Since the beginning of France’s fifth Republic, the nuclear deterrent has played a determining role in French international policy. Guaranteeing safety against the USSR, it went a long way to allaying fears of a threat from the latter. France was thus able to enjoy a more balanced relationship with Russia than other European countries. This in turn meant France was less in need of American military protection, and so was able to establish a complex-free relationship with Washington, where independence prevailed over resigned obedience, without undermining western solidarity, particularly in the event of severe conflict between the East and West. France, therefore, did not consider itself to be restricted or inhibited in its relationship with the two superpowers in the same way as other European countries were.

In its eyes, this created a difference in status. It has often been said of the relationship between France and Germany, that there was a certain equality in the imbalance, France had the bomb, Germany had the deutschmark. During the cold war, the former counted for more than the latter.

Finally, in the eyes of the rest of the world, nuclear weapons gave France full membership of the superpower club. The Non-Proliferation Treaty, which it did not want to sign before 1992, further served to confirm its official nuclear status, while closing access to the atomic club.

In line with this clarity of situation corresponded a clarity of doctrine, which can be observed in the different actions of General de Gaulle, and in the work of Generals Buis, Poirier and Gallois, which were codified by the White Paper on Defence in 1972.

Ever since France has been a nuclear power, its idea of dissuasion has been built around notions of sufficiency, of minimal or proportional dissuasion, of dissuasion of the weak to the strong. These terms, used interchangeably, were nonetheless based on a common idea. France did not have the resources to keep up with the nuclear arms race started by the Americans and the Russians. However, as the law of more is better does not apply in the case of nuclear weapons, the quantitative difference in their arsenals did not prevent France from benefiting from all the advantages of being a nuclear power.

Between 1989 and 1991, this happy balance was to be severely shaken. The collapse of the Berlin wall and the disappearance of the Soviet threat, eliminated two of the major reasons for its nuclear weapons mission, supposedly intended to ward off threats from all sides but which, in reality, was focused on an exclusively Soviet target. Reunified Germany returned to full diplomatic status. The Gulf war proved two things: that the United States was the only true superpower, and that France was lacking in the non-nuclear resources which had proved essential to victory (surveillance satellites, high-precision guided missiles etc.). And on top it all, the USSR broke up, the Iraqis were discovered to have an underground nuclear programme, and the approaching expiry date of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (signed in 1970 for a period of 25 years) placed the fear of nuclear proliferation at the top of the list of strategic concerns. The nuclear factor, France’s major asset, was devaluating rapidly. It was less necessary for defence, while at the same time there were glaring shortfalls in the conventional field. The stability factor (dissuasion) became a risk factor (proliferation). This all contributed to an increasingly intense wave of protest against the need for nuclear weapons.

Was the path now leading towards a post-nuclear world? Should not the weapons that appeared with the cold war now disappear, as it had done? At the same time in the United States, the theory of the post-nuclear world was coming into being, prophesying the strategic obsolescence of nuclear weapons.

The end of the Soviet threat, the arising of new conflicts (the Gulf war, the conflicts in former Yugoslavia), raised the issue of adapting French nuclear weapons to the new strategic situation. Should France not abandon nuclear weapons, to the benefit of conventional ones, now that the threat hanging over its territory had disappeared?

Finally, is there a future for nuclear weapons now that the need for them is being called into question?

Certainly, nuclear weapons have always been, even in the western world, a subject of debate. Was it moral to threaten to destroy the life of millions of civilians, innocent by definition, to protect oneself? But despite the fact that doubts were raised and even protests made, this was not enough for the security policies of western countries to be called into question.

Today, partisans of the nuclear issue are on the defensive. Calls for disarmament, studies highlighting the current futility of nuclear weapons, unease stirred up by the proliferation of such weapons and the frightening prospect of watching countries seen to be fundamentally hostile to the western world (or, even worse, terrorist groups) arm themselves with nuclear weapons, have accentuated doubts and fears. The nuclear deterrent is being increasingly denounced for being dangerous, immoral and useless in terms of defence.

Official and unofficial forums denouncing nuclear weapons are not new. However, over the past few years, and particularly under the influence of the debate leading up to the conference for the prorogation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1995, the number of such forums has increased and their activities widened.

As highlighted by the Director of Legal Issues of the Quai d’Orsay, "clearly, the relatively quiet period, where intellectual debate on the relationship between international public law and dissuasion has been confined to specialists, is over. The international debate has begun".

Despite these difficulties, which it has taken into account, France intends to remain a nuclear power. This intention is, by and large, the subject of national consensus (a rarity in France) both within political circles and public opinion.

The starting up of nuclear testing again in 1995 — or to use the official terminology, "the final series of tests of limited duration and extent" —triggered one of the greatest controversies France has ever experienced under the fifth Republic over a matter of defence. The positions of those in favour of and those against renewed testing were particularly clear-cut, and sometimes even dramatised in the extreme.

The media gave the debate top priority, which is rare for a defence-related matter. Even the ending of the national military service, an equally important and symbolic issue, and one which is much more relevant in the daily lives of the French people, was not awarded such treatment.

However, despite the fierceness of the controversy, it should be noted that a new consensus was reached on nuclear issues in France.

It centred around the three main French political parties, the Rassemblement Pour la République (RPR, Gaullist), the Union pour la Démocratie Français (UDF, centre-right) and the Parti Socialiste (PS).

Although the PS was totally opposed to nuclear testing, it was not because it disagreed with the concept of dissuasion, but because its leaders considered that it was not the tests which would preserve France’s power to deter, and that they could actually harm the process for extending the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The Front National, the less structured ecologists and the Parti Communist did not, true to their vocation as protester parties, adhere to this view, for different reasons. However, it would be a fair assessment to say that their differences regarding the nuclear issue did not completely preclude the possibility of a political alliance with those supporting the dissuasion concept.

