication of initiatives in favour of European defence already begun by the European Parliament (pilot project for defence research) and the Juncker Commission (Preparatory Action on Defence Research) in 2014-2015. The European leaders certainly felt that they needed to do something to reinvent the validity of the European project and that this something could potentially be achieved by relaunching European defence.

This relaunch has taken the form of several major initiatives, some of which directly concern the capability process of the EU.

The first was the adoption by the Council of the European Union 14 November 2016 of an implementation plan for the global strategy\textsuperscript{87}. This plan itself contains three important measures:

1) the definition of a ‘level of ambition’ for European defence\textsuperscript{88}. This ‘level of ambition’ is of a political nature and is not the equivalent of the military ‘level of ambition’ set out in the NATO capability process. It is more akin to an embryonic ‘defence strategy’, as is the case in the United States or the United Kingdom, or the upper part of the Defence White Paper in France. The fact still remains that for the first time in its existence, the European Union has proven capable of defining defence objectives, other than in a treaty\textsuperscript{89}.

\textsuperscript{82} Constance CHEVALLIER-GOVERS, ‘la Consolidation de l’Agence européenne de défense’ in collective work ‘Vers une relance de la politique de sécurité et de défense commune’ - Ed. Larcier – Brussels 2014 p. 133 et seq. (available in French only)
\textsuperscript{83} André DU MOULIN and NICOLAS GROS-VERHEYDE, ‘la politique européenne de sécurité et de défense commune’ Ed du Villars 2017 p. 173 (available in French only)
\textsuperscript{84} White Paper on defence and national security (France) p. 67, Paris 2013, Directorate for Legal and Administrative Information (available in French only)
\textsuperscript{86} Jean-Pierre MAULNY : ‘État de l’Agence européenne de défense est-il irrémédiable?’ blog Bruxelles2, 9 May 2060 (available in French only)
\textsuperscript{87} CONS EU 14149/16 14 November 2016
\textsuperscript{88} For ease of reading, we have included this entire level of ambition in Annex 5
\textsuperscript{89} See Annex 5, The Defence Objectives of the European Union.
2) The drafting of a new Capability Development Plan (CDP) by the EDA, to be finalised in June 2018 and the invitation to the Member States in the framework of this re-examination to clarify and add to the preliminary capability priorities ‘on the basis of the level of ambition’ and ‘also taking into account the priorities of the Member States’. The Council moreover calls for this new CDP to be more results-driven.

2 a) The launch of a new military planning cycle by the EUMC and the EUMS. Although neither the CDM nor the EUMC/EUMS are expressly referred to, this is certainly what the Council means when it ‘tasks to review the military requirements stemming from the EUGS and the level of ambition and to develop the related illustrative scenarios, in line with the agreed procedures and as a contribution to the CDP review, while ensuring coherence outcomes and timelines with the NATO Defence Planning Process, where requirements overlap’. Although these initiatives were presented in this order and separately in the implementation plan, it goes without saying that they form one and the same initiative, the product of the CDM aiming to feed into the CDP and which must therefore necessarily come before it.

3) The implementation by the HR/VP of a Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD), steered by the Member States. The stated objective of the review would be to ‘develop, on a voluntary basis, a more structured way to deliver identified capabilities based on greater transparency, political visibility and commitment from Member States’. In reality, the aim was to clarify whether the commitments made by the Member States had been complied with or not. The EDA was tasked by the HR/VP with holding the secretariat of the CARD and it was agreed that it would take place not on an annual basis, but once every two years.

Readers may recall that the other two major initiatives concerning the launch of the European Defence Fund by the European Commission in November 2016 and the establishment of the Permanent Structured Cooperation by twenty-five Member States in November 2017. These two initiatives have been the subject of many recent observations and have already been described in the body of the report.
ANNEX 5:
THE DEFENCE OBJECTIVES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

The European Council of 14 November 2016 adopted ‘Conclusions on implementing the EU Global Strategy in the area of Security and Defence’. In these conclusions, the Council defines a ‘level of ambition’ covering three defence objectives or ‘strategic priorities’. As it is a complex text, every word of which we can assume has been the subject of negotiations, we consider it important to quote it in its entirety (bold and italics those of the Council text), particularly as this level of ambition was accompanied, in the text of the implementation plan, by an ‘annex to the annex’ setting out the list of missions that may be accomplished by the Union.

