

INTER-AGENCY REGIONAL ANALYSTS NETWORK
AN ACF AND IRIS INITIATIVE

RESPONDING TO THE MIGRANT CRISIS: Europe at a Juncture

June 2016

Global Report



This report is one in a series on the European migrant crisis written to inform Action Against Hunger's operations and positioning¹. It includes a focus on the drivers of the European response to the crisis as well as an updated set of scenarios with an outlook to 2018.

INTRODUCTION

The number of people globally that are forcibly displaced² increased by 50% between 2011 and 2015³. This period of continuous increase has been a notable change from the relatively stable figures of the previous decade where the population fluctuated by around 40 million people. Such a significant increase in the forcibly displaced population has reverberated through the international community as it draws attention to the protracted nature of many of the refugee producing contexts highlighting that there are no quick or easy solutions to this great and growing problem that is now dominating the international political discourse. The changing dynamics of global displacement have not only been in overall numbers but in location - 2014 was a notable year in that Pakistan was, for the first time in a decade, surpassed by Turkey as the largest refugee hosting country in the world. With an increasing number of refugees hosted on Europe's borders the number of migrants attempting to reach the EU in search of better conditions and more rights has also dramatically increased.

The countries from which the highest number of displaced persons originate are complex, chronic crises - Syria, Afghanistan and Somalia account for over half of all refugees⁴. Even before the escalation in the number of forcibly displaced persons the international community was failing in its attempts to concurrently meet the immediate and acute needs of displaced populations while seeking durable solutions to their situation. The inability of the international community to resolve the displacement of millions of people is best epitomised by the fact that in 2015, 41% of the refugee population was in a protracted situation - the average duration of which was 26 years⁵.

The scale of the challenge posed by the increasing proportion of the world's population that are forcibly displaced should not be underestimated.

¹ Please see RAN reports *Europe's Migrant Crisis: A scenario analysis* (September 2015), *Europe's Migrant Crisis: An Addendum* (March 2016)

² These figures include the following groups: refugees, IDPs and asylum seekers

³ UNCHR (2015) [Global Trends Report: Forced Displacement in 2015](#)


⁴ UNCHR (2015) [Global Trends Report: Forced Displacement in 2015](#)

⁵ UNCHR (2015) [Global Trends Report: Forced Displacement in 2015](#)

Relative EU burden

The label “Migrant Crisis” refers to the increase in migration flows towards states of the European Union, coined in April 2015, is more reflective of the public reaction to the phenomenon than its scale. When considered in the context of global displacement and response the EU is receiving a small fraction of international protection claims. The Eurocentric nature of the debate around the “Migrant Crisis” belies the fact that countries in the global south continue to host over 86% of the world’s displaced population⁷.

Where refugees from the top five countries of origin found asylum (end 2015)




UNCHR (2015) Global Trends Report: Forced Displacement in 2015

This distribution calls into question whether the designation of the term “crisis” refers to the EU’s failure to respond rather than the scale of the problem they face.

⁷ UNCHR (2015) Global Trends Report: Forced Displacement in 2015

It is within this frame that the response from the EU must be analysed - embedded in the causes of displacement in countries of origin, reflective of the situation in hosting states in the global south, cognisant of the challenges for countries of transition and assessing the EU's role in the system holistically beyond its approach to the migrants that arrive on its borders to those in conditions of extreme vulnerability the world over. Though the EU's proportion of the global burden is very low, the growth in the number of migrants arriving in EU member states to seek asylum has risen exponentially - applications in the last quarter of 2015 were 130% above those in the same period the year before⁸. The EU is unaccustomed to managing such a large caseload of displaced persons and as such does not have a system that is well adapted to absorbing migrants. The high level of benefits and the relatively generous system that EU states grant to persons receiving international protection make it extremely expensive in relation to the costs in other hosting states⁹. The dramatic increase in the number of asylum seekers and the relative cost has been the subject of a significant amount of media attention making migration a central topic of mainstream public discourse. The European response to issues of global protracted displacement has been brought to the forefront as their domestic audience now perceive themselves to be affected by it.



The vast number of migrants arriving in Europe are fleeing endemic conflict in Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan and acceptance rates for applicants from these three countries seeking international protection are some of the highest— between 67% and 97%¹⁰. Though the European migrant crisis is one of mixed migration, these figures are contrary to the narrative that the people arriving in Europe are predominantly economic migrants who would not qualify for international protection. The arrival statistics for the first six months of 2016 indicate that the caseload is likely to mirror that of 2015. However, acceptance rates will likely differ as several states have re-assessed applications from Afghanistan designating them as economic migrants and refusing protection which will significantly alter their rate of acceptance and has already led to a back log of Afghan citizens along transition routes.

Displacement into the EU originates from a variety of sources and while each case is individually assessed on its merits it is possible to look collectively at the drivers that cause these people to move.

⁸ Eurostat [Asylum quarterly report](#)

⁹ Williams, Rob (2016) [Syrian refugees will cost ten times more to care for in Europe than in neighbouring countries](#)

¹⁰ Eurostat, Press release, 75/2016, EU Member States granted protection to more than 330 000 asylum seekers in 2015, 20 April 2016


COMMON AND ENDURING DRIVERS OF MIGRATION

There has been little change in the situation of the majority of the countries of origin since the writing of the first RAN report where analysis of drivers at a regional level are expounded further. In addition for further information on some of the top ten source countries RAN analysis can be provided for: Syria, Iraq, Nigeria, Somalia and Cote d'Ivoire.

79% of the arrivals to the EU are from the top ten refugee producing countries worldwide, including some of the most complex crises that the international community has been unable to comprehensively address for decades such as Afghanistan and Iraq. Though the conditions across these contexts varies widely the root causes of displacement can be distilled into several categories:

- Insecurity caused by armed interventions from non-state actors
- Chronic insecurity and poor government capacity resulting limited economic development and basic service provision
- Natural shocks exacerbated by a lack of resilience
- Political repression and authoritarianism

Nationalities of aggregate cumulative arrivals to Europe (up to 30 April 2016*)



*Latest data available

International Organization for Migration (IOM), Mixed Migration Flows in the Mediterranean and Beyond, *Compilation of Available Data and Information*, Reporting period: 19 May - 1 June 2016

IRAQ

Iraq has a long history of forced migration, shocked by multiples waves of displacement within the country and across its borders even before the establishment of the Islamic State, nurturing the fertile ground of sectarianism that contributed to its growth. When the Islamic State announced its Caliphate, Iraq was already a fragile state suffering from a complex and protracted conflict levels of instability¹¹. Yet unlike during previous waves of displacement, Syria was no longer a safe refuge for Iraqis, and conditions for refugees in Lebanon and Jordan deteriorated as the war against IS—compounded by a fear of ethnosectarian retaliatory violence—dragged on. This lack of options in the region triggered the wave of migration to Europe from Iraq. Today an estimated 3.4 million Iraqis have been displaced¹² and constitute 13.7% of the refugee population reaching Europe¹³. Islamic State violence and Kurdish and Shia militia offensives against the terrorist organization account for the sharp increase. Humanitarian access in Iraq has been limited by security concerns and official permissions, meaning that actors work predominantly from the Kurdish region in the north—where many Iraqis and Syrians have sought refuge. Yet ongoing offensives against IS have led to the view that citizens who were living in the Caliphate are a security risk who should not enter Kurdish territory, and should remain in highly securitized encampments in administrative gray areas south of Kurdish territory. IS-liberated territory has at times been difficult to access by Sunni Arab inhabitants, highlighting the significant ethnosectarian tensions that will remain even after the Islamic State is destroyed.¹⁴ The recurrent and protracted displacement from Iraq epitomizes the challenges presented to Europe and the international community in resolving the root causes of displacement that will continue to drive flows of migration to the EU.

Crises that cause displacement - particularly those that force communities across an international border - are rarely quickly resolved. However, displacement can extend even beyond the resolution of a crisis if the conditions for return are not met. Countries that have a large displaced population often struggle to provide security and basic services in the aftermath of a crisis that would quickly induce quick returns to conditions of independence. The level of political will and investments required to support a crisis affected community within and outside the boundaries of a state from a response to the event through compounding vulnerabilities in situations of chronic instability to maintenance during a period and displacement and return set a high bar that is rarely met. A lack of sufficient attention to the complexity of this challenge has resulted in the situation evident in 2016 where global displacement is affecting the relative stability of the European Union.

Displacement is a heavily regionalised phenomenon with the majority of forcibly displaced persons staying in their country of origin as IDPs or seeking refuge in neighbouring countries. Transregional displacement is relatively limited as there are many social and financial barriers to undertaking longer migrations. However, for some the hopelessness of interminable encampment in the face of seemingly irresolvable drivers of displacement are sufficient motivation to seek better opportunities.

¹¹ Forced Migration Review, Van der Auweraert, Peter, [Was establishing new institutions in Iraq to deal with displacement a good idea?](#)


¹² IOM, [Displacement in Iraq Exceeds 3.4 million](#)

¹³ Eurostat, [Countries of origin of non-EU asylum seekers in the EU 28 member states, 2014 and 2015](#)

¹⁴ International organisation for Migration, [Iraq IDP Crisis](#)

MOST-USED TRANSIT ROUTES

Overwhelmed by the more than 2 million asylum seekers reaching Europe in 2015, the European Union and individual member states have worked to gain greater control over illegal migration by increasing the fortification and policing of borders, both internal and external.




National Geographic [Sea Migration Routes Map](#)

While the fencing of borders, encampment and the restriction of certain nationalities has decreased the total numbers of migrants compared to May 2015, hundreds of thousands of people will still reach Europe in 2016 by ever more dangerous and irregular paths. Without an improvement to living conditions in host countries or adequate legal channels to apply for asylum within third countries, individuals will continue to risk their lives to come to Europe.

While transit routes are still chosen based on proximity, ease and cost, the March 2016 EU-Turkey deal and the greater challenges along the West Balkans route due to the fencing of borders in Macedonia, Hungary and Serbia has decreased the number of migrants arriving in Greece borders

and the ease with which they travel north through Europe. The successful implementation of the deal rests on a series of conditions that could fail to be met by both the EU and the Turkish government. In the meantime, alternate routes, including the Central Mediterranean, or through Bulgaria or Albania, could increase in prominence.