Adopting a policy of minimal dissuasion — together with, as is already the case today, an active disarmament policy — does not constitute sufficient reason to justify the communists or the ecologists refusing to support, or even participate in a government.

Consensus was reached on four points:

The consensus should endure because the leaders of the political groups all accepted that in order to be able to govern France, matters of defence in general, and in particular those which are nuclear-related, need to be taken very seriously.

French public opinion adheres to this consensus. "The adhesion of the French to the dissuasion doctrine remains high: 61% of French people feel that France could not guarantee its own defence without the nuclear deterrent, 28% take the opposing view, 21% believe that it should be further increased and 32% that it should be continually updated. For 39%, the existing deterrent should be maintained, and 23% feel that it is time to begin cutting it back".

It is clear to the RPR, the UDF and the PS that a policy of dissuasion must be preserved.

The socialist party could have made an attempt to return to the antinuclear position, which it held until 1978. The advantages of such a change could have been to clear the political slate after 14 years of leadership; to take stock of the heritage left by President Mitterrand, as the new first secretary of the PS, Lionel Jospin wishes to do; and to strengthen the ties with the Greens and the Communists.

The government and its supporters did, in fact, invoke the opposition of the PS to the tests as proof of a return to its antinuclear position.

This fear — or hope — was to prove to be unfounded. The socialist leaders remain convinced that France needs to maintain a nuclear deterrent.

During the 1995 presidential election campaign, Lionel Jospin wrote in his programme: "the nuclear deterrent, supported by submarines, must remain the pillar of our defence strategy, the guarantee of our independence". The socialist candidate linked dissuasion to the development of surveillance satellites, in the context of an association with our European partners, in order to gradually build a totally independent information and warning system. Paul Quilès, responsible for defence matters within the PS, declared that "it is wise to preserve a policy of dissuasion, which should not prevent us from reconsidering its substance".

Indeed, the socialists believed that although the elections would not be won on the basis of strategic issues, they could be lost because of them.

It took the PS years to gain credibility on this point. After it accepted the idea of dissuasion in 1978, and in view of President Mitterrand’s strategic policy, it could no longer be attacked on this front. This was not the case in 1981.

Therefore, the PS does not wish to jeopardise this essential trust that it acquired so painstakingly and at such cost. This is why, in particular, it refused to endorse the document from the Canberra Commission as it stands (as requested by Michel Rocard, former socialist prime minister and member of the commission), because the philosophy behind this document is deemed to be too strongly anti-nuclear, despite the moderate nature of the proposals.

Furthermore, Lionel Jospin, now Prime Minister, declared to an audience at the Institut des Hautes Etudes de la Défense Nationale on 4 September 1997 that "Dissuasion remains the pillar of our defence strategy. Indeed, it should be noted that the nuclear deterrent was neither created nor conceived purely in the context of the cold war. Furthermore, the disappearance of antagonism between the East and the West does not call into question today its essential role in the defence of our territory and the protection of our vital interests. It would also be appropriate to emphasise that thousands of nuclear weapons remain stockpiled throughout the world. Despite the efforts to disarm and notwithstanding the numerous international agreements and inspection procedures, of which France is now more than ever a part, nuclear proliferation, although considerably lessened, has not been brought to a complete halt.

To provide for possible spurts of proliferation, and for the risk of a resurgence of a major threat, France must preserve a credible nuclear deterrent, but at a level of strict necessity and to a lesser degree than during the cold war.

Furthermore, in a world still dominated by power plays, its nuclear status is one of the elements which enables France to preserve its freedom of action and appraisal on the international scene".

Continuity is totally maintained.

Paradoxically, although the two parties hostile to dissuasion (the PC and the Greens) have entered government, the consensus has been strengthened. The two parties have considerably toned down their anti-nuclear weapons stance in order to participate in government.

The French Greens and communists are putting up with dissuasion.

In January 1997, a joint Green-PS text was completed, citing the need "to take action to reduce armaments, to fight against nuclear proliferation and to set the elimination of weapons of mass destruction as an objective". These were really minimal requests, and from many aspects very reasonable ones. Certainly nothing that would jeopardise the maintenance of the nuclear deterrent.

In fact, as was given to be understood by the interview granted by Yves Cochet (current Green MP in the Val d’Oise, and spokesperson of this group on international matters) in 1993, the ecologists, following in the footsteps of the PS between 1977 and 1978, chose the option of "maintaining the existing status" as regards nuclear weapons.

The future MP declared, "If, one day — in several years time — we were to participate in some form of government — when I say "we" I am referring to the ecologists, — the contract — because we are in favour of a contractual policy — would be based on compromise; we would have to make compromises with the current governing parties who would be our partners, and there would have to be mutual agreement on defence matters. The current governing parties would have to yield on some aspects of defence policy objectives, and we would have to be prepared to wait, knowing that defence policy is not something that can be changed overnight. Therefore, there would be a period — of I do not know how long — where we would seem to be moving away from our fundamental objectives, which are to eliminate nuclear weapons. However, the idea is to find out whether, by working together within a government, we could agree upon the essential steps to be taken to achieve shared objectives. Essentially, it is the transition that could be discussed. For example, we feel that the ending of all nuclear testing on Mururoa is tantamount to a condition of entry, for the Greens in any case, into a government. One of the first steps could also be to remove the missiles from the Plateau d’Albion".

