On May 1st, 2004, the European Union (EU) will experience an additional enlargement. Ten countries will join the EU, almost doubling the number of its member states, from fifteen to twenty-five. As a general rule, an international organization that welcomes new members gains more importance in international affairs, thanks to the additional support. Will this be the case for the EU ? Will the significant increase in the number of countries allow the European voice to be better heard on the international scene? It is obvious that the new Europe’s size, cumulative gross national product (GNP), and constituents will increase. However, it is less certain that the construction of a powerful Europe and the development of an autonomous European strategy will progress as well.

  José Maria Aznar’s decision to support the Bush administration’s choice of war, demonstrated the former’s new priorities in terms of foreign policy, i.e. the consolidation and the diversification of its relations with the United States. Spain’s Atlantic stance was materialised with the absolute majority victory of the People’s party (PP) in the 2000 elections. This event ruptured the fundamental triangle of Spain’s foreign policy, traditionally centred on Europe, Latin America and the Mediterranean. However, the re-emergence of a « Spanish affirmation », echoing the triumphalist debates prior to the democratic transition, was detrimental to Spain’s relations with France and Germany, and damaging to relations with Morocco as well as with Latin-American countries. Considered in this context, the defeat of the PP in the elections held on March 14th, 2004, following the terrorist attacks in Madrid, has sanctioned the government as well as its specific foreign policy.

  In the beginning of the 21st century, mankind has been lured into the dangerous spiral of capitalist globalization and the increasingly liberal policies the former brings forth. It is not overly pessimistic to denounce an economic system in slavery to the relentless and greedy pursuit of profits, which can only worsen social and ecological disparities. Thus, it is imperative to reflect on an alternative development, given that the anti-globalization movement encompasses varying opinions about this issue. This diversity enriches the movement, but calls out for a clarification of the concepts and especially the main objectives which could consolidate converging opinions.

  The addition of seven new states to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is one of the political and military consequences of the collapse of the Soviet Union. It also takes place in the context of an open crisis within the Atlantic Alliance following the application of the new American security doctrine, based on unilateralism and preemption. The world-wide transformations that took place during these last fifteen years have transformed NATO, giving it the authority to intervene worldwide, concerning issues more or less linked to security, to the detriment of the construction of a European Defense. Therefore, France must put a lot of effort into this European project without neglecting the new members of Europe, leaving aside rebukes and unilateralism in the management of European common affairs.

  Since October 2003, Russia has become the main oil-producing country in the world. The Ioukos affair took place the same month, which ended up with the resounding incarceration of Mikhaïl Khodorkovsky. These two events, though not directly linked, show how important energy is in Vladimir Putin’s Russia. The energy sector, the main impetus of growth, is the object of bitter power struggles between the government and economic actors, primarily oil companies. Moreover, energy constitutes a central element of V. Putin’s foreign policy. Moscow uses this influential factor with regard to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CCEE) and its relations with the West or Asia, in order to restore its extremely weakened international positions since the USSR’s collapse.

  The will to « construct a multipolar world » in order to prevent « political chaos », reiterated in the French foreign policy discourse, is wishful thinking. Indeed, France, in its conception of world order, considers the multipolar system as a world characterised by the existence of several poles of stability, and embeds its diplomacy in the realist theoretical perspective and the practice of Realpolitik, which both consider order synonymous with a stable system. In this regard, the realist consensus concerning the descriptive dimension of the concept – what is world order? – does not erase the divisions linked to the prescriptive dimensions of the concept – how to obtain and maintain world order? However, the analysis of the realist postulates shows that the thesis of world order conceived as the hierarchy of powers matches the facts and the realist postulates better than world order viewed as a balance of power.

  The expressions « world order » and « global order » are often mentioned indistinguishably by authors who do not justify the choice of the qualifier. For some of them, their « realist » or, at the contrary, « world-wide » perception is so obvious that the explanation is implicit. In English, the choice between « world » and « global » raises an additional problem or, at least, brings about another debate, i.e. the distinction, in French, between « mondialisation » and « globalisation », regarding the scope of the phenomenon and particularly its regulation. Indeed, to what extent does the end of bipolarity and the rise of globalization (« mondialisation » or « globalisation ») affect the Westphalian international order ?

  From the French Revolution, through the Bolshevik Revolution and Nazi Germany, to Islamic Iran, there are numerous examples of events that have durably shaken, and even transformed the world order, well beyond a simple modification of the balance of power configuration or a change in the hierarchy of powers. What impact did these revolutions have on world order? And, conversely, how did the world order influence these revolutionary states? The aim of this article is to try to understand the dynamics of the dialectic between the contesting and socialisation of world order.

  Among the numerous threats that jeopardize world order, China’s rise inspires the greatest number of American experts in International Relations (IR). However, the perception of the « Chinese threat » by the majority of IR specialists remains essentially a discursive construction emanating from realist and neo-realist theorists at the end of the Cold War. Therefore, China has been regarded as a distrustful power for several years, because the theories that engender such a vision tend to preserve and analyze the international statu quo. Today, the « Chinese threat » presented as an inevitable menace by realist and neo-realist theorists, constitutes, for the majority of authors, a basic reality.

  The world order can take numerous forms, such as the order of security communities, which is today at the heart of an important programme of constructivist research. In this regard, few observers contest the existence of a solid security community between the United States and Europe: the Atlantic Security Community (ASC). The main feature of this ASC resides more in the inevitably peaceful resolution of the conflicts between its members than the absence of conflict. Indeed, several examples show that security communities constitute vehicles for order, at both regional and international levels.

  Ten years after its independence, Moldova has become the poorest country in Europe and has been all but abandoned to its fate. Today, the country has to undergo four dependencies: Moldova depends on Russia’s energy resources and the political goodwill of Moscow, the tense relations with Bucharest, the conditions for supplying credit and assistance from Western Europe, and finally, the deadlock in negotiations with the separatist regime of Tiraspol. The necessary impetus for the resolution of the conflict in Transnistria, the consolidation of a Moldovan sovereign state and the transformation of Moldova into a democratic and market-based economy, will have to be largely initiated by the EU.

  Moldova is a weak post-soviet state. Its legitimacy is contested from inside as well as outside its borders. If the objectives entailed by the establishment of the rule of law and a market-based economy are still far from being achieved, Moldova’s future remains uncertain, undermined by ethnic and cultural conflicts. The country’s decline constitutes a threat at a regional level. Indeed, since its independence, political life in Moldova is characterised by troubled relations between political elites and the groups which the former claim to represent, as well as between the nations and their builders. Torn between the desire of reunification with Romania and separatism of Transnistria, Moldova’s aim was to build a viable state, even though its territorial problems have not yet been solved. Therefore, the construction of a « Moldovan » citizen identity still remains in utero ten years after its independence.