Where migrants using the three most popular routes come from



BBC 07/09/2015 [Migrant crisis: Migration to Europe explained in seven charts](#)

EU-TURKEY DEAL

The 18 March EU-Turkey deal aims to decrease illegal migration to Europe in exchange for increasing legal resettlement from Turkey. In principle, the EU has given Turkey three billion euros in exchange for allowing the return of irregular migrants to Turkey and tighter border security. Through formal channels, the EU will then resettle one Syrian for every Syrian returned to the country¹⁴. In exchange, the EU would relax its visa scheme for Turks and speed up the process of accession into the European Union. For its part, Turkey has brought weekly arrival numbers on the Greek islands down to the low hundreds, partly due to the disincentivisation of the route, increased Turkish border control and Greek encampment. Yet the agreement could still collapse for a host of legal and logistical reasons: if the EU fails to liberalize visa provision to Turkey, resettlement from Turkey is meager and Greek appeals committees continue to block deportations back to Turkey, thus re-incentivizing the route.

Governments, UNHCR and refugees themselves¹⁵ continue to contest the deal, as the commitment to mass returns raises concerns around the derogation of the principles of non-refoulement and collective expulsions enshrined in international and European law. Since the deal was implemented, Turkey—like Jordan and Lebanon—has increasingly shut its borders to Syrians and in many instances, opened fire on those trying to flee across the border to safety.¹⁶

Logistically, the process of registration, encampment and deportation has been slow to roll out. Since implementation, approximately 400 people have been deported from Greece, and most of these deportations were voluntary¹⁷. This has left approximately 50,000 people trapped in Greek refugee camps. The swift relocation of these refugees is another crucial element of the deal, but EU countries have been slow to act. The EU is also pressuring Greece to increase deportations, either by changing the law so that Greece deems Turkey a safe third country, or by encouraging the institution of more agreeable appeals courts.

¹⁵ The telegraph, [Refugees sue EU over Turkey deal](#), 13 June 2016

¹⁶ Human Rights Watch, [Turkey: Border Guards Kill and Injure Asylum Seekers](#), 10 May 2016.

¹⁷ Al Jazeera, [Deportation of refugees from Greece to Turkey begins](#), 4 April 2016


The majority of refugees applying for asylum in Europe in 2016 are from the top ten refugee producing countries worldwide, particularly Syrians, Afghans and Iraqis¹⁸ (followed by West and Sub-Saharan Africans, Pakistanis and Iranians). What has intensified along the migrant route, however, is the differentiation in treatment towards nationalities. Afghans are now no longer able to journey further north from Greece due to their reclassification as economic migrants by Macedonia, and the economic migrant distinction regarding Sub-Saharan and West Africans is increasingly impeding their movement past the camps in Greece and Italy. Syrians, too, are experiencing encampment and repatriation to Turkey as part of the EU deal.

Efforts to better monitor Mediterranean waters have also proven challenging. Despite the strengthened mandate of Frontex, thousands have died in the Mediterranean in the first five months of 2016 along the perilous Central Mediterranean route¹⁹.



International Organisation for Migration, 14/06/2016 Missing Migrants Project

EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN ROUTE



UNHCR (June 2016) Flows through West Balkans Route

¹⁸ Frontex, Trends and Routes

¹⁹ IOM Missing Migrants

²⁰ Koser, K., & McAuliffe, M. (2013) *Establishing an Evidence-Base for Future Policy Development on Irregular Migration to Australia* Irregular Migration Research Program Irregular Migration Research Programme Occasional Paper Series

The Eastern Mediterranean route to Europe departs from the Turkish coast to reach the Greek islands, and continues through Macedonia, Serbia, Croatia, Hungary, Slovenia and Austria to Germany. The safest and shortest of the routes, this route accounted for the vast majority of EU arrivals in 2015: 850,000 migrants, or three-quarters of all refugees arriving in Europe²¹. Despite the impediment of the March 2016 EU-Turkey deal and the marked decrease in numbers, it is still the most popular route. Though there are significant obstacles to overcome with the implementation of the deal, notable success has been made. Firstly, it is much harder for Syrian refugees to enter Turkey, due to even more aggressive border protections and the stringent visa policies of Lebanon and Jordan. From Turkey, illegal crossings have continued²², but Frontex has stated that arrivals to Greece have decreased by 90% in April 2016 compared to the previous month²³. Via Turkey's northern land border, nearly 5-6000 people were arrested at the Turkey-Bulgaria crossing in May—a slightly lower figure than in May 2015²⁴. Low-level smuggling also continues from northern Greece to northern Europe for all nationalities, but likely at increasing cost²⁵. Further along the route, institutionalised controls of asylum seekers passing through Europe through daily limits and the passage of only certain nationalities, in addition to the fortification of borders, has also stymied the flow arriving to Germany and Sweden.

In November 2015, Macedonia built a fence along the Greek border, allowing only Syrian, Iraqi and Afghan nationals to pass. In February 2016, Macedonia built a second fence and barred the passage of Afghans, having reclassified them as economic migrants. Since March, the Macedonian humanitarian corridor is now closed to all nationalities²⁶. This has led to the build-up of thousands of Afghans at the Greek border crossing in Idomeni without access to proper shelter. Further along the route, Hungary built a fence along its Serbian border, which it extended to its Croatian border, refusing passage to all refugees. In addition to physical fortifications, daily limits for refugees crossing their borders have been instituted in Slovenia, Croatia, Slovakia, Austria and Germany.

As the route has become more securitised, individuals have embarked on more irregular iterations, risking detention in Greek camps and repatriation to Turkey as they cross the Mediterranean. While Greece has received four new processing centers to deal with asylum claims, the country faces substantial challenges in maintaining camps, principally if the Turkey-EU deal disintegrates and refoulement ceases. Greece is on the frontline of the crisis, and has to some degree been provided with aid to build adequate shelter and WASH facilities, as well as provide NFIs and medical care. Further along the route, as the build-up of communities is perceived as a security, rather than humanitarian crisis and as migrants embark on ever more irregular and risky routes, humanitarian aid provision and access will remain inadequate.

CHALLENGES TO MANAGEMENT- *Eastern Mediterranean Route*

Eastern Mediterranean route management is contingent on several factors: tough Turkish land and sea border controls, the stability of the EU-Turkey deal and unified European support to Greece, which is now hosting more than 50,000 migrants in camps who must be resettled across the EU.

²¹ UNCHR (2015) [Global Trends Report: Forced Displacement in 2015](#)

²² Frontex stated that 157,019 illegal crossings were made between January and April 2016.

²³ Open Democracy [Warfare on the logistics of migrant movements: EU and NATO military operations in the Mediterranean](#)

²⁴ Interview with Guardian Migration Correspondent Patrick Kingsley

²⁵ Wall Street Journal [Inside the Migrant Smuggling Trade: Escapes Start at 1000 euros](#)

²⁶ Ibid.

Turkey remains the linchpin of the route, and its ability to stem illegal migration has significant knock-on effects along the route. While the country has shouldered many of the costs of hosting Syrian refugees alone, Turkey is increasing opportunities for humanitarian actors to work within host communities and ease some of the economic pressures faced by the government.

With the Macedonian border blocked, Greece faces challenges to encamp migrants and provide humanitarian assistance, even with far lower numbers crossing the Aegean Sea. The state is trying to clamp down on informal encampments near the Macedonian border by denying aid access and transferring migrants to state-run camps. Humanitarians argue that state-run camps do not meet the needs of the population and are characterised by insufficient water and sanitation infrastructure. This has led to skin diseases, stomach problems and infections for the groups housed in these camps. Medical facilities are also seriously overrun, and cannot adequately treat pregnant female refugees. These issues will worsen until member states agree to adequate redistribution figures that reflect current caseloads, but when this will happen remains to be seen. Greece will feel increasingly empowered to act in its own best interests and protect its borders from a migrant population that could remain in country for years to come.

Further along the route, political wrangling has put European transit countries in a difficult position—afraid to shoulder an unequal proportion of asylum seekers without recourse to a function EU resettlement system. As a result states are prioritising security considerations and diminishing space for formalised humanitarian assistance to disincentivise refugees from travelling through their countries. This leads to the use of riskier and more obscure routes, making aid distribution harder to implement. Border zones are becoming increasingly closed to humanitarian actors, and more states could increasingly use violent tactics to prevent crossing with impunity, which will be more challenging to monitor.

WESTERN BALKANS ROUTE



Politico: “Western Balkans route far from ‘closed’: map”

The Western Balkan route is a migratory flow through the Western Balkan countries crossing the Turkish-Bulgarian or Turkish-Greek border areas through Western Balkan countries to Hungary²⁷. Hungary blocked entrance into the country in September 2015 by building razorwire fences and deploying armed forces along its borders as well as passing a law to criminalise illegal crossing. This policy served to redirect the flow through neighbouring Croatia. In 2015, 764,000 illegal border crossings were detected—a full 16-fold rise from 2014²⁸. In the first four months of 2016,

²⁷ Frontex, [Western Balkan Route](#)

²⁸ USAK [Migrant Smuggling in Turkey: The ‘Other’ Side of the Refugee Crisis](#)

112,500 people have been recorded along the route²⁹— stressing the fact that the securitisation of one EU nation’s borders only displaces, rather than blocks, a route. Though Croatia does not disaggregate the data by nationality, it is assumed that Afghans—who already made up a considerable portion of the route before they were classified as economic migrants in Macedonia—are moving around this obstacle by travelling through the Western Balkans. In addition to Afghans, Syrian and Kosovan nationalities were the most represented along the route in 2015³⁰.

The Western Balkan region is a historic source for irregular migration³¹. In 2012, 33,000 people from Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia and Macedonia applied for asylum while many others were living illegally in EU member state countries. In 2015, Kosovans made up a notable component of nationals travelling to Europe. Macedonia, Serbia and Croatia—who receive development aid from the European Commission—have been main transit countries for the Western Balkans flow. Each of these countries has limited infrastructure and an asylum capacity totalling the low thousands, despite often receiving more than this load daily³². Western Balkans states have also accepted a relatively high number of asylum applications, particularly Croatia, despite the low number of applicants³³. Without the provision of adequate aid and a steady influx of migrants, countries like Croatia will feel increasingly pressured to enact similar kinds of securitisation policies as neighbouring Hungary.

