The public interest for international questions and the trend of taking into account public opinion in the conduct of foreign relations have reinforced the place accorded to international problems in the media, and have instigated a call to experts to explain the events. This evolution is positive. If for some people scientific rigor prohibits the popularization of complex knowledge in a short time, the process of popularization can also result from the media. Nonetheless, negative effects do exist, namely the risk of lapsing into overly simplistic analysis, and the temptation to appeal to the available specialist rather than the competent one. The most important reproach, however, concerns the disinformation realized by some experts. Thus, the media has the duty to exercise vigilance concerning this issue.

In the present globalized world, conflicts are paradoxically more and more justified by anthropological, religious or ethnic considerations. In order to face these excesses, it is necessary to come back to a secular analysis of conflicts, which aims at restoring knowledge of the many and true causes of war. The demographic, geographical, economic, political, historical, ideological and cultural factors have to be taken into account. In this respect, it is important to take certain methodological precautions, especially to avoid the binary vision of the world, a vision of unique causality, and criticizing the vocabulary. Thanks to this approach, it is possible to construct a typology of conflicts, which reflects the major socio-political problems of the beginning of the 21st century.

The Codevelopment was, in the 1980s, an innovative concept that pointed out the function of diasporas in the development policies of their native country, and has now become an alibi for restrictive migratory policies. The creation of a systematic link between immigration and Codevelopment is, however, a deception, because the temporal logics are different and mobility is an asset for economic development. The true solutions lay in facilitating brief successive stays in Europe. It is necessary, moreover, to associate the countries of the South with the definition of Codevelopment, whereas the difficulties of the institution of this policy are tied to the mobilisation of the migrant's saving and to its orientation towards beneficial programs for the whole population.

The Codevelopment, which points out the implication of immigrated populations in the development of their native country, is a recent phenomenon. In the 1980s the state was interested, within the framework of negotiations between the North and the South, in the equitable redistribution of wealth but since then, immigration has become a domestic policy issue and the Codevelopment an answer associated with the reduction of immigration and development. Thus, the institutional provisions established since 1997 have fluctuated between these two directions. With the creation of the Minister of Immigration, Integration, Codevelopment and National Identity in May 2007, immigration control is privileged and has become a question of associating it with the states of origin.

For several months, the “sovereign wealth funds”, defined as state-owned funds, have troubled politicians of Western states. Unlike traditional investments, these funds are suspected of serving financial but also strategic interests, likely to threaten the economic security of the countries in which they invest. But the facts prove that the ties between the financial and political world are broader and more complex. They aren't particular to the sovereign wealth funds and could concern not simply strategic interests but rather ethical ones. In order to define not only the nature of these links but also the threats and opportunities induced by the financial sector, it is necessary to examine this new state capitalism in its globality.

Within the Security Council, the leadership entrusted to a state on an issue is essential to understand the decisions taken by the United Nations concerning the management of armed conflicts. This social function, informally acknowledged by the members of the Council, crystallizes the stakes of diplomatic influence and credibility particular to multilateral affairs. In this respect, it is impossible to disregard the role of American diplomacy in the designation of the leader's delegation. Furthermore, this diplomacy also played a large part in the construction and transformation of the leadership's role during the 90's. Hence the apparent paradox : thanks to the evolution of this role, the current American Administration, although no longer inclined to favour unilateralism, has accepted a great expansion of the United Nations peace operations, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa.

This article deals with the analysis of the role played by the parliamentary elections in the evolution of both the political Russian elite and the parliamentarians. If the first parliamentary elections in Russia (1993, 1995) have broadly played a part in the re-emergence of the political elite, the following elections (1999, 2003) have underlined the growing ascendancy of the executive authority in the forming of the Parliament. This evolution is reflected in the change in profiles of the parliamentarians. Furthermore, the pro-presidential party, Unified Russia, which dominates the Russian political scene, should likely be reinforced by the elections of December 2007. This party openly declares its ambition to control the renewal of the Russian political elite.

In order to guarantee the transition to democracy, the initiators of democratic transition in Russia wished to favour the development of an independent civil society and of a strong political pluralism. Progressive associations, distrustful concerning political engagement, saw their demands concerning power relayed by the liberal parties. Since 2000, however, the connections between these parties and civil society have been threatened by legislation restricting their cooperation. The ousting of the liberal parties of the Duma in 2003 has undermined the political relay of the independent militants. In this context, the elections of December 2007 highlight the successful weakening of the civil society and of opposition parties that has continued since its beginning in 2000.