‘Level of Ambition’

7. Drawing on the proposal in the Implementation Plan, the Council hereby determines the level of ambition which sets out the main goals which the EU and its Member States will aim to achieve in order to implement the EUGS in the area of security and defence, including through CSDP, in support of three strategic priorities identified in the EUGS: (a) responding to external conflicts and crises, (b) building the capacities of partners, and (c) protecting the Union and its citizens. In doing this, the EU will pursue an integrated approach linking up different EU instruments in a coordinated way, building on the EU’s Comprehensive Approach and promoting civil-military cooperation. While respecting the autonomy of the EU’s decision-making processes, it will also continue to work closely with its partners, particularly with the United Nations and NATO.

a. Responding to external conflicts and crises covers the full range of CSDP tasks in civilian and military crisis management outside the Union. The aim is to enhance the EU’s awareness and responsiveness in all phases of the conflict cycle, including conflict prevention, in order to promote peace and security within a rules-based global order underpinned by the United Nations. The EU’s ambition remains to be able to respond with rapid and decisive action through the whole spectrum of crisis management tasks covered by Article 43 of the TEU.

b. Capacity building of partners is the objective of CSDP missions or operations with tasks in training, advice and/or mentoring within the security sector. The aim is to strengthen CSDP’s ability to contribute more systematically to the resilience and stabilisation of partner countries recovering from or threatened by conflict or instability, in synergy with other EU instruments and actors, including also along the nexus of security and development. CSDP can

90 CONS EU 14 November 2016 14149/16
also be used to provide expertise and assistance to strengthen partners’ resilience and counter hybrid threats.

This could include the areas of strategic communication, cyber security and border security. Promoting respect for international law, in particular international humanitarian and human rights law, as well as gender sensitivity, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 and subsequent resolutions, protection of civilians, and principles of democracy and good governance is integral to these efforts.

c. **Protecting the Union and its citizens** covers the contribution that the EU and its Member States can make from a security and defence perspective, notably through CSDP in line with the Treaty, to tackle challenges and threats that have an impact on the security of the Union and its citizens, along the nexus of internal and external security, in cooperation with Freedom, Security and Justice (FSJ) actors. Respecting that CSDP missions and operations are deployed outside the Union, the EU can contribute from a security and defence perspective to strengthening the protection and resilience of its networks and critical infrastructure; the security of its external borders as well as building partners’ capacity to manage their borders; civil protection and disaster response; ensuring stable access to and use of the global commons, including the high seas and space; countering hybrid threats; cyber security; preventing and countering terrorism and radicalisation; combatting people smuggling and trafficking; complementing, within the scope of CSDP, other EU efforts concerning irregular migration flows, in line with the October 2016 European Council Conclusions; promoting compliance with non-proliferation regimes and countering arms trafficking and organised crime. Existing EU policies in these areas should be taken forward in a comprehensive manner. The importance of Mutual Assistance and/or Solidarity in line with Article 42.7 TEU and Article 222 TFEU respectively is highlighted in this context as well. The Council recalls that NATO remains the foundation for the collective defence for those States which are members of it. The specific character of the security and defence policy of all EU Member States will be fully respected.

8. The Council underlines that these priorities are mutually reinforcing. CSDP missions or operations outside the EU’s borders can, directly or indirectly, support the EU’s own security needs by fostering human security, tackling root causes of conflict and thus resolving crises and their spill-over effects into the Union. Capacity building can contribute to the transition strategy of executive operations aimed at crisis response. The Council supports the types of possible CSDP missions and operations, derived from the level of ambition, as set out in the Annex.

9. The Council stresses that the level of ambition needs to be underpinned by the necessary financial coverage. It recalls the European Council’s call in June 2015 on Member States to allocate a sufficient level of expenditure for defence. The Council also underlines the need to consider encouraging financial solidarity and other forms of burden sharing. Finally,
Availability, flexibility and eligibility of EU financial instruments to support security and defence should be enhanced.

10. In pursuing these objectives, the Council underlines that the EU will continue to act in cooperation with partners, notably the United Nations, NATO, the OSCE and the African Union, with due respect for the autonomy of EU decision-making and the principle of inclusiveness. It recalls that, as Member States have a ‘single set of forces’ which they can use in different frameworks, the development of Member States’ capabilities through CSDP and using EU instruments will thus also help to strengthen capabilities potentially available to the United Nations and NATO.

**ANNEX TO THE ANNEX**

**Types of possible CSDP civilian missions and military operations derived from the EU level of ambition**

To be able to undertake rapid and decisive action in support of the level of ambition and its three strategic priorities, across the whole spectrum of crisis management tasks covered by Article 43 of the TEU, CSDP needs to be backed up by credible, deployable, interoperable, sustainable and multifunctional civilian and military capabilities. As a security provider, the EU should have wide reach, while focusing on its surrounding regions. It will act with partners wherever possible and always in compliance with international law. Based on previously agreed goals and commitments⁹¹, the EU should thus be capable to undertake the following types of CSDP civilian missions and military operations outside the Union, a number of which may be executed concurrently, in different scenarios⁹², including in situations of higher security risk and underdeveloped local infrastructure:

- Joint crisis management operations in situations of high security risk in the regions surrounding the EU;
- Joint stabilisation operations, including air and special operations;
- Civilian and military rapid response, including military rapid response operations inter alia using the EU Battlegroups as a whole or within a mission-tailored Force package;
- Substitution/executive civilian missions;
- Air security operations including close air support and air surveillance;

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⁹¹ Including the Headline Goal 2010, the Civilian Headline Goal 2010 as well as the ambition agreed by the European Council in December 2008.