CHALLENGES TO MANAGEMENT – *Western Balkans*

Across the EU, a lack of unified policy is triggering states to follow the example of Hungary’s fortified borders to maintain internal stability, erecting fences and increasing policing. Similarly, management of the crisis is framed by security concerns, and clamping down on illegal migration itself. The Western Balkans route has been affected by Hungary’s closed borders, but despite some reports to the contrary, remains in use, distributing migrants through neighbouring countries and along Hungary’s borders. Securitization has not massively decreased the flow, but has amplified the use of more treacherous routes and created informal settlements along borders where migrants face dire conditions. These conditions have been compounded by the growing difficulty of humanitarian actors to provide assistance in these makeshift environments. Along the Serbian-Hungarian border, humanitarian access has been diminished likely for fear of stabilising communities enough to settle, even if for the short-term. Particularly in eastern Europe, post-Communist states simply were not prepared to house asylum seekers, and facilities were over-stretched and under-serviced. These struggling nations are still behind other European neighbours regarding infrastructural response capacity—something that EU uncertainty will not ameliorate. Across the EU, illegal crossing has continued, but these black-market economies benefiting border guards and smugglers place migrants at the risk of exploitation and trafficking by driving these movements further out of the scope of humanitarian observers. Nevertheless, states have begun to target smuggling rings, and arrests have increased across European routes.

²⁹ Frontex, [Migratory Routes Map](#)

³⁰ Ibid.


³¹ IOM, [Feasibility Study on Irregular Migration in Western Balkans](#)

³² UNHCR, [2015 UNHCR sub regional operations profile - South-Eastern Europe](#)

³³ Eurostat [Statistics explained](#)

CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN ROUTE

Figure 3: Monthly arrivals to Italy, January 2014–May 2016



International Organisation for Migration

The central Mediterranean route embarks primarily from Libya, though instability along Egypt's western coast has also facilitated smuggling routes to Italy and Malta. For decades, the Central Mediterranean route has brought African migrants to Europe, despite the arduous nature of the journey and the high death toll of drownings in the Mediterranean every year. Unlike the Eastern Mediterranean route, which has witnessed a massive increase in the number of migrants crossing the narrow sea between 2014 and 2016, the Central Mediterranean route has remained relatively stable and continues to bring similar numbers to Europe year-on-year, if not slightly higher. In the first five months of 2016, IOM estimates that 48,761 migrants arrived at Italy's shores³⁴. The majority of nationalities arriving to Italy are African nationals representing a diverse caseload of environmental migrants, smuggled and trafficked persons, unaccompanied and separated children, pregnant women and refugees; the number of Syrians has dropped considerably due to the easier East Mediterranean route³⁵.

The violent uprising against the Gadhafi regime and years of protracted civil war that created a security vacuum not only displaced foreign economic migrants and Libyans, it also allowed smuggling networks along the Libyan coast to thrive, aided by equally open and insecure transit routes across vast stretches of the Sahara. For years, the risks facing migrants along this desert route have been well-documented by human rights organisations, who have written about physical and sexual abuse, indentured servitude and severe living conditions for individuals paying smugglers to reach Libya's shores³⁶. The journey is no easier on the open water, where since 2014 the majority of border control operations on this route have been search and rescue operations—still unable to prevent thousands of deaths every year.

Italian authorities are accustomed to answering the distress calls made by migrants six or seven hours after leaving the Libyan coast, when hundreds are stranded in sinking boats and unable to reach land. The European Commission has viewed this crisis through the lens of policing the smuggling trade³⁷, and has pushed for Frontex operations like Triton to focus on the capture of smugglers and the destruction of their vessels³⁸. Such logic fails to adequately address the

³⁴ IOM [The Central Mediterranean route: Deadlier than ever](#), 3 June 2016

³⁵ Frontex [Central Mediterranean Route](#)

³⁶ Amnesty [EU risks fueling horrific abuse of refugees and migrants in Libya](#), 14 June 2016

³⁷ The Guardian, [UK taskforce will 'smash' Mediterranean people-smuggling](#)

³⁸ AFP ['If we don't go, how many will die?'](#)

conditions that support such an industry, and has also failed to prevent the high loss of life along the route. Despite the efforts of coast guards and Frontex, an estimated 1 in 23 migrants have died attempting to cross the Central Mediterranean in the first five months of 2016 alone³⁹, or 2,859⁴⁰—a drastic worsening of the death toll from 1 in 53 in 2015.

The greatest numbers of incidents happen in close proximity to the western coast of Libya, near Tripoli, Zawiya and Zawara, where long-term instability and violence caused by the Libyan Civil war and the expansion of the Islamic State have negatively impacted economic migrants working in the Libyan oil sector and the local economy itself, increasing push factors for North Africans to search for more viable opportunities in Europe. Since the beginning of 2016, however, the Libyan coast guard has coordinated with Europe to better monitor its territory. Migrants caught trying to cross the Mediterranean are sent to one of 18 overcrowded detention centres under the control of a fragile state⁴¹; Amnesty has also documented widespread abuses against migrants committed by the Libyan coast guard including shootings, abandonment and beatings., in addition to torture and abuse in detention centers⁴². Nevertheless, the country's fractured government—divided as it is between rival administrations and militias, make it an ineffective partner to impose border controls. What is far more difficult to ascertain are the lives lost crossing the Sahara⁴³, an area has received far less attention. In its attempts to stem the flow of migrants to Europe, The EU has reached out to Sudan and Eritrea to prevent irregular migration to Europe—two countries accused of wide-spread human rights abuses⁴⁴. Similar deals were undertaken with Libya during the time of President Gaddafi and decreased illegal migration across the Mediterranean. Rights groups argue that such deals would gratify the leaders who have triggered migration in the first place.

Individuals making the journey will continue to factor in distance, difficulty, ease of transport and their understanding of European policies that could affect their journey. Yet the majority of these individuals depend on smuggling networks to guide them along these illegal and irregular pathways. For humanitarian actors operating in such rapidly-changing environments, migration routes are difficult to assess, access and operate.

³⁹ IOM [The Central Mediterranean route: Deadlier than ever](#), 3 June 2016

⁴⁰ IOM [Mediterranean Update](#) 14 June 2016


⁴¹ The Guardian [Libya faces influx of migrants seeking new routes to Europe](#)

⁴² VOA [Migrant Arrivals in Italy Soar as Amnesty Warns of Libya Abuses](#), 17 June 2016

⁴³ Reuters, [Dozens of migrants dying in Sahara desert trying to reach Europe](#)

⁴⁴ The Guardian [EU Considering working with Sudan and Eritrea to stem migration](#)

Figure 1: Migrant deaths and disappearances in the Mediterranean by route, January 2014–May 2016



IOM The Central Mediterranean route: Deadlier than ever 3 June 2016

CHALLENGES TO MANAGEMENT- *Central Mediterranean*

The Central Mediterranean route continues to pose the highest mortality risks to individuals crossing, due to maritime operations insufficient to match the high number of migrants that continue to embark on the dangerous route. The EU-led Operation Sophia has been almost entirely responsible for policing international waters off Libya, while Nato has been responsible for patrolling the Aegean Sea. In April 2016, EU leaders and Nato discussed working together to secure the coast of Libya, but will focus on anti-terrorist operations—a real concern for humanitarian actors.

Italy has historically been highly involved in coordinating with Libya to prevent the flow of migrants to Europe, by coordinating forces off the coast of Libya and training the Libyan national army. But a proportionally high number of asylum seekers arriving to Italian islands and the need for encampment and resettlement procedures has put the nation under tremendous pressure. Nato will now step in to fulfil some of these tasks, by building infrastructure like reception centers and assisting with border patrols. Looking further afield, EU countries have reached out to Eritrean and Sudanese governments to prevent migration across the Mediterranean through financial incentives. According to this plan, aid would also be sent to Niger, Libya and Ethiopia to pressure governments to curb irregular migration. The methods used to implement any potential agreement will likely impinge on human rights by placing citizens at greater risk of violence and detention, but their distance from the EU will decrease monitoring and public pressure to protect.

Another management challenge along the Central Mediterranean route is the increasing proportion of unaccompanied children reaching the EU. Minors face the highest risks of human trafficking and exploitation among groups crossing the Mediterranean, and face difficult conditions in Italy’s overcrowded migrant children’s centers, exacerbated by slow resettlement and redistribution. As with other routes, the securitisation of borders further north have put pressure on arrival countries to hold growing communities of migrants in their borders, with little likelihood that the migration situation will shift significantly in the coming year or two to address the needs of these migrants and distribute them across the EU, until then, pressures on state-run

camps and protection challenges in increasingly nationalistic and xenophobic environments is typical of the central Mediterranean route as much as the others.

DISCUSSION OF KEY DRIVERS OF RESPONSE IN EUROPEAN THEATRE

Though the EU is managing a very small percentage of the global caseload of displaced people its response to the ever increasing number of asylum seekers arriving at its borders has been greatly debated. At a time where the EU has been challenged by sluggish growth, enforced austerity, high unemployment, the financial crisis in Greece and the realisation of BREXIT, the migrant crisis has compounded growing scepticism over the validity of the European project. However, a united and comprehensive approach to the challenge of migration presents the greatest chances of collectively fulfilling the legal obligation of states, managing the insecurity created by unregulated flows of people across the continent and the integration of those seeking international protection into European states. The drivers of the response in the European Union are many fold but coalesce around two determinant groupings - level of coordination and degree of containment. These are defined as:

Coordination: the level of coordination between EU member states on issues relating to migration. This is translated into a determinant driver by including the level of cogency and coordination over the following elements - border protection, the EU legal framework as pertains to immigration and international protection, redistributive mechanisms (such as the quota system) and burden sharing (mostly financial), variable rights and benefits for migrants across the EU (including integration) and the responses to third parties (designation of safe countries, application of the non-refoulement principle etc.). For the EU to have a comprehensive response to the migrant crisis as is necessitated by the conditions of the Schengen agreement, the free market and the legal obligations of EU states under international and European law - the effectiveness of the EU response will be dependent on the level of coordination.


Containment: the way in which the flow of migrants to and across Europe's borders are managed. The axis of containment comprises the factors and actors that relate to the ability/desire of the EU to contain the flow of migration including - the prevalence of smuggling networks, efficacy of border protection, FRONTEX, a securitised focus on limiting the terrorist threat attempts to limit the arrival of migrants at an EU border and the approach to holding centres and detainment. The ability of the EU to manage the containment of the flow of migrants will be deterministic in how the continent is able to manage crisis and the way in which it will affect the countries in the EU differently.

