This article sheds light on the post-war reconstruction phase in Iraq, with a special focus on the “triangular bargaining” linking Iraq, the United States and international organisations in their assistance to Iraq’s political transition. The author analyses the difficulties facing these different actors in building the foundations of a democratic Iraqi State. Finally, the author reflects on the root causes underlining these difficulties – mainly the persistence of insecurity and of militias – by emphasizing the lack of a common vision of a social contract in Iraq.

For a long time the death penalty has been considered to be a measure of penal “justice”, therefore answerable to the state sovereignty. International organizations, global public opinion, the Europe Council, the European Union and the international criminal justice have gradually emphasized that death penalty is a human rights violation and the issue has thus become a stake of the international relations. A majority of states have abolished the death penalty but some great powers are still enforcing it (China, United-States). In order to improve the situation, it is necessary to debate the issue with Islamic, Buddhist and Taoist communities members, and to prove that the death penalty is inefficient to struggle against crime.

This article challenges an assumption common to both proponents and most adversaries of Iran’s nuclearization : the idea that nuclear weapons act as a stabilizing force at the strategic level. It sets out a pessimistic view : the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran creates strategic instability through the risk of accident, problems of command and control, and first strike incitements. Instability is even higher in times of crisis, especially since the Islamic Republic could use it as a peculiar form of deterrence of the strong by the weak. Therefore, an efficient policy on this point cannot avoid a detailed study of Tehran’s motivations. However, the conceptual framework on this point is still deficient.

The Hugo Chávez’s political discourse clearly diverges from that of his predecessors. Inspired by the Bolivarian project and by a nationalist and socialist ideology, it proposes to put in place the 21st century socialism and a Latin American integration, of which the aim would be to eradicate neo-colonialism in Latin America. In domestic policy, H. Cha´vez wants to substitute representative democracy for participative democracy. He has reinforced his authority over the country and is considered to be the spokesman of the protest against the United States. But for the time being the discourse has not been carried out. H. Chávez has not struggled against capitalism, and uses representative democracy principles. In fact, like in the past, the state continues to pursue a policy of influence based on energetic resources.

Even if the MBDA’s commercial objective is essential, the defence industry is first and foremost a security actor, which must satisfy the French, British, Italian and German defence needs. Thus, this states control the European arms industry’ activity, especially by reducing exportations. They have also encouraged the European arms groups to join together around cooperation programs. Consequently the states hold responsibility for financial circumstances of these industries, which have to adapt to threats change and to budgetary restrictions. But now, in order to face American competition, the industries need a European strong political support and the emergence of a great European unified market.

Fifteen years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Central Asian states have realised the first step of their adaptation to the new strategic, political, economical and social situation. This Soviet united territory has been disintegrated and isolated in a reapportioning of time and space. Societies have been connected with the outside Muslim world thanks to the liberalization of the religious practise, a new porosity of borders between Tajikistan and Afghanistan, the arrival of foreign Muslims actors (from states, infrastate, non-governmental organizations), and the development of a terrorist menace. Since 2005, the second adaptation has begun with the issue of the renewal of political elites coming from the Soviet nomenklatura.

The Andijan insurrection of May 2005 is a very significant turning point in Uzbekistan’s history. It was not due to an “Islamic coup d’etat”, contrary to what the authorities pretend, but points out socials tensions throughout the country. Islam Karimov regime’s authoritarianism has led to the rupture of the tacit contract between the state and the business class, which was the only one to have taken advantage of the 1990’s trade liberalization, but which is now weakened by a harsh isolationist policy. Thus the political and social worsening and the large rejection of the Uzbek regimes’ judicial injustice by the population largely explain these events, which probably herald a destabilization’s period in Uzbekistan.

In the near future, the main pipelines linking Russian and Central Asian hydrocarbon deposits to China will cross Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. The stabilisation of this territory is thus essential for Beijing. However, dissatisfaction and separatist trends among some fringes of Uyghur society threaten Chinese control. This increase in political protest comes along with an Islamic revival in China. In order to secure Xinjiang, Beijing is pursuing harsh repression and is cutting off militants from foreign support. Economic regional development has also been promoted in order to strengthen national unity. However, this policy has failed to reduce income inequalities between Han and Uyghur people, which fuel ethnic tensions.

For most people in Central Asia, Islam represents an important aspect of their national heritage, reclaimed in 1991. The regimes nevertheless react harshly to any presence of Islam in public life. The current international discourse on “Islamic threat” and the “war on terrorism” provide them an alibi to crack down on all dissent and wipe out all opposition, even the secular one. But political Islam in Central Asia occupies a small niche, is heterogeneous and not tightly connected to transnational Islamic networks. Its basic political stakes are local, specific to the post-Soviet present of the region and underline the social deadlock, in which some Central Asian social classes feel they find themselves.

The narcotraffic, already benefiting from regional geopolitics, has expanded thanks to the borders’ opening and the evolution of post-Soviet societies towards a capitalist economy. Since 1991, the traffic, previously taking southerner routes, has been redirected to now arrive in Russia and Europe via Central Asia. Until the end of the 1990s, the region was a transit area of the global narcotraffic. Since then, the situation has changed and the five states aim also at becoming places of drug production, transformation and consummation. In a vulnerable social context, the drugs’ traffic involves important health risks and plays a politically destabilizing role (corruption, Mafia networks entangled in public administration, etc.).

The Caspian Sea hydrocarbons’ level of production was low during the Soviet era but has increased since the Soviet Union’s collapse. Landlockedness of Caspian basin induced three types of interdependencies during the 1990s : those between exporting Caspian and Western oil-imports States, between Caspian oil-exporting and transit countries, and between Caspian States’ authorities and local people. Since 2000, these various interdependencies have changed. The exporter States have increased their control over production and over foreign oil companies. Although diversification of transit routes has increased, Russia’s role remain prevalent. Finally, oilrevenues redistribution remains at stake and could heighten internal tensions within Caspian countries.

After a withdrawal during the 1990’s, Russia is becoming more influential in Central Asia, and notably by means of the migratory issue. In Russia, migrant workers from Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan are estimated to be 2 millions, who predominantly work illegally. They hold a growing economic role in Russia, on account of the lack of workers in the Federation. They have an even more important economic and social impact in Central Asia, where their remittances, sent to impoverished populations, account for a regular and significant source of income. The working migration helps lessen a part of the economic and social impact of the Soviet Union’s collapse and plays a part in the redefinition of the complicated relations between the former centre and its former periphery.

The Chinese influence in Central Asia has been constantly increasing throughout the last years. China has taken advantage of the cooling between the United-States and Central Asian regimes, due to the war in Iraq and the “Colour Revolutions”, to form closer relations with these neighbours. It has relaunched political, economic, energy and security bilateral relations with these states. It has also strengthened multilateral relationships by developing the Shanghai Cooperation Organization institutions and activities.