Regarding French nuclear weapons, Yves Cochet is certainly in favour of dismantling the missiles of the Plateau d’Albion. However, as regards submarines, for which an upgrading programme exists, he is less categorical. "The Greens are opposed to the development of these nuclear submarines and (…) we propose that the current generation of submarines be preserved until it becomes obsolete and that the work planned to upgrade to a new generation not be pursued (…). On the nuclear level, it is the missile launching submarines (French acronym SNLE) which remain the most strategically useful. The current generation should be phased out gradually, to avoid irreparably upsetting the financial and social status quo. As for the future generation, we do not wish to develop it as it would incite other nuclear powers (…) to take steps in this direction".

These declarations would seem to indicate that certain ecologists are not opposed to maintaining the French nuclear arsenal in its current state (we preserve what we already have) although they remain hostile to the idea of keeping it up to standard (upgrading to maintain the arsenal at a constant relative level).

This is reminiscent of the way in which the PS went about converting to the idea of a nuclear deterrent. On 9 November 1977, the executive office unanimously adopted a motion on defence policy. The objective remained the renunciation of nuclear weapons in whatever form. However, while awaiting general disarmament, the nuclear arsenal would be "maintained in its current state", that is to say they would settle for preserving what already existed. Then, at the 1978 PS convention, François Mitterrand declared "We will not destroy the nuclear arsenal by maintaining it up to standard and not merely in its current state, we will make the technical modifications which technological advances and progress will require in the meantime".

In fact, the ecologists will not break an electoral alliance or governmental agreement to oppose maintaining the arsenal in its current state. They have been satisfied on a matter which they deem to be essential, regarding the civil nuclear industry, with the shutdown of the Super Phénix reactor. They also appreciate the fact that France will, from now on, be more active in the disarmament field, which will enable them to put up with the current nuclear programmes without any difficulty.

The same can be said for the PC. Their desire to participate in current affairs makes 1977 fade into the background, when the left-wing union was broken on the pretext (rather than the grounds) of the upgrading of French nuclear weapons. The PC also appreciates and accepts what is involved in the French disarmament policy.

For these two parties, the maintenance of a minimal nuclear deterrent, a guarantee more of France’s independence than her security, is a powerful argument, particularly at a time when American hegemony is seen to be looming. After all, was it not for this reason that the PC supported dissuasion with the 1977 Kanapa report?

The consensus is therefore objectively strengthened by the strategic context, the domestic policy situation and the constitutional context.

— As regards the first point, no spectacular events are in the pipeline which could shift public opinion (testing, deployment of ground missiles). Continuing with nuclear submarine patrols will not be inciting violent reactions, as it is not visible action. Dissuasion is becoming discrete, and thus more difficult to oppose.

— The political circle opposing the policy of dissuasion has also shrunk. 90 to 95% of the electorate is now represented by political parties which accept, or at least put up with the idea of dissuasion. This is certainly the best score in the history of the fifth Republic.

— Again discretion in dissuasion works in its favour. It helps the Greens and the PC to make people forget their official stance against nuclear weapons, and participation in government is well worth this type of memory lapse.

Finally, cohabitation makes dissuasion even more sacred. There is no shortage of points on which the President and the Government could disagree, but the government must be particularly careful to avoid the risk of creating problems on this matter which is even more delicate during a period of cohabitation. The president of France still plays a determining role and enjoys room to manoeuvre in this domain, as the two preceding cohabitation governments have shown.

It would therefore appear that there is no reason for the French consensus on the nuclear issue to be called into question in the future. Its fate will depend striking the right balance between the need for a nuclear deterrent and the aspirations of disarmament. French public opinion will continue to adhere to the dissuasion concept if it can always be seen to be non-aggressive and compatible with a certain degree of disarmament. One of the main challenges to be met will be to determine the disarmament measures that France could propose, or those which it could guarantee did not come into conflict with maintaining a policy of minimal dissuasion.

The second point upon which consensus has now been reached is on the concept of dissuasion. France — more by necessity than by virtue, because it is unable to keep up with the Americans and the Russians in the arms race — has adopted a doctrine which precludes recourse to nuclear weapons in battle.

The reason for possessing nuclear weapons is not to win wars, but to avoid them.

Behind this basic principle, lies a much more complex reality. Nuclear weapons have always been perceived with ambivalence. The French nuclear experts consider that the Americans applied conceptual outlines to nuclear weapons before they were developed. In France as well, there has always been a temptation to deny the political role of nuclear weapons and to ascribe them with a purely military function. The first time this temptation was yielded to, was in relation to short range nuclear weapons. These arms are classified as tactical in the United States, and they were deliberately described as "prestrategic" in France, precisely to justify linking them with strategic nuclear weapons rather than conventional weapons.

After the Berlin wall came down and after the Gulf war, the path of using tactical nuclear weapons to restore a purely military function to nuclear weapons was abandoned, to concentrate on miniature weapons, used for surgical strikes. This enabled contained, accurate strikes to be made on the chosen target without damaging the environment. The argument was based on the fact that it was impossible to deter the countries in the South with the same types of threats (massive strikes on towns) used by the USSR. The advantage of developing such weapons is therefore that they have a less destructive effect, and are thus used more readily. The disadvantage is exactly the same. Nuclear weapons would pass from the dissuasion sphere into the combat sphere, something that France has managed to avoid thus far. The need to have accurate weapons for surgical strikes should be reserved for conventional weaponry alone. However, according to traditional French doctrine, only nuclear arms can truly deter, but that is also all theymay do.

With the launch of the procedure in the White Paper, and the campaign to start up nuclear testing again, it seemed as if those who wished to modify the concept had won the eternal battle between the two perceptions of nuclear weapons. From 1992 to 1994, the need to move towards "more flexible" methods of dissuasion was inexorably finding favour with the political leaders (both right- and left-wing) and the experts. Nothing, however, became of it and the danger of these theories finally came to light, in particular as regards the debate on nuclear testing. During the 1995 presidential election campaign, the three main candidates manifested their inclination towards a traditional view of dissuasion.