Within the broader structure of coordination/containment several key drivers provide a useful breakdown of the components each of which has a pivotal role in determining the overall response from the EU.

REACTIONARY POLITICS

Across the EU public dissatisfaction with the status-quo of centre-right and centre-left politics has opened the space for other political parties to play a bigger role. One of the groups that have made substantial gains in legislative and executive elections since 2010 are parties from the far right.

The critical issues for far right parties in Europe are predominantly focused on: nationalism, anti-EU sentiment, immigration and austerity. The far right parties in Europe represent a wide and diverse grouping and the level of their success and the depth of their support varies across the continent.



New York Times (22/05/2016) [How Far Is Europe Swinging to the Right?](#)

However, the ability of far right parties to achieve electoral success is only one component of the increase in the role of reactionary politics. In addition to the elected positions that many far right parties now hold in Europe at local, national and European levels the agenda of these parties - especially in migration and European coordination - has influenced the national discourse and forced other centrist parties to move to the right. The rise of the far right agenda and the centralization of the issues in their manifestos has been a much more notable change in European political and social conversations - extending the influence of the far right beyond their ability to win at the ballot box (where the percentage of votes won by nationalist parties ranges from 4-35%⁴⁵). The normalization of anti-immigration and anti-EU nationalistic discourse is compounded by the growing frustration in Europe (and elsewhere) with the inability of the current governing powers to implement lasting solutions. Coming under pressure for their handling of the migrant crisis centrist parties have seen their positions undermined and several have revised their approach - such as in Denmark and Sweden⁴⁶.

⁴⁵ BBC News, Katya Adler, [Is Europe lurching to the far right?](#), 28 April 2016

⁴⁶ Foreign policy, James Traub, [The Death of the Most Generous Nation on Earth](#), 10 February 2016. The Economist, [Bridge of sneers](#), 5 December 2015

The rise in anti-EU sentiment, as most clearly expressed in the results of the British referendum, has an impact on the level of coordination at EU level. The UK has always exploited its ability to “opt-out” of EU initiatives perennially making them an “awkward” partner however, the British decision to be the first country to leave the EU block could have significant ramifications for the rest of the Union. The perception that state sovereignty is continually eroded by Brussels to the detriment of EU populations is not a uniquely British sentiment and support for a referendum on the EU is widespread in many European states - largely mirroring the rise in the reactionary right (notably Italy, France, Sweden, Germany and Poland)⁴⁷ though favourability of actually leaving is less popular. While referenda on a full exit of the EU is less likely in other states, concerns that the Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden (among others) could attempt to renegotiate their relationship with Brussels in the wake of British departure will result in considerable uncertainty over the direction of the EU project and potentially slow moves towards more coordinated approaches. This will be particularly true over the course of the outlook as the British exit is negotiated. A critical issue driving anti-EU sentiment has been the management of the EU migrant crisis from Brussels; polling indicates that a vast majority of EU citizens disapprove of the EU’s handling of the crisis with results in reception countries of Greece and Italy as high as 94 and 77 percent respectively⁴⁸.

In addition to the impact on EU coordination, the rise of the reactionary right directly impacts on issues of migration. Though the movement is underpinned by a multitude of factors, immigration and the “migrant crisis” are central to the discourse and a mobilising tool for the parties exploiting public anger. The swing and strength of the right and far right has been most evident in countries which are hosting the largest number of asylum seekers as a percentage of their population - Austria (where the far right was narrowly defeated in the 2016 Presidential election)⁴⁹, Sweden and Hungary, underlining the topic’s importance as an electoral issue.

The response to migration in Europe and the degree to which it is harmonised and led by Brussels is fundamentally a political issue. Public opinion which underpinned the rise of the reactionary right linked with migration and distrust of the EU has simultaneously pushed a securitization of the migration issue - linking it with the increase in the terrorists’ attacks in major EU capitals - it has shifted the narrative from a humanitarian and geo-political perspective to one focused very narrowly on national security.

Trends:

- Far right parties will continue to leverage public anger and fear to gain political power
- Gains will be mostly concentrated at local level but national parties could achieve sufficient strength at national level to force their way into governing coalitions
- The Europe of Nations and Freedoms (ENL) coalition will grow in strength as the European project continues to struggle faced with economic stagnation, austerity, the Eurozone crisis and migration
- Even without an increase in the rate of electoral success, the agenda of far right parties will pull centrist policies further to the right - engraining an anti-migrant rhetoric
- Linking nationalistic and anti-immigration rhetoric with anti-establishmentism will attract further sympathy for the cause even if it does not translate to far right party gains in elections

⁴⁷ IPSOS [BREXIT Poll](#) (May 2016)

⁴⁸ Pew (June 2016) [Euroskepticism Beyond Brexit](#)

⁴⁹ Guardian (23 May 2016) [Austria far right narrowly defeated](#)

- There will be future referenda on the role of the EU and the division of power with member states

SECURITISATION OF MIGRATION

Securitisation of the migration agenda, at its foundation, is a move by people and governments to assess and manage issues of migration as a security threat⁵⁰. This is a very narrow focus which is driven by a plurality of factors but subordinates each of these to the security agenda. The result of securitization is that more considered engagement that includes economic, social and political considerations are less influential in the policies governing the issue thereby making it less strategic in the longer-term.

The migrant crisis is not the advent of a move towards a more securitized approach to migration but it has accelerated the phenomenon. The drivers of securitization are similar to those that have underpinned the progress of reactionary politics in the EU; both phenomena are intertwined.

The justification of a more securitized approach is couched in two key themes, those that are interest based and those based around identity. Interest based arguments are founded on the self-interest of the public, for migration this takes the form of economic concerns that migration will take job opportunities away from Europeans in times of high unemployment or that the money spent on supporting migrants is diverted from European host communities, worsened by continued austerity. In addition, there are security concerns that the public link to a rise in the unregulated flow of people into the EU (and EU citizens returning from the Middle East) mostly on increased terror threats and crime levels.

In spite of the fact that the discourse of migration focuses largely on interest based issues it is posited that the real driver towards the securitization of the migration issue is based on identity. New racism “a so-called insurmountability of cultural differences”⁵¹ - is the key component in driving the securitisation of migration. The extent to which this discourse is propagated by the advancing far right and the degree to which it is absorbed into public opinion will be critical to how the EU engages with the migrant crisis over the course of the outlook. Identity based arguments are more determinant in securitisation as they colour the perception of the situation which informs interest based arguments. Misunderstanding of the scale and consequences of migration is rife among western nations - European and American citizens tend to overestimate the number of migrants in their countries, almost doubling the real figures⁵². In spite of the fact that migration is demonstrated to be a boon to the economy over time (provided migrants and refugees are able to work), the notion that migration is a drain on the economy and social

⁵⁰ Council for European Studies, Ariane Chebel d’Appollonia, *Security, Identity, Adversity, the French Touch on the securitization of Immigration*, 2 December 2015

⁵¹ For a summary of new racism and its constructs please see: Togral, B. (2011) “Convergence of Securitization of Migration and ‘New Racism’ in Europe: Rise of Culturalism and Disappearance of Politics”, in: G. Lazaridis (ed.): *Security, Insecurity and Migration in Europe*, Surrey: Ashgate, pp. 222

⁵² Ipsos Mori, *Perceptions are not reality: Things the world gets wrong* (2014): Immigration: across the 14 countries, the public think immigration is over twice the actual level – the average guess is that 24% of the population in the UK was born abroad, when the actual figure is 11%. This includes some massive overestimates: the US public think 32% of the population are immigrants when the actual is 13%; in Italy the public think 30% are immigrants when it’s actually 7%; and in Belgium the public think it’s 29% when it’s actually 10%.

services persists⁵³. Crime perception (opposed to actual crime victimisation) is another area of divergence from perception and reality - though the level of crime does not increase with migration the fear of crime does⁵⁴. The reason that identity is more determinant in driving the agenda is that in many cases mis-estimation of and misunderstanding of the negative consequences migration in how it affects interests is wilful and public opinion is not changed by rebutting inaccuracies with evidence⁵⁵.

The role of new racism and securitisation of the migration agenda is not only a linguistic distinction. The result of securitising the agenda manifests in the policies enacted by the EU and its member states and where they focus funding. A narrower view on the issue of migration will continue to drive more restrictive immigration policies, tighter border control (potentially at national not EU level), poor integration of migrant communities into European society (resulting in ghettoization) and neglect of the broader migration dynamics which address causal factors more than results.

Trends:

- The securitization of migration has been ongoing for over a decade and it will continue
- There will be waves of securitization spurred on by spikes in insecurity in Europe
- The rise of the reactionary right will be mirrored by an intensity of securitisation
- Securitization of the migrant issue is likely to be advanced further in countries with stronger far-right parties

EU BORDER MANAGEMENT

As the agenda of the migration issue has become increasingly securitized and the pressure from the exponential increase in irregular migrants mounts, the management of borders in the EU are increasingly nationalized. This is contrary to the tenets of the Schengen agreements establishing freedom of movement across much of the continent.

The refugee crisis has led to the de facto dismantling of Schengen visa-free travel in parts of the EU, and the fencing and policing of external borders as asylum seekers crossed Europe to reach their preferred countries of destination.

⁵³ OECD (May 2016) [Migration Policy Debates](#), Giugliano, Ferdinando (September 2015) [A short-term burden, refugees may yet boost sagging EU economy](#) and Steinhauser, Gabriele and Fidler, Stephen (January 2015) [EU Migrants Need Work to Continue Short-Term Boost to Economy, Says IMF](#)

⁵⁴ Nunziata, Luca (November 2014) [Immigration and Crime: New Empirical Evidence from European Victimization Data](#), Institute of the Study of Labor Discussion Paper No. 8632, Germany

⁵⁵ Sides and Citrin (2007) [How Large the Huddled Masses? The Causes and Consequences of Public Misperceptions about Immigrant Populations](#), presented at 2007 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL



Business Insider [EU Borders](#), 1 March 2016

Greece, as a first country of arrival, has been accused by other states of allowing migrants to pass through the country without registration. The heaviest border control measures have been implemented along the Balkans route to Germany, where barbed wire fences have been erected since 2014. Nevertheless, creating obstacles to migration routes has only led to new paths crossing nearby borders—temporarily disrupting migrant traffic but failing to block it completely. Border action complexifies the routes that are taken by migrants through countries of transition and the EU creates more risk and vulnerability for migrants undertaking the journey. National action in border protection is a critical breakdown in the ability of the EU to collectively manage the flows of migrants and creates tensions between neighbouring states as migrants build up along borders. Several European countries limit the number of migrants allowed to pass through their country on a given day, some even determining which groups are eligible⁵⁶. The lack of coordination in national border protection is a critical weakness in the EU response.

