Internal security is not quite easy to define. It relates at the same time back to the interpenetration of internal and foreign security, the definition of the new safety zone of the European Union (EU), and to the construction of the concept through political discourses, bureaucratic conflicts, and all what is left unsaid by European police cooperation. Beyond the dryness of laws, the aim of this article is to offer an outline of the implicits and the practices in terms of internal security in Europe. Furthermore, we will try to bring out the new challenges, particularly in terms of borders control and surveillance, forces structure and of the link between coercion and justice in order to draft an alternative based on what needs to be protected more than on what needs to be cracked down on.

  The concept of national security is essentially characterized by the malleability of its content, which is reflected by contrasting definitions that structure this area of studies. This article will try to point out the conceptual uncertainty which underlies our methodological problems. It includes the semantic questionability which is at the heart of its project, defines the scope of the concept of national security and states its conditions. Gathered, these considerations allow, through an analytical method, to reconcile the following triad : ontology - what is national security made of -, epistemology - how do we study it -, and politics - which are the variables that affect its implementation.

  We have to admit that Islam's transnationalization often draws attention from a security angle fed by radical Islam " de-territorialization ". And yet the Islamic connection from the particular to the global is surely not only linked to the shady interplay of Islamic networks. This can be explained by the fact that Islam's globalization has gone with its expansion all the way through the 20th century, and because Umma, the community of the believers, is transnational by definition. The transnationalization of Islam (here limited to Sub-Saharan Africa) takes different ways and combines individual and mass strategies. It is not only a matter of institutions, political and commercial networks, or " material civilization ", but also a matter of culture and symbols, because globalization is also being built and deconstructed in the imaginations.

  The question of the integration of Islam is part of the political agenda in many European countries. Although France has undertaken a reflection on this issue ten years ago and Germany has only started to do it recently, the two European neighbors are both committed in the process of the political recognition of this new religious component of their population, which comes mainly from immigration. Thus, a common process can be observed in the emergence of the Islam issue from a local to a national public issue. But in both cases, this shifting involves that Islam and its handling by public actors comply with national standards, and its modus operandi make different national political styles reappear.

  France's ability to display a strategy for its international influence is waning. First, we will study the evolutions of the concept of " influence " on the international arena, which underlie the weakness of the work done by the chancelleries. Then, this article dissects the fruitless tropisms which characterize the French political and administrative circles. The flaws of our strategy are firstly intellectual. Those flaws explain why we produce so few concepts, they also explain the gap between the intellectual and administrative circles and our inability to set up a "community of influence". The development of a doctrine is prior to any strategy of international influence. Therefore France will need to go past the circle of its administration. This effort of conversion to strategic thinking also requires other practices and new institutions at the head of the state.

  Think tanks are powerful institutions that efficiently participate to the development of concepts, doctrines, strategies, and policies in many fields. They characterize the American society and reflect an essentially Anglo-Saxon and a good democratic governance culture. One of the main lessons which is the thread of this article is the consistency between the expressed or felt needs, the means used to satisfied them, the human resources committed, and the results obtained. Today, at a time when many questions arise about the new directions of American foreign and security policy, it may be useful to determine its origins. Indeed, that is where most answers lie.

  Within the framework of a personalized studying period, the "Personalities of the Future" program of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs aims not only to transfer skills to its participants, but to modify their perception of France's image, to make their opinion evolve, and to allow them to comprehend what is at stake in the French position. Situated in Germany, the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies was created in order to allow present and future elites of the Euro-Atlantic zone and the Euro-Asian zone to acquire the Western standards and strategic concepts by mutual incitation, organizing meetings within the framework of different seminars. Wilton Park, with almost fifty conferences organized each year, gathers personalities from diverse nationalities and people from extremely different backgrounds, such as business, the media, research, academic centers and, particularly coming from the political scene.

  Although European Union's (EU) position concerning China's uniqueness has not been altered, since the end of the 1990's the perception of Taiwan's issue by the European authorities has evolved in a favorable way for Taipei's arguments. This evolution is the consequence of Taiwan's successful influence strategy, but it is also the result of Taiwanese political system's democratization. This democratization has enabled a greater flexibility in Taiwan's foreign policy and promoted a process of convergence based on a community of values. In this context, the European Parliament has become the main target of an influence strategy which reinforces in return the democratic legitimacy.

  The aim of Turkey's influence policy towards the member countries of the European Union (EU) consists in convincing them of its "European vocation". Turkey puts forward multiple arguments that different actors are expected to convey. Nevertheless, these actors are not always, or not entirely, controlled by the Turkish government. Diplomats are often the most active in this sense, and the Turkish government watches carefully over their training and supervision. The influential military branch has also its contacts and relays in Europe. However, one of the most influential groups is without a doubt the business circle. On the other hand, diasporas and other more personal, private or semi-private circles have contradictory policies and influences. Yet, this categorization is bound to be limited as these different actors, even if they certainly cross and drive along each other, build up an informal and vague network.

  During a certain period of time, economic intelligence filled the governmental sphere. This method, invented by the Japanese, associating public and private ways and means and which has proved to be effective as a result of the American experience, collides with a French culture way too characterized by a common practice of withholding of information and corporatism. Bernard Carayon’s recent report (2003), nine years after the well-known Martre’s report, certifies this French backwardness in spite of ambitious private and public initiatives. The new inter-ministerial and inter-sectorial dimension of new security, terrorist or sanitary risks does not seem to alter French habits fundamentally.