In his keynote speech on foreign policy delivered on 16 March 1997, Jacques Chirac claimed to be in favour of "maintaining our concept of dissuasion which rules out, and I emphasise this, all idea of nuclear war". He reiterated this view after being elected, stating that "France’s nuclear strategy will remain dissuasive and hence defensive, ruling out all idea of nuclear war".

On the television current affairs talk show "Sept sur sept" recorded at the presidential residence, the Elysée palace, on 10 September 1995, the President of France ruled out all possibility of drifting away from the doctrine, re-establishing the link between this problem and that of the tests, which he confirmed would be brought to a permanent halt, even small-scale ones, in 1996. "We do not have the technology for small weapons. We know how to make large weapons, we do not know how to make small ones. And small weapons are extremely dangerous because we could be more tempted to use them than large weapons. This is why this new generation of small weapons, which would require small-scale tests to be carried out in France or elsewhere, is very dangerous.

The stand that I have taken since June, is that France would not accept the development of a new generation of weapons, all the more dangerous because they are small and there is more temptation to use them. This is why, from the outset in June, I made it clear that France will take the ‘zero option’ ".

In fact, it appears that although the ‘zero option’ was not taken until August, it was more than anything, motivated by the desire to mollify international criticism of the tests by offering compensation in the disarmament field.

However, the timing is of little importance. What was essential was that consensus again be reached on the dissuasion doctrine. Among those in favour of a renewal of nuclear testing, those who wished to modify French doctrine won a Pyrrhic victory on 13 June, because the price they had to pay was bringing testing to a close once and for all (whereas they wished to continue on a reduced scale) and the freezing of nuclear doctrine (whereas they wished to develop it to achieve more flexible terms and conditions!).

The return to a purely dissuasive concept was of prime importance for the fate of French nuclear strength. It takes a fundamental lever away from the opponents of dissuasion. By focusing on the ways in which nuclear weapons could be actually used, France would have greatly strengthened anti-nuclear lobby, by clearly associating the idea of nuclear weapons with that of war, rather than with the idea of preserving the peace. All political debate condoning the maintenance of nuclear strength — which is already hard to swallow — would have been disqualified. In France, where the Front National is the only political party to clearly display its adhesion to this view — it would have obliged the PC and the ecologists to display greater hostility towards nuclear weapons. This hostility would have been more easily transferred to the public. Abroad, particularly in Germany, this would have served to intensify anti-nuclear sentiment, at a time when France was trying to limit German criticism on this matter by complying with old requests from Bonn such as to dismantle Hadès and ratify the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

We must therefore congratulate ourselves that the attempts — in the guise of providing the political decision makers with more flexibility — to provide France with a doctrine based on the use of nuclear strength, failed. It would almost certainly have enabled new nuclear weapons to be developed, but to the detriment of the policy of dissuasion.

The French leaders now agree that disarmament and the maintaining of a nuclear deterrent are not incompatible.

At the beginning of the sixties, France was opposed to the Arms Control policy set up by Moscow and Washington. They were not opposed to the principle of disarmament, but to the fact that the American and Soviet action was very clearly intended to prevent France (and China) from emerging as a nuclear power. If Paris had signed the Moscow treaty on the partial banning of nuclear testing, it would not have been able to finish building up its strategic strength. It was also due to its opposition to the joint Soviet and American action that France did not want to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968, despite it recognising France as one of the five official nuclear powers, and despite France’s claims to be in favour of the non-proliferation objective.

At the beginning of the seventies, France did however, come out on the side of the Salt process. The action this time involved both Russians and Americans. For Paris, this had a dual advantage. These superpowers were not only taking an interest in the arsenals of other countries, but had set about limiting their own. Suddenly, the French arsenal took on greater importance, due, in particular, to the ABM treaty.

However, France refused to participate directly in these negotiations. The argument was simple: the difference between the strength of the superpowers and that of France was so great, that France could not take part in the process.

In 1983 President Mitterrand set three conditions to be fulfilled before France could enter into nuclear negotiations. These were:

1 - reduction of conventional and chemical weapons imbalances in Europe,

2 - termination of the development of biological weapons technology,

3 - reduction of the central arsenals of the superpowers.

In 1978, President Giscard d’Estaing had decided to participate in the extraordinary UN session on disarmament. He proposed the creation of an agency of surveillance satellites, and called for disarmament in favour of development.

In 1991, President Mitterrand announced that France was going to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The proliferation of nuclear weapons appeared to be the primary danger and France had to show its commitment to fighting against it.

For this reason, a moratorium on nuclear testing was announced in 1992. Since 1991, France had reduced credit for nuclear weapons by 30%. It had abandoned the Pluton and Hades programmes, withdrawn AN52 gravitation bombs from service, reduced the projected number of SNLE-NGs from 6 to 4, lowered the nuclear warning system level, in 1992 proclaimed a moratorium on testing, signed the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, and, after the test episode, worked in favour of a treaty completely banning nuclear tests, while closing the Pacific experiment centre at Mururoa. France signed treaties creating nuclear-free zones in the South Pacific (Rarotonga) and in Africa (Pelindaba). It gave up a nuclear component by dismantling the Plateau d’Albion, closed the fissile material plants at Pierrelatte and Marcoule and accepted the principle of a Cut Off Treaty on fissile materials. President Chirac, in his speech in February 1996 announced the end of French nuclear testing and declared that France would be the "champion of nuclear disarmament".