However, the EU is taking steps to rectify the weaknesses on peripheral borders where migrants are gaining access to the EU. The European Commission has created a new iteration of the

⁵⁶ Macedonia, Serbia, Slovenia and Croatia each have limits on number of migrants allowed to cross their territory each day. On the 21 February 2016 Macedonia closed its borders to Afghan citizens – Guardian (February 2016) [Thousands of refugees stranded at Greece-Macedonia border](#)

inadequate FRONTEX project - the European Border and Coast Guard, with the mandate of applying common standards along external borders and monitoring. As a result European Border and Coast Guard will have power to intervene in a country if it deems border security inadequate— even against the wishes of the local government. Similar to FRONTEX the priority for this force is security - FRONTEX was recently accused by humanitarian organizations in late May of denying aid to refugees and preventing them from reaching Greek land for hours to take people directly into detention⁵⁷. This shift demonstrates the EU's growing focus on security, rather than humanitarian, policy.

Another area of nascent EU cooperation in border management is the EU-Turkey deal which sees all irregular migrants arriving in Greece returned to Turkey. Agreements with countries on Europe's periphery to attempt to stem the flow of migrants arriving the EU will likely proliferate as the EU struggles with containment. The security imperative supersedes the humanitarian imperative for organisations like the Coast Guard and border patrol, who increasingly prevent the distribution of aid along borders and risk rescue operations at sea. EU border management is both a political and legal issue and the consequences of border decisions are critical in how the EU approaches the migrant crisis as decisions taken by anyone member have an effect across the Union.

Trends:

- Fencing increases and the Schengen visa-free travel is suspended in many places
- Due to the UK's decision to separate from European Union, there could be greater chaos along the France-UK border with more migrants building up in Calais
- Increasing use of irregular routes, like Russia-Finland and Albania-Italy, Albania-Greece, Turkey-Bulgaria—Bosnia Herzegovina, Turkey-Italy, Libya-Turkey.
- A rise in direct detention at borders leading to long periods of encampment (there will be a differentiation of treatment according to nationality)

EU LEGAL ENVIRONMENT

The parameters of how the EU can respond to the migrant crisis in Europe are dictated by the legal framework which guides the provision of international protection. The statutes relating to international protection in the EU are founded on the international laws that govern the treatment of displaced or stateless persons.

The three types of protection for which the EU accepts applicants⁵⁸ are: under the *1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees*⁵⁹, subsidiary protection which extends beyond the parameters of persecution as defined in the 1951 Convention to those fleeing generalised violence or harm⁶⁰ and compassionate leave to remain⁶¹.

⁵⁷ Middle East Eye Frontex denied help to refugees, 31 May 2016

⁵⁸ For a more detailed explanation of these concepts please see the RAN Europe's Migrant Crisis (2015) report

⁵⁹ [1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees](#): The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees has been ratified by all EU states and translated into EU Directives and National laws.

⁶⁰ DIRECTIVE 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament And Of The Council, Article 2 paragraph f

⁶¹ DIRECTIVE 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament And Of The Council of 13 December 2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection

Of these only asylum - protection from persecution as is outlined in the refugee convention - is enshrined in international law. Both subsidiary protection and compassionate leave to remain are constructed only in European law and as such would be more easily changed from Brussels⁶².

Of the decisions taken in the first instance, not including decisions made on appeal, the EU granted international protection in 52% of cases in 2015 (an increase of 12% from the previous year) under the follow proportions⁶³:

Form of International Protection	Refugee status - Asylum	Subsidiary Protection	Compassionate Leave to Remain / Humanitarian grounds
Percentage of positive decisions	74% (up from 62.02% in 2014)	18% (down from 37.94% in 2014)	7.9% (up from 4.3% in 2014)
Total number of people	246,175	60,680	26,500

The relative increase in the proportion of cases granted asylum versus subsidiary protection indicate a desire by states to increasingly limit who is eligible for international protection in Europe as a means of lessening the burden.

The EU has struggled to set up adequate facilities to process and hold migrants arriving at EU borders which has resulted in a backlog of applicants. Given that the number of arrivals - 211,408 in 2016 as of 1st June - this is backlog likely to continue. However, in 2015 the EU took steps to speed up the process by using a Safe Country of Origin list⁶⁴. Though it does not dispense with the right of applicants from countries on the list to apply for asylum or the obligation for EU states to make a case-by-case decision, applicants from safe countries are “fast tracked” to speed the potential for return. As the EU continues to receive a large number of migrants arriving at its borders, it retains the right to add more countries to the existing list - indicating that applicants from those countries will have a lower success rate in the future.

In addition to creating a Safe Country of Origin list, the EU has begun designating “safe” third countries to allow for the deportation of migrants arriving irregularly at European borders. Similar to cases for applicants from a Safe Country of Origin the EU is required by law to process each case and make a decision on the level of protection required but with a safe third country - such as Turkey - the EU is then able to return migrants on the basis that their grounds for international protection can be met elsewhere. In the face of evidence that Turkey engages in forcible returns and detention among other derogations of EU law, the legality of this action has been recurrently questioned by some EU states, human rights groups and international agencies. However, the ability of the EU to create a system where they are able to return or send migrants to other hosting states is one that they will likely explore as pressure to reduce the intake of migrants to Europe continues.

The overall number of acceptances across the EU conceals their disproportionate allocation across the Union. According to the Dublin II Regulations⁶⁵ migrants must apply for asylum in the in EU the country of entry. However, the unequal burden this places on the countries on the eastern and

⁶² The departure of Britain from the European Union will likely have limited effect on the structure or implementation of the European legal migration framework (beyond lending support to other political countries seeking to change the law) as the UK had already opted out of several EU immigration agreements and directives. The UK is also not a part of Schengen nor had it agreed to be part of the formal quota system.

⁶³ European Commission, Home Office *Asylum in the EU* (data from Eurostat 9/6/2015)

⁶⁴ European Commission, [An EU 'Safe Countries Of Origin' List](#)

⁶⁵ COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 343/2003

southern periphery of Europe has prompted the EU to revise these regulations. The proposed change from the European Commission would construct a centralised, automated system to catalogue asylum applicants and formalise the quota arrangement with a “fairness” correction where anytime an EU country is overtaxed (according to a formula based on wealth and population) all further applicants to that country would be redistributed to other EU states until the proportion of applicants falls back below 150% of the reference share. EU states that do not agree to reallocate asylum applicants would be subject to a “solidarity” fee on a per applicant basis⁶⁶. This system has not yet been accepted and given the challenges to the existing ad-hoc quote system designed in 2015, it is likely to be highly contentious.

The distribution of asylum seekers across the EU is one of the biggest challenges to coordination.

Trends:

- The translation of international law into domestic (or European) law will alter over the course of the outlook - as the EU seeks to manage the increase in applications it is likely that they will endeavor to restrict access to the protection that is offered
- Any alterations to the international protection framework in the EU is likely to come under the compassionate leave to remain or subsidiary protection as this is most under EU control
- There could be changes to the British framework governing international protection (subsidiary protection and compassionate leave to remain) at the end of the outlook
- The designation of countries as safe or communities as ineligible for international protection (as happened with Kosovo in 2015) could expedite the applications process but restrict access for applicants to the EU
- The principle of non-refoulement could be maintained but as the EU can make determinations - such as Turkey as a safe third country - which could radically alter what the legal protections in the EU look over the outlook

Fiscal Cost of Asylum Seekers, 2014-16¹
(Percent of GDP)

	2014	2015	2016
Austria	0.08	0.16	0.31
Belgium	0.07	0.09	0.11
Croatia	0.002	0.09	0.11
Cyprus	0.003	0.012	0.012
Czech Rep.	0.0	0.0	0.02
Denmark	0.24	0.47	0.57
Finland	0.09	0.13	0.37
France	0.05	0.05	0.06
Germany	0.08	0.20	0.35
Greece	n.a.	0.17	n.a.
Hungary	0.0	0.1	0.0
Ireland	0.03	0.04	0.05
Italy	0.17	0.20	0.24
Luxembourg	0.05	0.09	0.09
Netherlands	0.10	0.18	0.23
Serbia	0.00	0.06	0.1
Spain	0.006	0.006	0.03
Sweden	0.3	0.5	1.0
U.K.	0.015	0.016	n.a.
Simple average	0.07	0.14	0.22
GDP-weighted average	0.08	0.13	0.19

Source: IMF staff estimates based on authorities' information and/or other sources.

¹ Assumptions behind estimates vary across country. For example, assumptions about per head spending (both for staying applicants and for immigrants transiting to other destinations); length of stay of and benefits received by rejected applicants; and coverage of benefit-related spending (e.g., security and education) and local government costs.

IMF (2016) The Refugee Surge in Europe: Economic Challenges


⁶⁶ European Commission (2016) The Reform of The Dublin System

DISTRIBUTION OF ASYLUM APPLICATIONS

The lack of burden sharing in the EU has resulted in gross imbalances in the hosting of refugees with states of arrival (such as Greece and Italy) and the more desirable destination countries (including Germany and Sweden) hosting more than others.

The cost of supporting asylum seekers as a percentage of GDP has more than doubled for many EU states. However, cost to each EU state in terms of GDP reflects this disparate burden between members with Denmark and Germany paying the most relative to their GDP⁶⁷. Though the dramatic increase has fuelled the public anger and far right parties agenda, even at its most expensive the cost of supporting asylum seekers in the EU continues to be well below 1% in every country.