While the Russian population is about to face critical political decisions in the next presidential elections, the relationship between the Russians and their institutions, and more precisely the Army, is being questioned. Indeed, the system of compulsory military service places the relationship between the State and the citizen at the very centre of the military issue. This relationship emphasizes the ambivalence of the Russian population towards its institutions : the youth broadly rejects military conscription and the Army fails to recruit soldiers ; but at the same time military values and practices are essentially ingrained in the identity of Russian society. This duality reveals the society's complex nature and it is at the root of both the structural deficiency of the system of defence and the inability of the government to reform the Army.

In only a few years, Russia has become the world's leading country in the number of skinheads about 50,000 individuals. The skinhead's movement, which was at first very unorganized, has become more structured in the second half of the 1990s. Its rapid growth is due to its capacity to go beyond doctrinal splits, by refocusing its actions on xenophobia and the fear of migrants. With this strong message, the skinheads have been able to develop close ties with official political parties, have responded to the social unrest of certain classes of the population, and have reinforced the broad feeling that migrants are a threat to the national and economic stability of the country. The skinhead movement is thus in the domain of a more global context, which partly explains the political and juridical complacency from which it benefits.

Since 1989, Russia has received on its soil more than 10 million migrants from various countries. If immigration was only a secondary issue in the 1990s, it has now become one of the main political, social and economical stakes. Because of the demographic decline, which is already affecting the amount of available workforce, Russia will not be able to do without immigration. Nowadays, the flows from the Community of Independent States (CIS) are the most dynamic and play a part in maintaining the link between the old centre and its peripheries. Moreover, they are at the origin of evolutions, which influence not only the relations between Russia and its “close foreigner”, but also Russian domestic policy concerning immigration.

Over the last few years, Russia has become more involved and offensive in the international arena. The use of firm rhetoric, the political power stemming from natural resources and opposition to the Western world are frequently interpreted as a return to lost power. Nevertheless, the Russian tensions reflect a helplessness and an adaptation crisis rather than a profound change in the relationship to the world. In this context, the resort to force or methods of destabilization can be analysed as a reflex remaining from the time of the USSR. Whereas Russian diplomacy is based upon principles – its vision of a multilateral world, the awareness of a specificity –, little susceptible to change, the attention accorded to new instruments (image, language) reflects a search for influence rather than for power.

Since 2005 Russia has opened a debate with the aim of reconsidering its military doctrine. The discussion underlines the evolution of Russian foreign and security policy and is, in particular, an expression of a political split with the Western world. Russia refuses American unilateralim and reproaches the geographical and functional extension of NATO. They feel uneasy about the technological advancement of Western armies and consider the Western world as a source of “civilian threats” citing for example its support for the “coloured revolutions”. Furthermore, the debate reflects internal evolutions in Russia, notably the attempt of military figures to regain the political ground lost under Vladimir Putin.

The recent tensions between Russia and the United-States concerning missile shield installations and the enlargement of NATO towards Eastern Europe have their origins in the basics of their separate foreign policies. The integrity of the territory and national security are essential for the Americans ; while Russia, without the benefit of natural boundaries, looks to protect itself by maintaining its influence in post-soviet areas and by preventing the United-States from impeding this process. Nevertheless, a new confrontation between the two countries is hardly foreseeable. In fact, to reinforce its place in the international arena Russia needs the United-States, whereas Russia is no longer a principal threat for the Americans. Moreover, global issues necessitate cooperation between the two states.

For fifteen years, Russia has negotiated its membership to the World Trade Organization (WTO). These long-term negotiations underline the difficulty faced by the Russians in proving the reality of the economic transition towards capitalism. Several factors explain the slowness of these negotiations. Beyond the long and complex membership procedure, entry into WTO requires a series of reforms. Certain sectors of activity have to be liberalized, in particular that of the energy, motor, and aeronautics industries. The reciprocity principle and the most favoured nation clause must be enforced. The issues of illegal copies and of compliance with sanitary standards are also important. Finally, some reasons independent of Russian negotiations may also impact the agenda.

The energy relation between Russia and Europe is ambiguous. The EU, of which 25 % of the gas and petrol consumed is Russian, is afraid of too large of a dependency on Russia. This situation has become troublesome since the middle of the 2000s, when the energy policy of Vladimir Putin hardened and consequently weakened European confidence in the Russians. The EU has thus been concerned with the security of its energy supply, which was traditionally left to the competence of the states. Nevertheless, the diversity of European interests hampers the elaboration of a common energy strategy. For Russia, which declares itself even more dependent on its Europeans customers, the EU's fears are largely unjustified. Russia thus intends to break away from this subordination.