The choices are, it is true, as much dictated by budgetary factors as strategic ones. For the time being, France has, however, refused to participate directly in negotiations to reduce nuclear strength by placing its arsenal under the restriction of a multilateral negotiation, France still considers that the discrepancy between its arsenal and those of Moscow and Washington is still too large to consider such participation. However, if the Start II agreements were actually applied, thus bringing the Russian and American arsenals to a ceiling limit of 3000 warheads, France (which possesses 400) could participate in Start III negotiations.

For this to happen however, Moscow and Washington would have to refrain from embarking on anti-missile defence programmes.

There is now a consensus in France uniting adherents to the dissuasion policy, admitting that the latter should be accompanied by a disarmament aspect. The fight against the proliferation of nuclear weapons, decentralisation of global-scale risks and threats, and disenchantment with nuclear weapons, now make it indispensable for everyone, including those in favour of dissuasion, not to appear to be frontally opposed to the disarmament process, not to get swept along by the anti-nuclear wave. Dissuasion and disarmament are now seen in France by the leaders of the major political parties and by those responsible for strategic issues, as complementing each other rather than as being mutually exclusive. This was not the case in the past. Playing an active role in disarmament is now included in the French consensus.

Finally, the fourth point of consensus consists in the link to be forged between French nuclear strength and European defence.

The establishment of a connection between the national possession of nuclear strength and the emergence of a joint European defence system is certainly one of the main topics of strategic debate. It is becoming difficult for the French leaders to confirm both that nuclear weapons provide the supreme guarantee of French security, and that the construction of a joint European defence system is a major objective, without establishing a link between the two.

With regard to this matter, two periods in French policy can be noted. Before 1992, refusal to make French nuclear weapons available to a European defence service was categorical. This was considered to be in conflict with French strategic realities and interests. According to the White Paper of 1972, "Nuclear dissuasion is a purely national issue. At present, the risk is not shared". Not believing in the reality of a European-scale nuclear deterrent as envisaged by the Americans, France did not, however, wish to propose a version which would obviously be less solid. French nuclear weapons would therefore protect the national territory and vital interests of France.

Nonetheless, according to the authors of the White Paper, western Europe benefited from this strategy because "although the deterrent is reserved for protecting our vital interests, the boundaries of the latter is vague. A potential adversary would find it even more difficult to assess his room to manoeuvre, which strengthens the power of the deterrent".

In 1976, the Army Chief of Staff, General Méry, went so far as to talk of a "broadened territory", but, in face of the general outcry at his ideas, the subject was quickly closed.

Throughout the eighties, President François Mitterrand remained loyal to the line of action laid down in the White Paper. In 1984 he declared that the France had not hidden the fact from its allies that, beyond protecting its national territory and associated vital interests, it would be unable to take responsibility for the security of the whole of Europe.

His opening address on 11 January 1992 on the occasion of the national meetings on Europe was to be timid: "Is it possible to conceive a joint European nuclear doctrine? This question will quickly become one of the major questions behind the construction of a joint European defence system".

The White Paper of 1994 also bore witness to a great degree of reticence: "A European nuclear doctrine and European nuclear deterrent will only be achievable when there will be European vital interests, considered as such by the Europeans and understood as such by others. Until then France does not intend to dilute its national defence resources in such a field under any pretext".

It was Alain Juppé, then Minister for Foreign Affairs, who revived the debate in January 1995, during a speech delivered for the twentieth anniversary of the Centre d’Analyse et de Prévision (CAP) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. "After developing a joint doctrine between France and the United Kingdom, should our generation fear the prospect, not of a shared deterrent, but at least discussing the issue of dissuasion with our main partners? Might not adopting a single currency, and a new Franco-German contract alter France’s perception of its vital interests?".

Unfortunately, the controversy on nuclear testing during Summer 1995, was to weigh heavily on the debate. Faced with the unpopularity roused in Europe by the lifting of the moratorium, the French leaders tried to justify the renewal of tests by implying that they were not only carried out for France, but for the benefit of European protection. This had the opposite of the desired effect and, indeed, it was the idea of a joint deterrent itself which came in for harsh criticism. The emotion roused by the nuclear testing played havoc with deliberation on the subject of a European deterrent.

This was not surprising, nuclear tests have always been the most effective target for opponents of the atom. They constitute the only concrete element to which they can refer.

France was not sufficiently aware of the fact that nuclear issues were not viewed in the same way across the European continent. What was seen in Paris as progress and a major concession, left the majority of its partners completely indifferent, when it did not actually incite hostility for fear of being "nuclearised" against their will.

While nuclear dissuasion is perceived in France as the perfect way of achieving independence and security, it is seen in Europe as a threat (Russia, proliferation) and as causing dependency with regard to other nuclear countries. This is all the more unfortunate in that it is certain that there can be no true European defence system in a world which will remain nuclearised, without this European defence system possessing some form of nuclear component.

In Germany there is also an unnatural alliance between the Atlantic lobby (who do not want to give the impression of exchanging American protection for French protection) and the anti-nuclear lobby (by nature hostile to the concept of dissuasion) to refuse the French proposal.

In other countries (Austria, Sweden), there is very intense rejection of the nuclear industry, whether for civil or military purposes. These countries are therefore very reticent about projects moving in this direction.

The lack of tangible progress in this field would both discredit nuclear weapons, and postpone European strategic autonomy indefinitely. The "Europeanisation" of French nuclear weapons — in one way or another — is therefore contributing to justifying the need for a European-scale nuclear deterrent.

How, therefore, can European reticence, due to both structural reasons (non-nuclear European countries are wary of the inequality of status that this involves with regard to nuclear European countries) and circumstantial reasons (the mistake of having wanted to "pass on" the decision on nuclear testing to the European level by proposing a joint deterrent) be overcome? It is important not to appear to be in a position of asking anything of the other European countries. This was unfortunately what happened in Summer 1995, before the situation was remedied. Today, France is satisfied with making it clear that it is available.