To ease the disproportionate burden, in 2015, EU states agreed to redistribute 160,000 refugees over two years⁶⁸. In spite of this commitment only 1,500 had been resettled by June 2016: barely one percent of the target⁶⁹. In addition to states, for migrants, burden sharing in the EU poses serious challenges as is evidenced by the one in seven of the asylum seekers to be relocated through the flagship scheme “absconding” or refusing to move due to an unwillingness to be resettled to poorer European countries, or the fear of being separated from friends and family⁷⁰.



The EU’s struggle to redistribute the caseload that arrived in 2014 is an ominous sign as this figure represents just half of the arrivals from 2015. The dynamics of burden sharing is one of the most critical areas that determines how much cooperation the EU is able to muster on the issue of migration. The greatest challenge facing the implementation of a redistribution system is the unwillingness of states to agree to quotas, which have been vehemently opposed by the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Poland and Spain. They argue that the system contravenes a state’s right to set its own policy. As a result, the EU Commission has threatened to withdraw billions of euros in EU funding for infrastructure for non-compliance and impose a penalty under the fairness mechanism of the new Dublin II Regulation proposals.

If there is an impasse on the level of burden sharing between European states it could undermine the EU’s ability to speak with authority on finding durable solutions for the protracted refugee cases in the global south as is required for any lasting solution to the migrant crisis in Europe.

⁶⁷ IMF (2016) [The Refugee Surge in Europe: Economic Challenges](#)

⁶⁸ The number of asylum seekers granted first instance protection status in the EU in 2014.

⁶⁹ As of 26 May 2016. [The Telegraph](#).

⁷⁰ [Financial Times](#), 16 May 2016

Trends:

- Without a workable EU-wide quota system, member states will continue enacting differing policies regarding asylum seekers.
- The shift in routes towards Italy as the port of arrival, the lack of adequate administrative facilities and the unwillingness to register asylum seekers without an EU wide resettlement project could lead to encampment without processing of asylum applications.
- States that have refused asylum applications without consequence will incentivize other states to do the same.
- The high proportion of unaccompanied minors reaching some EU countries, slow processing due to legal ambiguity and the possibility of refoulement to third countries raises serious protection risks.

Demographics of refugees arriving in Europe



EU APPROACH TO DURABLE SOLUTIONS

The migrant flows to the EU are unlikely to be greatly diminished without durable solutions for the root causes of displacement. The protracted displacement from which the largest caseloads of migrants entering the EU originate epitomises the challenges associated with resolving and even managing global displacement. The path for durable solutions to displacement has been explored and defined by the UN though it lacks any political will or real investment to make it a reality. This is also true of the EU - though addressing the root causes of displacement is a pillar of its engagement with countries of origin and of transit, there is substantial doubt as to whether initiatives such as the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa will be used to pursue durable solutions or simply manage the burden elsewhere, attempting to limit access to Europe⁷¹.

The potential resolutions for refugees are threefold:

Voluntary repatriation - understood as enabling refugees to return with safety and dignity “to conditions of physical, legal and material safety”⁷². This is the only solution proposed that is enshrined in law as the right of return. However, its implementation relies heavily on the capacity of poor and post conflict states to provide sufficient security and basic services for displaced communities to return. For many of the top ten caseloads entering the EU (Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq) lasting solutions to the crises have been elusive and are likely to continue to be so over the course of the outlook.

“**Local integration** is a legal, economic and socio-cultural process aiming at providing the refugee with the permanent right to stay in the country of asylum, including, in some situations, as a naturalized citizen.”⁷³ Local integration has been widely unpopular. The inability of the EU, with a population of over 500 million citizens, to effectively integrate approximately 1 million asylum seekers over the period of the year undermines their standing to encourage countries in the global south hosting much greater proportion of displaced people with far fewer resources to lead on integration.


⁷¹ IRIN (12 Nov 2015) [EU-Africa migrant plan raises worrying questions](#)

⁷² UNHCR (July 2011) *Resettlement within UNHCR's mandate*

⁷³ UNHCR (July 2011) *Resettlement within UNHCR's mandate*

Resettlement is the durable solution which is often sought by refugees in protracted caseloads however, it is also the least likely option. Resettlement “is the transfer of refugees from the country in which they have sought asylum to another state that has agreed to admit them as refugees and to grant them permanent settlement and the opportunity for eventual citizenship”⁷⁴. Resettlement is both tool of international protection and a durable solution. Less than 1% of refugees are resettled globally and the EU’s contribution to resettlement has been woeful - taking less than 9,000 applicants⁷⁵ in 2015. The EU is increasingly including resettlement figures in their statistics of asylum however, combining asylum cases with resettlement can be disingenuous. Resettlement is a durable solution designed to spread the burden of refugees beyond the states neighbouring crises, it is a formal mechanism and should not be subsumed into broader discussions on asylum where the applicants have made their way to a European border irregularly.

UNHCR RESETTLEMENT SUBMISSIONS AND DEPARTURES 2012-2015




UNHCR, [Resettlement Factsheet 2015](#)

The lack of investment by the international community in durable solutions is a major driving force for migrants to travel from their countries or origin or first asylum to Europe. Without an avenue to durable solutions the encampment policy, a lack of economic opportunity, frustration, hopelessness and insecurity will continue drive protracted caseloads to seek better opportunities in Europe. The ability of the EU to have a coordinated and impactful approach to durable solutions is dependent on consistent, multi-year funding from EU states, the political will to concurrently fund lifesaving programming for displaced populations and durable solutions and a consistent and collaborative approach that would be empowered if the EU could lead by example. For each of these elements to be realised the EU will need a coordinated approach to move beyond business as usual.

Asylum applications approved 2015



Total claims granted by country



BBC 04/03/2016 [Migrant crisis: Migration to Europe explained in seven charts](#)

⁷⁴ UNHCR (July 2011) *Resettlement within UNHCR’s mandate*

⁷⁵ Eurostat, Press release, 75/2016, *EU Member States granted protection to more than 330 000 asylum seekers in 2015*, 20 April 2016

EU EMERGENCY TRUST FUND

Stated Objectives

- Focus on communities located along migratory routes by supporting creation of economic/employment opportunities and strengthening ‘resilience.’
- Support the return and reintegration into areas of origin by increasing access to basic services and economic opportunities for returnees and communities they return to and promote harmony between the two.

The EU Emergency Trust Fund is being rolled out with uncharacteristic speed as projects are selected not on the basis of need from a humanitarian perspective but the willingness of states to reduce the flow of migrants and accept returns. The scale of the EU Emergency Trust Fund project is yet to be fully understood as the total potential projected budget is exponentially larger than the European Commission has committed - predicated on the enthusiastic subscription of member states and private partners. If the EU Emergency Trust Fund reaches the desired total of 62 billion euros⁷⁵ it will be a formidable tool in both international aid and politics.

The objectives of this fund (with relatively few restrictions or conditions) are leaving the EU open to accusations that it is derogating on its human rights commitments and prioritising stemming the flow of migration over the needs of vulnerable displaced people⁷⁶. Concrete details on the parameters of the projects that will receive funding are scarce but a high degree of secrecy around them, such as the 200 million euro deal with Sudan and Eritrea, raises considerable concern⁷⁷. The overarching aim the EU to reduce the flow of migration that arrives at its borders is likely to continue to put it at odds with its humanitarian goals. It will also support the broader trend of aid instrumentalisation in the long-term. The Trust Fund mechanism leaves the bloc open to “blackmail” as countries along migration routes could use the fund to extort greater investment in return for stronger containment.

The EU Emergency Trust Fund has the potential to realise lasting change in areas of persistent displacement if the funds are strategically allocated. However, strategic investments aimed at resolving the root causes of displacement requires the EU to accept that gains in the short-term would be limited. If an immediate reduction in the number of migrants crossing the Mediterranean supersedes this long-term objective (as it is already reported to have done) interim measures to contain migrants in developing countries are likely to result in a litany of abuses and, if successful, could fundamentally challenge the humanitarian focus on migration to one increasingly focused on security.

Trends:

- There will be insufficient funding allocated for durable solutions over the course of the outlook to make a measurable difference in the overall population of concern for UNHCR

⁷⁶ European Commission (June 2016) [Commission announces New Migration Partnership Framework: reinforced cooperation with third countries to better manage migration](#)

⁷⁷ Financial Times (June 2016) [Brussels bargains with Mideast and Africa for fix to migrant crisis](#)

⁷⁸ Der Spiegel (June 2016) [Questionable Deal: EU to Work with African Despot to Keep Refugees Out](#)

- Due to continued flows of migrants the EU will concentrate on a securitized approach - putting limited investments in seeking real durable solutions (creating a vicious cycle). Concurrently, it will push neighbouring hosting states to continue to warehouse refugees in an attempt to lessen the flow of migrants.
- Without real access to durable solutions, migrants will be unable to envision a future beyond encampment and will grow increasingly vulnerable and hopeless - driving those who are able to make the journey to Europe in search of opportunities to do so, using ever more dangerous routes

The EU's response to the migrant crisis is a complex system including a multitude of different actors, antecedent concerns over European identities, the individual agency of migrants and natural and manmade barriers to movement. In an increasingly interconnected world, government instability, conflict or poverty thousands of miles from Europe's borders can manifest in migrants at its door.


SCENARIOS FOR 2018

The following are potential scenarios for the evolution of the European migrant crisis with a two-year outlook to June 2018. None of these scenarios should be considered definitive but they seek to explore the plausible futures given the system's key drivers and uncertainties. Using the logic expounded in the discussion of the key drivers of the European response, the scenarios use a matrix approach to explore the dynamics of the two determinant driver groupings.

Assumptions:

- Complex crises including conflict with non-state actors and low resilience to natural shocks will continue to be the biggest drivers of displacement globally
- Achievements in durable solutions for displaced populations will be very limited
- Protracted caseloads will continue as no major refugee/IDP causing situation will be resolved allowing for sustainable returns
- The push-factors that drive migrants towards Europe will not be resolved

SCENARIO SUMMARY



EUROPEAN DISCORD

The flow of migrants is steady but there is a small reduction in the number of arrivals at EU borders as there is variable improvement and limited worsening of the protracted conflicts spurring migration to Europe. Most notably, fragile peace in Syria and closure of the Syrian border with Turkey stops the outflow of refugees which was a major driver of the migrant crisis in Europe. The steady withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan, lowering the overall figures to less than 6,000 by 2017, hampers the ability of the National Unity Government to reclaim more territory from the Taliban but with continued US support for the Afghan army, an on-going drone campaign and the NATO presence, there are no significant losses. The EU's Trust Fund for Africa succeeds in stemming the flow of migrants from Eritrea to Europe however, much of the \$200 million spent in Sudan and Eritrea is spent on containment and encampment rather than durable solutions resulting in a myriad of human rights abuses. Similarly in West Africa containment programs rise in prominence and are implemented in an effort to reduce Europe-bound migration induced by multiple vulnerabilities to conflict, environmental disaster, a dearth of economic opportunities and growing inequality. The reduction in successful applications for international

protection for Nigerian, Eritrean and Afghan citizens in the EU dis-incentivises the journey diminishing the proportion of these caseloads stabilising the level of migrants to the EU though not significantly decreasing it.