⁹² As appropriate, some of these missions and operations may also be deployed to provide assistance in the context of a global response to natural disasters and pandemics outside the EU, in particular when such situations can lead to large scale destabilisation.
Maritime security or surveillance operations, including longer term in the vicinity of Europe;

Civilian capacity building and security sector reform missions (monitoring, mentoring and advising, training) inter alia on police, rule of law, border management, counter-terrorism, resilience, response to hybrid threats, and civil administration as well as civilian monitoring missions;

Military capacity building through advisory, training, and mentoring missions, including robust force protection if necessary, as well as military monitoring/observation missions.

This non-exhaustive list provides input for the follow-on work to derive requirements based on a review of the Illustrative Scenarios, in line with agreed procedures under the Capability Development Mechanism, under the control of the Political and Security Committee.
ANNEX 6:
THE EUROPEAN CAPABILITY PROCESS AS MAPPED BY THE EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES (EU-ISS)

From *EU defence capability development – Plans, priorities, projects*, Daniel Fiott June 2018

The EU’s defence capability development policy process
### ANNEX 7:

**PURCHASES OF FOREIGN MILITARY EQUIPMENT BY THE EU MEMBER STATES WHICH ARE PARTIES TO PESCO**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Buyer</th>
<th>Seller</th>
<th>Companies</th>
<th>Products</th>
<th>Price in USD Millions</th>
<th>Date of the contract</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Lockheed Martin</td>
<td>34 F-35A (fighter jets)</td>
<td>4,095</td>
<td>25/10/2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium, Czech Rep, Denmark, Greece, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Boeing</td>
<td>500 Jdam</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>11/08/2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>12 F-16D Barak</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>28/03/2018</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>IAI Elbit Systems</td>
<td>UT30MK2</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>01/08/2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Bell</td>
<td>12 UH-1Y</td>
<td>575</td>
<td>23/10/2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Raytheon</td>
<td>46 SM-282 IIIA</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>31/07/2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Boeing</td>
<td>133 anti-ship missiles RGM-84Q-4 Harpoon Block II+ER</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>01/02/2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Lockheed Martin</td>
<td>Mark 41 Vertical Launching System</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>21/02/2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Raytheon International/ General Dynamics</td>
<td>69 surface air missiles RIM-7 Sea Sparrow</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>21/02/2018</td>
</tr>
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<td>Finland</td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>Israel Aerospace Industries</td>
<td>Gabriel</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>01/07/2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>General atomics</td>
<td>2 drones systems Reaper MQ-9 Reaper</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>August 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Boeing</td>
<td>5 CH-47D helicopters</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>28/04/2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Bell</td>
<td>70 OH-S8D Klowa</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>Spring 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>Eurospike (Rafael)</td>
<td>Spike missiles</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>12/02/2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>IAI Elta</td>
<td>5 short range radars</td>
<td>2,800</td>
<td>29/03/2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>Rafael</td>
<td>Samson RCWS-30 (Kontrat Boxer)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>01/04/2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Lockheed Martin et Raytheon</td>
<td>Javelin missiles</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>01/06/2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>General atomics</td>
<td>4 MQ-9 Reaper</td>
<td>339</td>
<td>17/07/2018</td>
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**TOTAL:** 28,274
ANNEX 8: 
ABBREVIATIONS

ACT  Allied Command for Transformation (Commandement Allié Transformation)
ACO  Allied Command for Operations (Commandement Allié Opérations)
CARD Coordinated Annual Review for Defence (voir EACD)
CDM  Capability Development Mechanism
CDP  Capability Development Plan (Plan de développement des capacités)
ECAP  European Capability Action Plan
EDA  European Defence Agency
ESDP European Security and Defence Policy
EUGS European Union Global Strategy
FFAO Future Framework for Alliance Operations
HR/VP High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission
ISR Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
LoI Letter of Intent
MFF Multiannual Financial Framework
MN Multinational
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NDPP NATO Defence Planning Process
OCCAR Organisation conjointe de coopération en matière d’armement
PESCO Permanent Structured Cooperation
SACT Supreme Allied Commander Transformation
SACEUR Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SFA Strategic Foresight Analysis
UK United Kingdom
EU DEFENCE: THE WHITE BOOK IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS

BY FRÉDÉRIC MAURO
LAWYER AT THE PARIS AND BRUSSELS BARS, ASSOCIATED RESEARCHER AT IRIS

MARCH 2019

This study has been done upon request of the Subcommittee on Security and Defence of the European Parliament; it is also available on the Think Tank webpage of the European Parliament’s website: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/home.html

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