As the President of the Defence and Foreign Affairs Commission of the Senate, Xavier De Villepin so rightly points out, "this agreement on a future European nuclear deterrent assumes that the approach to this deterrent will essentially be political. It will not involve stationing nuclear weapons around the territory of our partners, nor will it mean extending the French nuclear guarantee unilaterally. It will involve taking into consideration the fact that our vital interests are more politically than geographically oriented, and that France and its closest European partners — in particular Germany — could form a joint strategic zone".

At the same time, France has made gestures intended to soothe the irritation of its European partners by reaffirming the purely dissuasive nature of its nuclear policy, setting aside the scenarios covering the actual uses for its nuclear arsenal which could have had alienated the other European countries, and by committing itself more actively to nuclear disarmament.

France’s options are therefore limited. Franco-British co-operation today seems to be the first stone to be laid for this future system of dissuasion. It constitutes an indispensable first step towards the construction of a nuclear section for a European defence system.

This co-operation was revived in Autumn 1992 by Pierre Joxe and Malcolm Rifkind. It resulted in the setting up of a commission on nuclear policy and doctrine which consists of a small number of top officials from the ministries of defence and foreign affairs. François Mitterrand and John Major decided to make it a permanent commission.

The work of the mixed commission has shown that, contrary to expectations, the doctrines of the two countries are very similar. However, we are not yet at the stage of sharing oceans or jointly targeting objectives.

During the Franco-British summit of 29 and 30 October 1995, the joint declaration stipulated that there were many points of common interest between the two countries on nuclear doctrine. John Major and Jacques Chirac indicated that they did not see any possible circumstances under which the vital interests of France could be threatened without those of Britain also being affected. It was the first time such a public show of solidarity had been made. It was also the first time that France agreed to broaden the territorial reach of its vital interests.

The justification for a nuclear deterrent is strongly contested in Europe. Options are therefore extremely limited. Jacques Chirac seemed implicitly to accept this on 22 February 1996 by specifying that, for this matter, France’s partners were not the fifteen EU members, but that "[…] essentially the Germans, the English and the Spanish are those closest to us…This is already provides an incredibly complex basis for discussion". The ambitions for summer 1995 were cut back considerably.

The major problem is timing. For Hubert Védrine, "it is certainly not with a nuclear deterrent that we will make any progress towards a European defence system […]. François Mitterrand could not believe that by opening up something that, by nature, cannot be shared, he would create a European defence policy".

However, on 14 January 1995, in his foreign policy speech as candidate for the presidential elections, Lionel Jospin declared that nuclear strength is "Now, by necessity, a national matter, it will one day serve a Europe whose defence-related identity will be confirmed".

A European deterrent must be the structure’s keystone; constituting both the essential component that will support the European defence system, and that which will be the last to be fitted into the structure. Just as there will be no European defence system without a political Europe, nor will there be a European deterrent without a European defence system. All attempts to invert the priorities are doomed to fail and could prove to be highly counter-productive, for both European construction and a nuclear deterrent.

Does the strategic revolution of 1989 invalidate the French nuclear concept or render it unsuitable or outmoded? If a majority emerges in favour of preserving nuclear strength, to which doctrine should it be associated? And is it necessary to write such a doctrine and make it public, or would it be better to stay vague?

For Jacques Chirac, it is no longer a matter of making the entire military system dependent on the nuclear deterrent as during the cold war. However, the nuclear deterrent still constitutes "the ultimate assurance of our security and the guarantee of our independence". The President also reaffirmed that "the nuclear strategy of France will remain dissuasive, and thus defensive, precluding all idea of war". On 23 February 1996, Jacques Chirac declared before the army officers that "A nuclear deterrent remains a prime necessity (…) but the savings made in this particular sector of defence, will contribute to financing the adaptation of our conventional forces". According to him, advantage should be taken of the respite offered by the strategic situation, to rethink our nuclear stand. However, the President does not give more specific details on the concept of dissuasion.

Should the new concept of dissuasion be described in detail, or should it be kept rather vague? For the moment, the leaders seem to prefer the second option, a policy based on the principle that there is no need or rush to clearly formulate a new concept.

The White Paper of 1994 did, however, outline part of the doctrine.

Chapter IV, covering defence strategy starts thus: "France does not currently have any specified adversaries. Its strategy remains essentially defensive. The refusal to resort to conventional and nuclear war upon which the dissuasion doctrine is based will continue to be its inspiration".

According to this document, possession of an independent nuclear arsenal "will remain an essential means for France to maintain the degree of freedom it requires to defend its interests. However, it is specified that strategic autonomy "will no longer be based solely upon a nuclear deterrent, as the role of these weapons is becoming less central" due to fewer threats and less need to carry out new missions abroad.

The White Paper reaffirms the traditional principle of dissuasion which is based "on the assumption that any adversary would consider the risks it would be running in attacking our country to be unacceptable, and to far outweigh any possible gain" and rejects the theories which were in vogue between 1992 and 1994 of nuclear weapons for combat, specifying that "French nuclear strategy is a strategy of dissuasion, and no confusion can be made between dissuasion and use".

When looking more closely at the "concept of dissuasion", the following passage can be read: "The French concept of dissuasion will continue to be defined as the will and ability to intimidate an adversary to such an extent that they are deterred from threatening our vital interests, regardless of who they are, what levels of damage they are prepared to suffer and what they stand to gain". It refers specifically to the White Paper of 1972 which states that it is necessary to "render the idea of recourse to all-out war inconceivable as a political option".