The number of refugees in protracted situations remains above 10 million globally and calls for more durable solutions to be made available are deafening though futile. No new solutions are proposed, but hosting states in the global south who are incentivised to better contain their displaced populations become more vigilant and the enforcement of camps settings becomes even more extreme - heavily restricting the freedom of movement of displaced people.

An increase in international funding is dedicated to initiatives such as the EU-Turkey deal which supports transition countries to continue hosting displaced populations but does not advance any solution leaving millions in limbo. Initiatives to engage with partner states is poorly coordinated by the EU and as a result, success in limiting the spread of refugees who have already left their country of first asylum is variable in spite of the resources dedicated to it. Though some states in transition are able to limit flows through their territories many are ineffective (particularly in North Africa) and smuggling networks are able to continue operating. Exploiting the lack of a comprehensive EU response, smugglers continually adapt their approaches to find the weakest point in Europe's borders - trafficking migrants to states with most liberal policies at any given time. This strategy is successful due to ad-hoc border protection in the EU; borders (both within Schengen and on the periphery) are opened and closed capriciously yielding a high level of uncertainty. Smugglers with well-established networks, such as Afghan smugglers along the West Balkans route, are able to charge high prices for arrival at an EU border. The spreading insecurity across the North African coast and the increased threat level of terrorist attacks from ISIS bases across the Mediterranean leveraging the instability, underpin a populist EU response from EU governments and policies fluctuate with popular opinion.

The European project is continually challenged by weak Eurozone economic growth due to the uncertainty created by the BREXIT vote and EU wide austerity measures. The negotiations for the UK to leave the EU are concluded in 2018 but the process has had a profoundly destabilising effect with recurrent calls for referenda in other EU countries. The BREXIT vote empowers the trend of increasing support to far right parties in the EU who are able to link interest and identity politics to advance their anti-EU agenda making coordination ever more challenging and contentious. Though no far right party wins an election to become head of state, their growing voice in national and EU parliaments' conflicts with the more holistic humanitarian agenda that is waveringly advanced by the European Commission and policies on migration become ever more securitised. The sustained influx of migrants are met with changeable policies across the EU as the moves to advance the Common Asylum Policy and implement the reforms to the Dublin II Regulation falter due to political resistance and repeated challenges to the EU project.

Without an agreed strategy for burden sharing the EU's response is inefficient and migrants are further concentrated at the periphery. Holding centres in EU countries of entry are overwhelmed and there is no clear understanding of whether asylum applicants will be redistributed across the EU, returned or sent to a third safe country. This uncertainty increases the frustration of migrant communities and there is a need for greater policing of holding zones - which the EU does collectively fund.

The EU becomes more inward looking, focusing on retaining the remaining 27 member states and though the situation is "managed" to the extent that it doesn't explode, the crisis mentality

continues and the treatment of migrants is very different over the course of the outlook and between member states as the EU wrestles to create a coordinated vision. Variable benefits and economic imbalances mean that migrants continue to push for northern countries where they can, yet the internal borders within Schengen which fluctuate, deter the majority of migrants from pushing beyond the periphery irregularly.

Though the laws governing migration do not change, the EU is consistently adapting its application of it as pressures between securitisation and humanitarianism vie for dominance and wrangling between different member states increases. The number of migrants granted subsidiary protection falls precipitously as a proportion of successful applications. The EU is unable to create a coordinate approach to managing the crisis and lurches between rhetoric and policies of acceptance and return.

NEW DEAL

There are new waves of migration to Europe created by worsening conflict in several of the major caseload producing areas - including Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan. As conflict in Iraq becomes more entrenched, Iraqis make up the largest caseload of asylum applicants to the EU in 2018. The US withdrawal from Afghanistan results in a spike in violence and an earthquake creates a complex crisis dramatically increasing the number of displaced people in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Many states in the EU do not alter their determination that Afghan citizens are economic migrants to reflect the increased conflict which results in a build-up of Afghans along the transit routes and a growing unregistered, undocumented population of migrants working illegally in the EU.

Though protracted caseloads from East Africa (mostly Somali and Eritrean) continue to arrive in similar numbers as were seen in 2016 there is an increase in displacement to Europe from the chaos after the death of President Bashir which results in prolonged bloody civil unrest in Sudan. An operational alliance between ISIS and non-state armed actors in West Africa - such as Boko Haram - results in pervasive insecurity in the region driving more displacement towards Europe which is facilitated by smuggling groups from the alliance. The role of smuggling groups across northern Sub-Saharan Africa and the Maghreb creates a vicious circle where the funds from the smuggling operations moving displaced people towards Europe underpins the trade in weapons and violence that is creating the displacement in the first place.

The rise in the historic caseloads that have been seeking asylum in Europe are compounded by new caseloads from Algeria and Libya created by the rapid deterioration in stability. The destabilisation across the North African coast is fertile ground for the spread of terror cells. As ISIS extends its influence further into Libya it is able to exploit the increased flows of people from North Africa via the Central Mediterranean route to launch several more terrorist attacks on European capitals.

The surge in the flows of migrants towards Europe increases the traffic on all routes however none more so than the Central Mediterranean. Despite the efforts of the new European Border and Coast Guard and other marine rescue ventures to reduce the fatality of the sea crossings to Europe, tragedies continue to increase due to the proliferation of smugglers and departure points across North Africa. Both the Eastern Mediterranean and West Balkans route see an increase in

migrants but the situation is better contained and managed reflective of the relative stability of those states of transition governments.

The exponential growth of the forcibly displaced population affecting areas of interest for the international community, forces them to pay more attention to the problem and a greater amount of resources are mobilised to address the issue. The EU leads on managing the emerging crisis in North Africa and engages militarily but also makes strategic investments in the region going beyond purely humanitarian aid in nascent stabilisation efforts.

Without the threat of a British veto or opt-out the EU is able to consolidate the remaining members and advance common legislation on security, border control and migration. Though there is no substantial change to the EU architecture towards an ever closer union (in an effort to avoid any further referenda) the EU rallies in the short term as EU member states react in shock to the BREXIT vote and the torturous nature of negotiations over the course of the outlook make leaving the EU increasing unappealing. Concurrently there is a backlash against the nascent trend of intensifying reactionary politics across the EU with an increase in youth engagement which gives the EU a mandate to expand beyond the securitised agenda in its management of migration. Civil society in European states and at EU level play a critical role in advancing the solidaristic agenda.

The EU moves beyond the current ambition of the Common Asylum policy and fully adopts the European Commission's update to the Dublin II regulation, complete with fairness correction. The majority of states agree to accept migrants that are redistributed from countries with a burden greater than 150% of their referential share but some wealthier northern states prefer to pay the penalty. The continued acceptance of migrants under all three forms of international protection offered by the EU, including subsidiary protection, keeps acceptance rates at over 50% of the overall migrant population.

Though there is increased recognition of the need for better integration in Europe, efforts fall short as a result of the overwhelming numbers of migrants arriving. Poor integration results in continued objections from a vocal minority in the EU. In some states gains made by the far right lead to stronger objections but the EU is able to hold its position and progress. There is limited warehousing of refugees at Europe's periphery though processing still requires holding centres to be in operation. Returns still continue in an effort to encourage migrants to use the newly liberalised formal mechanisms but the rates are much reduced and the EU-Turkey deal is the only third country partnership.

The reality of the ever increasing number of globally displaced people provokes increased attention and funding to durable solutions- the EU creates a so called "New Deal" for displacement and acts in solidarity with other hosting states, not only resettling more refugees from states in the global south but providing increased funds for local integration where feasible. The greatest challenge to the EU's New Deal on global migration is the inclusion of climate refugees - the EU is not able to create a coordinated position on this new facet of refugee law and it is not settled within the course of the outlook. Some EU states offer refuge to climate migrants under the grounds of compassionate leave to remain but it is not standardised across the EU. Though the attention towards durable solutions produces gains towards reducing the global population of displaced people the progress towards the SDGs suffers as the world's attention is redirected to managing the global displacement crisis which becomes the humanitarian issue of a generation.

FORTRESS EUROPE

The level of displacement globally is held steady with limited waves of increase and returns and flows to Europe continue at 2015 rates. Though fragility for all caseload producing states is unimproved and recurrent displacement from the residual insecurity in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Afghanistan and Somalia continues, mass movements do not happen over the course of the outlook. Vulnerable communities in West Africa are affected by natural shocks which, given low resilience, results in displacement but it is regionally contained. The majority of migrants arriving in Europe are not newly displaced but those who face continued encampment in their countries of first arrival.

The Eurozone maintains its sluggish growth, crippled by uncertainty from the drawn-out process of negotiating BREXIT which limits opportunities for new employment. Poor growth and continued austerity adds fuel to interest based arguments against EU cooperation and migration and, EU integration is rolled back as centrist parties are forced to give in to pressure from the right. Though the overall scope of EU integration is reduced it is intensified in the area of defence and national security as EU member states see this as an opportunity to leverage public opinion in favour of collective action.

The EU's engagement with the global burden of displacement focuses on restricting access to Europe opposed to making real investments into durable solutions for displaced communities. This manifests in dramatically increased restrictions in countries of transition (on Europe's periphery and beyond) making the routes taken by migrants who do reach Europe's borders increasingly arduous. EU coordination extends to intensified, militarised border protection - including funding from Northern Europe for border defence on Europe's southern and eastern periphery - but not to solutions. In addition to the militarized border the EU is able to establish partnerships with transition states outside of Europe to minimize the number of migrants permitted to enter the EU, including the precarious governments on the North African coast who are supported to retain sufficient stability to stem the flow of migration. Transition countries on Europe's borders react to incentives and put in place measures to manage their own migrant issues - including border closures, indefinite detention and refoulement of their existing refugee populations. In addition to limiting the flow of migrants, the EU creates more partnerships similar to the EU-Turkey deal to legitimise the increased returns that become a standard part of their migrant management. The obstacles erected to dissuade migrants from traveling to Europe alters the demographic makeup of migrant communities to almost exclusively young men.

