The adoption of the Convention on Cultural Diversity by UNESCO is quite an achievement for French diplomacy. Not only has France imposed cultural diversity, a notion which it holds dear, confronting the cultural hegemony which liberalism leads to, but it has also succeeded in uniting the overwhelming majority of the voting countries around the principle that everything cannot be subject to a commercial logic. How was this outcome reached and who were its architects? This success is the result of the combination of three factors: the invention of an innovative and federative concept, the establishment of a coalition gathering a multitude of networks and actors, and the application of a negotiation method based upon a careful management of time, location and action.

The downfall of the authoritarian regime in 1974 induced fundamental changes in the dynamics of Portuguese foreign policy. It was not simply a transition from authoritarianism to democracy, but also a major changeover from an Atlanticist orientation towards European integration. Previously neglected, the European dimension becomes a structuring vector and a guideline for Portuguese foreign policy-making. Far from being incompatible with Portugal’s interests outside Europe, this evolution increases the scope of the country’s foreign connections as well as its international weight. The analysis of the general outlines of Lisbon’s foreign policy highlights the interconnection between its European and Atlantic dimensions (United-States and former colonies) and the opportunities for the Portuguese that arise from it.

After obtaining its independence in 1991, Slovenia has become a member of the European Union (EU) and joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Henceforth, in a globalized world in which local instabilities tend to spread on a regional level, Slovenia advocates an active European policy that would enhance security, stability and prosperity in EU neighbouring countries such as Turkey, Ukraine, Moldavia, the Balkans and South Caucasus… That policy would insure a decisive access to energetic resources, and would also help consolidating states located between Europe and risk zones, such as the Middle East and Central Asia.

France is a crossroads for international investment, but has an average-sized territory; in this context, the integration of financial markets caused a considerable progression of foreign shareholding in French companies’ capital. Most of the newcomer investors are non-French residents, essentially originating from the Eurozone and the United Kingdom, who reverberate the general growth of both direct and portfolio investment. Institutional investors function in a financial logic, whereas foreign groups obey to industrial strategies. The national market is narrowing for French companies, which globalize their activities and regroup in European conglomerates, but their development is kept in check by institutional obstacles, which could be overcome if there was a convergence of European corporate models.

The French privatization policies in both industrial and financial sectors have led to a radical modification of the big companies’ ownership. They now widely belong to foreign investors. Consequently, the “shareholders” logic grows on firms, bringing about pursuit of stock market value maximization and respect of the principles of governance, in order to insure the investors’ control over corporate executives. In this context the possibility of taking measures against takeover bids is very weak for a government. The most effective means of pushing economic and financial actors into respecting national imperatives, especially in terms of employment, are to limit the international capital circulation and to reinforce the workers’ influence in companies.

It can be hazardous to promote free and flawless competition in certain strategic markets. State intervention is legitimate in these sectors; it is practised by most nations, whether they are liberal or not. And yet, French and European capitalism suffers from a lack of global vision and “economic patriotism” in favour of strategic companies. By excessively stressing the application of the free competition theory, the European Union has handicapped itself in the race with other industrialized countries, which all implement interventionist policies and support their companies by all means in the bid for strategic markets.

As transnational companies keep on intensifying their foreign activities, determining their nationality becomes more difficult. Most of the possible criteria (origin, production sites, applicable jurisdiction, shareholders’ or managers’ nationalities,…) eventually turn out to be inadequate or obsolete. This evolution limits the scope of governmental interventions. Some states put forward the preservation of national security to justify their actions in favour of national companies, and advocate a reinforcement of national shareholding within these firms. However, the shareholders’ motivations remain purely monetary and will never be patriotic. The ascendancy of finance implies a necessary elaboration of attractiveness policies, and leads to examine the interferences between financial globalization and companies’ localization.

The globalization process invites us to reconsider the relation between companies and territory. It becomes a central issue to determine whether the European dimension is relevant in corporate decisionmaking. This article offers an assessment of the three most controversial dimensions of the European Union’s action towards companies: its industrial, competition and innovation policies. The inexistence of communitary actions turns out to be less problematic than the absence of an institutional framework that would provide legitimacy, coherence and foreseeability to companies. Finding common ground between companies and European public policies becomes urgent, and requires a determined political implication in order to specify what a “European company” is.

The creation of a Societas Europaea (SE) status could offer a solution to the “economic nationalism” crisis in Europe. This status was introduced in 2004, but it has only been adopted by one company yet. This first European company, Allianz Societas Europea, was born after completion of the merger between Allianz and RAS. The SE label aims to reduce the incompatibilities of national legal frames with the evolution of companies in a globalized economy. It simplifies the organization of conglomerates by allowing a centralization of decisionmaking in a European parent group or holding company. This legal structure took a long time to become effective, because it was perceived by employees as a challenge to existing social rights in national legal systems. It is still often considered a way of favouring companies to the detriment of workers.