"Our dissuasion system must be reserved for protecting our vital interests, whatever the origin and form of the threat. There is no need to give too specific a definition of these interests, which are subject to the freedom of interpretation of the most senior state officials. Nonetheless, in essence, they are free exercise of our sovereignty and the integrity of our national territory, its dependencies, its air space and surrounding waters".

Let us take another look at the different elements which make up French nuclear doctrine, to see whether they have withstood the test of time, or whether they need to be modified or reformulated. The principle of minimal dissuasion is not only still viable, but is now called for and/or applied by all nuclear powers. Furthermore, it is the principle which can best stand up to the current anti-nuclear wave which is breaking. In France’s case, it could be said that, dictated at the beginning by budgetary demands, it is now — as is the case in other nuclear countries — subject to political and diplomatic restrictions. Today, more than ever, "trop de nucléaire tue le nucléaire", meaning that to go overboard on the nuclear scene would kill it altogether.

Not only has the multi-lateral nature not aged one bit, but it is indeed all the more pertinent today than when the formula was established, because since then, as highlighted by all the political and military leaders, the Soviet threat has disappeared and crises will come in many different forms and from all different directions.

Should we, therefore, abandon the dissuasion of the weak to the strong strategy? It should be specified immediately that to abandon it would not mean ipso facto adopting a strategy involving surgical strike ability. However, this qualification of dissuading of the weak to the strong dates historically from a dissuasion-based relationship between France and the USSR. However, although it is true that the Soviet threat as we had known it since 1947, has disappeared, Russia still possesses a nuclear arsenal of a vastly superior size to that of the French arsenal. Furthermore, the most extreme uncertainty continues to reign over its political future. In any case, however it may evolve politically, one fact will continue to cause instability: the weight of Russia is unequalled by any other European country. France therefore, will still be in an unbalanced relationship with Russia for a while to come.

It will be in the same position in the future with regard to China whose capacity is increasing, whose ambitions are clear and who likes to impose its views on other countries. Everyone accepts that China is the rising power and that it is currently supplementing an unequalled demographic weight and impressive territorial base with an economic wealth which will enable it to soon have one of the largest GNPs in the world. As it gains in wealth, it is also modernising its army. It does not demonstrate, as yet, any feel for dialogue with other countries, or an ability to take their point of view into account, in other words it lacks a sense of respect for others, if the others do not happen to agree with China. It would therefore be particularly irresponsible of any government to disregard the prospect of a Chinese threat in the long term. In actual fact, it is imperative that it be taken into account. And the relationship between France, and even Europe, and China will very probably, in 20 or 30 years time, be another weak to strong relationship. It would therefore be prudent to ensure that we are in a position, not to defend ourselves against China, but to be able to avoid any form of diktat or blackmail instigated by it. Indeed, there is an initial contradiction between a multi-lateral strategy — i.e. directed against all potential threats — and a weak vs. strong strategy which, as far as France was concerned, was not targeted at Russia alone. At the same time, since the nuclear factor is a great equaliser, it can be a major cause of this weak to the strong relationship because it could be thought that to deter a weaker country, nuclear weapons are not all that useful, working on the principle that you do not use a jackhammer to crack nuts.

The anti-city strategy gives rise to an even more delicate problem. Bearing in mind that it was in view of the threat of a nuclear strike on Soviet towns and the leader in Moscow, that France managed to dissuade the USSR from attacking it.

The anti-city strategy easily focuses anti-nuclear protest. It symbolises the massacre of innocent civilians, as the commemoration of Hiroshima highlighted. The rational counter-arguments to this (that strikes on armed forces are worse because they involve the idea of nuclear combat, not just dissuasion; the threat of anti-city strikes, due to their atrocity, prevents the conflict from actually breaking out; the aim is not to exterminate towns — which, by the way, would only aim at deceiving any aggressor — but to avoid entering into war by brandishing the threat) are difficult to sell.

It would therefore be appropriate to retain an anti-city strategy, but it has become difficult to say so publicly. Not because it is immoral (it is war that is immoral, not dissuasion) but because it is considered to be so by world public opinion, and the wave is too strong to be able to face it head-on. So it would seem preferable to maintain a more generalised description of what the nuclear deterrent consists of, i.e. give fewer details so as not to lay ourselves open to criticism.

France must therefore both continue to maintain a clear policy of dissuasion, without giving details on the form or terms and conditions which it will embody. This goes against tradition, the French like to have things in black and white, and France is a country whose law is based on written codes rather than precedence. The rejection of the nuclear industry throughout the world means it must adopt a discrete attitude as protection. This does not mean giving up all forms of doctrine — which is often the way of eliminating all principles regarding nuclear weapons, so they can be used at whim. It is now necessary to put forward clear principles (the nuclear deterrent protects the national territory and vital interests against a major attack) without going into the details which may provide food for criticism. The British have taken a step in France’s direction — by publicly giving a general outline of their doctrine — France should take a step in Britain’s direction by not adopting too detailed a "written constitution" for its nuclear strategy.

It is the political effectiveness of the nuclear deterrent which should be given the spotlight, rather than its military effectiveness. In the new political environment the two cancel each other out. This is why the decision to start up nuclear testing again was counterproductive to the interests of the French dissuasion policy. Certainly these tests provided technical information. But the technical advantages were clearly outweighed by the anti-nuclear protest which broke out in response to the tests.

Should an ultimate warning be retained? We know that tactical or "prestrategic" nuclear weapons have always been a grey area in French strategy, some seeing them as weapons for a possible counter attack, the extent of which could be carefully controlled.