Though there is no real increase in the terror threat, the perception that migration is exacerbating the threat of terrorist attacks in the EU due to a greater presence of ISIS on the Libyan coast is the foundational argument articulated by the far right. Nationalist parties continue to advance in legislative elections, some gaining power in coalitions. The populism of this rhetoric means that anti-immigration stances become normalised by centrist parties and the approach to migration and international protection in the EU is notably altered in 2018. The migration discourse in the EU is dominated by the agenda of far right parties who have succeeded in completely securitising the issue and, in spite of no material change in the numbers of migrants arriving, drive the EU to effectively close its borders. Much of Europe's external borders are militarised which enables the EU to maintain freedom of movement inside the Schengen area. Despite the fact that the UK continues to be subject to EU law over the course of the outlook

steps are taken by the post-referendum leadership to curb all migration into Britain making it increasingly difficult for migrants to cross from France and creating a build up along the channel.

To enable open borders for EU citizens, policed holding camps are erected at Europe's periphery - migrants are not allowed to co-habit with local populations in countries of transition to maintain separation for processing. Holding camps are largely used as warehouses for many migrants prior to their return to a third country or to their country of origin. The criteria for who is entitled to subsidiary protection are increasingly limited and acceptance rates of applications in the first instance plummet. To expedite the process an increased number of origin, arrival and third countries are deemed "safe" by the EU to expedite returns.

Life for migrants already residing in Europe is increasingly challenging as the benefits that are provided to those granted international protection steadily diminish. Integration of migrants in Europe is minimised reinforcing the *us versus them* narrative of the far right parties and camps and ghettos extending to Western Europe proliferate. Though governments attempt to minimise incidents, there is an increase in violent confrontation between European communities and the migrant populations already residing in Europe. This encourages migrants arriving in Europe not to register and many attempt to find work illegally so that they are able to stay but have to forgo the limited benefits associated with international protection. In addition to an increase in deportations and forcible returns there is a high number of voluntary returns as the benefits for those granted international protection are shrunk to the lowest legally permitted, including eradicating the rights of migrants to bring their families.

Funding is almost entirely diverted away from international aid and is refocused on paying for the management of migrants in Europe and a militarized border.

OPEN FLOOD GATES

Worsening conditions in many of the migrant-producing contexts are compounded by a series of shocks, both natural and political, which leads to a rise in the global displacement figures. The death of President Bouteflika in Algeria and virtual state collapse in Libya creates a new caseload on Europe's border which dramatically increases the number of asylum applicants applying in Europe as their country of first arrival. Though the insecurity in the north coast of Africa decreases the number of migrants using it as a transition route in the short term, more departure points from the North African coast - including Egypt - are soon operational. This accommodates the persistent flow of migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa. Displacement from both East and West Africa are increased by a prolonged drought which hits the environmentally vulnerable areas where millions of refugees are hosted, worsening their already dire condition. As a result long-term refugees take advantage of the increase in the number of smuggling operations exploiting the chaos in the Mediterranean to make the jump to Europe. Funding to support hosting countries in the global south is incommensurate with the needs of a growing displaced population and, under political pressure from domestic audiences, many hosting countries in the global south begin to close their borders and some even engage in forcible returns. This is move is led by the Kenyan government who makes substantial progress towards closing the camps in Dadaab and Kakuma. For the existing displaced populations the threat of return and the reduction in support in camps settings spurs them to leave and make for Europe. Without incentives to do so (and

these are limited) southern hosting states do not attempt to stem the flow of migrants towards Europe, rather they ignore the mass departures to relieve the burden on their own states and allow smuggling operations to proliferate.

As a result this increases the flow of migrants from several of the major caseloads reaching Europe and puts incredible pressure on the countries in transition along the route. For countries that already have structural vulnerabilities (high poverty levels, political instability, insurgent threats etc.) the pressure of additional migrants is too much to bear and increasingly authoritarian measures are taken in Egypt, Turkey, Macedonia and Serbia.

Within the EU the quota system is never operationalised and burden sharing (including financial) is never realised leaving states on Europe's periphery to manage with the growing number of arrivals. States on Europe's periphery create a substantial network of holding camps but they are quickly overwhelmed. EU states on the periphery are unable to stop the creation of illicit routes to northern Europe - leading to greater mixed migration flows of people within the continent. The EU has given up on creating a coordinated response to the crisis by 2018 and the Schengen agreement is further and further eroded by unilateral border closures within the EU until it is ultimately suspended. Repeated referenda on EU policies and the EU itself results in weakening Brussels and the EU struggles to advance any part of its legislative agenda as states grow increasingly nationalistic. This produces a vicious circle where the EU is unable to create a coordinated approach and as a result is incredibly ineffective in managing the challenges facing the block - especially as regards migration - which fuels the argument of the nationalist parties that further restrict any space in Brussels to create collective solutions. Growing economic imbalances in the EU increase as a result of growing protectionism between members and the principle of free movement in the EU negatively affected.

As a result of EU and state failure, initiatives from NGOs and civil society to manage the crisis and provide lifesaving support - especially for maritime rescue in the Mediterranean become ever more important. These initiatives take place alongside the limited EU engagement that the Commission is able to get approved and funded.

The inability of the continent to manage the crisis increases the public opposition to migrants and they are recurrently targeted by acts of violence. Public sentiment is further angered by the repeated terror threats and attacks in the EU as terror cells take advantage of the chaotic movement of people. The EU is increasingly viewed as an impotent body. Member states force a revision in the parameters of subsidiary protection and it falls into disuse. States grant asylum for those meeting the higher bar in the 1951 Refugee Convention and limited cases accepted on humanitarian grounds but the overall acceptance rates fall in the face of the renewed migration wave. The rights and benefits accorded to those receiving international protection are considerably reduced.

There is insufficient coordination across Europe for a comprehensive response and EU countries focus all their attention on national security - abandoning the pretence of investing in solutions and moving away from geo-strategic engagement. The EU is not able to direct any funding or energy to durable solutions and remains fixed on dealing with the crisis once it hits its borders. The majority of EU international aid is retracted by states and diverted to supporting migration within their own borders. This results in little improvement in the broader context and a vicious

cycle of population movement and vulnerability spreads instability like a contagion. The burden of global displacement is accelerated even beyond current trends and the unprecedented movement of people is a global crisis.

UNCERTAINTIES

There are several aspects of the dynamics which define migration into Europe, and the EU's response to it, which are highly uncertain:

- **The forcible closure of existing refugee camps** - Governments in the global south suffer similar political pressures as EU states but with far fewer resources. Several states of first arrival have closed their borders with crisis states in a bid to deter further asylum seekers but the extent to which they will be willing and able to engage in forcible returns that would enable them to close existing refugee camps is questionable. If any government with a large refugee population was successful in closing a refugee camp it would likely lead to increased migration to Europe as some refugees attempt to escape being forcibly returned.
- **The potential for new caseloads** - The greater instability on the North African coast is a critical uncertainty for migration in the European theatre. Not only does it affect the flow of migrants from other areas but it has the potential to quickly and radically increase the scale of the crisis.
- **The stability of transition state governments** - Governments in transition zones, most notably Turkey including Libya and Egypt, are under immense pressure from the flow of migrants through their countries. Considering the domestic pressures and underlying structural vulnerabilities present in each of these countries the environment is potentially explosive - a collapse in any of these states could have a deleterious effect on migration into the European theatre.
- **Success of the far right in European elections** - The degree of success that is obtained by far right parties in seeking positions of power within EU member state governments will be definitive in how much coordination will be achieved. Though there are nascent trends of an ascending far right in many EU states there is great uncertainty in how that will be reflected in the make-up of governments.
- **Further referenda on the role of the EU** - The degree to which BREXIT will provoke increased unity for EU member states or add fuel to comparable initiatives across the membership is a significant uncertainty. This will determine the degree to which the EU is able to coalesce resources around a shared vision and how much political capital Brussels is able to use to address the migrant issue.

CONCLUSION

The issue of mass migration and the challenges it presents are not a new phenomenon. The average length of protracted displacement is 26 years, indicating that for some caseloads displacement is not a temporary condition but a way of life. The unprecedented flows of migration into Europe have forced the issue of displacement onto the world agenda. However, the Eurocentric tone of the debate obscures the true nature of the burden and overemphasises the relative scale of the caseloads arriving into Europe versus those that are, and have long been, born by states in the global south. To frame the European migrant crisis in this global system is not to undermine the challenges associated with providing a response in the EU that would accommodate asylum applicants with dignity but rather to highlight the scale of the challenge in seeking a durable solution for the 63.5 million people who have been forcibly displaced in the world. Today, the EU is at a critical juncture in its management of the flows of migration. It can either lead by example or falter and bear the negative consequences for Europe and displaced populations worldwide for the foreseeable future. This report has endeavoured to unpack the drivers of the European response and couch it within the global system - demonstrating the EU's role and the consequences of their decisions extending beyond its borders. Factors including the role of reactionary politics, the consequences of securitising the migration issue, the legal framework which defines the parameters of any response, the distribution of asylum applicants throughout the EU and the EU's approach to durable solutions will all intertwine to influence the scale and competence of the EU's response and, consequently the global debate on displacement. ■

Global Report:

RESPONDING TO THE MIGRANT CRISIS: Europe at a Juncture

BY THE INTER-AGENCY REGIONAL ANALYST NETWORK

@InteragencyRAN

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An initiative of:

INSTITUT DE RELATIONS INTERNATIONALES ET STRATÉGIQUES (IRIS)

2 bis rue Mercoeur - 75011 PARIS / France

T. + 33 (0) 1 53 27 60 60

contact@iris-france.org

@InstitutIRIS

www.iris-france.org

ACTION AGAINST HUNGER (ACF UK)

First Floor, Rear Premises, 161-163 Greenwich High Road, London, SE10 8JA

T. + 44 (0)20 8293 6190

@ACF_UK

www.actionagainsthunger.org.uk