The temptation to make weapons not related to strategic weapons out of them has not completely disappeared. Jacques Baumel, who still backs the revision of the nuclear concept to adopt a specific stand with regard to the countries of the south writes "As for tactical and strategic nuclear weapons theoretically designed to deliver an ultimate warning, they would appear to be indispensable for deterring the second-order powers who might be tempted to resort to blackmail on the basis of the ballistic weapons in their possession, or for responding to future risks of nuclear terrorism from criminal organisations".

Strategic weapons would deter the USSR and "prestrategic" weapons would specifically deter the countries of the south. However, it is clear that this is leaning towards a strategy of the strong to the weak, with limited nuclear strikes on the countries of the south.

According to the White Paper on defence, "insofar as much uncertainty still surrounds the withdrawal of the threat of pressing the nuclear button, the boundaries of these vital interests must be specified, and our determination must be perfectly clear. This is the role of the ultimate warning".

In fact, what General Arnaud de Foiard wrote is still relevant: "The role of tactical nuclear armament is to give the nuclear threat (in itself absurd and even unrealistic) a plausible and rational air, that is to say make it seem credible and therefore effective as a deterrent".

It could even be said that insofar as the dissuasion policy is now more vague, the need to be in a position to "set things right" is still useful or could even be said to be more indispensable than ever.

Is it still useful for France to possess nuclear weapons? During the cold war the nuclear deterrent was inextricably linked to the Soviet threat. This threat was not felt to be a simple military threat. Possible defeat in a war would not just have been a dramatic event in itself, but would have lead to radical social and lifestyle changes. Since the fall of the iron curtain none of the emerging risks and threats is comparable in terms of stakes and power. Should nuclear weapons, which appeared with the cold war, continue to exist? Did not the Gulf war, and that of the former Yugoslavia prove that they are unsuited to the new types of conflict?

It is clear that the nuclear aspect no longer plays the lead role it did while the east and west were divided. It would nonetheless be very wrong to think that it has lost all purpose. The French leaders consider that the nuclear deterrent has never been, and could never be, conceived as a possible response to all types of military challenge. It has only one main, but essential, function: to protect French territory and vital interests. However, neither French territory nor its vital interests were called into question during the Gulf war or that in the former Yugoslavia. Therefore it was totally logical that the nuclear aspect should be left completely out of it, as it was in the Vietnam and Afghanistan wars. From this point of view, nothing changed when the Berlin wall came down. Regardless of the configuration of the nuclear relationship, the nuclear deterrent cannot credibly be used for what the military experts refer to as "external theatres". However, it plays an essential role in the defence, in the strict sense of the term, of a country. It should only be used to achieve specific objectives. Today, the military threat hanging over France is small, even non-existent. Does this mean there is no need for a defence system? No French leader could support such an incongruous idea. However, as long as there is a need to defend French territory and vital interests, a nuclear deterrent will provide absolute protection. It remains the ultima ratio of French defence.

The nuclear aspect can serve the "routine" security problems. The fundamental interests should not obscure the fact that protecting our territory is the very essence of the defence system. To affirm this is also to show that the nuclear side is purely defensive, or to go even further, purely preventive. We are not talking about winning wars. For the French leaders, the sole aim is to prevent a war breaking out against France. Yes, the Soviet threat has disappeared, but one should never reason on the basis of the type of stakes one has to protect. French territory and vital interests did not disappear with the USSR. Therefore, they must continue to be protected against any threat from any quarter. The nuclear dissuasion policy is multi-lateral, i.e. it must dissuade all countries from attacking us and, this being its sole purpose, it is also "uni-functional". Regardless of who a possible adversary of France may be, only two scenarios exist: the attack will either be large-scale, and in this case the adversary must be persuaded that a nuclear counter-attack would be justified in order to prevent it actually attacking, or it will be small-scale, and the involvement of nuclear weapons would not be justified. This reasoning was viable in the past for the USSR, and is still viable today and will continue to be so in the future for all countries which could in a position to threaten us.

Since the beginning of the nineties, France has considerably reduced its nuclear equipment.

The end of the Soviet threat, budgetary restrictions and the need to contribute to nuclear disarmament have all played a part in this.

The determining element was almost certainly budgetary restrictions, even if this is not often mentioned. It is still awkward for political leaders to admit that their actions are governed by restrictions rather than carefully-considered, voluntary choices.

The defence budget was therefore considered to be the variable which could be used to adjust the budgets of the Member States. For France, nuclear credit was used to adjust military credit.

From 1990 to 1997, the amount allotted to the nuclear domain was halved from 38.8 billion francs, to 16. As a result it was impossible to retain all the projected programmes and to renew all the components.

In the coming years, the French nuclear arsenal will be considerably modified, both quantitatively and qualitatively. The upgrading of certain components will be accompanied by a reduction in their number.

In 2002, France will have four SNLEs, three of which will belong to the new generation, compared with six at the end of the eighties, and five today.

Submarines will be equipped with two sets of M45s and one set of M4s rather than one set of M45s and three sets of M4s.

Today, the FOST has five SNLEs, four of which are operational, and two of which are permanently at sea, each has 16 M4 missiles equipped with six nuclear weapons, in all 384 nuclear weapons.

The president of France confirmed in his speech of 22 February 1996 that the SNLE-NG programme would involve four submarines rather than three as was envisaged at one time in view of budgetary concerns. Not constructing a fourth SNLE

would have saved 13 billion francs, but it would have had the serious drawback of only enabling two SNLEs to be at sea at any one time, which would have detracted from the credibility of France’s strength. The possession of four SNLEs means that three can be operational at any given time. The total estimated cost of the SNLE NG programme when it began was 88.3 billion francs for six vessels and is now estimated to be 88.4 billion francs for four. The average price per submarine is now estimated to be 12.5 billion francs compared with less than 10 billion when the programme was launched in1986.

The calendar of the SNLE-NG programme is given below: